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FOREWORD
The International Law Studies "Blue Book" series was initiated by the Naval
War College in 1901 to publish essays, treatises and articles that contribute to the
broader understanding of international law. This, the seventy-fourth volume of
the series, publishes The Tanker War 1980-88: Law and Policy, written by George
K. Walker, Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. Professor
Walker has served as the Charles H. Stockton Professor ofInternational Law at the
Naval War College (1992-93) and is a retired Captain in the U.S. Naval Reserve.
This volume provides an in-depth analysis of the legal issues surrounding the
"Tanker War" between Iran and Iraq, with a focus on law of the sea, the law of
armed conflict, the UN Charter, and environmental issues. In addition to discuss-
ing the legal aspects of the conflict, there is a summary of the factual record of the
Tanker War and a general prologue of the history of the Arabian Gulf. Professor
Walker's work is a significant contribution to the literature on this subject. His
meticulous and thorough research ensures it will be a standard reference for its
study. While the positions and opinions expressed in this volume are those of the
author and are not necessarily those of the United States Navy or the Naval War
College, the work provides valuable insights into international law developments
experienced in the Iran-Iraq War.
The Tanker War was brought to publication with the assistance ofthe Naval War
College's Oceans Law and Policy Department. Professor Emeritus Jack Grunawalt
provided invaluable service by volunteering his time as editor. On behalf of the
Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, I extend to Professor
Walker and the others who participated in the development of this publication my
gratitude and thanks.
aSc. CEBROWSKI
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

PREFACE
The Tanker War 1980-88: Law and Policy, written by George K. Walker, Profes-
sor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law, is the culmination of a process
that began over ten years ago. Professor Walker conducted research and wrote the
book while maintaining a schedule as a full-time law professor, in addition to his
many other personal and professional obligations. He brings an extensive interna-
tional law background to this subject. Besides his teaching responsibilities in the
field ofinternational law and admiralty at Wake Forest, he served as the Charles H.
Stockton Professor of International Law at the Naval War College during the
1992-93 academic year. He also was a participant in the development of the San
Remo Manual, a contemporary restatement ofthe law applicable to armed conflicts
at sea. The Oceans Law and Policy Department of the Center for Naval Warfare
Studies, Naval War College is indebted to Professor Walker for the superb scholar-
ship exhibited in this volume.
The International Law Studies "Blue Book" series is published by the Naval
War College and distributed throughout the world to academic institutions, li-
braries, and both U.S. and foreign military commands. The Tanker War will greatly
enhance the series by presenting an insightful work on a topic previously not fully
addressed.
Thank you again to Professor Walker and the others who assisted in the devel-
opment and publication of this volume. We also extend our sincere thank you to
Dr. Alberto Coll, the Dean ofthe Center for Naval Warfare Studies, for his support
of the "Blue Book" series.
Dennis Mandsager
Professor of Law
Chairman, Oceans Law
and Policy Department

Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
This book has taken better than a decade to research and write. Soon after the
Iran-Iraq conflict began in 1980, I began to study the war. That conflict
ended in 1988, and it was succeeded by the Gulf War, whose active hostilities be-
gan in August 1990 and ended in early 1991, although final resolution of that war,
like the 1980-88 conflict, may be decades in coming.
Factual accounts ofthe Iran-Iraq war, and its maritime component, the Tanker
War, were scattered among many sources. Unlike wars in which the United States
or other States that are open societies are belligerents, access to primary accounts
from either Iran or Iraq were difficult to find. The large number of partici-
pants—ranging from the UN Security Council and Secretary-General through
multinational organizations to individual countries and nongovernmental orga-
nizations, whose pronouncements, although critical, were often difficult to
find—also made building a solid factual foundation difficult. It was only with pub-
lication of The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the Law ofNaval Warfare and The
Tanker Wars that I could be sure that a relatively complete factual record could be
consulted. Media reports and summaries appeared soon after events, but these
books and the first round of analysis required a cross-check for accuracy and com-
pleteness.
The law itselfwas also in transition. Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
was signed in 1977, and today it is virtually universally applicable as treaty law, al-
n
though the United States has not ratified it. In 1980 the Conventional Weapons
Convention and its Protocols were signed, and today have many States as parties,
including the United States for all but one of its Protocols. These treaties for the
i 9 » •
most part do not apply to war at sea, but they restate principles
—
e.g., discrimina-
tion, proportionality, necessity—applying to all warfare. In 1982 the UN Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (LOS) was signed, and today it is moving toward
universal acceptance, with an amending protocol, to replace the 1958 LOS Con-
ventions; thus far the United States has not ratified it. However, many countries,
including the United States, accept the LOS Convention navigational articles as
restatements of customary law.
Important secondary sources also matured during the war and are now gener-
ally available. In 1987 the Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations was published, and
it may have influence like its predecessor Restatement (Second). In 1987 Naval
Warfare Publication (NWP) 9 was also published; it was the first complete revi-
sion ofthe US Navy's law ofwar manual since NWIP 10-2, first published in 1955.
Capping nearly a decade ofconferences, the San Remo Manual, the first of its kind
2 The Tanker War
since the 7973 Oxford Manual on the law of naval warfare, was published in 1995.
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Besides these sources, the new treaties generated commentaries comparable to
1
8
Pictet's respected series on the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
It is therefore hoped that a combination of a more complete factual record and,
at least for the time being, a more stable format of international law will make this
book useful for general and academic readers.
I began research on the war in 1980, continued it through a semester of aca-
demic leave and as I could while carrying a full academic schedule at Wake Forest
University and coping with post-Vietnam War tumult in academia, which had rip-
ple effects for a decade. I completed most of the basic research and writing during
and after service as Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law at the Na-
val War College, Newport, R.I., truly an outstanding experience, for which I re-
main grateful.
Chapter II B summarizes the factual record of the Tanker War; a general pro-
logue of the history of the Persian Gulfprecedes it in Chapter II A. Chapter III ap-
plies the law of the UN Charter to the conflict; a short summary of other factors
that may govern during war, e.g., the impact of armed conflict on treaties, is in
Chapter III D. Chapter IV focuses on LOS issues that applied during the war, e.g.,
straits passage. Chapter V examines law of armed conflict (LOAC) issues in the
Tanker War. Chapter VI explores issues affecting the Persian Gulf environment
during the war. A general summary and conclusion follows in Chapter VII.
Parts of this book have appeared in other publications. In some cases the prior
text has been published, and in most situations references are given to prior publi-
cations.
Part A. Acknowledgments
There are many who have helped with the thinking, research and writing oiThe
Tanker War 1 980-88: Law and Policy. John Donne rightly wrote that no one is an is-
21
land, and this applies to this book's preparation.
My first and greatest debt is owed my wife, Phyllis, and our children, Charles
and Mary Neel, who endured many times when I was engrossed in thinking, re-
search and writing during graduate study and absences at libraries, carrels, offices
and elsewhere. Part of the personal experience for preparing The Tanker War was
duty with the US Navy, with which I was privileged to serve with Atlantic Fleet de-
stroyer forces (1959-62) and in the Naval Reserve (1957-59, 1962-89). From 1966
until retirement in 1 989, my family supported absences for Naval Reserve duty as a
line officer that took me away at least two weeks a year and more weekends and
other times than they or I would like to remember.
My father, J. Henry Walker, never saw active military service. He held an Army
commission for a time after World War I and before World War II. He was too
young for the First World War and too senior for the Second World War. In the
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family tradition, he was active in Civil Defense during World War II and taught
physics to Army Air Force cadets while teaching premedical studies at the Univer-
sity ofAlabama. He had been prevailed upon by the President ofthe University to
stay on and teach future doctors for that war. He encouraged my brother, Lieuten-
ant Commander Rufus H. Walker, USNR, and me to seek naval commissions and
was never more proud of his sons than when my brother chose a naval career and I
remained in the active reserves through the Cold War. I remain grateful for his in-
22
sights that grew more meaningful as I matured and for his supporting my deci-
sion to enter academic life. Cancer claimed my brother in mid-career, but his sea
service stories added to thoughts for this book.
At the University of Alabama several great teachers quickened my interest in
the larger world, its history, politics and diplomacy, and unconsciously directed
me toward an eventual career in the law. These included John F. Ramsey, one of
the truly great teachers and mentors for many at the University and for whom an
annual student award is given to this day; Captain Hubert E. Mate, USNR, profes-
sor and College ofArts and Sciences assistant dean, an academic and Navy mentor;
Commander John S. Pancake, USNR, professor ofhistory and another Navy men-
torwho introduced me to diplomatic history; and Walter H. Bennett, a demanding
member ofthe political science department, who immersed me in political theory.
At Duke University Harold T. Parker, who with William Newton supervised
my history master's thesis on the Franklin Roosevelt - Winston Churchill corre-
spondence, 1939-41, taught me how history moves and insisted on the highest aca-
demic standards in researching the thesis. Many years later, another Duke faculty
member encouraged my study ofthe law ofnaval warfare. Rear Admiral Horace B.
Robertson, Judge Advocate General's Corps, USN and Judge Advocate General of
the Navy, later a Duke law faculty member and vice dean, has my special thanks.
From my Vanderbilt University law school experience, I remember the excel-
lent grounding that Professor and Dean John W. Wade gave me. My teacher and
now colleague and friend Harold G. Maier encouraged my study of international
law there and has supported my academic career since then. I also mention
Vanderbilt's great teacher of conflict of laws, Elliott E. Cheatham, who knew my
grandfather when he practiced law in Georgia and my grandfather was a superin-
tendent of schools. He opened my eyes to thinking factorially in ways reflected in
this book, particularly Chapter VI.
Service as US District Court law clerk to John D. Butzner, Jr., now Senior US
Circuit Judge for the US Court ofAppeals for the Fourth Circuit, and as a trial law-
yer with what is today the law firm ofHunton & Williams in Richmond, Virginia,
was probably the best postgraduate education I could have asked for. George C.
Freeman, Jr., who had active naval service on U.S.S. Wasp; Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
who saw distinguished World War II service and was later an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States; H. Merrill Pasco, General of the Army
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George C. Marshall's aide; Lewis T. Booker, later promoted Brigadier; and Robert
F. Brooks, were among the outstanding lawyers with and for whom I worked. With
23
that kind of leadership by example, excellence was the expected norm.
A decision and commitment to legal education led me to the University of Vir-
ginia School of Law, and I am grateful for the wonderful intellectual growth expe-
rience the Master of Laws program gave me. I express thanks to great teachers and
research supervisors, all ofwhom became good friends and colleagues: A.E. Dick
Howard, White Burkett Professor of Law and Public Affairs; Richard B. Lillich,
late Howard W. Smith Professor and a Stockton Professor of International Law at
the Naval War College; and John Norton Moore, director ofthe graduate program
and Walter L. Brown Professor. The Virginia law library supported my masters in
law and later research, and I remain grateful to the late Frances Farmer and her
staff for support they gave.
At the Yale Law School while on sabbatical I came to know W. Michael
Reisman. Michael, then Wesley N. Hohfeld Professor ofJurisprudence, and today
Myres S. McDougal Professor of International Law, has supported my work
through the years. I also remain grateful for the comments and support ofMyres S.
McDougal, Sterling Professor of Law Emeritus, and for a particular insight that
Eugene F. Rostow, Emeritus Dean and Sterling Professor of Law, gave me. My un-
cle, Rufus C. Harris, later a law dean and university president, always reflected the
broad base ofJ.S.D. work he did at Yale after returning as a wounded World War I
veteran, and his experience and example were reasons I wanted to research there.
Lastly, I remain grateful for the facilities of the Yale Law and Sterling Libraries
and their support.
To recount names of those within the sea services who influenced my thinking
during 32 years of enlisted and commissioned service would fill a volume. Often I
learned great truths from, or was inspired by, those with whom I served, who led
me, or whom I was privileged to lead. Two must be mentioned. Captain J. Ashley
Roach, Judge Advocate General's Corps, US Navy (Ret.), and I met just after my
time at Yale. He suggested the developing Middle East situation would be interest-
ing research, and so it was. During my 1992-93 appointment as Charles H.
Stockton Professor of International Law at the Naval War College, I gained Rich-
ard J. Grunawalt, Captain, Judge Advocate General's Corps, US Navy, (Ret.), and
now Emeritus Professor and former Director of the Oceans Law and Policy De-
partment ofthe College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS), as a great col-
league and friend. I remain grateful for his positive leadership, encouragement and
insistence on the highest standards ofscholarship. Jack was principal editor of this
volume. He was ably assisted by Lieutenant Colonel James E. Meyen, U.S. Ma-
rine Corps.
Three Naval War College Presidents are owed a special debt ofthanks. Rear Ad-
miral Joseph C. Strasser, US Navy, was President during my Stockton year.
Introduction 5
Admiral Strasser solidly supported my teaching and research at the College; he
cared about people as he led the College. His leadership will not be forgotten. Rear
Admiral James R. Stark, US Navy, who succeeded Admiral Strasser as President,
has also supported the College's law program. Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski,
US Navy, succeeded Admiral Stark and wrote the Foreword for this book. Within
the College, I remain grateful for comments, insights, research suggestions and
corrections of Professors Grunawalt and Dennis Mandsager, current Oceans Law
and Policy Department Chairman, and his staff. Dr. Robert S. Wood, former Dean
ofthe CNWS, has my thanks for his research suggestions, comments and insights.
I also express thanks to Hugh Lynch, Captain USN (Ret.), of the CNWS faculty,
for reading Chapter II for factual accuracy. The Nation remains in good hands, due
in part to the administrative, academic, military and moral leadership ofthese ded-
icated people.
Wake Forest University generously gave me leave to attend Yale, to accept the
Stockton appointment, and for research. I express special thanks to a good friend
and colleague, Edwin G. Wilson, Emeritus Provost and Professor of English, like
me a Reserve destroyer officer (but separated by a few years in time of service, al-
though shipboard experiences we shared were remarkably alike). I remain grateful
for the support and counsel ofDean and Professor J. Donald Scarlett, who laid the
foundation of the reputation the law school enjoys.
Other libraries besides those at Yale helped with research. At Wake Forest Uni-
versity, Professor Thomas M. Steele and the staffofthe Worrell Professional Cen-
ter Library that houses the law library deserve thanks for support and unfailing
help in obtaining unusual sources that were so important. I am also grateful for the
resources of the University's Reynolds and Army ROTC Libraries. At the Naval
War College Robert E. Schnare, Director of its Library, and his staff deserve equal
thanks. Dean Wood helped me obtain a carrel for research summers after the
Stockton appointment, which enabled me to continue my studies. The Redwood
Library, Newport, and the Winston-Salem - Forsyth County libraries lent books.
Behind every academic there is a wonderful secretary. Peggy W. Brookshire has
been my mainstay for so many years and so many projects that we have given up
counting. Besides voluminous correspondence, work with me on editing several
books, public service projects with bar associations, appellate briefs, class assign-
ments, and similar papers, she prepared sheafs of correspondence, fitness reports
and other documents when I commanded Naval Reserve units. She typed many
drafts and helped prepare the manuscript for this book. As the sea service signal
25
has it, "Bravo Zulu." I also express thanks to the secretarial staff at the Naval War
College who helped with my research manuscripts there, particularly Virginia
Lautieri and Lucy Dunlea.
Truly, no academic is an island.
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Part B. A Note on Sources
US Senator Hiram Johnson said in 1917 that the first casualty ofa war is truth.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
28
States, said that a word is the skin of a living thought, and that a page ofhistory is
29 r
worth a volume of logic. My good friend, the late Myres McDougal, emphasized
that a writer's observational standpoint must be taken into account. These truths
are important in this book. Recent history is difficult to research and write. Only
after a decade has separated the end of the war have more complete and relatively
balanced accounts begun to appear. Many contemporary reports appear to be mis-
dated, misstated, or sometimes wrong, and this at times applies to government
sources. Another problem is the language and availability of sources. I am not
versed in Farsi or Arabic, and many sources may be only in those languages. Many
critical sources lie hidden in government archives, to be revealed only after several
decades, if at all. Even when fundamental documents, e.g., treaties, will be pub-
31
lished is less than clear, owing to publication lags and national security. The
32
same can be said for deducing custom and objections to claims. More has been
written from Iran and Western sources; whether the archives of Iraq and the for-
mer USSR will ever be available is less than certain. Even readily available and reli-
able sources, e.g., the Foreign Relations ofthe United States (FRUS), appear only after
decades to protect national security, and they are necessarily selective. The same
can be said for the digests; the 1980-88 Digest ofthe Reagan Administration is only
in its third volume.
The factual account, and the history of foreign and domestic policies, are there-
fore necessarily less than absolutely complete or accurate. I have tried to distill out
rhetoric and bias but may not have always succeeded. My own intellectual bias as
an academic lawyer, my cultural bias as an American, my prior experiences, e.g., as
a serving line officer in the US Navy and later as a Naval Reservist, may have af-
fected the story ofthe war in Chapter II and succeeding chapters oflegal analysis.
Nevertheless, I hope that this analysis will be helpful.
Part C. Citation Format: Recurring Citations, Abbreviations, Acronyms
Although this volume conforms generally to another "bluebook," short form
citations, abbreviations and acronyms replace full citations for recurring refer-
ences (e.g., LOS for law of the sea; LOAC for law of armed conflict); institutions
(CMI, Comite Maritime Internationale); States, e.g., the United Kingdom (UK) or
the United States (US); international organizations, e.g., the United Nations (ab-
breviated to UN); or, occasionally, agencies, e.g., the International Committee of
the Red Cross (acronymed ICRC). For short form citations listed below, references
to published sources have been omitted; to conserve space, periods have been
omitted from commonly used citations. For example, a "bluebook" citation,
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 311(1), U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), 1833 UNTS 3, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1327
(1982), appears as LOS Convention, art. 31 1(1). A treaty not listed below might be
cited as, e.g., Treaty on Protection of Artistic & Scientific Institutions & Historic
Monuments, Apr. 15, 1935, arts. 1-3, 49 Stat. 3267, 3268-70, 167 LNTS 289, 290
(Roerich Pact). Acronyms and abbreviations are parenthetically defined when
first used, unless meaning is obvious. Acronyms and abbreviations in quotations,
or words in quotations that would otherwise be subject to acronyming or abbrevia-
tion, have not been changed, except to include an explanatory parenthetical where
meaning is not obvious.
Certain citation formalities have been shortened. Most treaties not listed below
are referenced to the article or other material cited, preceded by a note where they
first appear, rather than repetitive citation of, e.g., "UST at . .
.
," or "UNTS at. . ..".
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Letters, e.g., do not follow the "from . . . to" rubric, "letter" follows the writer or
the writer's title. Government officials' titles have been abbreviated; e.g., the
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations is cited as "US UN
Permanent Representative." Treaty titles omit superfluous articles and substitute
"&" for "and."38
Reference signals, supra, infra and hereinafter, have been eliminated insofar as
39
possible. Material cited to a reprint source is designated as in" instead of "re-
printed in. ' When cited within the same chapter, notes to previous or future mate-
rial are cited, as, e.g., "n. 2 or Part B". Ifcited from another chapter, a reference will
read, e.g., "n. II.2," meaning the second note in Chapter II. Similarly, a Part cited
from Chapter II will read, e.g., "Part II B". More than one note is abbreviated to
"nn." The word "at," interposed between note numbers and page numbers, has
been deleted except where needed for clarity. Book titles and authors are printed in
large and small caps. Article titles and like material are printed in italics. The ob-
jective is to combine information with brevity, any style manual's goal.
Part D. Short Form Citation
Abbreviation or Acronym Full Citation
ADIZ Air Defense Identification Zone.
AFP 110-31 United States Department of the Air Force,
International Law—The Conduct of Armed
Conflict and Air Operations: AFP 110-31
(1976).
AGL Above ground level.
AJIL American Journal of International Law.
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AJIL Supp.
Alexandrov
AMC
American Foreign Policy
ASIL Proc.
AWACS
Benedict
Bevans
BFSP
Birnie & Boyle
Bothe et al
Bowett, Self-Defence
Bowman & Harris
Brierly
Brown
American Journal of International Law,
Supplement.
Stanimar A. Alexandrov,
Self-Defense Against the Use of
Force in International Law (1996).
American Maritime Cases.
American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents (year follows abbreviated
citation).
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law;
year of annual meeting precedes citations;
publication dates omitted.
Airborne Warning and Control System.
Benedict on Admiralty (7th ed. rev.,
Frank L. Wiswall, Jr., ed. 1999), volumes
6-6F.
Charles I. Bevans, Treaties and Other
International Agreements of the United
States of America 1776-1949 (13 v.
1968-76).
British Foreign & State Papers.
Patricia W. Birnie & Alan E. Boyle,
International Law and the
Environment (1994).
Michael Bothe et ai, New Rules for
Victims of Armed Conflict (1982).
D.W. Bowett, Self-Defence in
International Law (1958).
M.J. Bowman & D.J. Harris,
Multilateral Treaties: Index and
Current Status (1984; 11 th Cum. Supp.
1995).
J.B. Brierly, The Law of Nations
(Humphrey Waldock ed., 6 th ed. 1963).
E.D. Brown, The International Law
OF THE Sea (2 v. 1994). Volume 1 supplies
analysis; volume 2 reprints documents;
unless otherwise indicated, citation to
Brown refers to volume 1.
Introduction 9
Brownlie, International
Law
Brownlie, Use of Force
BSFHV
Bulletin
BYBIL
Cable
CENTCOM
CFR
Chubin & Tripp
1969 Civil Liability Convention
Coll & Arend
Colombos
COLREGS
Continental Shelf Convention
Convention on Maritime
Neutrality
Conventional Weapons
Convention
Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law (4th ed. 1990).
Ian Brownlie, International Law and
the Use of Force by States (1963).
Bochumer Schriften zur Friedenssicherung
und zum Humanitaren Volkerrecht.
Department of State Bulletin.
British Yearbook of International
Law.
James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy
1919-1991 (3d ed. 1994).
US Central Command.
Code of Federal Regulations.
Shahram Chubin & Charles Tripp, Iran
and Iraq at War (1988).
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 973
UNTS 3, supplemented by Protocol, Nov.
19, 1976, in 16 ILM 617 (1977).
Alberto R. Coll & Anthony C. Arend,
The Falklands War: Lessons for
Strategy, Diplomacy and
International Law (1988).
C. John Colombos, The International
Law of the Sea (6th rev. ed. 1967).
Collision Regulations, the short form of
rules of the nautical road found in treaties
like, e.g., Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea, July 15, 1972, 28 UST
3459, 1050 UNTS 16.
Convention on the Continental Shelf. Apr.
29, 1958, 15 UST 471, 499 UNTS 311.
Convention on Maritime Neutrality, Feb.
20, 1928, 47 Stat. 1989, 135 LNTS 187.
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed Excessivily
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
Oct. 10, 1980, TIAS , 1342 UNTS 137.
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2 CORDESMAN & WAGNER
3 CORDESMAN & WAGNER
Covenant on Civil & Political
Rights
Covenant on Economic, Social
& Cultural Rights
CTS
Cultural Property Convention
CYBIL
DE GUTTRY & RONZITTI
Definition of Aggression
Dekker & Post
Digest
2 Anthony H. Cordesman & Abraham
R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern
War (1990).
3 Anthony H. Cordesman & Abraham
R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern
War (1990).
International Covenant on Civil & Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, TIAS , 999
UNTS 1.
International Covenant on Economic,
Social & Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
UNTS 3.
Consolidated Treaty Series, publishing
treaties between 1648 and 1920, the start of
LNTS.
Convention for Protection of Cultural
Property in Event of Armed Conflict &
Protocol, May 14, 1954, 249 UNTS 215.
Canadian Yearbook of International
Law.
Andrea de Guttry & Natalino
Ronzitti, The Iran-Iraq War
(1980-1988) and the Law of Naval
Warfare (1993).
Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314,
UN GAOR, 29th Sess., UN Doc. A/Res/3314
(1974). Because of a reprint error in the
Resolution, art.3(d), 69 AJIL 480, 482,
reprint citation is to the draft version in UN
General Assembly Special Committee on
the Question of Defining Aggression,
Report of the Working Group, UN Doc.
A/AC.134/L.46 (1974), in 13 ILM 710
(1974).
Ige F. Dekker & Harry H.G. Post, The
Gulf War of 1980-88 (1992).
Digest of United States Practice in
International Law; published since the
annual volume for 1973; successor to
WHITEMAN. Year covered precedes citation.
The rule for citing this digest has not been
followed with particularity.42
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1
Dinstein
Dispatch
1972 Dumping Convention
ENMOD Convention
Environmental Protection
First Convention
Fishery Convention
FON
Fourth Convention
Fragments Protocol
Franklin
FRG
Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and
Self-Defence (2d ed. 1988).
US Department of State Dispatch.
Convention on Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes & Other
Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 UST 2403, 1046
UNTS 120.
Convention on Prohibition of Military or
Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31
UST 333, 1108 UNTS 152.
Glen Plant, Environmental
Protection and the Law of War: A
"Fifth" Geneva Convention on the
Protection of the environment in
Time of Armed Conflict (1992).
Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition ofWounded & Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST
3114, 75 UNTS 31.
Convention on Fishing & Conservation of
Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29,
1958, 17 UST 138, 559 UNTS 285.
Freedom of navigation, an acronym used in
naval operations.
Convention Relative to Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287.
Protocol on Non-detectable Fragments
(Protocol I), Oct. 10, 1980, TIAS
,
1342 UNTS 168.
Carl M. Franklin, The Law of the
Sea: Some Recent Developments (Nav.
War C. Int'l L. Stud., v. 53, 1961).
Federal Republic of Germany, now part of
Germany; see Walker, Integration and
Disintegration 8-9,
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Friendly Relations Declaration
FRUS
1971 Fund Convention
G.A. Res.
GCC
Geneva Gas Protocol
Gilmore & Black
Goodrich et al
Green
Grunawalt
Hackworth
Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations &
Co-Operation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625, UN GAOR, 25 th Sess.,
Supp. No. 28
,
UN Doc. A/8028 (1970), in 9
ILM 1292 (1970).
Foreign Relations of the United
STATES (preceded by year number and
volume number bracketed if more than one
was issued for that year; publication dates
omitted).
Convention on Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for
Oil Pollution Damage, 1110 UNTS 57.
UN General Assembly Resolution, for
which UN Document numbers have been
generally omitted. Resolutions have been
cross-referenced to reprint sources, e.g.,
ILM.
Gulf Cooperation Council, formed in 1981
by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia and the UAE.
Protocol for Prohibition of Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, &
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June
17, 1925, 94 LNTS 65, with US no-first-use
reservation, Dec. 16, 1974, 26 UST 571-72.
Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black,
Jr., The Law of Admiralty (2d ed. 1975).
Leland F. Goodrich et al., Charter of
the United Nations (3d ed. 1969).
L.C. Green, the Contemporary Law of
Armed Conflict (1993).
Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping
(Nav.War C. Int'l L. Stud., v. 65,
Richard J. Grunawalt ed. 1993).
Green H. Hackworth, Digest of
International Law (7 v. 1940-43). The
rule for citing digests has not been followed
with particularity.43
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1899 Hague II Hague Convention (II) with Respect to
Laws and Customs of War on Land, July
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803.
1899 Hague III Hague Convention (III) for Adaptation to
Maritime Warfare of Principles of the
Geneva Convention of 22 August 1864, 32
Stat. 1827.
Hague II Hague Convention (II) Respecting
Limitation of Employment of Force for
Recovery of Contract Debts, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2241.
Hague III Hague Convention (III) Relative to
Opening of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2259.
Hague IV Hague Convention (IV) Respecting Laws
and Customs ofWar on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2227.
Hague V Hague Convention (V) Respecting Rights
and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons
in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2310.
Hague VI Hague Convention (VI) Relating to Status
ofEnemy Merchant Ships at Outbreak of
Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, 205 CTS 305,
Schindler & Toman 791.
Hague VII Hague Convention (VII) Relating to
Conversion of Merchant Ships into
War-Ships, Oct. 18, 1907, 205 CTS 319,
Schindler & Toman 797.
Hague VIII Hague Convention (VIII) Relative to
Laying Automatic Submarine Contact
Mines, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332.
Hague IX Hague Convention (IX) Concerning
Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of
War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351.
Hague X Hague Convention (X) for Adaptation to
Maritime Warfare of Principles of the
Geneva Convention, 36 Stat. 2371.
Hague XI Hague Convention (XI) Relative to Certain
Restrictions with Regard to Exercise of the
Right of Capture in Naval War, Oct. 18
1907, 36 Stat. 2396.
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Hague XIII
Hague Air Rules
Hague Radio Rules
Harvard Draft Convention on
Agression
Harvard Draft Convention on
Naval & Aerial War
1 von Heinegg
2 von Heinegg
Helsinki Accords
Helsinki Principles
High Seas Convention
HlRO
Hague Convention (XIII) Concerning
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in
Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415.
Commission of Jurists to Consider and
Report Upon the Revision of the Rules of
Warfare, Hague Rules for Air Warfare, Feb.
19,1923, in Schindler & Toman 207.
Commission of Jurists to Consider and
Report Upon the Revision of the Rules of
Warfare, Hague Rules for Control of Radio
in Time of War, Feb. 19, 1923, in LAW OF
Naval Warfare 367.
Harvard Draft Convention on Rights &
Duties of States in Case of Aggression,
1939, 33 AJIL 819 (Supp. 1939).
Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and
Duties of Neutral States in Naval & Aerial
War, 1939, 33 AJIL 16 (Supp. 1939).
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search,
Diversion, and Capture in Naval Warfare:
Part I, The Traditional Law, 29 CYBIL 283
(1991).
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search,
Diversion, and Capture in Naval Warfare:
Part II, Developments Since 1945, 30 CYBIL
89(1992).
Conference on Security & Co-Operation in
Europe, Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, in 14 ILM
1292(1975).
International Law Association Committee
on Maritime Neutrality, Final Report:
Helsinki Principles on Maritime Neutrality, in
International Law Association, Report of
the Sixty-Eighth Conference Held at
Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China 24-30
May 1998, at 496 (1998).
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29,
1958, 13 UST 2312, 450 UNTS 82.
Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The
Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (1991).
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Hyde
ICAO Convention
ICJ
ICLQ
ICO
ICRC
ILA
ILM
ILR
IMCO
IMO
Incendiary Weapons Protocol
1-3 Charles Cheney Hyde,
International Law Chiefly as
Interpreted and Applied by the
United States (3d ed. 1945-47).
Convention on International Civil Aviation
(Chicago Convention), Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1 180, 15 UNTS 295; see also Protocol on
Authentic Trilingual Text of Convention
on International Civil Aviation with Annex,
Sept. 24, 1968, 19 UST 7693, 740 UNTS
21;Proces-verbal of Rectification to
Protocol, 20 id. 718; there are numerous
amendments and protocols to the ICAO
Convention, most ofwhich are not relevant
to this analysis, and many of which are not
in force for some or all States. See BOWMAN
& HARRIS 110-11; id. 168 (Cum. Supp.
1995); TIF 380-81.
International Court of Justice (the "World
Court," successor to the PCIJ in 1945);
abbreviation for reports of its decisions.
International & Comparative Law
Quarterly.
Islamic Conference Organization, created
by Charter of the Islamic Conference
Organization, Feb. 28, 1973, 914 UNTS
111.
International Committee of the Red Cross.
International Law Association
International Legal Materials.
International Law Reports.
International Maritime Consultative
Organization, later renamed International
Maritime Organization (IMO).
International Maritime Organization,
formerly International Maritime
Consultative Organization (IMCO).
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III),
Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 UNTS 171.
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INCSEA
INCSEA Agreement
INCSEA Protocol
1917 Instructions
1969 Intervention Convention
Intervention Protocol
Joyner
KARSH
Keesing
Key Resolutions
Law of Naval Warfare
Levie, Code
Liber Amicorum
Acronym for agreements between States to
regulate navigation and other behavior of
their warships, State aircraft and other
platforms. See, e.g., INCSEA Agreement &
INCSEA Protocol.
Agreement on Prevention of Incidents On
and Over the High Seas, May 25, 1972,
USSR-US, 23 UST 1168, 852 UNTS 151.
Protocol to Agreement ofMay 25, 1972 on
Prevention of Incidents On and Over the
High Seas, May 22, 1973, USSR-US, 24
UST 1063.
US Department of the Navy, Instructions
Governing Maritime Warfare: June 1917
(1918).
Convention Relating to Intervention on the
High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution
Casualties, Nov. 29, 1969, 26 UST 765, 970
UNTS 211.
Protocol Relating to Intervention on the
High Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution by
Substances Other than Oil, Nov. 2, 1973,
TIAS 10561, 13 ILM 605 (1974).
The Persian Gulf War: Lessons for
Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy
(Christopher C. Joyner ed. 1990).
Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War:
Impact and Implications (1989).
Keesincs Contemporary Archives.
Dietrich Rauschning et al., Key
Resolutions of the United Nations
General Assembly 1946-1996(1997).
Natalino Ronzitti, The Law of Naval
Warfare: A Collection of
Agreements and Documents with
Commentaries (1987).
1-2 Howard S. Levie, The Code of
International Armed Conflict (1986).
The Law of Military Operations:
Liber Amicorum Professor Jack
Grunawalt (Nav. War C. Intl L.
STUD., v. 72, Michael N. Schmitt ed. 1998).
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Lieber Code
LNTS
LOAC
London Declaration
1930 London Naval Treaty
1936 London Naval Treaty
London Protocol
LONW
LOS
1958 LOS Conventions
LOS Convention
LOW
MacChesney
United States, Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States
in the Field, General Orders No. 100 (Apr.
24, 1863), in SCHINDLER & TOMAN 3.
League of Nations Treaty Series.
Law of armed conflict, synonymous with
law of war (LOW).
Declaration Concerning Laws of Naval
War, Feb. 26, 1909, 208 CTS 338, in
Schindler & Toman 843, 3 AJIL Supp.
179(1909).
Treaty for Limitation and Reduction of
Naval Armaments, Apr. 22, 1930, 46 Stat.
2858, 112 LNTS 65.
Treaty on Limitation of Naval Armaments,
Mar. 25, 1936, 50 Stat. 1363, 184 LNTS 115.
Proces-Verbal Relating to Rules of
Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of
Treaty of London of 22 April 1930 [arts.
22-23, 46 Stat. 2858, 2881-82, 112 LNTS 65,
88], Nov. 6, 1936, 3 BEVANS 298, 173 LNTS
353.
Law of naval warfare, a component of the
LOAC or LOW.
Law of the Sea.
Territorial Sea Convention; Continental
Shelf Convention; High Seas Convention;
Fishery Convention.
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, 397.
Law of war, synonymous with law of armed
conflict (LOAC).
'
Brunson MacChesney, Situation,
Documents and Commentaries on
Recent Developments in the Law of
the Sea (Nav. War. C. Int'l Stud., v. 51
1957).
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MacDonald
Mallison
MARPOL 73/78
Matheson, Remarks
McDougal & Burke
MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO
McDougal, Lasswell &
Chen
McNair
MCRM
Charles G. MacDonald, Iran, Saudi
Arabia and the Law of the Sea:
Political Interaction and Legal
Development in the Persian Gulf
(1980).
W. Thomas Mallison, Submarines in
General and Limited Wars (Nav. War
C. Int'l L. Stud., v. 58, 1968).
Protocol of 1978 Relating to Convention for
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973,
Feb. 17, 1978, 2 WALLACE 1916, TIAS
incorporating by reference Convention for
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2,
1973, id. 1834, 12 ILM 1319 (1973).
Michael J. Matheson, Remarks, in Session
One: The United States' Position on the
Relation of Customary International Law to the
1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva
Conventions, in Symposium, The Sixth
Annual American Red Cross - Washington
College ofLaw Conference on International
Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on
Customary International Law and the 1977
Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, 2 Am. U.J. Int'l L. 419 (1987).
Myres S. McDougal & William T.
Burke, The Public Order of the
Oceans: A Contemporary
International Law of the Sea (1962).
Myres S. McDougal & Florentino
Feliciano, Law and Minimum World
Public Order (1961).
Myres S. McDougal, Harold
Lasswell & Lung-Chu Chen, Human
Rights and Minimum World Public
Order (1980).
Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (2d
ed. 1961).
US Department of Defense, Maritime
Claims Reference Manual: DOD
Publication 2005.1M (1987).
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Mine Protocol
Moore
Moore, Arbitrations
Naff, Gulf Security
Naff, The Iran-Iraq War
NATO
1900 Naval War Code
NAVIS & HOOTEN
Nicaragua Case
nm or NM
Nordquist
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
Use of Mines, Booby Traps & Other
Devices (Protocol II), Oct. 10, 1980, TIAS
, 1342 UNTS 168, as amended, May 3,
1995, 35 ILM 1206 (1996).
John Bassett Moore, A Digest of
International Law (8 v. 1906). The rule
for citing digests has not been followed with
particularity.44
John Bassett Moore, History and
Digest of the International
Arbitrations to Which the United
States has Been a Party, Together
with Appendices Containing the
Treaties Relating to Such
Arbitrations, and Historical and
Legal Notes (6 v. 1898).
Gulf Security and the Iran-Iraq War
(Thomas Naff ed. 1985).
Thomas Naff, The Iran-Iraq War:
Implications for US Policy (1985).
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
US Naval War Code of 1900, in Naval
War College, International Law
Discussions, 1903 (1904).
Martin S. Navis & E.R. Hooten,
Tanker Wars: The Assault on
Merchant Shipping During the
Iran-Iraq Crisis, 1980-1988 (1996).
Military & Paramilitary Activities in &
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. US), 1986 ICJ
14.
Nautical mile(s).
This multivolume series, edited by Myron
H. Nordquist, has different authors or
editors; volume numbers precede
abbreviated citations:
1 Myron H. Nordquist, United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A
Commentary (1985).
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NOTAM
NOTMAR
NWC Rev.
NWIP
NWIP 10-2
NWP
2 Myron H. Nordquist, United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A
Commentary (Satya N. Nandan et al. ed.
1993).
3 Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne,
United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea 1982: A Commentary (Myron H.
Nordquist ed. 1995).
4 Myron H. Nordquist et al., United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:
A Commentary (1991).
5 Myron H. Nordquist, United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea: A
Commentary (Shabtai Rosenne & Louis B.
Sohn eds. 1989).
Notice to Airmen.
Notice to Mariners.
Naval War College Review. Review
articles analyzing international law issues
have been reprinted in READINGS IN
International Law from the Naval
War College Review 1947-1977 (Nav.
WAR C. INT'L L. STUD., v. 61 & 62, Richard
B. Lillich & John Norton Moore ed. 1980)
and Readings on International Law
from the Naval War College Review
1978-1994 (Nav. War C. Intl L. Stud., v.
68, John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner
ed. 1994). Parallel citations to these
volumes have not been added in chapters
that follow. Articles on international law
published after 1994 and articles dealing
with other topics, e.g., military operations,
are not included in the INTERNATIONAL
Law Studies reprints, and resort to the
Review is necessary.
Naval Warfare Information Publication.
US Department of the Navy, Law of Naval
Warfare: NWIP 10-2 (1955 through Change
6, 1974).
Naval Warfare Publication.
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NWP 1-14M
NWP1-14M Annotated
NWP 9
NWP 9A Annotated
Nyon Arrangement
Nyon Supplementary
Agreement
OAU
O'Connell, Influence of
Law
O'Connell, Law of the sea
ODIL
1954 Oil Pollution Convention
1962 Oil Pollution Convention
Amendments
OPEC
US Department of the Navy, The
Commander's Handbook on the Law of
Naval Operations: NWP 1-14M/MCWP
5-2.1/COMDT PUB P5800.1 (1995).
Naval War College Oceans Law and Policy
Department, Annotated Supplement to the
Commander's Handbook on the Law of
Naval Operations: NWP 1-14M/MCWP
5-2.1/COMDT PUB P5800.1 (1997).
US Department of the Navy, The
Commander's Handbook on the Law of
Naval Operations, NWP 9 (1987).
US Department of the Navy, Annotated
Supplement to the Commander's
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations:
NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10 (1989).
Nyon Arrangement, Sept. 14, 1937, 181
LNTS 137.
Agreement Supplementary to the Nyon
Arrangement, Sept. 17, 1937, 181 LNTS
151.
Organization of African Unity, created by
Charter of Organization of African Unity,
May 25, 1963, 479 UNTS 39.
D.P. O'Connell, The Influence of Law
on Sea Power (1975).
D.P. O'Connell, The International
LAW OF THE SEA (Ivan A. Shearer ed.; v. 1,
1982; v. 2, 1984).
Ocean Development & International Law.
Convention for Prevention of Pollution of
the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954, 12 UST 2989,
327 UNTS 3; amendments, Apr. 11, 1962,
17 id. 1523, 600 UNTS 332; Oct. 21, 1969,
2Sid. 1205.
1962 Amendments to 1954 Convention for
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,
Apr. 11, 1962, 17 UST 1523, 600 UNTS 332.
Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries.
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Oppenheim
1 Oppenheim (1955)
1880 Oxford Manual
Oxford Naval Manual
Paris Declaration
PCIJ
PlCTET
Pilloud, Commentary
1973 Pollution Convention
PRC
Proceedings
Protection of the
Environment
This multivolume series has different
editors; volume numbers precede
abbreviated citations:
1 Oppenheim's International Law
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wChapter II
THE TANKER WAR, 1980-88 1
ith Iran's willingness, as of late 1988 and early 1989, to negotiate a
ceasefire on the basis ofUN Security Council Resolution 598, an initial
conclusion might be that the end of hostilities in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war also
ended US and European security interests in the Persian Gulf. France withdrew
the aircraft carrier Clemenceau and other naval units in September 1988. The
United States adopted a more wait-and-see attitude but also began to reduce its na-
val commitment by stopping convoying while remaining in the Gulf to provide a
"zone defense." Kuwaiti tankers' "deflagging" began in early 1989, and in March
1990 the last US Navy minesweepers were brought home. "[RJeturn ofthe wooden
ships was in response to a reduced mine threat and will not affect continuing . . . op-
erations by US naval vessels aimed at maintaining freedom of navigation and the
free flow of oil through the Persian Gulf," a press release said in May 1990.
Despite these encouraging trends, that war's end did not terminate security in-
terests in the Gulf, particularly for the United States, Western Europe and Japan.
The war was but a warmer chapter in the struggle ofnational security interests for
control or influence in Southwest Asia and petroleum, that region's vital resource.
The Gulf area has a very large proportion of world oil reserves, about 54-60 per-
cent. Two years later, the 1990-91 GulfWar between Iraq and the Coalition again
8demonstrated the relationship between oil and national security interests.
This Chapter begins with an historical overview, followed by analysis of
great-power involvement, particularly that of the United States, in the Iran-Iraq
war at policy and strategic levels.
This work cannot consider in depth other aspects of the war's impact on other
national security interests
—
e.g., the USSR incursion into Afghanistan, which
Iraq condemned; a Soviet port arrangement with Syria in 1988; Iran-US bilat-
eral relations from the Shah's fall in 1979 through the embassy hostage crisis,
11 12
which Iraq also condemned, to claims in the Iran-Contra Affair; the rise of Is-
1
5
lamic fundamentalism, particularly in Iran ; OPEC as an influence; the land war,
with renewed use of poison gas and missile attacks on cities, despite interna-
tional law to the contrary; or even an apparent shift in Soviet foreign relations at
the time —all ofwhich (and more) impacted the war and security interests in the
Gulf. These additional factors are recited, without extended analysis, to confirm
the point that national security interests in one vital area cannot be seen in a
vacuum.
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Part A. Prologue
17
There have been many actors in the Persian Gulf: France, introduced to the
Middle East in 1916 after the Sykes-Picot agreement, when Syria became a French
1 o
mandate; Great Britain, whose influence dates from the early nineteenth cen-
tury; Iraq, independent since 1932 after time as a British mandate and free of Brit-
ish influence since 1954, having been part of the Ottoman Empire before World
War I; Iran, formerly Persia and more or less independent during the last two
20
centuries; the United States, whose oil companies have had interests there dur-
ing this century and which assumed the mantle of providing naval security when
British forces withdrew in 1971; and countries that formed the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) in 1981,21 i.e., Bahrain,22 Kuwait,23 Oman,24 Qatar,25 Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE is a federation of the
former Trucial States—Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras-al-Khaimah,
Sharjah, Umm-al-Qawain—and came into existence December 1, 1971, when
27
Britain left the Gulf. Before World War I the Ottoman Empire was sovereign
over some territories that became the GCC States, e.g., Saudi Arabia, while Britain
was protector of others, e.g., Kuwait and the Trucial States.
1. The United Kingdom and France; UK Interventions and Reactions.
Britain's strategic interests evolved around oil and air routes to India; it dic-
tated defense and foreign relations policy to Iraq and western shore Gulf States,
later GCC members, except Saudi Arabia, which with Iran were always outside the
28UK orbit. Britain exercised considerable influence over Iran, however. In July
1946, for example,H.M.S. Norfolk and Wild Goose were ordered to Basra, Iraq, after
the USSR-backed Tudeh Party fomented rioting at the UK-owned oil refinery at
Abadan, Iran. In August 1946 UK troops landed in Basra. Although intervention
in Iran was not necessary, the "eventual outcome was satisfactory to British inter-
29
ests and entailed a setback to the growth of Soviet influence" in Iran. On June 26,
195 1 several Royal Navy warships were ordered to Abadan, Iran, to protect British
subjects during a UK dispute with Iran over nationalization of an oil refinery;
30
these ships conducted an evacuation October 3, 1951. In 1961 Britain landed
Royal Marines and troops, with a naval concentration offshore, to help deter an
Iraqi invasion of newly independent Kuwait. Arab League troops later replaced
UK ground forces. Still later Iraq recognized Kuwaiti independence. For a cen-
32
tury and a half, the Gulf had been a "British lake," but times were changing.
33
France continued to have close ties with Iraq, however.
Evidence of the rise of other forces in the area was demonstrated in 1969 when
Iranian warships successfully escorted an Iranian merchantman from Khorramshahr
in the Shatt al-Arab to the Gulf, defying Iraqi threats to stop any Iran-flagged ves-
sel from sailing through Iraq-claimed waters. In 1961 Iran had bowed to a similar
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threat, but naval action now secured her purposes. As Iran perceived the Soviet
threat diminishing to her north, she began to focus on her security interests in the
Gulf. Iran began to assert offshore rights to areas where oil reservoirs were
known to exist and pushed territorial sea claims outward into the Gulf. Eventually
agreements were reached, except in the upper Gulf, where Irani, Iraqi and Kuwaiti
claims remained unresolved until 1975. After diplomatic interventions in Lon-
don and a plebiscite in Bahrain overwhelmingly rejecting union with Iran, Iran
37dropped sovereignty claims to Bahrain. Saudi Arabia has asserted territorial
claims to parts ofAbu Dhabi, a UAE member, and Dhofar, part ofOman, and the
Khufu strip, disputed with Qatar. Occasionally these disputes would spill over
into adjacent Gulf waters, e.g., in 1968 when an Iranian gunboat approached and
detained an Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) crew on an oil rig
claimed to be on the Iranian side ofwaters said to be Iran's for oil exploitation un-
38
der a Iran-Saudi tentative agreement.
2. The United States; Preliminary Gambits in the Gulf.
US interests began with oil investments in the area, particularly an exclusive
concession in Saudi Arabia, later shared with the Saudis, that became ARAMCO.
After World War II US and others' investments gave returns in billions ofUS dol-
lars annually; US Gulf area concessions stood at half the total of arrangements
39
there. In the 1970s, however, Saudi Arabia nationalized ARAMCO and other
foreign holdings. Following on World War II cooperative arrangements, the
United States built an airfield at Dhahran (1945-62) and homeported its minus-
cule Middle East Force, under US Central Command (CENTCOM) during the
Tanker War, in Bahrain. Britain's 1971 withdrawal, while minimal in terms of
UK security forces and interests, had a profound impact on western Gulf States:
[UK] withdrawal from the Gulf was more substantial in political terms since it
necessitated the formulation of an independent political framework for the small
emirates along the Arab littoral, but the real impact was . . . psychological. Britain had
served as judge, arbiter, administrator, and . . . protector of this littoral for well over a
century. Departure in 1971 was tantamount to removal of the safety net. . . .
[CJurrents of nationalist and modernist sentiments and ideas had begun to circulate
along the shores of the Gulf even before the influx of oil revenues.42
Some local rulers did not favor UK withdrawal, for the obvious reason of losing
support, and perhaps to fend off neighbors.4
The United States did not rush into power the vacuum. Reeling from Vietnam
and responding to a USSR-Iraq friendship treaty, the Nixon Administration
developed the Twin Pillars policy ofmilitary assistance to Saudi Arabia and Iran
to protect common regional security interests as part of the Nixon Doctrine. The
United States would no longer assume direct responsibility for preserving
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worldwide security but would strengthen regional actors to play a primary role in
48
assuring stability. "Benign inaction" characterized US policy, 1971-79. The
United Kingdom saw the Iraq-USSR treaty as more apparent than real, although
49
France adhered to a view closer to that of the United States.
In the northern Gulf, there was no benign inaction. Iran-Iraq relations were
strained, 1970-75, but in 1975 treaties to confirm land and water boundaries
seemed to patch up differences. Thus matters stood until Iran's Shah fell in 1979.
Perhaps an omen for the future had occurred in 1971, the day of British with-
drawal, when Iran occupied Greater and Lesser Tunb islands belonging to the
UAE's Ras Al Khaimah principality. That same day, pursuant to treaty, part of
Abu Musa island, belonging to the UAE's Sharjah principality, was given to Iran
for a military base in return for a grant to the Sharjah ruler. Sharjah and Iran would
share oil concession revenues. All three islands lie at the mouth of the Gulf, near
the Strait ofHormuz. Iraq retaliated against Iranian interests, and Libya retaliated
against Britain, which did not intervene as in 1961.
3. The Soviet Union.
The USSR was seen as "eager to exploit the opportunities created by the . . .
[1980-88] war [when it came] and the perception of faltering US interest to insert
themselves into the Gulf—a region in which their presence [had] traditionally
52been limited and marginal."" A Soviet naval flotilla had been on permanent sta-
tion in the Gulf since March 1968, two months after the UK's notice that it was
quitting the area. J The USSR and Iraq had signed a Treaty of Friendship &
Co-Operation in April 1972, but Soviet relations with Iraq, 1972-80, have been
characterized as "cordial but far from a patron-client arrangement."
4. Worldwide Dependence on Persian Gulf Oil and Foreign-Flag Shipping.
This shift in political balances was accompanied by increasing worldwide de-
pendence on Gulfoil and, for the United States at least, relying on lift ofoil in ships
flying other nations' flags. At the beginning of the Gulf War Europe imported
about half of its oil (France, 70 percent; Italy, 60 percent; and other States smaller
percentages). While US 1973-85 Gulf oil import percentages fell through effi-
ciencies, domestic oil production peaked, and by 1985 US oil companies saw the
United States in a dangerously vulnerable position vis-a-vis OPEC oil. Western
Europe received 20-40 percent, and Japan about 60 percent, of its oil from the
Gulf.
56 By 1987 US dependence on Gulf oil had doubled from 1985, Western Eu-
rope's consumption of Gulf oil was about 33 percent of its total, Greece's was 50
percent, and Turkey's and Japan's nearly 66 percent. US domestic oil production
continued to decline. Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, had tremendous
57
advantages in oil reserves and surplus production capacity. Saudi oil supplied
half of France's needs, and other European States had large investments in the
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country. When the war began Iraq supplied considerably more oil to Britain,
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France, Germany and Italy than Iran. Even at war's end, when oil-dependent
countries had begun to tap other sources, the Gulf supplied a fourth of petroleum
moving in international commerce. Thirty percent of Western Europe's, and 65
percent of Japan's, oil came from the Gulf. The United States was 50 percent de-
pendent on foreign oil sources, but only 1 8 percent ofthat or 9 percent of total con-
sumption, came from the Gulf.
By 1986, US-flag foreign trade tankers were almost nonexistent; their role had
been taken by other nations' vessels, particularly those flying flags ofconvenience
but often beneficially owned by US business interests. The US foreign trade out-
look was then also poor. Contrasted with the US-flag fleet's steady demise and
growth of flags of convenience, the State-run USSR merchant fleet continued to
rise. In 1985 its tonnage was well ahead of that of the United States. With Soviet
satellites and clients counted, the USSR was third in world shipping tonnage (25
million), behind Liberia, Panama and Greece and ahead of the United King-
dom. The Suez Canal closure during the Arab-Israeli wars prompted building
ever larger tankers, which could be operated more cheaply than smaller ones, but
which might have greater economic consequences and effects for the environ-
ment, ifa ship were damaged or sunk in a grounding or collision, or in a storm. The
same result would obtain ifthese huge ships were damaged during armed conflict.
5. The Environment.
The environment became another important factor. The UN Environment
Programme, developed after the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment, resulted in many regional treaties, among them the Kuwait Regional
Convention and Protocol (1978). By 1981 it was in force for eight Gulf States,
Iran and Iraq among them. TheUN LOS Convention, negotiated during the de-
cade before signature in 1982, restated many principles of the 1958 Geneva Con-
ventions on the Law of the Sea, added new terms and published maritime
environmental standards. The Gulf is particularly environmentally sensitive be-
cause of heavy tanker traffic and offshore petroleum production activity. The
Gulfs currents are slow, there is only a gradual exchange of water, and therefore
little purgation of pollution once it happens.
6. Geography of the Persian Gulf.
The Persian Gulf, known as the Arabian Gulf to Gulf coastal States, is a shallow
extension ofthe Indian Ocean between the Arabian Peninsula to the west and Iran
to the east. It extends northeast 614 miles from the Gulf of Oman in the Indian
Ocean, through the Strait ofHormuz to the Shatt al-Arab in the north. Iran bor-
ders it on the northeastern shore; Iran, Iraq (which has only a 10-mile coastline)
and Kuwait are on its northwest shores, and the island State of Bahrain, Kuwait,
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Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE border the Gulf on its southwestern shore and
around Oman's Musandam Peninsula to the Gulf ofOman and the Indian Ocean.
The Gulf is 24 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point in the Strait and about 200
miles across at its widest point. Like the Baltic and Black Seas the Gulf is shallow
with an average depth of 130-260 feet, with greatest depths of 700 feet within
Omani territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz. There is no deep seabed in the
Gulf, whether considered from a geographic or law of the sea analysis. The shal-
lowest areas, less than 120 feet, are along the UAE, where vessels over 5000 tons
displacement, i.e., nearly all of today's tankers, can safely sail no closer than five
miles offshore. The Strait, only about 24 miles wide at its narrowest point, is rela-
tively deep (210-270 feet) in its navigational channels. However, the Strait is dot-
ted with islands claimed by littoral countries, Qeshen (Iran), Larak (Iran) and
Quoin Islands (Oman) at its narrowest point, and Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser
Tunbs, occupied by Iran. Bahrain is an island nation, and there are other off-
shore islands around the Gulf, e.g., Bubiyan (Kuwait) and Kharg (Iran). Several
Gulf States, e.g., Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have numerous offshore
oil rigs or pumping stations. At the head of the Gulf, the Shatt al-Arab (formed by
confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers) flows through a marshy delta into
the Gulf. There are also shallow estuaries elsewhere along the Gulf, where a pearl
CO
industry flourished for centuries. The Shatt has been a boundary, albeit dis-
puted, between Iran and Iraq. Kuwait lies just around the corner of the Gulf from
the Shatt marshes and Iran and Iraq. Like the Baltic and Black Seas, there is rela-
tively little outflow or inflow from or to the Gulf. It is not as stagnant as the Black
Sea, but a pollution problem in the Gulf, whether deliberate, e.g., petroleum dump-
ing during war or a terrorist attack, or accidental, e.g., in collisions or during war,
can have longterm consequences for the Gulf environment, not to mention free-
dom of navigation.
7. Vital Shipping Chokepoints.
Yet another, and critically enduring, factor is that waters enclosing the Arabian
Peninsula have three ofthe world's most economically and strategically important
waterways: the Strait of Hormuz, entry for the Gulf; the Suez Canal and Bab El
Mandeb Strait, entries and exits for the Red Sea, through which 10 percent of
world commerce flows. Suez and Bab El Mandeb cut transit time dramatically for
merchantmen or naval forces moving between the Mediterranean Sea and the In-
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dian Ocean; closing the Canal during the Arab-Israeli wars forced travel around
Africa and promoted building larger petroleum tankers to supply the world. "The
. . . Gulf . . . with the Strait of Hormuz, which gives access to it from the Gulf of
Oman and the Indian Ocean, might well be described as an international oil high-
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way" or "the West's lifeline," and a collision or terrorist attack in the Strait could
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have serious consequences. More than 80 tankers passed through Hormuz
73
daily. The number is less today.
Part B. The Course of the War and Others' Responses
The precipitating event for US involvement in the 1980-88 Gulf War was the
USSR invasion ofAfghanistan and danger to the Gulfbecause of a power vacuum
there. US President Jimmy Carter's January 23, 1980 State ofthe Union Address
treated the Gulf area as a vital American interest; he said the United States would
respond with force if necessary: "Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt
by any outside force to gain control ofthe . . . Gulf region will be regarded as an as-
sault on the vital interests of the United States .
.
, and such an assault will be re-
75
pelled by any means necessary, including military force." US naval task forces
7ft
were already in the Indian Ocean because of the Hostage Crisis; they remained
there. The Carter Doctrine, as this point in the Address came to be called, pro-
moted a basic rationale for prepositioning ships with stores for the Rapid De-
ployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) at Diego Garcia, a British Indian Ocean
77
dependency, and preparing for possible RDJTF deployment. RDJTF was not
78
then a strong or mobile enough force to make it a serious US policy instrument,
although its "jurisdiction" stretched over 19 countries, from Pakistan to Egypt to
Kenya, an area twice as large as the continental United States with nearly impossi-
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ble lines ofcommunication and some of the most inhospitable terrain on Earth.
The other, unstated goal was protecting Saudi Arabia. The United States would re-
spond "positively" to requests for assistance from "non-belligerent friends" in the
80
region.
Activist Iraqi Muslim Shiites, the dominant sect in Iran, tried to assassinate
Iraq's deputy premier in April 1 980. Iraq began rooting out these activists, bombed
an Iranian border town, expelled Iranian residents and Iraqis of Iranian descent,
and called on Iran to vacate Abu Musa, Lesser and Greater Tunb, occupied by Iran
and formerly UAE territory. Iran began training infiltrators, and Iraq supported
important members of the Shah's government resident in Baghdad, who tried to
topple the Iranian government. Iraq sought and received backing from Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia, fearful ofIranian antimonarchial policy; according to Iran, Ku-
wait and Saudi Arabia signed secret agreements on September 12 to boost oil out-
puts considerably and to contribute sales revenues to Iraq's war effort. (Saudi
Arabia had signed an agreement with Iraq in February 1979, reportedly including
mutual security arrangements.) After border clashes in the summer of 1980, Iran
began shelling Iraqi towns in early September. Iraq demanded territorial cessions,
purportedly part of the 1975 settlement. 81
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1. 1980: Opening Moves; First Efforts at Ending the War.
82On September 22 Iraq invaded Iran. Two days later Jordan offered Iraq total
support, including arms bought from the USSR and Western powers. Jordan also
gave Iraq access to the Port ofAqaba and land and air facilities for imports and ex-
ports. The war had begun.
On September 21 and 24 Iraq declared the 1975 agreement demarcating the
Shatt abrogated, asserting it would exercise full sovereignty over the Shatt.
Iraq required Iranian ships using the Shatt to engage Iraqi pilots and fly the Iraqi
87
ensign at the truck. Iran refused to do this. When Iraq had invaded Iran on Sep-
88
tember 22 claiming self-defense, an Iranian Notice to Mariners (NOTMAR) de-
clared waterways near its coast a war zone, announced new shipping lanes after
ships passed Hormuz, disclaimed responsibility if vessels did not follow the lanes,
89
refused access to Iraqi ports, thereby closing the Shatt, and warned of retaliation
90
ifGulf States gave Iraq facilities. Refusal of access to Iraqi ports was later charac-
91
terized as a "blockade" of the Iraqi coast. There were also sporadic attacks on
92
shipping in the Shatt in the early days of the war. Whether this resulted in pollu-
tion into the Gulf cannot be determined; undoubtedly there was spillage from
bunkers, tankers and damaged facilities. Attacking States' motivation and care, in
terms of concerns, if any, for the environment is not known.
On September 23 the European Community (EC) endorsed an Arab League ap-
peal for a ceasefire and "emphasize[d] the vital importance for the entire interna-
tional community offreedom ofnavigation in the Gulf, with which it is imperative
93
not to interfere."' From the beginning of the war until near the end, however, the
EC made no effort to harmonize policy, due to lack of internal cohesion and a clash
94
of cultures. Several Arab States, Libya and Syria among them, had supported
Iran in the League; Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation and South Yemen had boycotted the meeting. Five days later the UN Se-
curity Council's Resolution 479 called for ending hostilities. Iraq, denying
territorial ambitions, accepted the Resolution; Iran considered the 1975 treaty
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valid and demanded condemnation of Iraqi aggression. Although the resolution
had not mentioned freedom of navigation, Japan and the United States stressed
98
that principle's primary importance. Resolution 479 also supported the UN Sec-
retary-General's efforts to settle the dispute through mediation or conciliation,
and in November he appointed former Swedish Prime Minister OlafPalme as me-
99
diator; Palme's efforts were largely unsuccessful.
On October 1 Iran declared the Shatt closed for all maritime craft until further
notice. On October 5 a US NOTMAR announced Iran had warned that "all
coastal waters [were] battle areas. All transportation of materials to Iraqi ports
[was] prohibited." After passing Hormuz, merchant traffic should stay south of
designated points. The Shatt estuary should be avoided, and mariners were cau-
tioned to be alert to unusual, abnormal or hostile actions while in the Gulf.
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Iran's rationale for its war zone declaration was twofold, "the first being of a de-
fensive nature. . . . Iran was [concerned with] protecting] its coastline against in-
trusion by ships likely to present a risk to national security. . . . [F]oreign ships
wishing to pass through the zone had to request prior authorization— Ships call-
ing at a port in . . . [a] countr[y] bordering the . . . Gulf were, for obvious security
reasons, subject to stricter regulations," being required to contact Iran's naval
headquarters 48 hours in advance. "Iran's second concern was to guarantee the
safety ofinternational shipping [T]he zone could be dangerous to shipping due
to warlike events likely to take place there. Without going so far as forbidding ac-
cess to the zone, Iran . . . recommend foreign ships to avoid the zone by following
shipping lanes outside it, thereby disclaiming responsibility for any damage
which might be incurred on passing through the zone. Thus warned . . . , ships
102
which persisted . . . did so at their own risk." Iran began shuttling merchant con-
voys under naval protection down her coast, through Iraq's GulfMaritime Exclu-
103
sion Zone (GMEZ), to the lower Gulf. According to an Iranian commentator,
"contrary to allegations, Iran never extended its war zone to . . . Hormuz and, on 22
October . . . , reaffirmed a commitment to keeping the Strait open to naviga-
tion." The United States later welcomed belligerents' assurances that Hormuz
would remain open. Despite lapses in its threats to close the Strait, or its ap-
107
parent use of others' territorial sea for naval maneuvers, there is clear evidence
to the contrary ofa commentator's view that Iran's position in the Third UN Con-
ference on the Law ofthe Sea (UNCLOS III) that produced the 1982 LOS Conven-
tion "remained faithful to monarchical Iran's worldview regarding the navigation
regime ofthe Gulf, most notably, opposition of a special regime for straits used for
international navigation . .
.
, as well as insistence on prior authorization of war-
108
ships intending to exercise innocent passage through the territorial sea."
On October 7 Iraq declared the Gulf north of 29 degrees 30 minutes North lati-
109
tude "a prohibited war zone;" this was the Tanker War arena until 1984. This
war zone declaration was reportedly reprisal, or retaliation, for the Iranian "block-
ade." By far the most severe blow to the Iraqi economy was Iran's successful clo-
sure of the Gulf, soon after hostilities began, to Iraqi oil exports. Closing Iraq's
coast and Iranian bombing ofIraqi oil terminals forced Iraq to use pipelines to Ku-
waiti, Saudi, Syrian and Turkish ports to export oil to finance the war, or to export
or import war-sustaining goods by other means, i.e., nearby third-State ports. The
result was that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia sold oil and turned over at least part ofthe
proceeds to Iraq as loans. They also made cash grants to Iraq. Estimates of Saudi
and Kuwaiti financial aid range from $25 billion to $65 billion. Although hav-
ing sided with Iran early in the war, Syria allowed Iraqi oil exports through the
Kirkuk (Iraq)-Tripoli (Lebanon)-Banias (Syria) pipeline until 1982. 114 During
the fall, "as reprisal for Kuwaiti assistance to Iraq," Iranian warplanes attacked
42 The Tanker War
Kuwaiti border posts and bombed the Um-Aish oil refineries, 25 miles below the
Iraqi border.
Whether these were arms-length bargains, or these States acted out of fear of a
powerful neighbor, or otherwise, is less than clear. Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE
maintained strict official silence, although two UAE principalities (including Ras
117
Al Khaimah, which lost islands to Iran in 1971) loaned Iraq $1-3 billion by the
end of 1981, Abu Dhabi loaned $500 million a year by 1983, and Qatar loaned an-
1 I o
other $1 billion. ' UK intelligence discovered Iraqi helicopters and troops in
Oman preparing to invade and occupy Abu Musa and the Tunbs; the UK and US
governments successfully pressed Oman to scuttle the Iraqi plan. Later, Saudi
119
Arabia persuaded Iraq to abandon the plan. Thus, at the beginning of the war
nearly all Gulf littoral States supported, or at least tilted toward, Iraq. Jordan had
solidly supported Iraq, opening the Port ofAqaba on the Red Sea for Iraqi civilian
and military imports. According to Iran, Jordan also permitted Iraqi use of an air
120 • r
base. This support was probably necessary for survival of the Iraqi regime, be-
cause Iranian bombardment of Iraqi Gulf ports early in the war made Iraq effec-
tively a landlocked country. By the end of 1980 its oil exports had dwindled from
121
over 3 million to 1 million barrels a day. Although officially neutral, Turkey
122
leaned toward Iraq. Nevertheless, perhaps 10 percent ofTurkey's exports went
123
to Iran during the war and another 10 percent to Iraq. Egypt sold weapons to
Iraq and may have augmented the Iraqi army with mercenaries and volunteer de-
tachments. Egyptian pilots took part in air raids on Iran.
Officially neutral, the United Kingdom improved relations with Iraq. France
125
was also neutral, but its policies favored Iraq. Private contractors in both coun-
tries signed deals with Iraq, and other States' arms dealers went through Iraq's oil
1 yf:
customers to supply Iraq arms and spares. At the beginning of the war the
United States did not have diplomatic relations with either belligerent; US rela-
tions with Iran were bad because ofthe ongoing Hostage Crisis. On the other hand,
the USSR had relations with both and was in a less strained position with respect to
Iran, for which there had been historic Russian interest. Soviet aid to Iran stood at
$1 billion in 1980. 127 By the end of the war the USSR had provided $8.8 to 9.2 bil-
128
lion in military assistance, most of it coming through Aqaba. The initial Soviet
response to the invasion was strong disapproval, despite the 1972 Iraq-USSR
friendship treaty, and may have resulted in beginning Iraqi overtures to the
129
United States. Italy's previously solid economic relations with Iraq were put
under pressure when it declared neutrality; Italy's Fincantieri shipyard could not
then deliver 1 1 warships Iraq ordered as part of a $1.1 billion contract. Italian ex-
port licenses granted in 1981 lapsed because of the government's decision to ban
military exports to the belligerents. Iraq then refused to pay on its $2 billion debt to
Italy. Italian companies and Italian nationals also worked on Iranian construction
projects; this kept Italy from a high diplomatic profile. Italian businesses operated
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with both belligerents. The FRG maintained a more evenhanded approach.
Smaller northern European States not dependent on Gulf oil looked to the United
Nations to resolve the war. Spain and Greece, Gulf oil dependent, got all of it they
needed. 130
The Islamic revolution left Iran in poor financial condition. As more skilled,
better educated and wealthy people fled, oil production declined, and foreign ex-
change reserves dwindled from $14.6 billion in 1979 to $1 billion in 1981. How-
132
ever, Iran had military spare parts reserves, a legacy of the Shah's rule; these
supplied its war machine for awhile. Syria and Libya supported Iran, airlifting
133USSR-made arms to Iran; Syria provided intelligence. Some private arms deal-
ers in States officially leaning toward Iraq sold supplies to Iran. Israel sold Iran
arms and spares from its stocks and got others from European sources. North Ko-
rea, East Germany and Cuba, eager to buy oil, sold Iran military supplies. The
USSR, officially linked closely with Iraq, may have sold war goods to Iran as
i -in
well, but Iraqi reverses in 1982 prompted promises of Soviet aid to Iraq. The
USSR was caught among three conflicting foreign policy issues: its relationship
with Iraq, an official amicable stance toward the Iranian revolution, and an inter-
national atmosphere marred by the Afghanistan invasion and tense US-Iran rela-
tions after the Hostage Crisis. The Soviet Union had declared its neutrality early in
138
the war, however. The USSR appeared dissatisfied with Iraqi military action in
late 1980, and flirted with Iran and its friends, inter alia signing a Friendship
Treaty with Syria in October. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union did not totally aban-
don Iraq. Iraq, perhaps petulently, rejected arms from the USSR this time. Warsaw
Pact countries—Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland—increased arms sales to Iraq.
Early in the war Iran rebuffed a Soviet arms offer. Iran did get satellite information
139
on impending Iraqi attacks, however. Iran was determined to be militarily
self-sufficient as part of the Islamic revolution. Iraq, on the other hand, relied in-
creasingly on Gulf State financial subventions, up to $18-20 billion by the end of
1981. Iraq also came to rely on the superpowers diplomatically too.
In November Iranian NOTMARs directed ships entering or leaving Iranian
ports to get coordinates for Gulftravel from its navy and to inform the relevant Ira-
nian port of their position hourly. Inbound ships had to give estimated time of ar-
rival at Bandar Abbas and be cleared. If not cleared, they were to anchor there.
Early in 1981 a NOTMAR directed all very large crude carriers or ultra large crude
carriers (VLCC or ULCC), not inbound for Iranian ports and intending to cross
the Iranian restricted zone, to contact Iranian naval headquarters with travel in-
formation 48 hours before departure, ostensibly for ship safety reasons.
"Although neither Iran nor Iraq declared contraband lists, the fact that both na-
tions attacked neutral crude oil carriers, loaded and in ballast, indicated both . .
.
regarded oil as contraband. Whether classified as absolute or conditional contra-
band, oil and the armaments which its sale or barter on international markets
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[would] bring, were absolutely indispensable to the war efforts of the . . . bellig-
erents." No prize courts were established until the end of the war, when Iran
published its rules, which did not include a contraband list.
The UK Armilla Patrol was deployed in the Gulf from the beginning; Gulf
States provided it and other western navies facilities. Logistics sources limited
Patrol operations to the lower Gulf, up to 40 miles north ofDubai, and outside war
zones; UK merchantmen steaming to Kuwait were not protected northward. A
US guided missile cruiser was ordered to the Gulf in October; President Carter
wanted a naval task force presence to keep Hormuz open. By October 1 5 at least
60 Australian, French, UK and US warships were in the Indian Ocean to protect
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the oil route; 29 Soviet vessels were also there. US overall policy had these
themes:
(1) United States neutrality . .
.
(2) American expectation of neutrality and non-interference by other nations;
particularly the U.S.S.R.
(3) Defense of United States vital interests including:
(a) Preservation of freedom of navigation to and from the Gulf,
(b) Prevention of the war's expansion in ways that would threaten the re-
gion's security.
(4) A desire for the immediate cessation of hostilities and solution of the dispute
by diplomatic means.
These derived from US goals of peace and preventing a wider war. The United
States had imposed economic sanctions on Iran when the Hostage Crisis began.
Some controls were revoked in 1981 after the hostages' return, others remained in
force, and more controls were imposed again in 1987 because of Iran's actions
against US flag vessels in the Gulf. The United Kingdom had passed special leg-
islation to permit Orders in Council to limit contracts related to Iran in early 1980,
152
and this legislation also remained in effect during the war.
When the war began 70 neutral-flag vessels were trapped in the Shatt. Despite
UN good offices in October 1980, including a plea for a ceasefire to allow them to
leave under a UN or Red Cross flag, Iraq refused to allow it, citing its "full"
sovereignty over the Shatt. Iran had accepted the proposal. ' The ships re-
mained in the waterway for the rest of the war.
2. 1981: Efforts at Settlement; the GulfStates Organize the GCC.
In March 1981 the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) offered the bellig-
157
erents a peace plan; they rejected it. UN mediation, which had begun in No-
158
vember, had failed by April.
Between May and November 1981 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
and the UAE established the GulfCooperation Council under Saudi leadership with
French and UK advice, to effect coordination, integration and interconnection
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between member States to achieve unity among them. GCC members moved to-
ward economic integration and defense and security coordination between 1981
159
and the end ofthe war. The Council initially stressed economic and social plan-
ning, as is evident from its Charter, but security issues eventually emerged as the
GCC's primary focus. The Council "consistently supported Iraq and repeatedly
called for cease-fire in the war, fully endorsing Security Council resolutions."
Although the GCC tried to underline its neutrality, Iran may have seen its estab-
lishment as a step against it and the Islamic revolution. However, one member,
UAE, pursued its special relationship with Iran; the GCC secretariat approved it to
maintain open, friendly communication with Iran. Even here there was ambiva-
1 r-3
lence because of Iran's occupying Abu Musa and the Tunbs. Similarly, al-
though basically supporting Iraq, Kuwait felt pressure from Iran because of its
geographic proximity.
Militarily, the GCC was weak, relative to the belligerents, except the Saudi air
force; the other five States mustered only 100,000 in their armed forces. The
GCC was never totally unified, at least early in the war. For example, Qatar, be-
cause of a Saudi-Qatar dispute over the Khufu strip, withdrew forces from Penin-
sula Shield I, the first relatively modest GCC combined exercise. This action,
according to an Iranian commentator, reportedly "followed a succession of other
blows to attempts at constructing a common defense arrangement." Later Pen-
insula Shields (II, 1984; III, 1987), were more successful. For the first time in the
Twentieth Century, forces from all GCC States participated in cooperative mili-
tary activities aimed at defending their territories. Although the war initially
posed a threat to GCC States, the end result was a stronger, more unified military
structure. In 1984 its Council decided on a rapid intervention force for peacekeep-
ing operations in the Gulf area; in 1987 the Council approved a comprehensive se-
i fn
curity strategy, which may amount to a collective defense pact. Nevertheless,
most Western analysts concluded during the war's early years that the narrow
military significance ofany GCC measures would remain marginal. Council mem-
bers, even if they acted in unison, were seen as lacking manpower and infrastruc-
ture to mount an adequate defense against a determined aggressor. Although the
GCC States could not stop a Soviet attack, they could increase the political and mil-
itary costs of aggressive moves by regional States, e.g., Iran or Iraq, and thereby
1 CO
serve as a deterrent. GCC States also negotiated a web of bilateral internal secu-
169
nty arrangements to combat subversion and terrorism. The May 1981 GCC
summit in Abu Dhabi declared that the Gulf should remain free of international
conflicts and expressed fear offoreign intervention. Its November Riyadah confer-
ence expressed hope that efforts coming from the ICO, non-aligned States, and the
United Nations, would be successful. Thus the GCC came to emphasize the ICO as
a mediator between the belligerents. Thus, early in the war, the GCC's signifi-
cance and the emerging regional security framework was seen
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as an information-sharing network for . . . containing] . . . internal subversion and
violence; as a wholly indigenous and domestically palatable framework for serious
and routine consultation with a view toward enhancing members' diplomatic
initiatives and deterrent capabilities against external aggression; and as a possible
venue for establishing more realistic, efficient, and compatible industrial plans in an
era of reduced income.
171Much would depend on events in Iran and Iraq, however.
Also in 1981, at Saudi request, US Air Force AWACS aircraft deployed to Saudi
172
Arabia to enhance surveillance capabilities. The incoming Reagan Administra-
tion saw the USSR as the major threat in the Gulf, a purported shift in US pol-
173
icy. On Saudi advice, the Administration sent a special emissary to Baghdad in
April 1981, and Iraq announced in July that the head of the US interests section
would be treated as a de facto ambassador. US military presence was to be in-
creased, including assets prepositioning a Navy-Marine Corps task force, Army
and Air Force exercises, creation of the RDJTF, and efforts to get access to Indian
175Ocean facilities. A May 27 US NOTMAR repeated previous warnings and
Iran's revised shipping guidelines.
In May 1981 Iran seized a Kuwaiti survey ship and a Danish vessel, Elsa Cat,
bound for the UAE and Kuwait and carrying military equipment to Iraq; Iraq
protested Elsa Cat's seizure. Both vessels were let go. Iran was careful at this time to
avoid provoking neighbors or major Western powers, being dependent on trans-
1 77
shipments from the UAE and food imports through the Gulf. In October an Ira-
nian air raid damaged Kuwaiti Umm Aish oil installations. Beginning in 198 1 and
continuing through 1984, Iraq attacked commmercial vessels in the northern
Gulf, usually tankers and cargo ships calling at Bandar Khomeni or Bushire, Iran
178
after being convoyed through Iranian territorial waters. In March 1982 it was
reported that Iraq had mined the Bandar Khomeni - port ofBandar Mashahr chan-
nel to the open sea. An Iranian tanker had been lost in February, probably to
1 79
mines. There are apparently no published reports of oil spillage and pollution,
or pollution from other cargoes or bunkers from these or later attacks, except for
1 80
the 1983 Nowruz attack. However, it is safe to infer that there was spillage and
therefore pollution of harbors and offshore sea areas; the extent is unknown. The
minelayers' motivation and care in conducting these and later attacks is also un-
known. In April 1982 Syria had shut off Iraq's oil pipeline access to the Mediterra-
nean; Iraq could now only export oil through Saudi Arabia and a trans-Turkey
181
pipeline. In 1984 the Turkish line was expanded; in 1987 a second leg was built.
Oil was also trucked across Jordan to the Port of Aqaba. This network, which
included a spur pipeline to Yanbu in Saudi Arabia, increased Iraqi export capacity
from 650,000 barrels a day in 1982, the low point during the war, to 2.5 million
1 8?
barrels a day in 1987, or close to prewar output. Iran also realized the danger of
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lifting its oil through Gulf ports and planned a 1200-kilometer pipeline to Jask in
183
the Indian Ocean.
3. 1982: More Efforts at Peacemaking; Iraq's Maritime Exclusion Zone.
In May 1982 Iraq tried to invoke the Arab League mutual defense treaty to get
military aid from League members. Syria warned that ifEgypt, a League member,
184
lined up with Iraq, Syria would go with Iran. The result was a political standoff.
185
Algerian attempts to mediate the dispute almost resulted in a breakthrough.
The GulfCooperation Council's emergency meeting in April had declared support
for efforts to end the war, and its May emergency meeting had adjourned until May
30 to allow efforts, including those ofthe ICO, to end the war. When this effort col-
lapsed, the GCC called on Iran to respond positively to Iraq's peace initiatives. For
the first time, the Council identified Iran as the intransigent party. The GCC re-
peated this call in July 1982. This year marked the GCC's awakening to shoulder-
ing its security responsibilities more forcefully. GCC defense ministers authorized
comprehensive cooperation in security affairs. Peninsula Shield II was held in
187
1984, a result of these decisions.
In June 1982 the GCC had offered a peace plan : ceasefire, withdrawal to the 1 975
188borders and negotiations on other issues. In July and October Security Council
1 89
Resolutions 514 and 522 called for a ceasefire. The UN Secretary-General re-
ported Iraq was ready to cooperate in implementing Resolution 514, which also
190
called for UN observers to supervise a ceasefire and withdrawal. Iran was not;
the next day (July 13,1 982) Iran launched the first ofmany offensives into Iraq, the
191
first real invasion of its adversary. In September the Arab League urged ending
192
the war and complying with Council resolutions. Iraq subscribed to this peace
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plan, sponsored by Saudi Arabia; Iran rejected it, demanding $1 50 billion in in-
demnity. Even Saudi Arabia's private offer to pay $50 billion to Iran in indem-
195
nity was refused. Israel's invading Lebanon in June also helped blow these
efforts off course. By late 1982 all Gulf States had policies of strict neutrality be-
cause of fear ofIran except Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which strongly favored Iraq.
Kuwait was fearful of its northern neighbor as well; Iraq continued to demand a
lease of Kuwait's Bubiyan Island at the Shatt's mouth. Saudi Arabia agreed to pay
for five Super Etendard fighters, sold by France to Iraq, in Saudi oil money. Ku-
wait and Saudi Arabia also guaranteed performance offoreign companies' defense
contracts with Iraq. Observers claim Iraq could not have sustained its war effort
197
without the French deliveries. The United States authorized sale of60 helicop-
1 Q8
ters for "agricultural purposes" and $460 million ofcredits for American rice.
On August 1 2, 1 982 Iraq had announced its GMEZ, advising it would attack any
ship within the zone and that tankers docking at Iran's Kharg Island, regardless of
199
nationality, would be targets. Kharg was Iran's main export terminal. When an-
nouncing the GMEZ and "blockade" of Kharg, Iraq stressed that its war zones
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were designed to cope with difficulties in distinguishing between vessel nationali-
ties in the Gulf. On August 29 Iran responded, declaring it would protect
foreign shipping, began escorting foreign shipping, and deployed ships with sur-
face-to-air missiles at Kharg. Iran began giving naval protection to shuttle convoys
of Iran-flagged and neutral flag merchantmen lifting oil from Iranian northern
Gulf ports to those farther down its shore for world export. Iraq attacked ships in
its GMEZ through September. The GMEZ was modified in November, Iraq
"ask[ing] all companies and owners of oil tankers that their vessels [would] be sub-
201ject to danger upon entering the . . . zone." In general, however, up to March
202
1984, Iraq attacked all ships in its GMEZ. " This aspect of the war was the only
203
theater where the initiative lay with Iraq. The US freedom of navigation policy
was redefined to keeping Gulf access open for nonbelligerents. Contacts with
the United States increased, and in 1982 the United States removed Iraq from its
205
list of States supporting international terrorism, thereby opening a door for
more Iraq-US contacts, e.g., intelligence information and business. The USSR
by now had receded from its initial disapproval of Iraq's invasion and began to in-
crease supplies to Iraq, to the point where the Soviet Union underwrote most of
Iraq's 1987 defense effort. The USSR was primarily concerned with Iraq's sur-
vival; an Iranian military victory was not considered to be in the Soviet Union's
207
best interests.
The November 1982 Bahrain GulfCooperation Council summit focused on Ira-
nian complicity in a failed coup in Bahrain, and "More than any other event, [it]
molded the GCC's view on how to react toward Iran." Although Saudi Arabia
failed to convince GCC members to help Iraq financially, it succeeded in identify-
ing the Iranian Islamic Revolution as a threat to the GCC. After the summit GCC
defense ministers and others conferred to coordinate contingency plans for con-
taining the war, i.e., to prevent spillover into their territories. These officials asked
Iran to respond to the ICO, UN and other peace missions; there was no response.
208Given these rejections, the GCC decided to officially support Iraq. In January
1983 Iran, Libya and Syria issued a "Damascus Communique," condemning Iraq
and expressing support for Iran. GCC foreign ministers sent a strong rebuke, say-
ing the Communique did not serve Arab unity and would not help end the war.
The 1983 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit urged a ceasefire appealing to
the United Nations to consider a peacekeeping force at the belligerents' bor-
ders.
209
4. 1983:Assault on theEnvironment; The UNSupports Freedom ofNavigation.
On March 2, 1983 Iraq bombed Iran's Nowruz offshore oilfield, causing an im-
mense slick; previously it had bombed Kharg facilities.
Efforts to arrange a cease-fire ... to allow anti-pollution activities were unsuccessful,
and the persistent oil slick in a level of pollution which some experts believed would
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cause permanent damage to the Gulf ecosystem; ... by early June . . . desalination
plants in Saudi Arabia had to be closed, while Dubai [one of the UAE] announced on
3 June that it had [imposed a ban] on all imports of fish from neighbouring Gulf
countries after the discovery that existing stocks had been contaminated by oil.
In some areas the oil was reportedly two feet thick. International shipping lanes
were threatened, since many vessels use sea water for cooling and distilling into
fresh water. Early reports that the slick had equalled the area ofBelgium were later
discounted. Strong winds blew it offshore and partially dispersed it. Iraq rejected
Iran's request for a partial truce so that oil cappers could try to stop the 2000 to 5000
210
barrels a day flow. (A merchantman's allision with a well on January 27 had
211
caused part of the spill. ) The United States may have been involved in helping
212
get the spill capped. Iran characterized the attack as a clear violation of the Ku-
wait Regional Convention organization regulations which "strictly prohibited]
213
military attacks on oil installations." Iraq countered that the conventions
"ha[d] no effect in . . . armed conflict." The London-based War Risks Rating
Committee raised marine cargo insurance rates in 1982 and again in 1984 because
215
of Iraqi attacks on Gulf shipping.
In October the Security Council called for a ceasefire. Resolution 540 "Con-
demn[ed] all violations of international humanitarian law, in particular . . . the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 in all their aspects, and call[ed] for the immediate ces-
sation of all military operations against civilian targets, including city and residen-
tial areas[.]" The Resolution
. . . Affirm[ed] the right of free navigation and commerce in international waters,
callfed] on all States to respect this right and also call[ed] upon the belligerents to
cease immediately all hostilities in the region of the Gulf, including all sea-lanes,
navigable waterways, harbour works, terminals, offshore installations and all ports
with direct or indirect access to the sea, and to respect the integrity of the other
littoral States.
The Council "Call[ed] upon both parties to refrain from any action that may endan-
ger peace and security as well as marine life in the region of the Gulf."' In voting
to approve Resolution 540, the USSR made it clear that it would firmly oppose
21
7
armed intervention in the Gulffor any reason, including freedom ofnavigation.
The GulfCooperation Council's fourth summit endorsed the resolution. The GCC
thus went on record, for the first time, to support freedom of navigation in the
Gulf.
218
On January 1, 1983 the US Central Command (CENTCOM) had been estab-
lished to replace the RDJTF to plan and coordinate US military operations in the
region more effectively. France and Britain continued to maintain a substantial
Indian Ocean naval presence, with ships regularly sent there. The USSR also
continued its Indian Ocean presence. President Reagan had reaffirmed and
50 The Tanker War
expanded the Carter Doctrine to include US interest in dealing with threats to
Saudi Arabia and readiness to keep the Strait open if Iran tried to stop shipping
there. US buildup continued. Operation Staunch sought to curtail the arms
721
flow to Iran. US policy had changed in late 1983, following Iraqi officials' visit
to Washington, where they advised the United States that closing the Gulf to Iraqi
oil exports had hurt the Iraqi economy and that Iraq would have to increase the
222
cost of the war to Iran in order to press Iran to end it. In December 1983 Iran
sought to revive the Regional Cooperation for Development Agreement with Paki-
stan and Turkey that the Shah had established in the 1960s. Pakistan and Turkey
223
received the overture cordially.
5. 1984: Attacks on Tankers and Other Shipping; Responses.
Perhaps presciently, the United States published this Notice to Airmen
(NOTAM) and NOTMAR in January 1984:
A. U.S. naval forces operating in international waters within the . . . Gulf, Strait of
Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman are taking additional defensive precautions against
terrorist threats. Aircraft at altitudes less than 2000 ft AGL [above ground level] . . .
not cleared for approach/departure to or from a regional airport are requested to avoid
approaching closer than five NM [nautical miles] to U.S. naval forces. It is also
requested that aircraft approaching within five NM establish and maintain radio
contact with U.S. naval forces on [designated frequencies]. Aircraft which approach
within five NM at altitudes less than 2000 ft AGL whose intentions are unclear to
U.S. naval forces may be held at risk by U.S. defensive measures.
B. This notice is published solely to advise that hazardous operations are being
conducted on an unscheduled basis; it does not affect the freedom of navigation of
any individual or State. . . . ^24
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Iran protested this and later "cordon sanitaires" around US warships and air-iv
craft, and US Navy ships transiting Iran's territorial sea during the war. l The
United States rejected the protests, asserting a right of self-defense. l These
claims were seen as a hardening of positions between Iran and the United States.
The US official position was that Iran was refusing to end the war, and not Iraq,
which had accepted Resolution 540, and that Iraq attacked shipping in its GMEZ,
while Iran was hitting neutral vessels in international waters. By now 19 US war-
228
ships, including a carrier, were in the Gulfarea. Britain decided not to use an en-
229
velope around its Armilla Patrol.
In March 1984 the United States reportedly tried to persuade some Gulf States
to avoid a crisis by letting the United States use their military facilities and to allow
military supplies prepositioning in Bahrain, Oman and the UAE. The United
States had coordinated contingency plans with Great Britain for escorting tankers
and providing air cover in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. US plans also
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reportedly included blockading Kharg Island, mining Iranian Gulf ports and
commando raids on Iranian bases. However, the United States insisted that it be
invited into the region and that any arrangement must involve Western allies. The
730
mission came to naught. Part of the background for the US initiative may have
been Kuwait's claim that Iran had attacked Bubiyan Island, owned by Kuwait, and
Kuwait's complaint ofIranian hospitality to terrorists who hijacked a Kuwaiti air-
231
liner and escaped to Iran.
In February 1984 the Iraqi GMEZ had been extended to 50 miles around Kharg
Island; Iraq warned that ships approaching Bandar Khomeni or Bushire would be
737 233
sunk. Bandar Khomeni approaches had been mined the previous October.
Britain protested a March 1 Iraqi attack on a convoyed cargo ship, The Charming, in
the Bandar Khomeni approaches; Indian and Turkish vessels were also at-
tacked. The war was creeping down the Gulf. Tankers were hit in Iraqi air at-
tacks on Kharg, and Iraq destroyed Saudi tankers outside its GMEZ. Iran attacked
Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers, including a supertanker, Yanbu Pride, for the first time
235
in April and May 1984. Iraqi attacks were airborne, since the Iran "blockade"
had effectively bottled up Iraq's relatively weaker naval forces. Iraq had shifted
its anti-shipping campaign focus in an effort to attack the weak link in Iran's war
237
economy and to arouse world interest in the conflict, perhaps to "draw in other
states, the Western powers in particular, in the hope that they would support Iraq
238
and help to bring about a peaceful settlement." Iraq had some success in dis-
rupting Iranian oil exports; its attacks promoted third State measures designed to
239
protect their nationals' commercial interests. In attacking mostly neutral-flag
tankers sailing independently,
Iraq appears to have devoted minimal effort to obtaining visual identification of the
target before [launching missiles;] . . . accidents . . . did occur. Iran does not appear to
have begun attacking commercial shipping until Iraq commenced its anti-tanker
campaign— Since there was no sea traffic with Iraq, Iran attacked neutral merchant
shipping destined to and from neutral ports . .
. ,
presumably ... to persuade Iraq's
financial backers, the other Gulf States, to dissuade Iraq from its campaign against
the Kharg Island tankers. Iran's attacks on merchant shipping were less numerous . .
.
and, in general, less costly in lives and property . .
. ,
[being] conducted with rockets
instead of missiles. . . . Iran devoted more effort to target identification than did
Iraq. . .
.
Iran did not conduct its attacks in declared . . . zones[,] and some . . . attacks
were ... in neutral territorial waters.240
This expansion ofthe Tanker War led the United States to grant a Saudi request to
buy Stinger short-range air defense missile systems. The USSR supplied Iraq
with weapons, consistent with its bilateral friendship and cooperation treaty, and
at the same time Soviet weaponry may have found its way to Iran through North
Korea and the PRC. Soviet arms sales seemed to follow the fortunes of the battle-
field and Soviet failure to achieve influence within Iran. France was becoming a
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heavy supplier to Iraq and in 1984 sold $4.5 million in arms to Saudi Arabia,
which may have found their way to Iraq. Sweden began selling arms to Bahrain
but mostly to Iran through middlemen in Austria, Brazil, Ecuador, Singapore,
Thailand and Yugoslavia. Among these sales were 40 "pleasure cruisers," as desig-
nated by a Swedish manufacturer, to the Iranian coast guard. At the same time the
UN Secretary-General chose a Swedish politician who later became prime minis-
ter, Olaf Palme, as mediator between the belligerents.
The Tunis May 9-10 Arab League Summit Conference strongly condemned at-
248
tacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers. The Soviet Union was concerned that Ira-
nian attacks on the tankers would result in a major regional war on its borders and
a possibility ofUS intervention. Although the USSR negotiated with Iran in June
1984 concerning Soviet military support of Iraq, little changed in Soviet behavior,
which was becoming increasingly pro-Iraq, partly due to Iranian purges ofpro-So-
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viet groups in Iran.
In April an Iraq-laid mine had damaged a Saudi tanker, and in May Iran initi-
250
ated a retaliatory policy against Arab shipping. On May 2 1 the GCC States com-
plained to the Security Council about Iranian "acts ofaggression on the freedom of
navigation" to and from their ports, asserting that "Such acts ofaggression consti-
tute a threat to the stability and security of the area and have serious implications
251
for international peace and security."' Iran justified the attacks on reaction
against aid to Iraq by States in the region, and "indivisibility of security in the . .
.
252
Gulf." Although this argument concededly had no basis in law, Iran hoped tar-
253
get States would pressure Iraq, whom they had been supplying, to stop attacks
on Iran. During Council meetings many States addressed freedom ofnavigation.
. . . Norway . . . expressed regret that ships had been attacked in international waters
outside the declared war zones, and stated that free and safe navigation should be
secured for international shipping in the area. . . . Kuwait said that attacks against
Saudi and Kuwaiti tankers were acts of aggression committed against . . . two
countries . . . not parties to the . . . conflict, carried out in violation of . . . conventions
according to which the high seas [were] open to all countries. This view was shared in
general terms by other Gulf States such as Bahrain, Oman, [UAE] and Saudi Arabia.
Yemen also denounced those attacks aimed against tankers belonging to States . . .
not parties to the conflict. The importance of . . . free navigation and free commerce
was further stressed by . . . Ecuador, [FRG], India, Jordan, Liberia, Morocco,
Pakistan, Somalia and Sudan[.] . . . Panama called on the . . . Council to take action to
ensure that the right of free navigation and trade in international waters might be
effectively exercised by all [T]he Netherlands pointed out the legal aspects of the
attacks on shipping in the Gulf, recognizing that under international law belligerents
may . . . restrict shipping to and from ports of . . . belligerents, and that such measures
do of necessity affect the rights of third States under whose flags such shipping is
conducted; . . . deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against merchant shipping in
any part of the Gulf were to be considered absolutely outside the scope of the
permissible use of armed force. The Soviet Union, . . . restating that any foreign
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armed intervention in the . . . Gulf was inadmissible, no matter what the pretext,
asserted that international law demand[ed] strict observance of . . . freedom of
navigation, as laid down in general maritime law and in binding treaty obligations.
The other permanent members of the . . . Council reaffirmed in rather general terms
the legitimate rights and interests of third States. 2^
The Arab League Secretary General also invited the Council to take appropriate
measures to protect navigation in the region and to ensure safety of international
sea lanes and channels. Many States addressing the Council had vessels under
their registries, perhaps under flags ofconvenience (e.g., Liberia, Panama), or were
major carriers, in the Gulftrade. Many had been or would be major naval players in
the Tanker War. The resulting Resolution 552 (June 1, 1984)
. . . Call[ed] upon all States to respect, in accordance with international law, the
right of freedom of navigation; . . . Reaffirmed] the right of free navigation in
international waters and sea lanes for shipping en route to and from all ports and
installations of the littoral States that are not parties to the hostilities; . . . Call[ed]
upon all State to respect the territorial integrity of the States . . . not parties to the
hostilities ...;... Condemned] the recent attacks on commercial ships en route to and
from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; . . . Demand[ed] that such attacks should
cease forthwith and that there should be no interference with ships en route to and
from States . . . not parties to the hostilities; . . . Decide[ed], in the event of
non-compliance with the present resolution, to meet again to consider effective
measures . .
.
commensurate with the gravity ofthe situation ... to ensure the freedom
of navigation in the area . . . .258
ICQ
A GCC draft resolution would have named Iran as an aggressor. A week later the
London Economic Summit of major Western powers and Japan
. .
.
expressed [its] deep concern at the mounting toll in human suffering, physcial
damage and bitterness that this conflict has brought; and at the breaches of
international humanitarian law that have occurred.
. .
.
The hope and desire ... is that both sides will cease their attacks on each other
and on the shipping of other States. The principle of freedom of navigation must be
respected. We are concerned that the conflict should not spread further and we shall
do what we can to encourage stability in the region.
. .
.
We also considered the implications for world oil supplies [T]he world oil
market has remained relatively stable. . . . [T]he international system has both the
will and the capacity to cope with any foreseeable problems through the continuation
of the prudent and realistic approach . . . being applied. 2^
Almost simultaneously Saudi aircraft, with US AWACS help, downed an Iranian
fighter over the Gulfafter two warnings; there was a dispute as to whether it was in
international or Saudi airspace, but in any event Iran appeared unwilling to
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challenge the Saudis. Two weeks later Saudi Arabia established an Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ), the Fahd Line, beyond Saudi territorial sea limits.
This allowed Saudi interceptors, guided by US AWACS and refuelled by US air
tankers, to engage other aircraft, primarily Irani, threatening shipping. Saudi
Arabia also proclaimed a 12-mile safety corridor within the GCC States' territorial
sea. It was intended to provide security for neutral shipping carrying oil from Ku-
wait and other supporters of Iraq.
At the same time, however, pragmatists within Iran tried to reassure GCC
States; a diplomatic breakthrough for Iran came a year later, in May 1985, when
the Saudi foreign minister paid an official State visit. There were also high-level
exchanges between Iran and Oman and the UAE. The one area where diplomatic
progress eluded Iran was the tanker war. Even here, for more than a year Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia tried to resolve differences through bilateral negotiations. The
Tanker War was not amenable to diplomatic solution between the GulfArabs and
Iran, because it was an Iraqi war policy. Iraq controlled the timing and intensity of
attacks on Iranian shipping and oil installations; with fewer operational aircraft
and weapons, Iran had to choose when and against whom to respond. Tankers car-
rying Kuwaiti oil became special targets of Iranian attacks because of all the GCC
countries, Iran had the least friendly relations with Kuwait, which was far weaker
militarily than Saudi Arabia.
During the summer of 1984 mines detonated in the Gulf of Suez and the Strait
ofBab el Mandeb, choke points for the Red Sea to the west ofSaudi Arabia, damag-
ing several ships. Although Iran and Libya were accused of laying the mines, Iran
denied the charges; it is thought that the Libyan cargo ship Ghat laid them. Egypt
exercised its right under the Constantinople Convention to inspect all shipping,
and a half dozen navies cooperated in locating and destroying the mines. Saudi
Arabia received US assistance in sweeping its ports of Jidda and Yanbu.
A UN-sponsored ceasefire in the land war supposedly lasted from June 1984 to
March 1985. The belligerents agreed to stop attacks on civilian population cen-
ters. Iran proposed that the truce include Gulf shipping as well, and Iraq in-
sisted that any agreement must allow it to repair or replace its Gulf oil export facili-
ties. Impasse resulted. Kuwait also negotiated with the Netherlands to buy
mine-hunting ships; a UK order had forbidden export of small boats and boat
parts.
268
TheUN Secretary-General report mandated by Resolution 552 included States'
concerns over incidents since June 4. The report, later supplemented, expressed
International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) "deep concern" over "serious
escalation of attacks on innocent and neutral merchant ships and their crews" in
the war. The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) chair and the President of
the International Shipping Federation (ISF) also declared that merchant shipping
attacks "had led to much loss of life and to the destruction and damage of many
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vessels; they appealed to the Secretary-General and the [UN] to continue efforts to
end the attacks." The Secretary-General brought these concerns and Resolution
269
552 to the belligerents' attention.
6. 1985: War of the Cities Renewed; The Tanker War Continues;
Heightened Responses.
270
In 1985 the truce was broken; the War ofthe Cities was renewed. In April Eu-
ropean heads of State issued a declaration asking for the war to end and for
belligerents to stop using chemical weapons; at the same time, however, large ship-
271
ments of European arms began arriving in Iraq. Iraq successfully renewed at-
tacks on Kharg and Iranian tankers; Iran restarted a campaign against neutral
272
tankers with less success. By the end of 1985 "the tanker war had [become] the
773
most important feature of the Iran-Iraq War." In June 1985 Iran had inter-
cepted and detainedAl-Muharaq, a Kuwaiti-flag ship Kuwait bound but suppos-
edly carrying "5 tonnes of merchandise clearly intended for Iraq." Iraq had been
using Kuwait as an entry port for goods since the beginning of the war. (It was
275
only in late 1987 and early 1988 that Iran enacted a prize law; this ex postfacto
legislation was justification for seizure ofAl-Muharaq and other Kuwait-bound
ships.) In September Iran's visit and search procedures, looking for strategic
materials for Iraq, were stepped up. Although Iran could not (or chose not to try
277 ... . . .
to) close Hormuz by military action, Iran might succeed in scaring off enough
shipping to make a difference, since oil sales financed Iraq's war effort, and it
had to ship through the Gulf, being denied Mediterranean Sea pipeline access ex-
279
cept through Turkey. Iranian crude was now being ferried in Iranian tankers
from Kharg to Sirri Island in the lower Gulf, where it was stored in "mother" ships
for transfer to customers' tankers. Iranian tanker shuttles also operated between
280Kharg and Lavan Island in the lower Gulf. Iran also established a helicopter
base on its offshore Reshadat oil platform 75 miles from the Qatari coast. Iran
was also beginning to feel the pinch of seriously depleted stocks of replacement
282
parts, particularly for its air force.
The August 1985 Casablanca Arab League summit supported prior resolutions
favoring Iraq. "It was against this background that Baghdad mounted its effective
283
air strikes against Kharg oil terminal." Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, South Yemen
and Syria boycotted the meeting; in June 1985 Libya and Iran had signed a Strate-
gic Alliance Treaty. These moves were seen as evidencing growing division in the
284
Arab world over the war. Turkey continued to support Iraq, the United States
had formally restored diplomatic relations with Iraq in November 1984, and the
US-Iraq trade became three times (at $1 billion), that ofthe USSR with Iraq. Direct
links between the US embassy in Baghdad and the United States were estab-
785
lished. France continued as a major supplier for Iraq, although she also supplied
Iran. China was Iran's major supplier through North Korea, but it too supplied
56 The Tanker War
Iraq, through Egypt. Iran was becoming more isolated, however. At the same
time Soviet sales to Iraq increased, the USSR reduced oil imports from financially
287
strapped Iran.
Because of the belligerents' actions, the United States published this NOTMAR
Special Warning in September 1985:
1. U.S. Mariners are advised to exercise extreme caution when transiting the . . .
Gulfwhich are becoming increasingly dangerous due to continued attacks on vessels
outside the military zones declared by Iran and Iraq.
2. In view of recent Iranian visit, search, and in some cases seizure of vessels of
third countries within the . . . Strait ofHormuz, and the Gulf ofOman, U.S. mariners
are advised to exercise extreme caution and to be alert to possible hazardous
conditions, including hostile actions, when transiting these waters.
3. . . . Iran . . . has issued guidelines for the navigational safety of merchant
shipping in the . . . Gulf, the relevant portions of which are . . . :
—After transiting . . . Hormuz, merchant ships sailing to non-Iranian ports
should pass 12 miles south ofAbu Musa Island; 12 miles south of Sirri Island;
south ofCable Bank Light; 12 miles south of Farsi Island; thence west of a line
connecting the points 27-55N, 49-53E, and 29-ION, 49-12E.; thereafter south
of the line 29-ION, as far as 48-40E.
—All Iranian coastal waters are war zones.
—All transportation of cargo to Iraqi ports is prohibited.
—
. . . Iran . . . will bear no responsibility for merchant ships failing to
comply with the above instructions.
4. Deep draft shipping should be aware of shoal waters south of Farsi Island.
5. . . . Iraq . . . has stated that the area north of 29-30N is a prohibited war zone. It
has warned that it will attack all vessels appearing within a zone believed to be north
and east of a line connecting the following points: 29-30N, 48-30E, 29-25N, 49-09E,
28-23N, 49-47E, 28-23N, 51-00E. . . . Iraq ... has further warned that all tankers
docking at Kharg Island regardless ofnationality are targets for the Iraqi Air Force.
6. In view of continued hostilities between Iran and Iraq and recent acts of
interference or hostility against vessels of their countries, U.S. mariners are advised,
until further notice, to avoid Iranian or Iraqi ports and coastal waters and to remain
outside the areas delimited in paragraphs 3 and 5 above.
The NOTMAR added that the United States did not recognize the validity in law
TOO
ofany foreign rule, regulation or proclamation so published. "While the United
States obviously recognized provocations by both sides . .
.
, it . . . regarded Iranian
attacks against neutral shipping as the major problem. [US] policy regarding the
war was to avoid military involvement, if possible, while providing friendly Gulf
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States with [means] ... to defend themselves." For example, while asserting
freedom ofthe seas and straits transit passage policies, the United States offered to
work with the GCC and to help it militarily if aid was requested publicly and there
was access to suitable facilities. At about the same time GCC-Iran relations
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appeared to be improving. Individual GCC members' policies continued as
before, however. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait aided Iraq with $4 billion in 1984, and
late that year Iranian aircraft penetrated the Saudi ADIZ and hit a Kuwait-bound
freighter. There was an assassination attempt on the Kuwaiti emir in May 1985,
292 *•
said to have been fomented by Iran. The United Kingdom announced a $3-4
293
billion sale of combat aircraft to Saudi Arabia. The UAE mostly continued to
support Iran, with $1 billion in trade between them. The UAE was concerned
about its offshore oil facilities, which pumped two-thirds of its oil. Moreover, 20
294
percent of its population were Shiites.
In October 1985 France began defending French-flag merchantmen. A French
warship positioned itselfbetween the Ville d 'Angers and an Iranian warship, warn-
ing the Iranian that it would use force ifthe Iranian tried to intercept Ville d'Angers.
French ROE declared that French warships would fire on forces refusing to break
off attacks on neutral merchant ships; the result was a drop in attacks near French
295
men-of-war.
7. 1986: Boarding ofMerchant Ships; Attacks on Shipping and Port Facilities.
On January 12, 1986 Iran boarded and searched the President Taylor, a US-flag
296
vessel. The United States acknowledged a belligerent's right to board and
search but cautioned about overstepping rights and norms, "and even violence, in-
297
herent in all ship search incidents." Later that month the UK justified Iranian
298
interceptions and seizures of UK-flagged merchantmen as self-defense. The
Netherlands recognized the right of visit and search but only for ships proceeding
299
to and from belligerents' ports. In April 1986 a US destroyer warned an Iranian
warship off what may have been a planned boarding oiS.S. President McKinley, a
US flag merchantman.
In February 1986 Security Council Resolution 582 called for a ceasefire; it "De-
plore[d] the escalation ofthe conflict, especially territorial incursions, the bombing
of purely civilian population centres, attacks on neutral shipping or civilian air-
craft, the violation ofinternational humanitarian law and other laws ofarmed con-
flict and, in particular, the use ofchemical weapons contrary to . . . the Geneva Gas
Protocol." That month Iraq extended its exclusion zone up to an area close to
301
Kuwaiti territorial waters. Also in that month, the United States concluded its
agreement with the United Kingdom for use ofDiego Garcia as a naval support fa-
cility.
302
In May, after more Iranian strikes on shipping, the United States reaffirmed a
commitment to Saudi self-defense, freedom of navigation, free flow of oil, and
303
open access through Hormuz. That day Iran warned that its naval forces would
attack US warships escorting or convoying cargo ships carrying cargo for Iraq or
which tried to interfere with Iran's interception procedures. A US May 14
NOTMAR advised:
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1. U.S. naval forces operating in international waters within the . . . Gulf, Strait of
Hormuz and the GulfofOman and the Arabian Sea north oftwenty degrees north are
taking additional defensive precautions against terrorist threats. All surface and
subsurface ships and craft are requested to avoid closing U.S. forces closer than five
nautical miles without previously identifying themselves. U.S. forces especially
when operating in confined waters, shall remain mindful of navigational
considerations ofships and craft in their immediate vicinity. It is requested that radio
contact with U.S. naval forces be maintained on [designated frequencies] when
approaching within five nautical miles of U.S. naval forces. Surface and subsurface
ships and craft that close U.S. naval forces within five nautical miles without making
prior contact and or whose intentions are unclear to such forces may be held at risk by
U.S. defense measures.
2. These measures will also apply when U.S. forces are engaged in transit passage
through . . . Hormuz or when in innocent passage through foreign territorial waters
and when operating in such waters with the approval of the coastal State.
The Notice was published "solely to advise that measures in self-defense will be ex-
ercised by US naval forces [and] will be implemented in a manner that does not
30Simpede the freedom of navigation of any vessel or State."
In August Iraq bombed Iran's Sirri oil terminal for the first time; a UK-regis-
tered, Hong Kong-owned tanker was badly damaged. By that month Iraq had hit
five of the 1 1 shuttle tankers operating between Kharg and Sirri. Iran's Lavan and
Larak oil terminals were bombed later that year. In September 1986 Iranian war-
ships fired on, stopped and searched a USSR merchantman, Pyotr Emtsov, Kuwait
bound with arms ultimately destined for Iraq. During 1985-86 Iran inspected
307
over 1000 vessels. In October Security Council Resolution 588 called for com-
308
pliance with Resolution 582. In November Iraq bombed the UAE Abu al-
309Bukhosh off-shore oil installations. The 1986 Iraqi attacks reduced Iranian oil
production considerably; a fall in world oil prices aggravated Iran's economic
• 310
straits.
A November 20 US International NOTAM reported Iranian airspace was
closed to US-flag aircraft and that
U.S. Naval Forces in the . . . Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian
Sea (North of 20 Degrees North) are taking additional defensive precautions against
terrorist threats. Aircraft at altitudes less than 2000 ft. AGL which are not cleared for
approach/departure to or from a regional airport are requested to avoid approaching
closer than 5 nm to U.S. Naval Forces.
It is requested that aircraft approaching within 5 nm of U.S. Naval Forces
establish and maintain radio contact with U.S. Naval Forces on [certain frequencies].
Aircraft which approach within 5 nm at altitudes less than 2000 ft. AGL whose
intentions are unclear to U.S. Naval Forces may be held at risk by U.S. defensive
measures.
. .
.^U
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In that month UK naval presence increased due to increased attacks on neutral
312
shipping.
Iraq began to default on foreign loans, but its leading creditors—the FRG,
France, Japan and Turkey—rescheduled debts, along with India and Yugoslavia.
By 1986 Iraq's pipeline through Saudi Arabia was in operation, and another
through Turkey was under construction. Oil sales from these conduits would reas-
sure creditors. The USSR began a massive military support program of$4.9 bil-
lion for 1986, compared with $4 billion for the previous year, for Iraq. However, in
August Saudi Arabia had to abandon its price-war strategy at the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which helped its relations with Iran.
The Soviet Union, under Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership, appeared to begin a
new policy toward the war, resolving to ending it by expanding diplomatic con-
315
tacts with Iran. Nevertheless USSR arms sales to Iraq continued until the end.
By the next year the Soviet Union was in effect underwriting much ofthe Iraqi de-
2 1/:
fense effort. Although not known at the time, US arms sales to Iran through Is-
317
rael in what came to be known as the Iran-Contra affair began about then. A
Danish-flag vessel, Else-HT, made voyages with these goods on board in May and
June from Eilat, an Israeli port on the Gulf of Aqaba and near Jordan's Port of
318
Aqaba, to Bandar Abbas. After an Iranian attack on a UK merchantman in Sep-
tember, Britain closed Iran's military procurement office in London. Britain was
319
Iraq's second largest nonmilitary supplier. UK companies helped with tools
320
and parts too.
8. 1987: Escalating US Involvement; Reflagging and Convoys;
Attack on U.S.S. Stark.
In late January 1987 the ICO met in Kuwait and heard the UN Secretary-Gen-
eral call for an international panel to determine war guilt. Iran boycotted the meet-
ing. The United States moved six warships, usually based in Bahrain, to the upper
371
Gulf to provide naval cover for the meeting. About then an Italian yard deliv-
ered two corvettes and a support ship to Iraq; they sailed for Alexandria, Egypt, en
route to Umm Qasr, an Iraqi port. Warned of a possible Iranian Silkworm attack,
322
they returned to Italy.
In March 1987 the United States expressed concern over Iran's testing 1100-
pound warhead, 85 kilometer range, PRC-manufactured Silkworm missiles in the
Gulf. Kuwait became increasingly concerned about Iranian attacks on its tankers
and requested Soviet and US protection. Internationalization of the Tanker War
was "exactly what [Iran] wanted to avoid, but . . . that is precisely what happened."
373The war had entered a new phase. (A US congressman also suggested mining
374.
Iranian ports to force it to stop its attacks in the Gulf.) In April Iran delivered a
note through Algeria concerning the right of transit passage through the Strait of
Hormuz. The US response rejected an Iranian claim that LOS Convention
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principles were contractual and not customary in nature, saying the LOS Conven-
tion represented longstanding customary law. The United States also "re-
jected]. . . any claim by Iran of a right to interfere with any vessel's lawful exercise
325
of the right of transit passage in a strait used for international navigation."
In May Kuwait and the United States completed negotiations leading to trans-
fer of 11 tankers owned by Kuwaiti Oil Tanker Co. (KOTC), the Kuwaiti State
shipping company, from the Kuwaiti to the US flag. This preempted the USSR,
which had to settle for chartering three tankers to Kuwait; these charters were
later renewed into 1 988. The Soviet Union was "deliberately vague on the ques-
327
tion of military protection." The UK position, stated in Parliament after the
first US convoy sailed, was that vessel owners were free to reregister their vessels as
long as national requirements were met, and that with reregistration went an obli-
328
gation for the Royal Navy to defend these vessels. Three KOTC tankers were
329
later reregistered in Britain. The USSR kept its arrangement with Kuwait in
perspective; a rapid Soviet naval buildup in the Gulfmight prompt a much greater
US naval presence and might provoke GCC concerns about the USSR, both con-
330
trary to Soviet interests. In June 1 987 a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister said the
USSR had no intention of increasing its naval force in the Gulf. Although as-
sailed in some quarters, most commentators felt US reflagging comported with in-
332
ternational law. " Iran tried to pursuade Kuwait to stop the reflagging process;
when this failed, Iran declared that Kuwait had practically turned itself into an
Iraqi province with its resources at the disposition of France, the USSR and the
United States. Iran said it could not allow Iraq to receive guaranteed oil income to
333
beef up its war machine through Kuwaiti tankers flying other flags. "
At about this time an Iranian patrol boat fired on and damaged a Soviet mer-
chantman, Ivan Koroteav. In mid-May a Soviet tanker chartered to Kuwait, Mar-
shal Chuykhov, hit a mine which the USSR said Iran laid. A second Kuwait-bound
tanker was mined on June 19. Mines were detected in approaches to the channel
leading to Kuwait's Mina Ahmadi terminal. Mines began appearing through-
out the Gulf. Iranian small boats, Revolutionary Guards crewed, laid them just be-
fore a preselected vessel arrived in the area. " * The Saudi and US navies took a
336
month to clear the channel to Kuwait and its approaches. "' A Soviet response to
337
attacks on its merchantmen was to deploy three more minesweepers to the Gulf. ~
On May 17 two Iraqi fighter-launched Exocet missiles hit the frigate U.S.S.
Stark, presumably unintentionally. There were deaths and injuries among its crew
338
and severe damage to the ship. (In 1989 Iraq paid US claims for the Stark at-
339
tack.) There is no report of the extent ofpollution resulting from loss ofbunker
fuel; this appears to be true for later attacks on naval vessels in engagements. The
United States added three ships to MIDEASTFOR, ordered its forces to a higher
state of alert and revised its Rules of Engagement (ROE) for possible interac-
tions between US and Iraqi forces and anyone else displaying hostile intent or
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committing hostile acts. UK ROE continued to reflect Britain's view that the
UN Charter, Article 51, governed UK responses. "The rules of engagement
[were] intended to avoid escalation, although the varied nature of potential threat
and the possibility of surprise attack [were] recognized and the inherent right of
self-defence of Royal Navy ships or British merchant vessels under their protec-
tion, is not circumscribed or prejudiced." The result would have posed "interest-
ing questions" if a UK warship could have defended UK merchantmen or
British-crewed ships. One "practical solution" might have been that attack on a
merchant ship "might reasonably [have been] perceived as an attack on the war-
ship as well. In that situation, the warship [would] be able to defend itself and in
doing so defend the merchant vessel accompanying it." The nature ofother na-
val participants' ROE have not been published, but undoubtedly they reflected, or
were limited by, States' views on the scope of self-defense, national policies, and
defense capabilities.
The US ROE had their complement in a July 1987 US NOTAM andNOTMAR:
A. In response to the recent attack on . . . Stark and the continuing terrorist threat
in the region[,] U.S. naval vessels operating within the . . . Gulf, Strait of Hormuz,
Gulf ofOman and the Arabian Sea, north of 20 degrees north, are taking additional
defensive precautions. It is requested that aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters)
approaching U.S. naval forces establish and maintain radio contact with U.S. naval
forces on [designated frequencies]. Unidentified aircraft whose intentions are
unclear or who are approaching U.S. naval vessels may be requested to identify
themselves and state their intentions as soon as they are detected. . . . [T]o avoid
inadvertent confrontation, aircraft . . . including military aircraft may be requested to
remain well clear ofU.S. vessels. Failure to respond to requests for identification and
intentions or to warnings and operating in a threatening manner could place the
aircraft at risk by U.S. defensive measures. Illumination of a U.S. naval vessel with a
weapons fire control radar could result in immediate U.S. defensive reaction.
The notice was published "solely to advise that measures in self-defense are being
exercised by US naval forces in this region." The NOTAM/NOTMAR closed:
"[T]hese measures will be implemented in a manner that does not unduly interfere
with the freedom ofnavigation and overflight[.] . . ." This Notice was revised in
September 1987:
In response to the recent attack on . . . Stark and the continuing terrorist threat in
the region, U.S. naval vessels operating within the . . . Gulf, Strait ofHormuz, Gulf of
Oman, and the Arabian Sea, north of 20 degrees north, are taking additional
defensive precautions. Aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters) operating in these areas
should maintain a listening watch on [certain frequencies]. Unidentified aircraft,
whose intentions are unclear or who are approaching U.S. naval vessels, will be
contacted on these frequencies and requested to identify themselves and state their
intentions as soon as they are detected. . . . [T]o avoid inadvertent confrontation,
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aircraft . . . including military aircraft may be requested to remain well clear of U.S.
vessels. Failure to respond to requests for identification and intentions, or to
warnings, and operating in a threatening manner could place the aircraft ... at risk by
U.S. defensive measures. Illumination of a U.S. naval vessel with a weapons fire
control radar will be viewed with suspicion and could result in immediate U.S.
defensive reaction. This notice is published solely to advise that measures in
self-defense are being exercised by U.S. naval forces in this region. The measures will
be implemented in a manner that does not unduly interfere with the freedom of
navigation and overflight. . . .
U.S. naval forces in the . . . Gulf, Strait ofHormuz, Gulf ofOman, and Arabian Sea
(North of 20 Degrees North) are taking additional defensive precautions against
terrorist threats. Aircraft at altitudes less than 2000 ft AGL which are not cleared for
approach/departure to or from a regional airport are requested to avoid approaching
closer than 5nm to U.S. naval forces.
It is requested that aircraft approaching within 5nm of U.S. naval forces establish
and maintain radio contact with U.S. naval forces on [designated frequencies].
Aircraft approaching within 5nm at altitudes less than 2000 ft. AGL whose
intentions are unclear to U.S. naval forces may be held at risk by U.S. defensive
measures. . . . ^46
This was a much stronger statement of intentions than the Notice of a year ear-
lier. "In the wake ofthe Kuwaiti reflagging, it was (perhaps deliberately) left un-
clear as to how far the [US] protective umbrella was to extend." Promises of escort
for US- flagged ships would "depend ... on the situation" as well as for foreign flag
348
shipping in certain cases. The US reaction may have been partly due to media
reports of Iran's training 20,000 Revolutionary Guards to attack US ships in fast
349
Swedish-built "pleasure boats."
350
In July the US Navy began convoying reflagged tankers. Previously the
United States "had found intermittent convoys an effective deterrent to Iranian
action. Indeed, Iran refrained from harassing ships carrying other flags when they
sailed in the vicinity ofUS warships." Only a small percentage oftankers plying
352
the Gulf were convoyed, however. Reflagged tankers carried no contraband to
or oil from Iraq. "' On July 24 the reflagged Bridgeton and on August 10 the Texaco
Caribbean, under charter to a US company, hit mines; the Navy began providing
mine protection. (Although US Navy destroyer types had escorted Bridgeton to
Kuwait, the Navy outfitted Kuwaiti commercial tugs with minesweeping gear for
the return trip. When civilian tug crews refused to undertake minesweeping, Navy
355
volunteers manned the tugs for the return. "[T]he [Bridgeton] incident opened a
356
chapter of direct US-Iran naval confrontation in the Gulf." Whether a result of
deliberate Iranian decision or Iranian Revolutionary Guard fervor, mines began
appearing all over the Gulfand outside the Gulf, in the Strait ofHormuz and Gulf
of Oman, and in Kuwaiti and Omani territorial waters. French and UK naval
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357
operations expanded to meet the threat in the latter areas. In late August U.SS.
Guadalcanal rescued an Iraqi fighter pilot downed by an Iranian air-to-air missile
in international waters. He was repatriated through Saudi Red Crescent Society of-
358
ficials. There is no record of Iranian consent or protest.
The UK Armilla Patrol began "accompanying" but not escorting or convoying
UK merchantmen; one result was that foreign vessels were attracted to UK regis-
try to gain protection, at least in the lower Gulf, where there were new mine
threats. British vessels were not armed against attacks; UK seafarer unions op-
posed arming. Italy opposed it as a matter of policy too. After Iranian forces
attacked a French flag cargo ship, Ville d'Anvers, France broke off diplomatic rela-
tions. However, even with reinforced naval presence, it could not organize convoy
protection on the US model and relied on a policy of accompanying French flag
ships. The USSR sent a Krivak class frigate to escort four Soviet ships carrying
arms from the Strait ofHormuz to Kuwait for ultimate destination in Iraq, a signal
36?
to belligerents that the USSR would protect Soviet-flag ships. Some merchant-
men began to carry chaff canisters to confuse incoming missiles; others were re-
painted dull, non-reflective gray for the same reason. Although most merchant
ships remained unarmed, a US helicopter reported coming under missile fire from
a Greek ship. Iran reportedly completed testing its Silkworm missiles. Press re-
ports said Iran's air force had established a suicide plane squadron to attack mer-
chant shipping like the World War II Japanese kamikazi flights. Iran began
three days ofnaval maneuvers in the Gulf, dubbed Exercise Martyrdom, which in-
volved firing a shore-to-ship missile and ramming a speedboat loaded with explo-
sives into a dummy naval target. Some Iranian naval maneuvers were in Saudi
365
territorial waters. Besides traditional boardings, Iran began using helicopters
366
for visit and search. The Gulf was becoming a more dangerous place as actors
crowded the arena and employed new techniques for old methods and new
technologies.
Two US warships' Sparrow missiles shot at a radar target suspected of hostile
367
intent missed, and warning shots were fired across two dhows' bows in August.
The US Navy, claiming a right of self-defense, captured the Iranian landing ship
368
Iran Ajr caught laying mines in September. Three Iranian crew died, two were
lost at sea, and the United States repatriated 26 crewmen to Iran through Omani
Red Crescent auspices five days later. Shortly thereafter they were turned over to
Iranian officials, along with the remains ofthe three who had died. It is not known
369
whether Iraq consented or objected to these arrangements. Iran asserted that
self-defense could only be claimed in response to an armed attack and that this was
370
aggression. It also promised revenge and gave an "explicit warning" that it
371
would soon be engaged on another front. However, the US attack "effectively
37?
halted Iranian minelaying for six months." But by mid- 1987 Iranian aircraft,
helicopters, small boats and warships had attacked over 100 ships of30 nationalities.
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Iraq had attacked over 200 vessels, mostly Iranian owned or chartered. In late
May 1987 the USSR had sent three minesweepers to join two frigates that had pa-
trolled the Gulf since 1986; this was in response to Iranian mining of Soviet-flag
ships.
374
The June 1987 Venice Economic Summit had "agree[d] that new and concerted
international efforts [were] urgently required to bring the Iran-Iraq War to an
end." Besides calling upon the belligerents to end the war and supporting the
United Nations, the Summit "reafflrm[ed] that the principle offreedom ofnaviga-
tion in the Gulf is ofparamount importance for us and for others and must be up-
held. The free flow of oil and other traffic through the Strait . . . must continue
unimpeded." The Summit pledged to consult on ways to pursue these important
375
goals effectively. In July unanimous UN Security Council Resolution 598
Deplor[ed] . . . bombing of purely civilian population centres, attacks on neutral
shipping or civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law and
other laws ofarmed conflict, and . . . use of chemical weapons contrary to . . . the 1925
Geneva Gas Protocol, . . . Demand[ed that belligerents] . . . observe an immediate
cease-fire [and] Call[ed] upon all other States to exercise the utmost restraint and to
refrain from any act which may lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict
The Resolution also declared for the first time during the war that there had been a
breach ofthe peace and that the Council was acting under the UN Charter, Articles
39-40. 376 Iraq accepted Resolution 598 on July 23. On September 3 the 12-mem-
ber European Community supported Resolution 598, "strongly condemning] re-
cent attacks on merchant ships in the Gulfand reiterating] . . . firm support for the
fundamental principle of freedom of navigation, which is of the utmost impor-
378
tance to the whole international community."
On August 3 Iran had announced it planned naval maneuvers in its territorial
waters in the Gulfand in the GulfofOman, warning all vessels, commercial or mil-
itary, against approaching these waters. Iraq protested, noting that Iranian territo-
rial waters included part ofthe Strait ofHormuz and waters between the Tunb and
379
Forur islands, claiming that under the 1982 LOS Convention, Article 38(1),
380
and the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 16(4), that Iran could not sus-
pend passage through international straits, and that the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) had declared shipping lanes passing close to Tunb and
Forur.
381
By the end of July US Navy escorts had been receiving informal cooperation
from France and Britain and support and assistance from Saudi Arabia and other
382GCC States. In July and August France ordered its aircraft carrier Clemenceau to
the Gulf; France's prime minister declaring, "We have no aggressive intentions,
383 384but we want to be respected and we will be respected." In August, Britain and
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France agreed to send minesweepers to the Gulf, and by September Italian, Bel-
gian and Netherlands ships, the latter to operate jointly with Armilla Patrol pro-
tection, were on the way. Saudi Arabia committed its four minesweepers to
387
clearance operations. On August 20, the Western European Union (WEU) de-
clared Europe's vital interests required that freedom of navigation in the Gulf be
QOO
assured at all times. The capacity ofWEU members to consult on this policy
389
"was all the more important[,] given a previous record ofdisunity." By now Iran
had lost the international diplomatic leverage it had been cultivating for the previ-
390
ous three years.
On October 8, Iranian speedboats fired on US helicopters; in accordance with
US self-defense principles and ROE, the helicopters returned fire, sinking one
boat and damaging others. Iran claimed the US helicopters fired first and vowed a
391
"crushing response." Some argued it was a "carefully calculated reprisal." US
Navy personnel rescued six Iranian Revolutionary Guards boat crew members; two
died aboard U.S.S. Raleigh. Survivors and remains were returned to Iran through
Omani Red Crescent auspices. It is not known whether Iraq consented or objected
392
to repatriation. Later that month the United States, claiming self-defense,
responded to an Iranian Revolutionary Guards Silkworm attack in Kuwaiti
territorial waters on a US flag tanker, Sea Isle City, by destroying the Iranian
Rostum offshore oil platform in the southern Gulf. Sea Isle City's master, a US
national, was blinded in the attack. When the attack on Sea Isle City occurred, it
was not under US Navy convoy; convoying ceased when vessels reached Kuwaiti
territorial waters. Rostum was a Guards gunboat communications base and was
not directly involved in the Silkworm strike. Those manning it were given time to
evacuate before the attack began. Rostum apparently was not engaged in oil
393
production; therefore, the attack did not create a threat to the environment.
The US strike was stated to be in specific response to the Sea Isle City attack;
connection with an Iranian attack on the Sungari, which had occurred a day before
Sea Isle City was hit, was avoided. Although Sungari was beneficially US owned, it
394
was Liberian flagged. ' Iran claimed the platform attacks were aggression and
39S
that self-defense could only be asserted in response to armed attack. (US import
396
controls on Iranian goods were said to be a reason for the attacks. There is some
evidence Iran was aiming at oil tankers in the Kuwaiti port of Al-Hamadi, where
Kuwaiti and Saudi oil donated to Iraq was being lifted to pay for ammunition
397
shipped to Iraq through the Port of Aqaba.) US response for the Sea Isle City
Silkworm attack, and not for the Sungari attack, established some precedent that at
this time the United States did not consider open registry ships, even if owned by
US interests, to have enough connection to merit protection. This view changed as
the war deepened, at least where US nationals were in the crew. There were no
more confrontations with the United States for the next six months as a result of
the US response on Rostum. Iranian Guards speedboats continued to harass
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unprotected shipping; three days after the US response to the Sea Isle City
attack, Iran hit the Kuwaiti deep-water Sea Island Terminal. Iran made it clear
that this action was intended as retaliation for the Rostum attack.
This exchange of blows was notable because of Iran's care not to attack the US
directly but to target its regional allies— [T]he most Iran did was to probe the extent
and scope of the US commitment ... to find the weak links, the grey areas. Yet it did
over-reach itself when it was caught red-handed in minelaying, thus unwittingly
providing ammunition to those who argued that it was Iran that constituted a menace
to the freedom of navigation. . . . [I]t found the impulse to defy the United States,
whatever the consequences, irresistible, providing the [Iranian Islamic] revolution
with the high drama that it so cherished, even at the risk of diverting from the
principal] issue—the land war. . . . Iranian leaders were confident that the US
presence could not last forever, that sooner or later the expense of the enterprise and
the distraction of other issues . . . would see a withdrawal of the US fleet.403
Future events would prove this assessment to be incorrect. By the end of 1987
Western naval presence in the Gulfappeared more durable than might earlier have
been expected. However, for the time being Iran continued to see its strategy pay-
ing off, weakening US credibility with its Gulf allies, exasperating its military, and
drawing the United States from impartiality to messy partisanship.
In November, an Arab League Extraordinary Summit "expressed anxiety at the
continuation ofthe war and voiced . . . indignation at [Iran's] intransigence, provo-
cations and threats to the Arab Gulf States." The Summit "condemned Iran's . .
.
procrastination in accepting . . .Resolution 598 . . . [, and] called on Iran to accept
the Resolution and implement it in toto. . ." The Summit asked the international
community to "shoulder its responsibilities, exert effective international efforts
and adopt measures adequate to make [Iran] respond to the calls for peace." Iraq's
accepting Resolution 598 and positive response to peace initiatives was appreci-
ated. It confirmed support for Iran's defending its territory and "legitimate rights"
but declared solidarity with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as to Iranian threats, aggres-
sion and violations of holy places. A few days later Iranian speedboats shot up
three tankers carrying Saudi oil, but Syrian pressure succeeded in getting Iran to
refrain from hitting targets in Kuwait. Iran's president visited the United Na-
tions to discuss a peace plan. However, UN diplomatic activity was to stop by early
1988. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General continued to press Iran to accept the
UN proposal. It was only in October 1987 that Iran and Iraq formally broke off
diplomatic relations, a further sign of polarization.
During that month a US warship fired on a UAE fishing vessel, resulting in a
death and three injured crew; the United States said it fired in self-defense but ex-
pressed regret over the incident, which had occurred between the UAE coast and
Abu Musa, from which Iranian speedboats carried out Gulfshipping raids. The
United States was particularly concerned about small boats; Iran had been
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conducting naval maneuvers in its exclusion zone and territorial waters, including
simulated speedboat attacks on suicide runs. In December a US warship helped
rescue a Cypriot crew after an Iranian gunboat attack set their tanker ablaze.
Tanker masters began tailing convoys or simulating them during night steam-
ing. During that month H.M.S. Scylla and York protected merchant ships from
Iranian speedboat attacks.
On December 11, NATO Council "Ministers underlined the importance of an
early and full implementation of [Resolution] 598. They also recalled the impor-
tance offreedom and security ofnavigation in the Gulf. They call[ed] for appropri-
ate follow-up action ... to resolve these problems." Late in December a GCC
conference confined itselfto expressing "deep regret at 'the destructive war' . . . and
urging theUN Security Council to implement. Resolution 598 as soon as possible."
Part of this was due to Omani and UAE opposition, caused by the geography that
compelled Oman and Iran to patrol Hormuz jointly, and the UAE's financial affili-
ation with Iran. The growing risk to neutral shipping increased trade through the
UAE, where goods would be shipped overland. Sentiment against an arms em-
bargo directed toward Iran was the same in the GCC and the Security Council.
Nevertheless, the December GCC Summit approved a comprehensive security
strategy that may have amounted to a collective self-defense pact. However,
some governments, notably China, France, the FRG and the USSR, were per-
suaded that Iran's not rejecting Resolution 598 meant Iran might be genuinely in-
terested in a negotiated settlement to end the war. Permanent Security Council
members (China, France, USSR) would veto any US-sponsored resolution to im-
pose sanctions. Iran claimed naval presences from States outside the Gulf vio-
lated Resolution 598, Article 5.417
Meanwhile, the USSR and the United States continued to support Iraq, the So-
viet Union through military supplies, the United States by $961 million in agricul-
41 R
tural commodity credits in 1987. The USSR and its Eastern European satellites
continued to send negligible amounts ofmilitary equipment to Iran, but there was
419
no question about the USSR's priorities.
9. 1988: End Game: Intensity ofResponses; Collapse and Ceasefire.
A January 2, 1988 US NOTMAR reflected the intensity of the situation:
1. U.S. mariners are advised to exercise extreme caution when transiting the . . .
Gulf, the Strait ofHormuz, and the GulfofOman, due to hostilities between Iran and
Iraq. Mariners are further advised to avoid Iranian or Iraqi ports and coastal waters
and to remain outside the areas delimited in paragraphs 2 and 3 below until further
notice.
2. Iran has stated:
A. Iranian coastal waters are war zones.
B. Transportation of cargo to Iraqi ports is prohibited.
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C. Guidelines for the navigational safety of merchant shipping in the . . .
Gulfare . . . : after transiting . . . Hormuz, merchant ships sailing to non-Iranian
ports should pass 12 miles south of Abu Musa Island; 12 miles south of Sim
Island; south of Cable Bank Light; 12 miles south of Farsi Island; thence west
of a line connecting the points 27-55N. 49-53E. and 29-10N. 49-12E.;
thereafter south of the line 29-10N. as far as 48-10E.
D Iran disclaims any responsibility for merchant ships failing to comply
with the above instructions.
E. Iranian naval forces patrol the Gulf of Oman up to 400 kilometers from
the Strait of Hormuz.
3. Iraq has stated:
A. The area north of 29-30N. is a prohibited war zone.
B. It will attack all vessels appearing within a zone believed to be north and
east of a line connecting the following points: 29-30N. 48-30E., 29-25N.
49-09E., 28-23N. 49-47E., 28-23N. 51-00E.
C. All tankers docking at Kharg Island regardless of nationality are targets
for the Iraqi Air Force.
4. Several vessels have suffered damage from moored or floating mines in the . .
.
Gulf. U.S. mariners should exercise caution in navigable waters throughout the Gulf
region and particularly in the following areas where moored mines have been
encountered:
A. The Mina Al Ahmadi/Mina Ash Shu'aybah Channel (28-56N. 48-53E.)
and its approaches.
B. The shipping channels south and west of Farsi Island.
5. Mariners should be aware that Iranian naval forces visit, search and in some
cases seize or divert to Iranian ports vessels of non-belligerents in the Persian
Gulf/Gulf of Oman region.
The United States took no position on the zones' legal validity. During 1987 the
belligerents had attacked 178 merchantmen.
At the end ofJanuary 1988 Iran promulgated a prize law, article 3 of which de-
clared the following to be war prizes:
(a) All goods, merchandise, means of transport and equipment belonging to a
State or to States at war with . . . Iran.
(b) Merchandise and means of transport . . . belonging to neutral States or their
nationals, or to nationals ofthe belligerent State ifthey could effectively contribute to
increasing the combat power ofthe enemy or their final destination, either directly or
via intermediaries, is a State at war with . . . Iran.
(c) Vessels flying the flag of a neutral State as well as vehicles belonging to a
neutral State transporting the goods set out in this article.
(d) Merchandise, means of transport and equipment which . . . Iran forbids from
being transported to enemy territory."*22
The Law provided that property listed in Article 3(a), i.e., property ofa State at war
with Iran, would become the property ofIran; Article 3(b) and 3(c) property, i.e., of
neutrals would be confiscated and adjudicated. Article 3(d) means of transport
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would "become the property of. . . Iran or be confiscated according to circum-
stances. Any person contesting this must appear before the [prize] Tribunal."
Iraqi attacks on tankers resumed February 10, 1988, after a month's lull. The
War of the Cities began again on February 28, 1988; Iran shelled Basra after Iraq
bombed an oil refinery near Tehran. Iraq hit Halabja, an Iraqi town captured by
Iran, with chemical weapons in March. Later that month Saudi Arabia confirmed
buying 1600-mile CSS-2 ballistic missiles from the PRC. On March 30 Iranian
gunboats fired on a Kuwaiti military base on Bubiyan Island.
In early 1988 the United States noted willingness to consider a UN Gulf naval
force, ifa collective action concept was spelled out clearly; the United States would
not support a UN force replacing US and US-aligned forces. The United King-
dom was unenthusiastic, but Italy and the USSR supported the idea. The So-
viet Union wanted to replace the large Western naval presence with a UN
flotilla
428
During this time there were clashes involving US naval forces, several with Iran
429
and one with Iraq. On April 14 U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts, a frigate likeStark, hit a
mine in a field Iran laid in shipping lanes in international waters 70 miles east of
Bahrain. In response, on April 18, the United States engaged Iranian warships
and neutralized two Iranian oil platforms that had conducted or supported attacks
on neutral shipping. Occupants ofthe two oil platforms (Sassam and Sirri, both lo-
cated in the lower Gulf) were first given the opportunity to evacuate. Sirri had been
responsible for about eight percent of Iran's oil exports. Iran saw the US response
(which represented an escalation in US military action) as siding with Iraq, per-
haps because Iraq reconquered al-Faw near Basra the day ofthe Sassan/Sirri attack.
Several Iranian naval units, including two frigates, were destroyed or damaged
during that operation. This engagement, dubbed Operation Praying Mantis,
was the largest combined air and surface engagement in war-at-sea for the US Navy
since World War II. Iran protested the platform attacks as aggression. The
United States rejected the protest. A few days later Iranian speedboats attacked
an oil rig in the UAE Mubarak oil field, operated by US interests, 30 miles north
of Sharjah, and a tanker and freighter that were nearby. While thus engaged the
boats were hit by US air strikes. Shipping and oil commerce in the southern
Gulf virtually stopped for two days. UK- and French-accompanied convoys were
temporarily halted. Some commentators trace the turning point in the war to
April 17-18, when Iran lost the Fao peninsula to Iraq and their warships to the US
Navy.436
By now five NATO nations besides the United States—Belgium, Britain,
France, Italy, the Netherlands—had sent over 25 warships to the Gulf for escort
and mine suppression duty. The FRG, constitutionally restricted from sending
forces there, augmented its Mediterranean Sea NATO presence with four ships.
Norway sent a minesweep to NATO Channel Command; Luxembourg, which has
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no navy, backed the Belgian-Dutch commitment financially. Australia and Japan,
the latter also constitutionally limited, installed precise navigation transmitters in
the Gulf and dispatched diver and mine disposal teams. The Netherlands Navy
collaborated very closely with the Royal Navy. Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands
probably would not have deployed forces except for WEU's political cover. '
French forces, reflecting France's longterm withdrawal from the NATO com-
438
mand structure, operated independently but cooperated with other navies,
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agreeing to consult within the WEU framework. " Italy followed the same pol-
icy. WEU naval experts convened regular meetings in London to discuss the
evolving threat. Even the USSR and US navies occasionally cooperated in find-
ing and destroying Iranian mines. At about the same time Hans Dietrich
Genscher, the FRG foreign minister, was emerging as representing Iranian inter-
A A T
ests in efforts to end hostilities through mediation. However, "the unprece-
dented international concern and focus on the war in the United Nations and in
the Gulfs waters, with the extraordinary and unprecedented participation of
many European NATO States in an 'out ofarea' operation, ushered in a new phase"
of the war. The multinational maritime naval operation was not, however, un-
A A C
der the command of any State or States.
After Iranian gunboats attacked a Saudi-owned tanker offDubai on April 24,
on April 29 the United States announced it would begin assisting "friendly, inno-
cent neutral vessels flying a nonbelligerent flag outside declared war exclusion
zones that are not carrying contraband or resisting legitimate visit and search by a
. . . Gulfbelligerent Following a request from the vessel under attack, assistance
[would] be rendered by a US warship or aircraft if this unit [was] in the vicinity and
its mission permitted] rendering such assistance." This incremental US esca-
lation, partly in response to requests from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and US oil ship-
pers navigating under foreign nags, was a more generous protection promise
than Britain had announced in February, when UK policy shifted to permit pro-
tecting foreign flag ships having a clear majority UK interest in ownership.
This did not include Armilla Patrol protection for ships on which British seamen
were employed. Although officially more conservative than the US policy, it
was a distinction without a difference, since UK warships gave humanitarian as-
sistance to neutral vessels after an attack and were prepared to interpose between
an attacker and a target ship. The interposing warships were prepared to assert
self-defense if attacked while helping a foreign vessel. France pursued a similar,
perhaps more forward-leaning interposition policy. French warships were "avail-
able to assist [merchantmen] according to circumstances." What French war-
ships would do in a confrontation is less than clear; French ROE stated options,
but these have not been published. Italian escort was limited to Italian-flag mer-
chantmen, although Italian ROE promised response if a belligerent committed a
hostile act; the ROE did not contemplate "repressive acts" directed toward bases of
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operation. NATO countries agreed to provide mutual support and cooperation
in keeping international waterways free of mines, although France operated
separate mine clearance and Italy had separate bilateral arrangements for the
work.
In May 1988 Iraqi air strikes hit Iran's Larak oil terminal in the Strait of
Hormuz. Seawise Giant, Liberian registered and the world's largest supertanker,
was among five ships damaged. Iran began a 1 0-day combined forces exercise in
the Persian Gulfand the GulfofOman, to show that its maritime power was not as
458
crippled as the United States had said.
The July 3 Airbus tragedy arose in the context of Iraqi speedboat attacks and
concern over possible air attacks on US warships, or its supply barges anchored in
459
Kuwaiti waters, perhaps to coincide with the Fourth ofJuly. In April 1 988, dur-
ing Operation Praying Mantis, Iranian military aircraft had taken off from the
nearby Bandar Abbas airport, also used by civil aviation. These aircraft appeared
close to commencing attacks on US aircraft but did not. Other Iranian aircraft
had exhibited "targeting behavior" while observing Praying Mantis events from
afar, apparently to provide radar information, i.e., to possibly vector closer
planes to targets. On July 2-3 Iranian speedboats positioned themselves at the
western approach to the Strait ofHormuz to challenge merchant ships, a tactic that
had been a prelude to attack. During the evening of July 2, U.S.S. Elmer Mont-
gomery had responded to a distress call from a Danish tanker under Iranian speed-
boat attacks. That same day two Iranian F-14s came within seven miles of
U.S.S. Halsey. Other F-14s were known to be at Bandar Abbas. After Mont-
gomery heard challenges over the radio and many speedboats were seen approach-
ing a Pakistani merchantman on July 3, U.S.S. Vincennes was sent to the area to
investigate the Montgomery report. Vincennes' helicopter was fired on by Iranian
small boats, which "were deemed to have hostile intent." Vincennes opened fire on
the boats. Two minutes later, Iran Air Flight 655, a civil airliner, took off from
Bandar Abbas for Dubai, across the Gulf, on a flight path through the area of the
on-going naval battle near Hormuz. Seven minutes later and after repeated
radio warnings, and owing to Vincennes' preoccupation with the ongoing surface
action and misinterpretation of electronic information and commercial air sched-
ules on board, Vincennes fired surface to air missiles that destroyed Flight 655.
When Vincennes' commanding officer gave the order to fire, in the middle of the
surface melee, he "believed that the Vincennes and the Montgomery were the subject
ofa coordinated sea and air attack involving [Iranian] Revolutionary Guard speed-
boats and an F-14 aircraft." The United States claimed a right of self-defense for
Af.9
the mistaken attack.
A week after the Airbus tragedy, US ship-based helicopters attacked Iranian
gunboats that had set afire a Panama-registered, Japanese-owned tanker with US
nationals in the crew, thus implementing the new US policy ofdefending other
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countries' merchantmen upon their request and consistent with other US opera-
tional commitments.
By the end of the war the US Navy had conducted over 100 convoys in the
Gulf. Other navies were also engaged in numerous escort operations.
On the diplomatic front, Saudi Arabia broke relations with Iran April 27, 1988,
a few days after US actions against Iranian warships and speedboats. Perhaps
more importantly, during that year a pipeline from Al-Zubair in Iraq to Yanbu in
Saudi Arabia was completed, allowing Iraqi oil to flow to Yanbu, where it could be
shipped to South Africa for hard currency or arms. Iraq may have also com-
pleted a smaller pipeline to Turkey that year, which with the Yanbu line would
have boosted its oil exports to 3.2 million barrels a day, about the prewar peak
level. This may have been a counterpoint to Iran's economic cooperation accord
ofthe previous summer with the Soviet Union, by which the USSR agreed to build
a pipeline to carry Iranian oil to the Black Sea. A shipping route in the Caspian Sea
was settled. A second connection between airline and railway systems was also
planned. However, Iran's economy was in a shambles, with only $1 billion in
foreign exchange reserves left, after an upswing the year before. Part ofthis erosion
was due to Iraqi bombing in the first quarter of 1988, which reduced oil production
considerably.
In June 1988 a second Arab League Extraordinary Summit reaffirmed its 1987
ind on the war. On Ju
joint political declaration:
sta ne 15 the European Community and the GCC issued a
. . . They explicitly emphasized that freedom of navigation and unimpeded flow of
trade is a cardinal principle in international relations and international law. In this
context, they call upon the international community to safeguard the right of free
navigation in international waters and sea lanes for shipping en route to and from all
ports and installations ofthe [Gulf] littoral States . . . not parties to the hostilities.47 ^
The June 20 Toronto Economic Summit supported Resolution 598, condemned
use ofchemical weapons, deplored proliferation of ballistic missiles in the region,
and "renew[ed the Group of Seven] commitment to uphold . . . freedom of naviga-
tion in the Gulf." By mid-June Britain and France had restored diplomatic rela-
tions with Iran. (The United States had severed relations with Iran during the
hostage crisis, and these were not restored.) Saudi Arabia announced a $12-30
billion arms deal, including six to eight minesweepers, with Britain and bought
481
1600-mile ballistic missiles from China.
482
Iran announced acceptance of Resolution 598 on July 17; on August 8 the
483UN Secretary-General announced a ceasefire effective August 20. The next day
the Council approved the Secretary-General's report on the war and decided to es-
tablish UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) to help the peace
485
process. Withdrawal from occupied territories began, but the 1990-91 war
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ended UNIIMOG's mandate. UNIIMOG seemed to have worked reasonably
487
well during its short commission. Negotiations between Iran and Iraq with re-
spect to their disputed border began simultaneously with the ceasefire and contin-
488
ued thereafter. These discussions broke down over Iraq's insistence that it
should control the entire Shatt al-Arab waterway; neither side was prepared to
compromise on this issue, and both refused a political solution. However, two
weeks after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Iraq conceded most Iranian demands,
agreeing to revert to the 1975 treaty providing for joint sovereignty over the Shatt
and to return prisoners ofwar (POWs). These concessions had been Iranian peace
489
conditions stated soon after the 1980 Iraqi invasion. No major exchanges of
POWs, mostly captured ground forces but undoubtedly including naval person-
nel, came until 10 years later.
Iran announced on August 20 it would continue inspecting vessels during the
491 492
ceasefire; this was a largely theoretical gesture, although Iraq protested it.
The commitment of the European naval force was extended to clear 2000 mines
from the northern Gulf and the Shatt al-Arab after the ceasefire. Operation
Cleansweep has been hailed as the "culmination ofa major pioneering landmark in
European naval co-operation." There had been no coordination of merchant ship
493
protection amongWEU navies, however. The United States announced the end
of escorted convoy operations in the Gulf in October 1988, although US forces
would be positioned to act ifUS-flagged vessels were directly threatened. Later
495
this was replaced by a monitoring system. In January 1989 "deflagging" proce-
dures for reverting the tankers to the Kuwaiti ensign began. In March 1 990 the
497
last US Navy minesweepers came home. Increased US naval presence in the
498
Gulf, resulting in over 100 convoys, was considered an "unqualified success;"
499
other participating States gave their operations high marks. Iraq, deeply in debt
to several Western States, Japan and the USSR, declared victory, and Iran felt
skeptical relief, at the end of hostilities.
Part C. Conclusions
"The Iran-Iraq conflict was a major war, not a small war. For the only time since
World War II, deliberate and sustained operations were carried out against mer-
chant ships" by the belligerents. It was also one of the longest wars of the cen-
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tury, with a million casualties, mostly in the land campaigns. Perhaps virtually
503
every Iraqi family lost a son, brother or father, or 1 50,000 killed among 400,000
casualties. An entire generation lost a decade of its life, and the country had only
begun to face the social costs it would have to pay. For Iran, the war brought dis-
illusionment and moderation in its Islamic fundamentalism and perhaps 300,000
dead. Direct and indirect economic costs of the war to Iran and Iraq came to
about $1 .2 trillion, plus another $1.1 trillion to rebuild their economies. "The total
cost of the war exceed[ed] the oil revenue of the two States throughout the
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twentieth century."" Iraq's booming prewar economy and rapid economic devel-
opment may have been set back two decades, and a large non-Arab debt remained
507
to slow economic recovery. Iraq's foreign debt stood at $65 billion in 1985, with
cr\o
perhaps halfowed GCC States; it had ballooned to $100 billion at the war's end.
Iraq's only positive gain may have been in its armed forces; its ground forces were
five times larger with 955,000 effectives at the war's end; by 1988 Iraq had doubled
509
its available tanks and aircraft. Nearly all of the increase in military hardware
was due to Soviet aid. Counting reserves, Iraq had nearly all the working popu-
lation of the country under arms. Iran also increased its total active military
manpower, mostly in ground forces, but its mechanized units, combat aircraft,
tanks, artillery and naval power were reduced considerably by the last years of the
war.
512
It was a war that resolved nothing, changed little, toppled neither regime, and
settled none of the underlying issues.
. . . [Tjhis [was] a war worthy of a place of honour in Barbara Tuchman's March of
Folly. It will be cited as a classic example of the power of an individual's blind
dogmatism in totalitarian states to lead a people towards disaster and thereby to
change history. This occurrence could well repeat itselfj,] especially in the prevailing
instability presided over by autocratic regimes in the Middle East.514
The 1990-91 GulfWar, beginning with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, began two years
later and proves the point; there may be repetitions in the future. The key lesson
to be learned from the war, according to Chaim Herzog, then President of Israel,
was that no State can survive militarily in isolation. "The nations of the world are
interdependent, and a major element in any middle and small nation's military ca-
pability must ... be based on its international economic and political standing.
The . . . War proved that this must be a major and vital consideration in the defence
of any country."
The war at sea, while relatively less costly in terms of life and less important
than the land, air and missile campaigns in terms ofpeople involved, was a signifi-
cant part of the conflict.
1. The Tanker War.
The Tanker War was the most important aspect of naval warfare during the
517
conflict. It was the largest loss of merchant ships and mariners' lives since the
Second World War:
Throughout the eight year . . . War, Iran and Iraq . . . attacked more than 400
commercial vessels, almost all of which were neutral State flag ships. Over 200
merchant seamen . . . lost their lives. . . . [T]he attacks . . . resulted in excess of 40
million dead weight tons ofdamaged shipping. Thirty-one ofthe attacked merchants
were sunk, and another 50 [were] declared total losses. For 1987 alone, the strikes
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against commercial shipping numbered 178, with a resulting death toll of 108. In
relative terms, by the end of 1987, write-off losses in the GulfWar stood at nearly half
the tonnage ofmerchant shipping sent to the bottom in World War II [S]hips . .
.
of more than 30 different countries, including . . . permanent members of the . . .
Security Council, [were] subjected to attacks.
518
Only about one percent of Gulf voyages involved attacks, however. Neverthe-
less, in terms ofpercentages oflosses due to maritime casualties worldwide, the sta-
tistics were staggering. During 1982, the first year ofthe Tanker War, 47 percent of
all Liberian-flag tonnage losses due to maritime casualty worldwide occurred in
the Gulf. In 1986 the figure was 99 percent; in 1987, more than 90 percent, and the
final percentages may have gone higher due to marine insurance underwriters' late
declaration of constructive total losses. Flags of convenience were flown by most
Gulf tankers, a third being owned by US nationals, with another substantial por-
tion chartered by US nationals. The financial loss to US interests was therefore
substantial. Insured losses declared by underwriters were heavy, reaching $30 mil-
lion in one month, with resulting tremendous increases in war risk premiums. The
total cost of conducting the war, and the direct and indirect damage caused by it,
was nearly $1.2 trillion. If there were
any good things that could be said of this conflict, they [were] that the Gulf War
[became] the principal factor in reducing the overtonnage ofthe world oil tanker fleet
and in aiding a recovery ofthe tanker market, and . . . tremendous advances in marine
firefighting equipment and techniques [were] directly attributable to recent
experience in the Gulf.
To a US government expert, "this [was] too thin a silver lining to justify the
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cloud." Iran attacked ships of more than 32 national flags, while Iraq mostly
concentrated on vessels flagged or chartered by Iran. Iraq concentrated on attack-
ing ships within Iran's war zone, while Iran mostly attacked vessels in the lower
Gulf, outside its or Iraq's zones. Iraq tended to shoot first and identify later, while
Iran conducted careful vessel reconnaissance and specific vessel identification.
Iraq used aircraft for its strikes, while Iran employed conventional aircraft, heli-
copters, surface combatants and small boats, the latter manned by Revolutionary
520Guard forces. Iraq never caused a major interruption in Iran's exports to finance
its war.
Several warships—US frigates Samuel B. Roberts and Stark, and major units of
the belligerents' navies as well as smaller craft like Iran Ajr—were severely dam-
aged or sunk. Some losses resulted from opposing belligerents' attacks, some oc-
curred through mistake, and some through self-defense responses by States not
party to the conflict. There were deaths and injuries among crews. Belligerents and
neutrals lost air crews through combat losses or accidents. There were losses of
personnel at offshore terminals and other oil facilities. These facilities, including
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some in territories of neutral States, were also damaged. Attacks on oil platforms
resulted in deaths, injuries, and material destruction. The Vincennes tragedy
522
caused 290 deaths. These losses do not include those incurred during the land
523
campaigns.
One interesting result of the war was reduced use of the Strait ofHormuz as an
oil lifeline to the West. While tankers lifted nearly 20 million barrels a day through
the Strait in 1978, this had been reduced to 6.4 billion in 1985. Oil discoveries out-
side the Gulf, pipelines from Iraq through Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and the Sau-
dis' construction of an east-west pipeline with capacity of 3.2-5 million barrels a
day may be "insurance—in case the Strait ... is closed." These developments may
inhibit skyrocketing oil prices ifthere are more political-military developments in
the region. Yet another factor is increased production from other oil fields, e.g.,
the North Sea.
2. The Marine Environment.
The environment was also a loser, a major casualty to the Gulf being the 1983
525Nowruz attack. Undoubtedly attacks on other terminals and offshore oil facili-
ties caused spills. And undoubtedly attacks on loaded tankers and other vessels,
ships in ballast and warships, resulted in loss ofcargoes, primarily petroleum, and
527 528
bunkers. Aircraft losses likely spread sheens on the Gulf. Apart from the
Nowruz spill, there is no indication that States considered the impact of military
529
activity on the environment or the developing law protecting it. Completion of
530
overland oil pipelines may reduce risk of pollution at sea in the Gulf, but these
pipelines are vulnerable to attack by any number of methods (particularly if laid
close to the shore) during war or accidents at any time. Pipeline construction has
only shifted the environmental risk to the land.
3. The Role ofthe United States and the Soviet Union.
In terms ofUS policy, it has been said that
By playing a leading role in the Gulf as well as in the United Nations, the United
States unquestionably helped bring Iran to the negotiating table ... U.S. policy
helped reestablish U.S. credibility among the GulfArab States by demonstrating that
the United States could sustain a low-key, politically sensitive, and consistent
military policy U.S. military planners were quite pleased with the . . . cooperation
they enjoyed from Gulf States normally reluctant to be so forthcoming— U.S. policy
"kept the Soviets out of the Gulf in any significant operational sense, while U.S.
policymakers nonetheless worked successfully with the Soviets in the United
Nations in forging Resolution 598. All these produced . . . satisfaction among U.S.
diplomats involved in the year's [1988's] events.
. . . [T]he United States shared credit for bringing the cease-fire into effect with a
wide range of factors. Iraq's extended bombing campaign, of which the tanker war
was but a minor part, slowly ground Iran's economy down to crisis levels by the end of
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1987, and Iran's efforts to deal with its economy only exacerbated deep fissures
among competing political factions in Tehran. Economic deprivation combined
with battlefield stalemate to produce . . . war weariness across Iran— The "war ofthe
cities" provoked confusion and fear out of all proportion to the relatively meager
physical damage In some sense, Iraq can be said to have won its war with Iran.
Luck also played a role. Other factors that might be mentioned, at least in the
context ofthe Tanker War, included cooperation ofthe Gulf States and US NATO
allies and other States affected by the war's dislocations and attacks on their ship-
ping. The overwhelming supply of arms and other goods to Iraq also was a major
factor. However, "[i]t should now be clear that US involvement in the Gulfdur-
ing the . . . War, particularly during the . . . 'tanker war' . . . was part ofa long-stand-
533
ing continuum of American foreign policy."
The USSR tried to achieve several goals: preserving its influence in Iraq, gain-
ing influence in the GCC and Iran, and reducingUS influence in the region, e.g., by
chartering tankers to Kuwait. The war bolstered Soviet standing in the region. At
war's end Iraq could not afford to alienate the USSR or end its dependence on So-
viet arms supplies. Iran would have to improve its relations with the Soviet Union
to encourage the USSR to moderate its support ofIraq. While the Gulf States were
much less dependent on the Soviet Union, they were not anxious to see the USSR
leave the Gulf after the war; Soviet presence was seen as useful to keep the United
States concerned about the region. Soviet post-war gains were therefore not signif-
icant. With the war over, there were fewer opportunities and greater obstacles for
extending Soviet political and military influence in the Gulf. The USSR's dis-
integration three years later of course meant loss of whatever gains it had made
535during the war. Iraq lost an arms supplier, Iran lost a whipping boy, and the
other Gulf States lost a makeweight. The Soviet Union's demise meant a triumph
ofUS policy, and just in time for the 1990-91 Gulf War.536
4. The Role ofInternational Organizations.
The United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, emerged from Cold
War gridlock to a more active role in peacemaking. Its resolutions affirming free-
537dom of navigation are particularly important for this analysis. The Arab
League, at first gridlocked because ofdivisions among its members, some ofwhom
(e.g., Syria) supported Iran and others Iraq (e.g., Kuwait, Saudi Arabia), came to-
538
gether at the end of the war. States in other established international organiza-
tions, e.g., individual NATO members, cooperated together more or less under the
WEU with Persian Gulf States to support freedom of navigation. WEU's revital-
539
ization has been traced to the Tanker War shipping threat. These European
States, while following a Western political strategy, were able to distinguish them-
selves from US policy. They made separate, ifnot radically different, definitions of
Western interests in the Gulf. Deployment of European naval power to the Gulf
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improved the status of European States with many Gulf Cooperation Council
members, particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
The European Community, evolving into the European Union during the war
years, and the Economic Summits lent diplomatic pressure to end the conflict.
Nevertheless, it appeared likely that although the EU will harmonize policies in
Europe, European States will muddle through with individual policies in the Gulf
in the future.
However, the most impressive development during 1980-88 was the organiza-
tion of the Gulf Cooperation Council of other Gulf States in 1981, which by war's
end could "have good reasons for being pleased and confident They . . . success-
fully weathered the Iranian revolution, eight years of Iran-Iraq fighting, and a
whole range of direct or covert Iranian efforts to undermine them. They [could]
reasonably argue that the future [could] not be worse than the recent past." It
has been correctly predicted that
. . . [T]he GCC states will strive to maintain their unity to limit the chances of
turmoil spreading from one state to the rest. Together, they will try to hew a middle
path between Iran and Iraq ... to achieve a balance ofpower in the Gulf and limit the
opportunities for super-power intervention .... Because the GCC states can never
attain an even mildly formidable . . . defense posture, their attention is properly
focused on diplomacy. Nevertheless, practical steps toward closer security
cooperation . . . can serve to deny the attractions of outside meddling in the affairs of
the weaker members of the community, and put the larger powers on notice that the
GCC states are determined to act together to preserve their political integrity.-544
For the United States, a problem could be military equipment purchases from
other countries, thereby lessening dependence on America while increasing de-
pendence on other States.
5. The Ensuing Chapters.
From any perspective the Tanker War was costly in terms of people, property,
pollution of the environment, and perhaps international law. The Chapters that
follow analyze the war in the context of the UN Charter, and in particular the in-
herent right ofindividual and collective self-defense in Article 5 1 ; the law ofthe
sea in the context ofthe Persian Gulf; the law ofnaval warfare, apart from Char-
ter considerations, at stake in the Tanker War; and the law of the sea, the law of
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the maritime environment, and the law of naval warfare.
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80 The Tanker War
had ratified one or both Protocols by the Tanker War's end. See Schindler & Toman 701-03; Ratifications and
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,
Jan. 10, 1989, typed release from US Navy Internal Relations Activity; and US Secretary of Defense
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17. This multi-sided power structure in the ensuing discussion adds several countries to participants listed in
John E. Peterson, DefendingA rabia: Evolution ofResponsibility, in International Issues and Perspectives 117 (1980),
which, as its title indicates, is primarily concerned with Arabian peninsula issues.
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(1978) for internal Iraqi politics analysis in the decade before the war.
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Abadan, a 20-minute flight from Iraq. See generally Joyner, n. 13, 7-8 for a geopolitical sketch of Iran at the end of the
Tanker War.
21. Charter Establishing Gulf Cooperation Council, Including Rules of Procedure & Unified Economic
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Joseph A. Kechichian, The GulfCooperation Council and the Gulf War, in Joyner 91 ; Nassibe G. Ziade, Introductory Note,
in International Issues, n. 17, 1 1 (1980) (explaining GCC's genesis, development); Richard P. Johnson, Conquering
Fear in the Gulf, 115 Proceedings 78 (Mar. 1989) (analyzing GCC in action); Michael Sterner, The Gulf Cooperation
Council and Persian GulfSecurity, in Naff, Gulf Security ch. 1. GCC States line the Gulfwestern shore. For analysis of
the region's geography, see nn. 66-69 and accompanying text.
22. The smallest of the Gulf States, the island nation of Bahrain has one of the largest oil refineries in the region
and considerable oil reserves. See generally Joyner, n. 13, at 11 for a geopolitical sketch of Bahrain at the end of the
Tanker War. Bahrain became independent in 1971. MacDonald 30.
23. Kuwait has significant oil reserves and offshore pumping facilities. See generally Joyner, n. 13, 9-10 for a
geopolitical sketch ofKuwait at the end ofthe Tanker War. Kuwait became independent in 1961 . MacDonald 30.
24. Oman has significant oil reserves. See generally Joyner, n. 13, 11-12 for a geopolitical sketch ofOman at the end
of the Tanker War. Oman has been independent since 1650. MacDonald 60 n.18.
25. Qatar has significant oil reserves. See generally Joyner, n. 13, 10 for a geopolitical sketch of Qatar at the end of
the Tanker War. Qatar became independent in 1971. MacDonald 30.
26. Saudi Arabia has a 10 million barrel per day pumping capacity and reserves estimated at 170 billion barrels,
the largest on Earth. See generally id. 6-7 for a geopolitical sketch of Saudi Arabia at the end of the Tanker War.
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the UAE and neighboring Qatar have experienced internal instability. Burrell & Cottrell, n. 7, 18-22;
MacDonald 30; Joyner, n. 13, 10-11.
28. Peterson, n. 17, 118-21.
29. Cable 179.
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& Economic Co-operation Between Arab States, with Military Annex, June 17, 1950, 157 BFSP 669, 48 AJIL Supp. 51
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(1946); nn. III. 800-17 and accompanying text.
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38. Burrell & Cottrell, n. 7, 22-30; MacDonald 1 50; Saideh Lotfian, Regional Powers and the War, in Rajaee,
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The US return from investments in the area has been in the billions ofdollars for years. Burrell & Cottrell,
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War I, and Persia, now Iran, the Empire's principal enemy, down to today. Hiro 7-8, 2 1 -33; Mansel, n. 1 3, 39, 1 89-90.
51. Burrell & Cottrell, n. 7, 16-18; Cable 198; Hiro 14; see also nn. 31, 34 and accompanying text. Iran said it
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2. to replace the [UK] as the dominant external power in the Arabian Peninsula and . . . Gulf area: the Western
oil companies and half of the West's oil supplies are then in a measure hostages to Soviet political and economic
policies;
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54. Kazem Sajjadpour, The USSR and the War, in Rajaee, Iranian Perspectives 29-30, referring to Treaty of
Friendship & Co-Operation, n. 46.
55. This had been true for over 10 years. Compare Burrell & Cottrell, n. 7, 4 with Naghibzadeh, n. 18, 40.
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See also n. 409 and accompanying text.
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85. Post, n. 50, 32-33; see also nn. 36, 50 and accompanying text.
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Chapter III
CLAIMS TO MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER ON THE OCEANS
Chapter II demonstrates that attempting to preserve minimum public order
in the Gulf during the Tanker War involved many participants with vary-
ing (sometimes multiple) perspectives in different arenas and situations with
numerous coercive and persuasive strategies at their command. This and suc-
ceeding chapters examine claims to authority in the effective power process as part
of the ongoing global social process. As McDougal and his associates have noted,
international law as the effective global power process is subject to claims by par-
ticipants to optimize their goals in that process. In some instances these claims
are part of the civic order, i.e., private orderings or private claims, as opposed to
public order norms or claims to public order. But civic order claims, as will be
seen, may have serious and strong impact on public order claims and claimants.
For example, attacks on merchant ships caused phenomenal increases in insur-
ance rates; these in turn affected global oil prices, and rising oil prices undoubt-
edly influenced government decisionmakers. By the same token, decisions of
governments, based in their perception of law, undoubtedly influenced their con-
siderations on assisting one or both belligerents and their attitudes toward private
parties who had dealings with belligerents. The tilt toward supporting Iraq that
grew throughout the war, and a corresponding decline in support ofIran, although
there were cross-currents the other way, is an example of this interrelationship.
Although Jessup argued for an interstitial transnational law, more recently
Lowenfeld has made the point, as law of war manuals have for a sliding scale of
o
conflict between war and peace, that there is a sliding scale relationship between
public law and transnational law that governs matters between private actors and
between private actors and States, sometimes an actor's own country and some-
o
times another nation. And while the Chapter III-VII analysis in this volume con-
centrates on public law analysis, the incidence of civic order relationships, i.e.,
transactions governed by transnational law, must be borne in mind.
Because ofthe Charter's trumping effect on treaty law and its strong influence
on customary norms, and because several participants in the Tanker War, e.g.,
France and the United Kingdom, believed that the Charter and not the LOAC
12
governed, analysis begins with study of Charter-related claims, particularly is-
sues of self-defense and neutrality. This Chapter ends with an examination of the
law of treaties and its relationship with crisis and armed conflict.
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Part A. UN Charter Norms; Related Issues
The history of the Charter, and its drafting and record of negotiations, have
been well-documented. The general contours ofpractice under the Charter have
also been chronicled. This is not the place to mine anew these lodes. What fol-
lows is a statement of provisions of the Charter, followed by summaries of claims
and counterclaims under the Charter and relat(
sions (outcomes) as to the current state of the law.
ated sources of law, with conclu
/. Norms Stated in the Charter
Five parts ofthe Charter are relevant to the Tanker War: its Preamble, Purposes
and Principles; self-defense and related concepts in the Charter era; lawmaking
under the Charter; pacific settlement of disputes; and action under the Charter to
deal with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. A half
century of practice under the Charter has developed in some instances. In other
cases pre-Charter norms still have force.
a. The Preamble, Purposes and Principles of the Charter. The Charter Preamble
initially expresses Member States' determination:
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war[;] ... to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, ... in the equal rights of. . . nations large and small [;] to
establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from
treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained [;] and to promote
social progress and better standards for life in larger freedom.
To achieve these goals, UN Members have pledged:
to practice tolerance and live together in peace ... as good neighbors, and to unite
our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the
acceptance ofprinciples and the institution ofmethods, that armed force shall not be
used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for
[promoting] economic and social advancement of all people[.] 16
All Persian Gulf States, and all countries that were Tanker War participants, al-
though perhaps as States not parties to the conflict, areUN Members. Iran and Iraq
17
are original Members.
Little use of the Preamble's statements have been made since 1945. One recent
example, however, occurred during the Tanker War itself, when the Security
Council noted "that Member States pledged together to live together in peace with
18
one another as good neighbors in accordance with the Charter. . ." The Preamble
in other cases "reinforces, without being essential to, the propositions [founded on
19 r
other parts of the Charter] being advanced" There have been occasional uses of
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the Preamble in other Council and General Assembly resolutions relevant to this
study, however. The General Assembly's Uniting for Peace (UFP) Resolution dis-
20
cussions in 1 950 referred to the Preamble. The General Assembly's Friendly Re-
21
lations Declaration of 1 970 also employed Preamble language. To the extent that
these resolutions have been incorporated by practice, e.g., by subsequent General
22
Assembly-recommended peacekeeping operations under a UFP precedent, or
23have been incorporated by reference in later resolutions or authoritative pro-
nouncements, the Preamble has had added vitality.
In any event, the drafters intended that all Charter provisions "being . . . indivis-
ible as in any other legal instrument, are equally valid and operative." Each provi-
sion must be construed and applied together.
(a) The "Preamble" introduces the Charter and sets forth the declared com-
mon intentions which brought us together in this Conference and moved
us to unite our will and efforts, and made us harmonize, regulate, and or-
ganize our international action to achieve our common ends.
(b) The "Purposes" constitute the raison d'etre of the Organization. They are
the aggregation of the common ends on which our minds met; hence, the
cause and object of the Charter to which member States collectively and
severally subscribe.
(c) The chapter on "Principles" sets, in the same order of ideas, the methods
and regulating norms according to which the Organization and its mem-
bers shall do their duty and endeavor to achieve the common ends. Their
understandings should serve as actual standards of international con-
duct.24
Thus the Preamble is an integral part of the Charter as a statement of "motivating
ideas and purposes," although it does not define UN Members' obligations. These
ideas and purposes can be, and have been, used to evidence the Charter's ideas and
purposes in considering the articles of the Charter. In effect, the Preamble is a se-
25
ries ofpledges, fulfillment ofwhich are in the Charter's Purposes, Principles and
constitutive provisions.
i. Purposes ofthe Organization: Articles 1(1), 1(2). Although the United Nations
as contemplated under the Charter is "a multipurpose organization, . . . mainte-
nance of [international] peace and security is the primary purpose ofthe Organiza-
tion and takes priority over other purposes." The order of listing the UN's
Purposes, Charter article 1(1) stating the goal of international peace and security
first, supports this view:
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take ef-
fective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
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the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches
of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity
with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settle-
ment of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach
of the peace. 27
Goodrich and his collaborators note the difference between Article 1(1 )'s lan-
guage, i.e., the United Nations may "take effective collective measures" to prevent
and remove threats to the peace, to suppress aggression or other breaches of the
peace, the "measures" language of Articles 39, 41 and 42, Article 50's "preventive
or enforcement measures," Article 5's "preventive or enforcement action" and the
"enforcement measures" Article 2(7) mentions. This language difference has been
cited as authority for the UFP Resolution; the Council might have a duty to take
"measures" or action, but the General Assembly's responsibility and powers under
Article 10 should be determined by Article l(l)'s twofold injunction for "effective
28
collective measures" to maintain or restore peace. Article 1(1) also assumes that
resolution of a dispute or situation will be in accordance with international law
29
and "justice," a provision inserted to protect small States, a corollary to the sover-
30
eign equality of all UN Members. Implementing Article 1(1), at least in terms of
the Charter language, has been through Articles 2(3), 2(4), and Chapter VI-VIII.
31
Therefore, analysis of the use of Article 1(1) will be deferred until later.
Another of the UN's Purposes is "to develop friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle ofequal rights and self-determination ofpeoples,
32
and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." Most
33
analysis has focused on elevating self-determination to a human right, some-
times in mutilateral conventions, and often invoked in efforts to end colonial-
ism, the Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
35 rr
Peoples being a watershed. A collateral effect has been developing the idea that
self-determination includes permanent sovereignty over natural resources and a
37
State's right to freely dispose of its natural wealth and resources.
Assembly and Council interpretations of Article 1(2) played a background role
in naval matters after World War II. In the Algerian Civil War (1957-59) the As-
38
sembly referred to "the right of the Algerian people to self-determination" after
39
France gave Algerians the right to determine their status. The resolution passed
after the French interdiction campaign and had no impact on claims of legality
ofthat operation. Assembly Resolution 1514, declaring all peoples including those
under colonial rule have self-determination rights, was incorporated by reference
in Council resolutions on Rhodesia (1965-80). In this case the Royal Navy en-
forced Council-directed interdiction of Beira-bound tankers loaded with oil in-
voiced to Rhodesia.
Article 1 (2) played no stated role in the Tanker War; self-determination was not
an issue. However, the issue of "the inalienable right" of all States "freely to
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dispose of their national wealth and resources" was behind the desires of States
like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to export petroleum, part of their "natural wealth,"
through their ports and all sea lanes. Shipping flagged under other States was en-
gaged in lifting petroleum from these ports and otherwise in legitimate trade
within the Gulf. The Council condemned hostilities in "sea-lanes, navigable wa-
terways, harbour works, terminals, offshore installations and all ports with direct
or indirect access to the sea . . .." The Council later reaffirmed "the right of free
navigation in international waters and sea lanes for shipping to and from all ports
and installations of the littoral States . . . not parties to the hostilities[.]" Iran had
attacked commercial shipping en route to and from Kuwaiti and Saudi ports. To
the extent that these attacks frustrated the rights of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and
other Gulf States not parties to the war to dispose oftheir natural wealth, attacks on
shipping carrying these exports could be seen as a violation ofArticle 1(3) as inter-
preted by the Assembly and the Council.
ii. Principles in the Charter: Articles 2(3), 2(4). The principle expressed in Arti-
cle 2(3) is a logical corollary of the principle of Article 2(4), which prohibits threat
or use of force against a State's territorial integrity or political independence, or in
any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. Article 2(3) re-
quires UN Members to settle their international disputes by peaceful means so
that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. A legacy
from the League Covenant era, the language of Article 2(3) has been incorporated
in many international agreements. Its substance, mingled with Articles 33-36's
48
parallel policies, has been restated in many UN resolutions, including Security
Council Resolution 479, the first Council action in the Iran-Iraq war.
Article 2(4) of the Charter "lays down one of the basic principles of the United
Nations," incorporating by reference Article l's Principles and declaring, "All
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes ofthe United Nations." Article
2(4) must be interpreted in the context ofother Charter norms; i.e., it may be tem-
pered by other rights (e.g., of self-defense) under the Charter or general interna-
52
tional law under a number of theories. The point of difference is the relative
scope of the right of self-defense and the extent to which the right of self-defense
qualifies Article 2(4), an analysis deferred for consideration in the context of
self-defense and related issues.
Definition of terms lies beneath the problem of interrelationships between Ar-
ticle 2(4), which at least restates a customary rule, and other claims. Two views
have developed on what "threat or use of force" means: Does "force" mean only
"armed force," or does it include economic or political pressure? Most commen-
tators say force means only armed force and does not include economic or political
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pressure. Recent treaty negotiations support a narrow definition of "force."
States have negotiated separate provisions prohibiting coercive economic or polit-
57
ical methods. Proponents of a clause to include economic coercion with military
coercion as a ground for voiding a treaty, failed in the Vienna Convention on the
58Law of Treaties negotiations. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organi-
59
zations also lacks such a provision. Although the General Assembly has adopted
resolutions calling upon States to refrain from economic or political coercion, nei-
ther the Assembly nor the Council has determined that such coercion equates with
use of force under Article 2(4). The Assembly may have come close with the 1970
Friendly Relations Declaration, but analysis reveals that the line has not been
crossed. Other examples are consensus approval of a definition of aggression
and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (NIEO).
Similar to the US position that aggression "cannot be so comprehensive as to in-
clude all cases . . . and cannot take into account the various circumstances which
might enter into the determination of aggression in a particular case[,]" the Res-
olution definition of aggression parallels Article 2(4): "Aggression is the use of
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political in-
dependence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Char-
ter ..., as set out in this Definition."
A State's first use of armed force in violation of the Charter is prima facte evi-
dence of an act of aggression, although the Security Council may determine that,
under the circumstances, no act of aggression has been committed. The Defini-
tion considers the following as acts of aggression whether or not there has been a
war declaration:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory ofanother
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such in-
vasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of an-
other State or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another
State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another
State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, marine
and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another
State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the condi-
tions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such
territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the dis-
posal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of
aggression against a third State;
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(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement
therein. 67
/TO
The list is not exhaustive. Article 5(1) is the only direct reference to economic
strategies: "No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic,
military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression." Thus eco-
nomic need cannot justify aggression, but that does not mean that a coercive eco-
nomic strategy is aggression.
As with the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration, NIEO Article 32 proclaims
that "No State may use or encourage ... economic, political or any other ... mea-
sures to coerce another State ... to obtain . . . subordination ofthe exercise of its sov-
70
ereign rights." Because of the vote on NIEO (118-6-10) and developed States'
solid opposition, and NIEO's status as not being a first measure ofcodification and
71
progressive development, it is unlikely that Article 32 recites custom. State prac-
72
tice under the Vienna Convention confirms this view.
One issue, for which there are no clearcut answers in Charter practice, is
whether the "territorial integrity" phrase in Article 2(4) includes the "floating ter-
73
ritory" ofa vessel flying a State's flag. The Corfu Channel Case settled the issue for
warships; the judgment included an award for damage to theUK ships and for per-
sonnel injured or killed. Security Council resolutions affirmed freedom of navi-
7S lf\
gation in the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict and in the Tanker War; in the past
other resolutions approved interdiction of Beria-bound merchantmen as part of
77
sanctions action against Rhodesia. The freedom of navigation resolutions con-
firmed vessels' right to be free of belligerent interference; the Rhodesia intercep-
tion resolution can be seen as a derogation on a right of "floating territorial
78
integrity" in the sense of Article 2(4).
Even if a ship might not be considered part of a State's territory and therefore
not subject to Article 2(4), attacks on individual merchant ships are acts of aggres-
sion and are subject to self-defense response(s) under Article 51. This issue was
particularly relevant for the Tanker War.
Although Article 2(4) does not cite aggression specifically, it does prohibit
Members from acting "in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations" in their international relations. Article 1(1) states the UN's pri-
79 • -i -11
mary Purpose as maintaining international peace and security through collec-
tive action to "suppress . . . acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace . . . ."
Therefore, UN Members have an obligation to refrain from acts of aggression
80
against other States. And, as also developed under the self-defense analysis, the
Nicaragua Case adopted the broader French-language version of the Charter, Arti-
cle 51. Article 51's English language version reads:
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Nothing in the . . . Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the . . . Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the . . . Council under the . . . Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary ... to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
The French version reads:
Aucune disposition de la . . . Charte ne porte atteinte au droit naturel de legitime
defense, individuelle ou collective, dans le cas ou un Membre des Nations Unies est
Pobjet d'une agression armee, jusqu a ce que le Conseil de Securite ait pris les mesures
neccaires pour maintenir la paix et la securite internationales. Les mesures prises par
des Membres dans l'exercice de ce droit de legitime defense sont immediatement
portees a la connaissance du Conseil . . . et n'affectent en nen la pouvoir et le devoir
qu'a le Conseil, en vertu de la . . . Charte, d'agir a tout moment de la maniere qu'il
judge necessaire pour maintenir ou retablir la paix et la securite internationales. 81
82The right of self-defense, however defined, arises when there is an "armed at-
tack," under the English language version, or under the French version when
there is an "agression armee" which connotes a broader range of activity or situa-
tions triggering a right of self-defense.
Both versions and those in the Chinese, Russian and Spanish languages are
84
equally authentic. However, since the languages in which the drafting was done
were English and French, Goodrich and his associates argue that more weight
should be given the English and French texts and, ifthere is a discrepancy between
the two, the interpretation most likely to be correct would be that based on the lan-
guage of the text that was originally adopted. Under this view, since Article 5 1 is
the result of a UK, i.e., English language, proposal, the "armed attack" phrase of
the English language version should prevail.
Linnan has advocated using the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to
87
guide analysis of the relationship between Articles 2(4) and 51. The same ap-
proach might be taken for the situation of equally authoritative texts where words
chosen for versions in differing languages have different meanings. The Vienna
Convention, article 33, provides in pertinent part:
1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is
equally authoritative in each language. . .
.
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each au-
thentic text.
4. . . . [W]hen a comparison of the authentic text discloses a difference of mean-
ing which the application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning
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which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the
treaty, shall be adopted.
Articles 31 and 32 of the Convention provide:
31. General rule ofinterpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose.
2. The context for . . . interpreting] ... a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the
text, including its preamble and annexes[.] . .
.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context . .
.
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the par-
ties so intended.
32. Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, ... to confirm
the meaning resulting from the application ofarticle 3 1 , or to determine the meaning
when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 88
89
There have been several theories for interpreting treaties, but Jimenez de
90
Arechaga says Vienna Convention principles declare existing law. Although
91
other approaches have appeal, the Convention's mainstream approach will be
the principal path of analysis.
92
Article 31(1) "establishes . . . the 'golden rule' of interpretation [:]" Give a
treaty its ordinary meaning in its context and in the light of its object and purpose.
Article 3 1 (2) further defines the context to include the treaty preamble. Along with
the context these are relevant, for this purpose: subsequent practice establishing
the parties' agreement as to its interpretation, Article 31(3)(b); and relevant appli-
cable rules of international law, Article 31(3)(a); and a special meaning to a term if
the parties agree to such, Article 31(4). Therefore, the first task is to examine in-
trinsic evidence; the second is a gradual progression from this center to more pe-
ripheral evidence, with a concession to parties' specific intent "if it is established,"
convincingly, "that the parties . . . intended" such. The last qualification does not
apply, since the problem lies with the meaning of Article 51's wording, for which
there is no terminological consensus. The problem in terms ofVienna Convention
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Article 31 analysis boils down to an issue of subsequent practice and relevant, ap-
95
plicable international law rules.
The most recent authoritative pronouncement on the meaning of "armed at-
tack"
—
"agression armee" in Article 51 is the Nicaragua Case. The ICJ accepted the
broader French-language Article 51 version, stating in dictum that the Definition
of Aggression Resolution, Article 3(g), stated a customary rule; sending armed
bands, irregulars or mercenaries across a border would be armed attack justifying
self-defense. (The Court went on to say, however, that supplying arms or other
logistics across a border was not aggression and that therefore a US collective self-
96
defense claim under Article 5 1 was not admissible.) And since the same word
—
97
"agression"—is used in Article 1(1) and Article 51, the same meaning should be
imported into Article 1(1) as incorporated by reference in Article 2(4).
The narrow question is whether there can be armed aggression against ships.
The Definition of Aggression Resolution, Article 3, declares: "Aggression is
the use ofarmed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or po-
litical independence ofanother State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
98
Charter ... as set out in this definition."' Although it could be argued that "terri-
torial integrity" in Article 1 includes the "floating territory" of ships, the negotia-
tors did not address this possibility; they voted down amendments to refer to the
territorial sea and airspace, although one State (Indonesia) added it by interpreta-
tive statement. Article 1 only covers armed aggression, and not economic or politi-
99
cal coercion; it does not cover threat of force, as distinguished from use of force.
Article 2 declares a first use of force in violation of the Charter to beprimafacie evi-
dence of aggression, but that the Security Council may determine that no aggres-
sion has occurred, perhaps because the act(s) or consequence(s) are not that
serious. The Definition also recites certain per se principles, subject to Article
2's first-use and de minimis principles, in Article 3, which provides in part:
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration ofwar, shall, subject to and in
accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine
and air fleets of another State . .
.
Article 3(c) says that blockading coasts or ports by armed forces is aggression.
The ICJ has stated that article 3(g), denouncing sending armed bands across a bor-
der, states custom; one commentator says all ofArticle 3 probably restates custom,
although others disagree. The Article 3 list is nonexclusive.
An ambiguity remains as to the phrase "marine and air fleets." Does this in-
clude a single merchantman flagged under a target State's flag? Article 3(d) covers
attacks on a warship, a warship formation, or a group of merchantmen, e.g., a
fishing fleet. Attacking a single neutral warship is never permitted in territorial
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waters, and by well-established custom on the high seas as well. Choice ofthe
expression "fleets" for article 3(d) was done "advisedly, ... to exclude from the pur-
view of the Definition the use of force [by an attacking State] against a single or a
few commercial vessels . .
., especially when they enter [attacking State] jurisdic-
tion," according to Dinstein, who cites Broms, chair of the UN committee that
107
produced the Definition. Dinstein concludes that "A reasonable degree offorce
(in the form of search and seizure) may be legitimate against foreign merchant
108
ships even on the high seas." However, Broms did not refer to merchant ships
109
generally; he and the Committee referred only to fishing vessels and fleets.
Dinstein's view appears inconsistent with what the Committee actually decided. It
is also clear that coastal States, engaged in legitimate policing of their coastal wa-
ters (e.g., territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ) do not commit aggression under
article 3(d) when they pursue, and possibly attack, merchant ships for viola-
dons. 110
The Dinstein view is inconsistent with what the UN Committee actually de-
cided. The UK Committee delegate pointed out during negotiations that Article
3(d) would not impugn coastal State action "in accordance with international law for
the legitimate enforcement of its authority." A saving clause describing coastal
State rights had been omitted from Article 3(d). Including it would
risk that such a clause might be taken to imply that any vessel . . . which ventured
within the jurisdiction of another State might be subjected to any degree of force
—
even an armed attack—that the State might choose to inflict on it in the exercise of its
own authority, which was not the . . . Committee's intention. 111
Thus, far from indicating that attacks on independently-sailing merchant ships
could not trigger a self-defense response, the Committee was trying to avoid the
problem ofunlawful attacks in the first place. There is no indication that the Com-
mittee even considered self-defense in this context. The Committee did not intend
to exclude attacks on independently-steaming merchantmen from the Definition,
for which self-defense or other legitimate response(s) might be appropriate.
1 1 7
As incidents like the Mayaguez seizure demonstrate, to say that not all at-
tacks on merchant ships can result in an aggression claim justifying a self-defense
response is dangerous business indeed. Even as a self-defense response that is not
proportional can become aggression, not every attack on an independently-sail-
ing merchantman should be shielded from an aggression claim. Some merchant
ships, e.g., passenger liners, are forbidden targets in any case; even with modern
commercial shipping's highly automated nature, and the resulting relatively low
size of crews, a deliberate attack on a single cargo merchantman can involve many
people's lives. The liner exception does not cover the situation ofother vessels car-
rying hundreds ofpassengers, e.g., ferries or work-boats transporting employees of
offshore drilling rigs, nor does it cover a common situation of cargo vessels with a
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small passenger manifest. Moreover, the reality of merchant traffic on the seas is
that no merchant ships, unless they are fishing vessels or tugs and tows, ever sail in
company. A view that all independently-sailing merchant ships could be attacked
without the attacking State risking being branded an aggressor would mean that
no merchant ship would be safe, under any circumstances, since all sail independ-
ently. Presumably an all-out, simultaneous, world-wide attack on all ships
flagged under the target State would qualify for Dinstein, but that hypothetical
lacks reality.
The "fleets" expression does not follow the principles of prior treaty law,
whether ratified or not. These agreements point to coverage of attacks on single
ships as enough to trigger a risk of a charge of aggression if the act or its conse-
quences are serious enough, under the Definition Resolution formula. Charter
era State practice buttresses this conclusion. The Resolution includes blockade as
• 117
a qualifiedper se instance of aggression. As a practical matter, blockade runners
do not try to avoid interception in groups. If it is assumed that the law ofblockade
still includes an ultimate right to attack and destroy merchant vessels trying to
118
evade blockade, and it is submitted that this remains the case, then illegal use of
blockade includes the illegal destruction of blockade runners as part of unlawful
aggression. And if such be true in the context of blockade, then it is likewise true
that illegal destruction of a single merchantman, sailing independently, would be
119
likewise susceptible to condemnation, if the situation is serious enough, under
the Resolution formula. Even if attacking a single merchant ship does not come
under Article 3(d)'s "marine . . . fleets" principle, prior treaty law and State practice
since 1945 points toward a strong potential of a finding of aggression for such an
attack.
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The record of treaties negotiated before the Charter era and immediately after
1945 is mixed as to whether attacks on shipping constitute aggression; no recent
agreements have been concuded on the issue. Some multilateral and bilateral
• 121 122
agreements categorize them as acts ofaggression; ' many do not. ' For purposes
of this analysis, however, it is most significant that Iran bound itself twice, and
Iraq once, to multilateral agreements specifically defining attacks on "vessels or
123
aircraft of another State" as acts ofaggression. Did "vessels" include merchant-
men as well as State ships? Contemporary USSR proposals in the League of Na-
tions, similar to the Definition list without the latter's nonexclusivity clause,
spoke of "knowingly attacking the naval or air forces of another State." Ap-
plying general principles for interpreting ambiguous treaty terms, it would seem
that the unmodified words, "vessels" or "ships," meant not only State vessels, i.e.,
warships, but merchantmen as well. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, Article 31(1) restates a customary rule: "A treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given the terms ... in
125
their context and in the light of its object and purpose." The ordinary meaning
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of"ship" or "vessel," unadorned by an adjective, is just that—it connotes all seago-
ing conveyance, military or commercial. This is reinforced by the context of the
era. The USSR, a primary promoter of an aggression definition, was a socialist,
command economy, in which the State owned all commercial ships through trad-
ing companies. At the time the USSR claimed an absolute theory of sovereign
1
jn
immunity, as distinguished from capitalist countries' acceptance of modified,
128
restricted forms of immunity. Although the USSR might have advocated a
129
more narrow theory for aggression in League debates, when treaties were nego-
tiated with other, often capitalist, States, these conventions' coverage was broaden
enough to cover all ships. Other countries' positions cannot be determined with
certainty, but Comments to the Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of
States in Case ofAggression, proposed exclusively by US (and therefore capitalist)
130
commentators, support a view that "vessel" or "ship" meant all vessels or ships,
131
regardless of relationship with a registry State. Moreover, including attacks on
merchantmen within a definition ofaggression would further the treaties' policies
in minimizing opportunity for legally-sanctioned violence.
Language of multilateral agreements contemporaneous with the Charter were
inconclusive or would appear to have drifted toward a view that only attacks on
warships would constitute acts of aggression; however, examples given were
132
non-exclusive. Thus there is some support in treaties for a view that States have
considered attacks on single merchantmen an act ofaggression; this is particularly
1 33
true for Iran and Iraq, whose treaty record is clearer than that ofmost States. " To
be sure, the law oftreaties says that treaties cannot create rights for third States un-
less these States accept them, but treaty rules can state custom.
State practice since 1 945 supports a view that attacks on single ships can amount
to aggression. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Syrian navy seized Romantica,
135
an Italian liner, later released upon the Italian ambassador's intervention. Loss
ofthe neutral Venus Challenger, sunk with all hands as a victim ofan Indian missile
1 36
during the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict, has been severely criticized. The
United States protested and responded with force to Cambodia's seizure of the
US-flag Mayaguez in 1975, claiming self-defense. A US Court ofAppeals found
Argentina liable for its attack on Liberian-flagHercules outside a declared war zone
during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War. 138
If today diminished in value because of failure of ratification or acceptance
of the final text, draft multilateral treaties or single-action proposals carry some
weight as a secondary source because of their authors' eminence as scholars.
These sources support a view that "vessels" include merchantmen sailing alone. In
this regard the 1933 USSR proposal is interesting; it would have said the first attack
on another State's "naval or air forces" was an act of aggression. The full League
Committee's 1933 draft Act Relating to the Definition of the Aggressor changed
this to the first attack on another State's "vessels or aircraft," some indication of
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accepting a broader definition of targets that could trigger a claim of aggression.
The 1939 Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of States in Case ofAg-
gression says that a single merchantmen, if attacked, could trigger a claim of ag-
gression. Few Charter era commentators have expressed a view,
independently of the "fleets" expression in Definition of Aggression, Article
3(d), perhaps because it is now obvious that an initial attack on a neutral mer-
chant ship, traveling alone, can be an act of aggression. Ifwe presume availabil-
ity ofthe 1977 Hague Recueil or its equivalent in Baghdad and Tehran when the
Tanker War began, the legal rationale for destruction and loss of life may be predi-
cated on this view, at least in part.
Appraisal. Although the record of claims and counterclaims is not clear, it is
submitted that an attack on a merchant ship, steaming independently on lawful
purposes, can be an act of aggression that can merit a self-defense response. An at-
tack on a man-of-war, sailing alone, can also be an act of aggression. Attacks on a
formation ofwarships, or on a fleet ofmerchantmen (e.g., a fleet offishing trawlers)
can be aggression that will support a self-defense response. As McDougal and
148
Feliciano and others have shown, not every "attack" is serious enough to merit a
self-defense response, and a self-defense response must be necessary and propor-
149
tional in any event. A target State may choose to make no response, or to counter
with retorsions or non-force reprisals, perhaps in connection with self-defense
measures. Moreover, some attacks may be subject to defenses, e.g., mistake, as in
the Stark and Airbus cases. Any proportional self-defense response to an assault
152
perceived at the time as an aggressive armed attack is legitimate.
Thus, the logical corollary ofthe principle in Article 2(4), prohibiting the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State,
or in any manner inconsistant with the UN's purposes, is the principle ex-
pressed in Article 2(3): "All Members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice,
are not endangered." A legacy from the League Covenant era, Article 2(3)'s lan-
guage has been restated in many international agreements. The substance of
Article 2(3), commingled with the parallel policies of the Charter, Chapter VI, Ar-
ticles 33-36, has also been restated in the Friendly Relations Declaration.
b. The InherentRight ofSelf-Defense UnderArticle 51; Other Concepts. As noted
above, Article 51's French language version (agression armee) connotes a broader
158
meaning than the English language phrase, "armed attack." (Both versions,
along with the other official languages, are equally authentic but a commentator's
159
analysis may point to the English language version as the one to follow.) An-
other difference in meaning between Article 51's two versions is the English lan-
guage phrase, "inherent right of . . . self-defense," which in French becomes "droit
naturel," i.e., the connotation of "natural right." Thus there is an "inherent" or
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"natural" right to self-defense by a State whenever there is armed aggression
against that State. The problem is compounded by use of English in important
treaty negotiations for 20 years before the Charter negotiations.
During negotiations leading to the Pact of Paris, which outlaws war as an in-
strument ofnational policy, US Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg sent identi-
cal notes to participants, stating that the draft Pact did nothing to "restrict or
impair in any way the right of self-defense inherent in every sovereign State and
implicit in every treaty." Self-defense was characterized as "inalienable" and a
"natural right," which "[e]very nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty
provisions" to exercise. Great Britain had expressed a similarly broad view of
the matter earlier, as had other States. Ultimately all parties accepted or
"noted" the US interpretation when the Pact was signed August 27, 1928.
About a year earlier the PCIJ had decided the Lotus Case, which strongly recog-
nized States' sovereignty to act as they chose in the absence of law. (State sover-
eignty, although occasionally assailed by some, remains a fundamental principle
of international law.) Under Lotus, States should have been as free to act within
the law ofself-defense as it then stood when their sovereignty was threatened by an
act ofwar that was a violation oflaw; i.e., there was no law to support the act. Thus if
it be assumed that the self-defense gloss on the Pact of Paris carries over into the
UN Charter drafting less than a generation later, there is at least the possibility of a
latent ambiguity, if Article 51's English or French version carries with it a differ-
ent and broader right of self-defense than the other, a right extending back into
pre-Charter understandings of the scope of the right. The same issue lurks in the
difference between "armed attack"—with its connotation of actual, physical as-
sault—and "aggression armet" "armed aggression," connoting a lower threshold
for triggering a right of self-defense.
We have seen how Linnan's analysis, employing interpretation methods in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, was helpful in determining the mean-
i fn
ing of"armed attack"
—
"agression armee" in Article 5 1 . Since the same issues are
at stake with respect to the point on the "inherent right" -"droit naturel" dichot-
omy, that method will be employed to determine the meaning of this phrase.
The most recent authoritative pronouncement on the meaning of "inherent
right" - "droit naturel" in Article 5 1 is the Nicaragua Case, where the ICJ accepted
the broader French version of Article 5 1 to state that the right ofindividual or col-
lective self-defense is a matter of customary international law, as evidenced in the
Friendly Relations Declaration interpretation ofArticle 5 1 . Sohn has convinc-
ingly noted the similarity of language between the understandings to the Pact of
169
Paris and the "droit naturel" language ofthe French text ofArticle 5 1 . The Court
170
accepted the broad view of "inherent right" advocated by Bowett and others.
With respect to the "armed attack" - "aggression armee" issue, the Court agreed with
171
the Definition ofAggression that sending armed bands, irregulars or mercenaries
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across a border was aggression, where this amounted to an actual armed attack by
172
regular forces. The Case involved incursions across land borders, but it is rea-
sonably clear that the Court accepted the French text's slightly broader defini-
1 73
tion. Therefore, it may be inferred that other forms ofarmed attack listed in the
Definition, e.g., naval blockade, also declare customary law. And if this is so,
1 75
there may be other forms of aggression that customary law now defines as such
in a particular context to justify a self-defense response. The Court did hold, how-
ever, that cross-border assistance to rebels in providing weapons, logistics, or other
support was only a threat of use of force or perhaps intervention into the affairs of
another State, and therefore not enough to be characterized as an aggression so as
to justify action by the target State in self-defense. Two dissents pointed out that
some situations involving logistics might be characterized as an armed attack, i.e.,
177
aggression. The Court declined to consider anticipatory self-defense issues; the
178
parties had agreed it was not an issue.
Although the Court's opinion is a secondary source and has no precedential
179
value in the common-law sense, its recitation of customary principles is, how-
ever, entitled to great respect. Other Charter era instances ofcustomary claims for
national self-defense, particularly in the context ofnaval warfare, are ambiguous.
The Definition of Aggression does not enlarge or contract the right of self-de-
fense: "Nothing in this definition shall be construed as . . . enlarging or diminish-
ing the scope ofthe Charter, including its provisions concerning cases in which the
use of force is lawful." States may respond to aggression in self-defense or by
181 • • 182
other appropriate means, e.g., retorsion or nonforce reprisals.
There is no evidence of a special meaning given Article 51 by the intent of the
183
parties. Thus recourse to supplementary means of interpretation under Vienna
Convention Article 32 is necessary, i.e., examining preparatory works. To be sure,
use of preparatory works should not be considered as a second phase or as a resort
184
when ambiguity or obscurity remains, but they do assume increased impor-
... joe
tance when Vienna Convention Article 31 analysis yields mixed results.
The Charter drafters negotiated against a background of the League ofNations
Covenant and the interwar years. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the Charter
1 oz:
had no equivalent to Article 51, and the negotiating history of the conference
that produced the Charter stated in part that "The unilateral use of force or similar
coercive measures is not authorized or admitted. The use of arms in legitimate self
187 188
defense remains admitted and unimpaired." ' (The Nicaragua Case has demol-
ished the opposing argument, that the right of self-defense is wholly confined to
189
Article 51 which preempts any customary norm.)
If the right remains "admitted and unimpaired," reference must be had to the
latest major agreement before the Charter concerned with the issue, i.e., the Pact of
190
Paris still in force with about 69 parties as ofJanuary 1, 1998, and negotiations,
including general understandings, before signature and ratification. There
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were no reservations concerning self-defense attached to the Pact; diplomatic cor-
respondence constituting part of that treaty's preparatory works were interpreta-
192
tions, i.e., understandings. Resort to analysis by analogy under the Vienna
193
Convention on the Law of Treaties confirms that the diplomatic correspon-
dence on the Pact contained understandings, not reservations. The Vienna
Convention, Article 2(1 )(d), says a reservation is "a unilateral statement, however
phrased or named, made by a State when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving
or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect
of certain provisions ... in their application to that State." The US notes to pro-
spective parties were transmitted June 23, 1928, two months before signature of
the Pact. Ratifications were exchanged much later. Moreover, since self-de-
fense was not mentioned in the Pact, the diplomatic notes, even if they might oth-
erwise be considered reservations, could not "exclude or modify the legal effect of
the treaty " In effect, then, the notes were "clarification[s] of the State[s'] posi-
197
tion," or "declarations of a purely explanatory character." The contemporary
position of two US Secretaries of State was that the self-defense corollary to the
198
Pact was an understanding, not a reservation.
Appraisal. The Nicaragua Case confirms that a separate customary norm for
• • 199
self-defense may exist alongside the Charter recitation in Article 5 1 . Article 5
1
says the right ofindividual and collective self-defense is "inherent," the same word
used in the reservations for the Pact of Paris. Such being the case, whether
Article 5 1 applies to a situation, or whether a customary norm applies, the result is
the same. The right of individual and collective self-defense as understood and
practiced before ratification ofthe Charter continues unabated, subject to applica-
tion ofconditioning factors, e.g., developing custom, perhaps stated in resolutions
202(the Definition of Aggression comes to mind); treaties, and other sources of
law, including jus cogens norms. If the right of individual and collective
self-defense has risen to the status ofajus cogens norm, as some have claimed, e.g., it
takes priority over other treaty norms like Charter provisions not having;ws cogens
205
status. Ifanother/ws cogens norm, e.g., the right to territorial integrity and politi-
cal independence recited in Charter Article 2(4), is involved, a jus cogens right of
self-defense must be balanced against the other jus cogens norm(s).
i. Individual Self-Defense. When commentators' views and Article 51 's interpre-
207
tation through treaty canons analysis are considered, a relatively broad right to
self-defense has developed. "U.N. practice in Art. 51, composed as it is of scanty,
vague and contradictory elements, says nothing, or at least nothing clear, about the
70S
grounds for self-defense." Besides maritime conflicts, only a handful of situa-
tions have involved published self-defense claims by a participant. In one of these,
the Security Council rejected Israel's anticipatory self-defense claim for its raid on
an Iraqi nuclear reactor.
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In the Corfu Channel Case, referred to the ICJ by the Council, the Court said a
second passage ofUK warships, ready for action ifAlbania again tried to use force
to oppose passage, was not illegal because of Albania's prior Channel mining and
21
1
resulting loss of British lives and ships. Waldock interpreted the Court's ap-
proving UK readiness for Albanian attack as legitimate preparation for imminent
212 71
3
threat of attack. Using force to defend the formation would have been legal.
(The case also decided that the United Kingdom could not invoke forcible
self-help, i.e, necessity, to justify use of force; this was held not legitimate in the
Charter era.) The decision did not mention Article 5 1 , probably because Al-
bania was not a UN Member when the Court's jurisdiction was invoked. The
decision was based entirely on customary law. Although this aspect of the case was
little noticed, Corfu Channel predicted the Nicaragua Case result three decades
later, when the case confirmed a parallel customary self-defense norm, in the latter
217
decision coterminous with Article 51.
In 1948 the Security Council heard Jewish Agency for Palestine claims, before
Israel became a State, that Transjordan and Egypt were guilty of aggression.
Transjordan (now Jordan) and the Arab League claimed self-defense to protect
Jordanian and Arab nationals and to restore peace, security and law and order. Bel-
gium raised self-defense in the Council. Council resolutions did not mention
self-defense. This was also true for Indian and Pakistani self-defense claims in
219
the 1948 Jammu and Kashmir dispute.
The beginning of the Korean War in 1950 again illustrates the point, in the col-
lective security context. Although Council resolutions condemned North Korean
aggression as a breach of the peace and called upon UN Members to assist UN
220
forces and refrain from assisting North Korea, the Council did not mention the
right of self-defense. Similarly, the General Assembly's Uniting For Peace Resolu-
tion, passed when the USSR's return to the Council and subsequent Soviet vetoes
221
made Council decisionmaking impossible, does not mention self-defense. (Ar-
ticle 51 provides for a right of collective as well as individual self-defense, and the
United States ordered its forces to come to the aid of South Korea before the Coun-
222
cil acted. Hence, the Council could have, but did not, approve, disapprove or de-
fine South Korea's self-defense rights and other States' self-defense efforts for
South Korea.)
In 195 1 , the Council rejected Egypt's self-defense claim for closing the Suez Ca-
nal to, and asserting a right of visit and search of, Israeli merchantmen over two
and a half years after hostilities had ceased. The resolution also noted that restric-
tions of passage of goods through the Suez Canal to Israeli ports were denying
valuable supplies to nations not connected with the conflict, and that these restric-
tions, together with Egypt's sanctions on ships that had visited Israel ports "rep-
resent[ed] unjustified interference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas
223
and to trade freely with one another, including the Arab States and Israel[.]"
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(Commentators debate whether a right of visit and search during an armistice ex-
ists.) The resolution was not supported; l there were more seizures and pro-
tests. The USSR vetoed a second Council resolution. Five years later the
United Kingdom justified its Suez Canal intervention on self-defense, to protect
its nationals; France, who combined with Britain in the sea-land operation, did
not do so. The justification seemed to lack factual foundation; it has been said Gen-
eral Assembly rejection of the UK argument "cannot be regarded as conclusive to
228
its validity in law."
From February-April 1957, however, US destroyers patrolled the GulfofAqaba
and the Straits ofTiran to successfully prevent Egyptian interference with US flag
merchantmen bound for Israel; other US warships evacuated US citizens and
"friendly nationals" on a space-available basis from Haifa, Israel, and Alexandria,
Egypt. During 1958-59 UK warships escorted and protected British fishing
trawlers in waters Iceland claimed as territorial sea. The United Kingdom eventu-
230
ally withdrew from the "Cod War," and diplomacy resolved the issue. In 1960
Belgium claimed a right to use force, but not based on self-defense, to extract its na-
231
tionals from the strife-torn Congo.
During the Algeria civil war France's self-defense claim for intercepting and
boarding or diverting vessels whose cargoes were suspected to be bound for Alge-
rian rebels was protested vigorously by States whose flag the ships flew. France had
declared a 20 to 50 kilometer (1 1-28 mile) customs zone off Algeria, but high seas
interception occurred offAlgeria; 45 miles offCasablanca, Morocco; in the Atlan-
tic Ocean; and in the English Channel. It is not clear whether protests were di-
rected at interceptions wherever occurring, or for those outside the zone, i.e., in the
Atlantic and the Channel. Although a large-scale operation (4775 ships visited,
1330 searched, 192 rerouted, 1 arrested in 1956), ships whose cargoes were seized
were smuggling arms to the rebels. Although arms were imported from the sea off
the Algerian coast, others were brought overland through Libya, Morocco or Tu-
nisia, and then across the Algerian border, perhaps through a third State, e.g., Tu-
nisia. Sometimes bogus shipping documents were used. Fishermen smuggled in
232
arms. The Council did not pass a resolution related to the matter.
In 1964 no Council resolution responded to a US self-defense claim in the Gulf
733
of Tonkin (Maddox-Turner Joy) incident. From the US perspective, other as-
pects of the Vietnam War were actions in collective self-defense.
No Council decisions were in resolutions related to Israeli actions against Syria
235
(1964, 1966) and Jordan (1966). Israel was condemned for attacks on Jordan
(1966,
236 1969 237 ) and Lebanon (1968- 82 238 ), however.
239
Although draft reso-
lutions were presented, the Council took no position during the 1967 Six-Day
War. During that war Egypt's submarines sank innocent Greek freighters in the
Mediterranean Sea, one off Alexandria and another further west. Britain
warned it would join other States to assure Straits ofTiran right of passage. A UK
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carrier group and the US Sixth Fleet were concentrated in the Eastern Mediterra-
nean, and a second UK carrier was in the Red Sea, but nothing came of the show of
force. U.S.S. Liberty, a warship on the high seas in the eastern Mediterranean mon-
itoring Israeli transmissions during the Egyptian phase ofthe war, was damaged in
an Israeli PT boat and aircraft attack. Israel later compensated the United States
for loss of life, crew injuries and damage to Liberty, without admitting fault. Liberty
was configured like a merchant cargo ship but flew a US ensign, was painted haze
grey like all US warships in the Mediterranean, and had traditional US white pen-
dant numbers on the bow and stern. The attack occurred during daylight. US
forces were not allowed to retaliate. Israel had declared an imprecise exclusion
zone, warning ships to keep away from "the coasts ofIsrael during darkness." As to
what coasts (e.g., conquered territory also?), the warning was less than clear. An in-
formal private warning also had been given the United States. No self-defense
claims were raised. The Liberty attack might be compared with the sinking of the
Israeli destroyer Eilat, a. belligerent warship steaming on the high seas, during re-
sumption of hostilities in October 1967 Eilat was destroyed by Styx missiles fired
from an Egyptian patrol boat in Port Said harbor. The difference was that the
Eilat attack occurred during a period of hostilities, whereas the Liberty incident
came out of the blue.
In 1968 North Korea seized U.S.S. Pueblo, another electronic reconnaissance
warship, on the high seas, outside of claimed territorial waters. The crew was re-
turned 11 months later. Other than diplomatic overtures, there was no US re-
sponse, and the United Nations did not act.
In the 1965 India-Pakistan conflict, Pakistan declared war, published lists of
absolute and conditional contraband, and established a prize court, asserting these
measures were lawful exercises of self-defense. India's position was ambivalent; it
responded with an absolute contraband list, but it is not clear as to whether India
acknowledged existence of a war. Since India responded with its contraband
lists, this at least indicated that India considered itselfan object ofan armed at-
tack (if Pakistan would be considered the aggressor), or entitled to respond to Pa-
kistan's actions, if the latter is taken as a self-defense response to Indian actions.
Late in 1 966 the General Assembly called on the belligerents to observe the rules of
warfare. Apparently there were no self-defense claims.
The 1971 India-Pakistan war was over in two weeks; this conflict also re-
sulted in attacks on and destruction ofinnocent merchantmen. After dark, neutral
vessels were not allowed to approach the Pakistan coast closer than 75 miles. The
Indian Navy sought to capture or destroy Pakistani merchant ships. More than 115
neutral ships were inspected; India diverted neutral vessels to Calcutta ifthey car-
ried cargo of military significance after India discovered that ship markings and
names had been changed. Three Pakistani merchantmen were captured; a Libe-
rian and a Spanish ship were also sunk. Two merchantmen were destroyed by
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Indian surface to surface missiles while at anchor in Karachi roadstead, and the
neutral inbound Venus Challenger was hit and sunk by a missile 26.5 miles off
Karachi. All hands were lost. A Pakistani destroyer also went to the bottom that
night, the target of a Styx missile attack. The cause of destruction of Venus Chal-
lenger was probably the missiles' "capricious behavior" and malfunction or inade-
quate operation ofguidance systems. A week after destruction of Venus Challenger,
248
the Bengal Chamber ofCommerce published its 40-mile dawn to dusk warning.
Again, apparently there were no self-defense claims.
During the 1973 Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War, international shipping was
warned about entering the region of conflict, which first comprised Egyptian and
Israeli territorial waters, but later further parts of the sea plus Egyptian, Libyan
and Syrian ports. In October the Syrian navy captured and diverted a Greek liner,
Romantica, which was released the next day after the Italian ambassador's inter-
vention. No further such incidents occurred, perhaps because of international
protests, although Egypt regularly stopped, visited and searched neutral mer-
chantmen. Third States' reactions varied. African countries unilaterally sus-
pended or ended diplomatic relations with Israel; Arab countries boycotted oil
exports to Israel and the United States. Britain embargoed arms, and this largely
affected Israel; except for Portugal, other Western European nations refused to al-
low use of their territories for supplying or assisting any belligerent. Arab navies
adopted a tactic of sheltering beside merchant ships in their harbors after firing
missiles at Israeli warships. Egypt declared a blockade in the Red Sea and attacked
but missed an Israel-bound tanker. In the GulfofSuez Egypt acted to blockade the
Abu Rudiers-Eilat route used by Israeli-chartered tankers carrying oil from the Is-
raeli-occupied Sinai fields to Eilat. Responding to Egypt's blockade of the Straits
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ofBab el Mandeb, Israel counter-blockaded the area. Protests regarding Syria's
attack on Romantica are an indicator that States considered the attack a delict and
perhaps also subject to self-defense reaction by Greece if Greece had chosen to re-
spond with proportional force.
In 1972 Iceland asserted a 50-mile fishing zone and cut aUK fishing boat's trawl
wires. A UK frigate deployed outside the zone. The next year UK frigates entered
the zone after continued Icelandic harassment. Incidents involving UK and Ger-
man trawlers continued through 1973. In 1972 Britain had sued Iceland in the In-
ternational Court ofJustice, the Court indicated interim measures in 1973, and in
1974 the Court held that Iceland could not bar Britain from historic waters. The
parties were admonished to negotiate differences. At about the same time US
fishermen experienced seizures of boats and crews, mostly off Latin America's
west coast and in the Gulf of Mexico, by States claiming territorial seas or eco-
nomic zones beyond those claimed by the United States. The US reaction was an
insurance system to secure crews' and boats' releases, coupled with US diplomatic
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protests. Some countries' fishing boats were attacked in Western Hemisphere
252
waters. There were no claims of self-defense in responses.
In 1973, responding to US assistance to Israel during the Yom Kippur War,
Libya declared the Gulf of Sidra below 32 degrees 30 minutes North latitude (the
"Line ofDeath") as Libyan internal waters. The United States and other countries
253
protested; only a few States have recognized the claim since then. The United
States began challenging the claim by warships' use of the Gulf, establishing a for-
mal Freedom ofNavigation (FON) program in 1979. During a 1981 FON exer-
cise, two Libyan air force jets launched missiles against Navy aircraft, which
dodged the missiles and downed the Libyan planes. The United States asserted a
right of self-defense. Libya escalated threats against US warships and praised ter-
rorists who hijacked the Italian linerAchille Lauro in 1985. Further US FON exer-
cises were undertaken in the Gulf, including one below the Line of Death. US
NOTMARs and NOTAMs published these exercises. In 1986, after Libyan
land-based missiles were launched against Navy aircraft flying in international
airspace but below the Line, and Libyan aircraft penetrated an announced exercise
area, the FON force commander declared any Libyan military forces leaving Lib-
yan territorial waters or airspace and threatening US forces would be considered
hostile. Thereafter, when Libyan missile patrol boats headed toward US forces,
and Libyan shore-based target acquisition radars were activated "with the evident
object of firing upon U.S. aircraft," the boats and radars were destroyed or dam-
aged. The boats were not attacked when seeking refuge alongside a neutral mer-
chantman or engaging in search and rescue operations. The United States claimed
255
a right of anticipatory self-defense.
Although the United States notified the Security Council of its self-defense re-
756
sponses in the 1975 Mayaguez incident, when US naval aircraft were attacked by
Libyan aircraft over the Gulf of Sidra in 1981, and in 1986 when the United States
responded to Libyan patrol boat advances, the Council passed no resolutions on
257
the situations.
In 1981 US forces operated under the recently revised Peacetime Rules of En-
gagement (ROE), which provided "word picture[s]" giving commanders listings
of military indicators of hostile intent to consider in self-defense, i.e., when there
was a demonstration of a hostile intent to attack that could justify response in an-
ticipatory self-defense. Although ROE might authorize units to respond to the
limits ofprinciples of self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, reaction in
a given situation might not rise to the line of permissible responses under the law
of self-defense. To the extent permitted by law, national policy and operational
plans and orders, force commanders also have discretionary judgment to make
other responses. Although US ROE have been classified in most cases, it is com-
monly known that US force commanders always have the obligation to defend
their unit(s). Failure to observe restrictive national ROE in protecting a unit under
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a legitimate claim of self-defense cannot result in a counterclaim of a violation of
258
the law of self-defense. In other words, ROE-based responses may articulate a
claim of self-defense; if the ROE response is more restrictive than the law of
self-defense might permit, practice under the ROE cannot be interpreted as setting
the boundaries of self-defense. ROE and the law of self-defense are therefore inde-
pendent variables, although ROE cannot exceed the boundaries of the law.
During the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war, although the United Kingdom based
its military operation on Art. 5 1 , no Council resolutions passed on the conflict took
259
a clear position on the point. On April 7, 1982 the United Kingdom declared a
200-mile Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ), to be effective April 12, for Argentine
shipping around the Falklands/Malvinas. On April 23 the United Kingdom estab-
lished a Defensive Sea Area (DSA) or "defensive bubble" around its task force,
warning that approach by Argentine civil or military aircraft, warships or naval
auxiliaries would be dealt with "appropriately." On May 1, when fighting started
in the islands, the MEZ was changed to a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) for ships
supplying the Argentine war effort. MEZ coverage was extended May 7 to sea areas
more than 12 miles offthe Argentine coast. Argentina had declared a 200-mile De-
fense Zone (DZ) off its coast and around the Falklands/Malvinas on April 1 3, after
having protested the UK action. MEZ enforcement capability came on the day it
?6ft
was effective, April 12. Presumably Argentina could have enforced its DZ if it
chose to do so, but after the cruiser General Belgrano sinking, Argentine naval
forces, except land-based naval aviation and possibly submarines, did not figure in
the war. On May 1 1 Argentina declared all South Atlantic Ocean waters a war zone,
threatening to attack anyUK vessel therein. Apparently the only neutral-flag ship
attacked by Argentina in the war zone was Hercules, a Liberian-flag, US inter-
ests-owned tanker in ballast. Although the USSR belatedly protested lawfulness of
the UK TEZ, it did apparently not object to the Argentine DZ and observed the
UK TEZ. The United States had published warnings to US vessels and ships
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owned by US interests, e.g., Hercules, two days before she was hit. On July 12,
1982, active hostilities in the war ended, but the UK TEZ and economic sanctions
were continued. Ten days later the TEZ was lifted, but the United Kingdom
warned Argentina to keep military ships and aircraft away from the islands, declar-
ing a 150-mile Protection Zone. The TEZ was relatively successful, although
Argentina succeeded in airlifts to the islands until the last days of the war. Appar-
ently Argentine sealift efforts failed.
In the Iran-Iraq war, although the Security Council recognized the right offree-
265dom of navigation and called for protection of the marine environment in a
266
context of belligerent and other States' self-defense claims, there was no Coun-
267
cil action to take charge ofthe conflict by decision, as the Charter provides. Both
belligerents declared defense, war or exclusion zones, and aside from Council
resolutions calling for recognition of freedom of navigation rights and protection
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of the environment, the Council did not purport to regulate these. No Council
resolution explicitly determined the validity of the self-defense claims of Iran or
Iraq.
Thus, at least in 1986 when Combacau's analysis was published on Security
Council practice in defining self-defense, "whatever the official pretence, and per-
haps the legal situation, the international community is . . . back where it was be-
fore 1945: in the state of nature; and . . . the notion of self-defense makes no sense
270
there." The latter part of Combacau's conclusion is overblown, for we may at
least draw upon the understandings of the Pact of Paris, as its concepts were car-
271
ried forward into Article 5 1 . The 1990-91 GulfWar, the most serious challenge
to the Council since the Korean conflict, shed no light on the issue. Council Reso-
lution 661 merely confirmed the right of individual and collective self-defense as
272 • r
stated in the Charter. As Combacau intimates, much of this is due to the struc-
ture and powers ofCharter institutions. Action by the Council must be taken with
273 rpermanent members' concurrence, and the Soviet veto was a regular feature of
Cold War politics. However, other countries (including the United States) vetoed
resolutions when allies, friends or interests were involved. Mindful of this, and
275
the "sovereign equality of [UN] . . . Members," it is no wonder that self-defense
has not figured strongly in Council resolutions, which nearly always have been
nonmandatory recommendations or calls for action.
The General Assembly record is also relatively meager. Except for certain com-
petences not relevant here, the Assembly's function is recommendatory and sub-
277
ordinate to the Council on matters related to international peace and security.
Article 12(l)'s requirement, that the Assembly cannot make a recommendation on
a matter relating to international peace and security while the Council is seized of
it, explains the Assembly record in part. Usually States will complain to the Coun-
278
cil first, as the Charter provides. While the Council debates the matter, the As-
sembly is impotent. If the Council acts, even through nonmandatory calls for
action or recommendations instead ofbinding decisions under Articles 25 and 48,
it remains seized ofthe matter. Ifvetoes stop Council action on a particular crisis, it
279
may still remain seized ofthe matter, depending on its prior resolutions. On the
other hand, ifthe matter comes to the Assembly first, the Assembly may make rec-
ommendations until the Council takes it up.
The Assembly's nonmandatory resolutions may recite, and therefore strengthen,
customary and treaty norms, or may lead to development of new norms, how-
ever. Certain of these resolutions have asserted claims relative to self-defense.
General Assembly Resolution 378 (1950), companion to the Uniting for Peace
Resolution passed during the Korean War, recites these recommendations:
(a) That if a State becomes engaged in armed conflict with another State or States,
it take all steps practicable in the circumstances and compatible with the right
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of self-defence to bring the armed conflict to an end at the earliest possible
moment;
(b) In particular, that such State shall immediately, and in any case not later than
twenty-four hours after the outbreak of the hostilities, make a public state-
ment wherein it will proclaim its readiness, provided that the States with
which it is in conflict will do the same, to discontinue all military operations
and withdraw all its military forces which have invaded the territory or terri-
torial water of another State or crossed a demarcation line, whether on terms
agreed by the parties to the conflict or under conditions to be indicated to the
parties by the . . . United Nations;
(c) That such State immediately notify the Secretary-General, for communica-
tion to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations, of the
statement made in accordance with [(b)] . . . and of the circumstances in which
the conflict has arisen;
(d) That such State, in its notification to the Secretary-General, invite the appro-
priate organs of the United Nations to dispatch the Peace Observation Com-
mission to the area in which the conflict has arisen, if the Commission is not
already functioning there;
(e) That the conduct of the States concerned in relation to the matters covered by
the foregoing recommendations be taken into account in any determination
of responsibility for the breach of the peace or act of aggression in the case un-
der consideration and in all other relevant proceedings before the appropriate
organs of the United Nations[.] 281
That same year the "Peace through Deeds" resolution "reaffirm[ed] that . . . any ag-
gression ... is the gravest of all crimes against peace and security" and "That
282prompt united action be taken to meet aggression wherever it arises[.]" The
1970 Friendly Relations Declaration again condemned the threat or use of force,
declared a war of aggression to be a crime against peace, and added that "States
have a duty to refrain from acts ofreprisal involving the use offorce." The Declara-
tion added, however, that "Nothing in [its terms should] be construed as enlarging
or diminishing in any way the scope of the provisions of the Charter concerning
cases in which the use of force is lawful," i.e., in self-defense.
Specific situations occurring in the Charter era offer little additional guidance
285
to the meaning ofself-defense. The 1 950 UFP Resolution has been discussed. In
1966 the Assembly belatedly called upon India and Pakistan to observe the rules of
warfare, but only as the war wound down. The Assembly condemned the USSR
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Afghanistan invasion in 1982 and US action in Grenada the next year.
Thus it might be said, apart from occasional forays into the field or general
statements, e.g., the Friendly Relations Declaration, that General Assembly prac-
tice, even during the UFP Resolution era occasioned by permanent Council mem-
ber vetoes, has been spotty. The result is that the definition of self-defense remains
as it was in 1 945 when the Charter was negotiated in the context ofthe Pact ofParis
and other midcentury agreements. We are thus left with arguments from history,
analysis of commentators, and rhetoric from some of the latter.
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ii. Collective Self-Defense. Article 51 of the Charter permits collective self-de-
fense under the same terms as the right of individual self-defense. Certain aspects
of collective self-defense differ from the issue of individual self-defense. However,
if the foregoing analysis for the right of individual self-defense is correct, i.e., that
ultimate resort to the context of the Charter's drafting is necessary, then similar
analysis is necessary to appraise collective self-defense.
Unlike individual States' right of self-defense, which is of ancient lineage, the
notion of collective self-defense in the sense of the Charter began with the Con-
gress of Vienna system (1815) established at the end of the Napoleonic wars and
289
continues on a parallel path to this day. Although there have been numerous
collective self-defense agreements concluded since 1945, none of these were di-
rectly at issue in the Tanker War. North Atlantic Treaty countries operated to-
gether during the conflict, but the territorial limits of the Treaty meant they
operated under principles of "informal" self-defense, analyzed below. Similarly,
291
two ANZUS Pact members, Australia and the United States, were Tanker War
292
participants; ANZUS did not apply, covering only Pacific area defense. Warsaw
Pact countries were participants, the USSR through naval deployments, aid and
293diplomacy and other Soviet Bloc nations through weapons sales to belligerents,
but there was no perceived direct threat to or attack on any Pact party except for at-
294
tacks on USSR-flag merchantmen, and the Pact was not invoked. Many Arab
League States were involved in the war, but a combination of internal dissension
295
within the League, at least at the beginning ofthe Tanker War, and an apparent
296
interpretation that this regional defense treaty pointed only toward outside ag-
gressors resulted in its not being invoked against either belligerent. The Arab
League seems to have functioned during the GulfWar as a regional arrangement
that attempted to maintain international peace and security pursuant to Article 52
297
of the Charter. Although late in the Tanker War the Gulf Cooperation Council
Summit approved a comprehensive security strategy that some have said amounts
298
to a collective self-defense pact, there has been no formal publication of this ar-
rangement as a treaty. The strategy can be viewed as an example ofinformal collec-
299
tive self-defense, also permissible under the Charter.
The Charter thus "contains the first real attempt to reconcile the imposition of
duties to maintain international peace and security with the problem posed by the
freedom which each sovereign State normally would have[,] to decide when and
how such a duty may be fulfilled." Given the context of the preparation of Arti-
cle 5 1 while the Act of Chapultepec was going forward to signature, McDougal
and Feliciano are correct in saying that the essence ofthe right ofcollective self-de-
fense lies in maintaining international peace and security through collaborative
302
arrangements among States.
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/. Other Regional Organizations: Article 52 ofthe Charter. The structure ofthe Charter
and practice since 1945 confirm theMcDougal-Feliciano view. Article 52(1) ofthe
Charter provides:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements
or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance ofinternational
peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such
arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations.
Thus, "the Charter basis of collective self-defense arrangements in Article 51 does
not exclude the possibility that other provisions ofthe treaties and activities ofthe
303
agencies in question came under Article 52." Indeed, "[fjrom the discussions
leading up to the approval ofthe Charter, . . . regionalism was considered primarily
in connection with the maintenance of international peace and security."
Although formed for other purposes in 198 1, the GulfCooperation Council had
moved from its initial stated goal of cooperation to protect internal security to a
305
policy ofcooperating in economic and defense security by the end ofthe war. By
the end of the war GCC members were cooperating among themselves for mine
suppression and other measures, and with other States with navies in the Gulf.
The Arab League also partook ofa collective defense treaty and economic coopera-
307
tion system.
II. Practice During the Charter Era; "Informal" Collective Self-Defense. Prior practice
confirms the view that a right of informal self-defense, besides Article 51's confir-
mation of the inherent right of collective self-defense, exists in the Charter era.
Although there was some objection to the concept of regional defense arrange-
308
ments, a number of these agreements, articulating the principle that an attack
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on one member is an attack on all, have been concluded and remain in force.
State practice has also confirmed regional arrangements, sometimes ad hoc, to deal
with threats to the peace, aggression or other forms ofbreaches ofthe peace. There
have also been bilateral or multilateral assertions of collective self-defense, often
without formal prior treaty arrangement.
Lack of a definition of self-defense by the Council or the Assembly in the Ko-
310
rean War has been noted. If it is assumed that UN operations (primarily US di-
rected) after Soviet vetoes began in 1950 could not have been grounded in the UFP
31
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Resolution, since General Assembly resolutions have no binding effect, one
theory of the multilateral operations in Korea after the USSR veto is "informal"
collective self-defense, i.e., cooperating countries pooled forces to resist North Ko-
rea's continued aggression and the PRC incursion. The same might be said for
contemporaneous US naval operations between Taiwan and the China
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mainland. For the United States and South Korea or Taiwan, bilateral defense
treaties replaced informal arrangements in 1953 and 1954 respectively.
The 1951 ANZUS Pact was memorialized Australia-New Zealand-US practice
after World War II and during the Korean War, another example of informal col-
lective self-defense.
In 1962, OAS countries, under US leadership, relied on Charter Article 52,
which permits regional organization resolution of disputes, to enforce a naval
quarantine around Cuba during the Missile Crisis. The US proclamation estab-
lishing the quarantine, besides citing the Rio Treaty, also relied on a US Congres-
sional resolution recognizing the threat. The proclamation was specific as to
cargoes to be halted, e.g., missiles, bombs, bomber aircraft, warheads, and support
equipment, "and any other classes of material hereafter designated by the Secre-
tary of Defense [to] effectuate" the proclamation. It exempted other cargoes, e.g.,
foodstuffs and petroleum, and declared neutral rights would be respected. No
blockade was declared, and the proclamation limited use of force to situations
where directions under the quarantine were disobeyed if reasonable efforts were
made to communicate directions to an interdicted vessel, "or in case of self-de-
fense." (The Rio Treaty authorized "partial or complete interruption ofeconomic
relations or of . . . sea communications; and use of armed force[,]" among other
measures, parallelling Charter Articles 41-42). While some said self-defense was
317
the proper claim, and others later asserted that the Nicaragua Case would have
31
8
held the quarantine action a matter of anticipatory self-defense, the OAS-US
1962 claim was based on Article 52 and not Article 51. The point is that Article 52
organizations can organize for informal collective self-defense in situations threat-
ening regional security without benefit of an Article 51 collective self-defense
treaty. The Missile Crisis thus might arguably be further precedent for informal
self-defense under the Charter.
The 1964 attacks on U.S.S. Maddox and Turner Joy (the Gulf of Tonkin Inci-
319
dent) have been analyzed. The conflict connecting these incidents, the Vietnam
War, is an example of a claim of informal collective self-defense. The US position
during the Vietnam War was that it and South Vietnam (RVN) were jointly resist-
ing North Vietnamese aggression and therefore were acting in self-defense. (There
370 r
were other views; e.g., it was a civil war.) During the conflict, patrol areas for Op-
eration Market Time, which sought to deny seaborne supplies to RVN opponents,
was extended to 30 miles off the South Vietnamese coast. Initially Market Time
operations took place in a 12-mile defensive sea area. North Vietnam used small
coastal fishing vessels to support military logistics in the South. Fishermen and
321
coastal traders were allowed to pass when on legitimate business. In 1 972 a mine
quarantine program in North Vietnamese waters sought to seal North Vietnam
377
ports. Its antecedent had been the RVN's attempted quarantine to stop sealifted
supplies coming to the Viet Cong through the GulfofSiam and the Mekong Delta.
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A RVN destroyer sank a North Vietnamese trawler, believed to be carrying ammu-
323
nition, in 1972 during these operations.
During the war the United States used Military Sealift Command vessels, US
flag charters and occasionally foreign-flag vessels to deliver war material. Several
ships were hit; two were sunk by Viet Cong attacks while in South Vietnamese
coastal waters. The Viet Cong seem not to have discriminated between vessels car-
rying war material and civilian-oriented cargoes, e.g., cement. US antisubma-
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rine protection was given high value ships, e.g., troop carriers. While some have
claimed SEATO may have applied, and its formal treaty obligations remain in ef-
feet, its supporting organization had been dismantled by 1975, and US assis-
tance to South Vietnam might be characterized as another example of informal
collective self-defense.
On the face of it, the Tanker War was a bilaterial conflict. However, as analyzed
377
above, some States or groups of States acted to favor one (or in some cases both)
of the belligerents throughout the war. As in the case of the Falklands/Malvinas
War (1982) and unilateral US help for Britain and the multilateral EC embargo on
328
Argentine goods, this kind of participation arguably could be said to recognize
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an interim state ofnonbelligerency in the Charter era. The same sort ofinformal
participation and influences or attempted influences came through organizations
aligned along geographic lines (the Gulf Cooperation Council), common defense
interests elsewhere (NATO), common economic interests (the EC and the Group
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of Seven), and ethnic or religious commonality (the ICO and the Arab League).
States also had informal arrangements among themselves. Italy's bilateral mine
331
clearing agreements are an example. The US statement that US Navy protection
was available to third-State merchantmen, upon request and ifUS naval commit-
332
ments permitted, is another. The clearest example of informal self-defense ar-
rangements was the December 1987 comprehensive security strategy adopted by
333
the Gulf Cooperation Council.
The belligerents also made arrangements that did not rise to the level of a for-
mal Article 51 self-defense agreement or an Article 52 regional arrangement, at
least on the public record. A notable example was the belligerents' financing their
war through petroleum sales and their importing war goods through third coun-
tries. Arms and other sales to belligerents might be seen as another example
of an informal arrangement. Below these governmental efforts were the effects of
organizations,^., the General Council ofBritish Shipping, seafarers' unions, and
the marine insurance industry.
III. Appraisalfor the Tanker War. No formal agreements like the multilateral or bi-
lateral defense treaties ofthe Cold War era were involved in the Tanker War. How-
ever, as with prior conflicts since 1945, e.g., Falklands/Malvinas, States or groups
of States aided one side or the other. When States that were not belligerents
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concerted together, these amounted to informal collective defense assistance ar-
rangements, sometimes with a belligerent and sometimes among other countries
not party to the conflict. There was precedent for this action before and during the
337
Charter era. It is arguable, for example, that the 1990-91 coalition assembled
against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was governed by principles of informal
self-defense, to the extent that there were no formal collective self-defense treaties
among coalition countries, before the Security Council authorized force in November
338
1990. After and to the extent the Council became seized of the matter, coalition
339
actions were governed by Security Council decisions.
Whether claims of informal collective self-defense amount to a resurgence of
the pre-Charter concept ofan interim legitimate stage ofnonbelligerency, between
belligerency and neutrality, is an open question. Many States recognize only
neutrality or belligerency. It would seem, however, that it is possible that
nonbelligerency may have crept in through the door of practice under the Charter
between 1945 and 1988, before the end ofthe Cold War. Whether this will continue
with revitalization of the Security Council since 1989 and the USSR's collapse is
only a guess. If the Council continues relatively powerless, by the veto or adoption
of nonbinding recommendations or calls for action, or if the UFP Resolution pro-
cedure is revived with a veto-paralyzed Council, that door remains open.
It would seem, however, that a distinction between belligerency and neutrality
can be retained by referring to informal collective self-defense for some situations,
e.g., US and EC support of Britain during the Falklands/Malvinas War. Whether
informal collective self-defense can sustain actions in all situations must be left to
speculation. The problem lies in a definition of the contours of the doctrine. It is
fairly clear, for example, that there is a customary right for formal treaty partners to
consult before action, and that consultation can include preparation for anticipa-
tory collective self-defense. It is also fairly clear that the inherent right to collective
self-defense includes a right of anticipatory self-defense, however that might be
limited by principles of necessity, proportionality and admitting ofno alternative
in a particular situation. Presumably informal collective self-defense includes a
right of consultation, but does it include a right ofanticipatory response? Ifthe re-
cord ofinformal collective self-defense is sparse in the Charter era, claims to a right
of anticipatory response appear to be even more scarce. There are few reports of it
in the century and a halfofprior practice; there may be many, particularly in the
maritime arena since 1914, but the record of State practice is not clear on the
point. Lack of media interest, space considerations and relative importance in di-
gests of national practice like Whiteman, lack of commentary by scholars, or na-
tional security, may have resulted in no or only episodic reportage.
There is one critical difference between collective self-defense claims, whether
anticipatory or otherwise, published in treaties and those asserted under a right of
informal self-defense. Today most treaties are published, perhaps first in informal
World Public Order 137
sources, e.g., International Legal Materials, but nearly always later in national series,
e.g., United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, and perhaps in the
United Nations Treaty Series, although International Legal Materials is selective in
publication and the latter two may be decades behind in printing. Some agree-
ments are never published, due to national security considerations, and these
may often deal with defense issues. However, at least for published treaties, there is
some public notice oftheir terms, perhaps qualified or explained by practice. By
definition, there is no similar method of notice by publication of informal collec-
tive self-defense arrangements, except what might be deduced from government
notices or the media. It would seem, however, that to avoid claims of unprovoked
aggression under Article 2(4) of the Charter, States should notify informal collec-
tive arrangements except where security considerations militate against publicity.
Notices to Mariners. (NOTMARs) and Airmen (NOTAMs) were employed dur-
ing the Tanker War to publicize defense, war or exclusion zones and warnings of
self-defense action. Even as a requirement of treaty publication is qualified to-
day, e.g., for national security considerations, States in informal collective
self-defense arrangements should consider publishing their terms.
iii. Reporting Self-Defense Measures to the Security Council. The Charter also
requires that "Measures taken by Members in [the exercise ofthis right of] self-de-
fense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any
way affect the authority and responsibility ofthe . . . Council under the . . . Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
350
international peace and security." There is little ambiguity in this requirement,
which is not part ofcustomary international law, according to the Nicaragua Case,
which added that failing to report "may be one of the factors indicating whether
351
the State in question was itselfconvinced that it was acting in self-defense." The
question might be raised, particularly in view ofthe Court's position that a parallel
customary law of self-defense has developed alongside Charter criteria in Article
352
51, how reporting could be a "factor" for a customary law of self-defense if the
reporting requirement is not a part of customary law. Use of "this right of self-de-
fense" in Article 51 underscores requiring reporting only in Article 51 -gov-
erned situations. Whether an Article 51 reporting requirement applies in cases of
informal collective self-defense, also permissible under the Charter, is not
known and perhaps depends on whether a State claims a right to informal collec-
tive self-defense under Article 51 or under customary law.
In any event, the Article 51 reporting requirement appears to have been hon-
355
ored more in the breach. A commentator has argued, however, that failure to re-
356
port at least indicates that measures taken are not defensive in nature.
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iv. Anticipatory Self-Defense. The Caroline Case is the classic statement of the
right of anticipatory self-defense, i.e., a target State may resort to self-defense be-
fore an actual armed attack where the necessity for that defense is "instant, over-
whelming, and leaving no choice ofmeans, and no moment for deliberation." The
action then taken must not be unreasonable or excessive, i.e., it must be propor-
tional to the threat; it must also be necessary. The Tokyo and Nuremberg tribunals
recognized a right ofanticipatory self-defense, holding the Netherlands could rely
on it to justify attack on Japan before a formal war declaration but that Germany
357
could not rely on it to justify attack on Norway.
Does the right ofanticipatory self-defense carry forward into the Charter era, or
must a State "take the first hit" before responding in self-defense, i.e., is only "reac-
358 • 359
tive" self-defense permitted? Commentators and countries divide sharply
on the issue. Commentators and countries may also divide on when self-de-
fense, anticipatory or reactive, is appropriate. The Charter is silent on the point,
except to say that UN Members retain the "inherent" right of individual and col-
lective self-defense. The Nicaragua Case did not rule on the issue. Some com-
mentators, and undoubtedly some States, have seemed to change views. Others
have taken no clear position.
If the methodology of treaty interpretation is employed, practice under Article
5 1 has been ambiguous. Bowett notes theUN Atomic Energy Commission's initial
report, which said a right of self-defense would arise where a party to a nuclear
arms treaty committed a "grave" violation of the treaty. He also cites the Secu-
rity Council discussion over the Kashmir invasion, justified by Pakistan on antici-
367
patory defense grounds, where only India argued against the view. ' In 1952 the
UN Sixth Committee heard four States argue that a State threatened with impend-
2f.Q
ing attack might be justified to respond in self-defense.
The Definition ofAggression resolution includes specific examples not involv-
ing armed attack on a State but which are nevertheless considered aggression un-
der the Charter: blockade of ports or coasts which, if complied with, results in no
use offorce, merely a threat ofuse of force; "use" ofarmed forces ofa State, within a
host State's territory by the host's agreement, but contravening conditions in the
agreement initially entitling the visiting armed forces to be there, which might re-
sult when such forces are "used" in nonforce situations. The enumeration is not
370
exclusive and could include other circumstances involving threat of force that
could trigger a potential for self-defense response. Ifacts ofaggression can justify a
proportional self-defense response, it is implicit in the Assembly's approval of
these as per se acts of aggression by which an anticipatory self-defense response
could be triggered.
The case ofblockade is illustrative. When blockade is declared against a target
State, no armed attack will occur if there are no ships to intercept. There is no way
to determine the blockade's effectiveness until interceptions occur or ships
World Public Order 139
successfully evade blockade. If a target State acts to end the blockade before its
goal—intercepting and possibly destroying target State ships—occurs, a target
State would be exercising anticipatory self-defense. Thus if armed aggression
—
371
the French version of "armed attack" in Article 51 —includes blockade as cus-
372
tomary law, then target State action to end a blockade may include anticipatory
self-defense.
The division of commentators and countries on admissibility of anticipatory
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self-defense as an option has been recited. Dinstein offers an intermediate posi-
tion of "interceptive" self-defense, permitted if a State "has committed itself to an
armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way. Whereas a preventive strike [i.e.,2m-
ticipatory self-defense] which is merely 'foreseeable' (or even just 'conceivable') an
interceptive strike counters an armed attack which is 'imminent' and practically
'unavoidable.' He cites a scenario based on the Japanese task force ordered to at-
tack Pearl Harbor in 1941:
[h]ad [it] been destroyed on its way to Pearl Harbor, this would have constituted
not an act ofpreventive war but a miraculously early use ofcounter-force [P]ut . .
.
another way, the self-defence exercised by the United States (in response to an
incipient armed attack) would have been not anticipatory but interceptive in
nature.^
Dinstein thus justifies Israel's first opening fire in the 1967 Arab-Israeli con-
flict. The hypothetical interception to end a naval war in 1941, before the Char-
ter era, is undoubtedly true today, ifthe Japanese task force was past the point ofno
return (i.e., it could not be recalled) and it was reasonably clear from facts available
377
to the United States at the time. The same can be said of Israel's 1967 attack on
Egypt.
Dinstein's analysis does not mention Israel's 1981 raid on the Iraqi nuclear re-
actor, condemned by the Security Council and others, arguing that the raid came
378during a continuing state of war between Iraq and Israel, nor does he mention
two tactical aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflicts, the Israeli attack on the U.S.S.
379
Liberty, and destruction of the Israeli destroyer Eilat by missiles. Liberty was a
US warship operating in international waters of the Mediterranean Sea, gathering
intelligence for the United States, when it was attacked by Israeli aircraft and PT
boats. The attack clearly violated international law and, as an act of aggression,
could have subjected Israel to US proportional self-defense responses.
Eilat's loss, also on the high seas, due to an Egyptian gunboat's Styx missiles
launched in Port Said harbor occurring during a resumption of the conflict, illus-
380
trates the change in naval warfare between 1941 and 1967. (This attack could
not raise the self-defense issue, since it occurred during hostilities, rather than at
the beginning ofhostilities.) Rather than a battleship and carrier formation steam-
ing at 20-30 knots to a position off Hawaii where it could launch raids flown by
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aircraft with top speeds of400 miles an hour, thus giving days or at least hours for a
target State to anticipate and deliver an interceptive strike, missile attacks from the
same range come in minutes. Moreover, a missile attack is nearly always fatal. One
can compare Eilat's loss in 1967, the sinking of Venus Challenger and a Pakistani de-
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stroyer during the 1971 India-Pakistan war, losses oiH.M.S. Sheffield and other
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ships during the Falklands/Malvinas war, and U.S.S. Stark's near loss during
383
the Tanker War, with survival of many ships during the World War II
Kamikazi attacks, where hundreds ofmanned Japanese suicide planes crashed US
warships. Aside from aircraft carriers and battleships, World War II men-of-war
were smaller and equally fragile, yet they took many hits before sinking, and most
384 385
survived. New occasions teach new duties and responsibilities, and if inter-
national law is to remain credible, it must parallel technical developments.
(That, of course, is the function of custom as opposed to a potentially rigidified
387
treaty regime.)
Dinstein's interceptive defense theory seems but another phrase for anticipa-
tory self-defense in the Pearl Harbor attack hypothetical. He is less than clear
about the situation ofan anticipated attack on an independently-steaming warship
before armed conflict begins. However, as events in the Tanker War and previous
incidents demonstrate, some States have asserted a right of anticipatory self-de-
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fense or interceptive defense as Dinstein would formulate it.
/. Libya-US Confrontations. Libya-US confrontations from 1973 through 1986 il-
lustrate the two views of the scope of self-defense.
In 1973, responding to US assistance to Israel during the Yom Kippur War,
Libya declared the Gulf of Sidra below 32 degrees 30 minutes North latitude (the
"Line of Death") as Libyan territorial waters.
The United States challenged the claim by warships' use ofthe Gulfof Sidra, es-
tablishing a formal Freedom of Navigation (FON) program in 1979. In 1981, dur-
ing a FON exercise, two Libyan air force jets launched missiles against Navy
aircraft, who dodged the missiles and downed the Libyan aircraft with missiles.
Under anyone's view of the right of self-defense, the Navy aircraft had a right to
fire in response to the prior Libyan missile attack; it was an example of reactive
self-defense.
Tensions again mounted in 1985-86. Libya escalated threats against US war-
ships and praised the terrorists who had hijacked the Italian liner Achille Lauro.
New US FON exercises were ordered off Libya, including one below the Line. US
NOTMARs and NOTAMs publicized the operations. After Libya launched
land-based missiles against Navy aircraft flying over international waters below
the Line, and Libyan aircraft penetrated the announced exercise area in interna-
tional waters, the FON force commander declared that Libyan military forces
leaving Libyan territorial waters or airspace and constituting a threat to US units
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would be considered hostile. Thereafter, when Libyan missile patrol boats headed
toward US forces, and Libyan target acquisition radars activated with a likely ob-
ject of firing on US aircraft, the Libyan boats and radars were attacked and dam-
aged or destroyed. In these cases the US claim was anticipatory self-defense, i.e.,
taking action to protect ships or aircraft after hostile intent (e.g., closing US ships
in an attack profile or illuminating US aircraft with target acquisition radar) was
manifested. There was, of course, no obligation for US forces to attack or desist
from attacking the Libyan vessels or aircraft, but there was the option to do so, sub-
390
ject to limitations ofself-defense, i.e., necessity and proportionality. Indeed, US
forces did not fire on Libyan missile patrol boats when they sought refuge along-
side a neutral merchantman or were engaged in legitimate search and rescue opera-
tions, which illustrate these principles.
In April 1986 US Navy and Air Force planes bombed terrorist operations cen-
ters in Libya after two US citizens were killed in a Berlin disco terrorist bombing.
The US hard evidence was that Libya was responsible for the disco bombing and
was planning further terrorist attacks on US military and diplomatic facilities in
Europe. The United States claimed self-defense conditioned by necessity and pro-
portionality as the basis for the operation. French, UK and US vetoes blocked a Se-
391
curity Council resolution condemning the raid.
II The Tanker War. The Tanker War produced numerous examples of reactive
self-defense, i.e., self-defense after an initial attack, as well as anticipatory self-
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defense, both individual and informal collective self-defense.
Iraq responded to Iran's shelling of Iraqi towns in 1980 with a three-front inva-
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sion of Iran, claiming self-defense. If it is true that the shelling was not respon-
sive to Iraqi invasions, Iraq's claim of self-defense was legitimate. On the other
hand, if Iranian shelling responded to prior Iraqi acts of aggression, the shelling
was a proper self-defense response by Iran, and the Iraqi invasion could not be
claimed as self-defense. In the latter situation, the invasion was a clear violation of
Charter Article 2(4). Use or threat of use of force in response to legitimate self-
defense action cannot be claimed as self-defense. Since UN Security Council Reso-
lution 479 was a "call" for cessation of hostilities, and not a "decision," there
was a strong political, but not a legal, obligation on the belligerents to comply.
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Both belligerents declared war zones. After the Iraqi invasion, Iran declared
its coasts a war zone, closed the Shatt al Arab, refused access to Iraqi ports, and
warned ofretaliation ifother countries gave Iraq facilities. Iran said the zone decla-
ration was for defense and for safety of shipping. Iraq's war zone was north of
29-30N in the Gulf and was reportedly reprisal, or retaliation, for the Iranian war
zone declaration.
Iran's war zone declaration was legitimate for Iran's coasts, which were part of
397
its territory. Although the Shatt al-Arab and Iraqi ports were part of the area of
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conflict, unless Iran had occupied the area or they were vital to its defense, Iran
could not lawfully announce their closure to States not party to the conflict. Still
less could Iran issue a generalized warning ofretaliation against these States ifthey
gave Iraq facilities, unless States were parties to a collective defense agreement or
arrangement with Iraq and employed this treaty arrangement to assist Iraq as the
398
aggressor. Since Iraq had withdrawn from the Baghdad Pact, and was not a GCC
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member, Iran could not claim that these regional arrangements were assisting
Iraq. Iraq was a party, with Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and other Arab
States, to the Arab Joint Defense Treaty, and it may have been to this Treaty ar-
rangement that Iran directed its warning. It would have been entirely legitimate, if
Iran committed aggression by shelling Iraqi communities, for the Treaty States to
have collaborated with Iraq in collective self-defense. Although Iran could warn
ofretaliation, this did not deprive the Treaty States oftheir right to assist Iraq with
collective self-defense responses. The Treaty States might have paid consequences,
e.g., by bombing raids on their territory if they did, but they could not be deprived
oftheir treaty obligation by the Iranian warning. On the other hand, ifIraq was the
aggressor, e.g., by invading Iran, the Treaty States could not aid Iraq pursuant to
the Treaty. Under no circumstances could Iran claim a right of retaliation
against States not party to any defense treaty or other similar arrangement with
Iraq, e.g., States whose shipping sailed the Gulf, or whose shipping interests used
the Gulf, e.g., France, Liberia, Panama, USSR, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
Whether the Iraq war zone declaration was a legitimate reprisal, or was legal in
terms of area, duration, etc., is addressed later in this chapter and in Part F of
Chapter V. If Iran was the aggressor when it shelled Iraqi communities, then the
Iraq war zone, later named the Gulf Maritime Exclusion Zone (GMEZ), was a le-
gitimate self-defense measure, subject to proportionality, etc., considerations.
The same is true for the zone's extension, again subject to the same limitations. "
On the other hand, if Iraq was the aggressor, then the war zones, and the GMEZ,
were not legal self-defense measures.
The GCC's establishment in 1981, with a goal of coordinating, integrating and
interconnecting, inter alia self-defense, among its six western Gulf littoral mem-
bers, was legitimate under Charter Articles 51-52, even though its self-defense
terms were never spelled out like most collective defense treaties. This too is an ex-
ample of a legitimate "informal" multilateral collective self-defense arrange-
ment. Similarly, it was legitimate for Saudi Arabia to request US Air Force
AWACS aircraft surveillance, and for the United States to agree to the operation,
in 1981. This is an example of a legitimate informal bilateral self-defense ar-
rangement. In neither case, however, could these informal arrangements be
used to aid an aggressor.
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The shuttle convoys carrying oil as part ofIran's warfighting, war-sustaining ef-
fort down Iran's Gulf coast and through the Iraqi zone were given Iranian naval
protection. These vessels were entitled to self-defense protection by Iran. IfIran
was correct in asserting that it was a target of Iraqi aggression, these fleets of ves-
sels, ifattacked by Iraq, were also targets ofaggression. Even ifthey sailed alone,
perhaps with naval escort or perhaps independently, these vessels would be con-
sidered targets of Iraqi aggression, if Iraq is deemed to have been the aggressor
at the beginning of the war. If, on the other hand, Iran was the aggressor, the at-
tacks were subject to the law of naval warfare.
The same analysis applies for Iranian visits, searches and diversions or at-
tacks on vessels bound for Iraq with military equipment, e.g., the Danish flag vessel
Elsa Cat, or from Iraq with warfighting or war sustaining cargo (i.e., oil) aboard,
ifIraq was the aggressor. Similarly, if Iraq was the aggressor, and if Kuwait was as-
sisting Iraq, and if, e.g., a Kuwaiti survey vessel was assisting the Iraqi war ef-
fort, it was properly subject to search, seizure or detention as part of Iranian
self-defense. These ships were also subject to search, seizure or detention as part of
the law of naval warfare if Iran was the aggressor.
Security Council Resolutions 514, 522 and 540 of 1982 and 1983, calling for a
ceasefire, refraining from any action that might endanger peace and security, ces-
sation of military operations against civilian targets, observing humanitarian law,
and affirming the right of freedom of navigation, were not Council decisions pur-
suant to Articles 25 and 48 ofthe Charter. They did not speak to the self-defense is-
sue. The effect of incorporation of humanitarian law, etc., by reference in these
resolutions elevated them to Charter law. At least insofar as conflicts between trea-
ties and the resolutions and practice under them, and perhaps insofar as there was a
difference between custom paralleling the treaties, the Charter practice held pri-
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macy. The same is true of other resolutions; they may have condemned action,
advocated observance ofthe LOAC, freedom ofnavigation, or protection ofthe en-
vironment, but in no case did they remove a State's right ofself-defense, which un-
419
der the Charter trumped any treaty law and perhaps also customary norms.
In January 1984 the United States announced new defensive measures for its
warships in NOTAMs and NOTMARs. These procedures, a "defensive bubble" or
"cordon sanitaire" around the ship(s) for a stated distance on the surface of the sea
and above the vessel(s) in the air, were justified on self-defense grounds when Iran
protested. The UK Armilla Patrol, deployed in the lower Gulf since the begin-
ning ofthe war, never published use ofa defensive envelope. In terms ofself-de-
fense, the US cordon sanitaire was legitimate; although other navies' warships did
not have benefit of a defensive bubble declared by their governments, they could
take self-defense measures ifthreatened or attacked. Ifa US warship proceeded in-
dependently or in formation without an announced cordon sanitaire, which was the
situation early in the war, that ship and the formation could also take self-defense
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measures. The US cordon sanitaire's validity in terms of area, duration, etc., is
considered separately.
The Armilla Patrol accompaniedUK flag merchantmen in the lower Gulffrom
the beginning ofthe war; these merchantmen were on their own as they proceeded
northward. In October 1985 France began defending French-flag merchant-
men. A French warship positioned itselfbetween the Ville d 'Angers and an Iranian
warship, warning the Iranian that if it attempted to intercept Ville d'Angers, the
warship would use force to prevent the interception. (French ROE declared French
warships would fire on forces refusing to break off attacks on neutral merchantmen
under attack; the result was a drop in attacks near French men-of-war.) In Janu-
ary 1986 the United Kingdom stated that a right of visit and search of neutral mer-
chantmen, believed carrying cargo to or from a belligerent port, was an aspect of
self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. In March 1986 the United States
recognized a basis in international law for belligerent searches of neutral mer-
chantmen. Nevertheless, in April 1986 a US destroyer warned an Iranian war-
ship off what may have been a planned boarding of President McKinley, a US flag
428
merchantman. When the Soviet flag Pyotr Emtsov, bound for Kuwait with arms
ultimately destined for Iraq, was fired upon, stopped and searched by an Iranian
429
warship in September 1986, the USSR protested.
The apparent divergence ofviews among States depends on the law deemed ap-
plicable to the interception, or the interpretation of it. IfArticle 5 1 and Charter law
in general applied, and if Iraq was the aggressor, Iran could intercept, search
and under some circumstances attack third-flag State unarmed merchant ships
bound for Iraq, and believed to have warfighting or war-sustaining goods aboard as
a self-defense measure. Treaty law to the contrary would be trumped by the Char-
ter. The only general treaty applying to visit, search and diversion or de-
struction of merchantmen is the London Protocol, which provides in Article 22
that
. . .
The following are accepted as established rules of international law:
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to
the rules of international law to which surface vessels are subject.
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly
summoned, or active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface
vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a mer-
chant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in
a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the
existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence
of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board. 433
The Tanker War belligerents were party to the treaty, and among naval powers op-
erating in the Gulf, Belgium, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, USSR, the United
World Public Order 145
Kingdom and the United States were also parties. No other GCC States were
party. Although the London Protocol bound many naval powers in the Tanker
War, it could not supersede the Charter and its Article 51 self-defense norms,
particularly ifArticle 5 1 states a.jus cogens norm. However, the Protocol, or prin-
ciples similar to it, could inform the content of self-defense under Article 51.
Whether the Protocol applies as customary law or has been superseded by practice
since 1936, at least insofar as an unqualified duty to place those aboard a merchant-
man in safety is concerned, has been debated by commentators and govern-
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ments, and since the Charter does not address the issue of custom conflicting
with a Charter provision, the question arises as to whether practice is sufficient to
offset specific London Protocol rules as custom. The issue also arises if there is a
parallel, and different, customary self-defense standard to be applied, the situation
in the Nicaragua Case. The San Remo Manual would restate the rule:
Merchant vessels flying the flag of neutral States may not be attacked unless they:
. . . (f) otherwise make an effective contribution to the enemy's military action, e.g.,
by carrying military materials and it is not feasible for the attacking forces to first
place passengers and crew in a place of safety. Unless circumstances do not permit,
they are to be given a warning, so that they can re-route, off-load, or take other
precautions.
The Manual permits attacks on enemy-flag merchantmen as a legitimate military
objective if, inter alia, they "otherwise mak[e] an effective contribution to military
action, e.g., [by] carrying military materials." Whether flying an enemy flag or
flying a neutral flag but characterized as enemy because ofits activity, e.g., carrying
war materials to aid the enemy, both classes ofmerchantmen are subject to rules of
discrimination, military objective and proportionality.442 Certain merchant ships,
e.g., coastal fishermen, are exempt from attack unless they lose exemption by aid-
ing the enemy. This standard, whether observed in the context ofinforming the
content ofself-defense or as a law ofnaval warfare norm, is appropriate. It balances
realities ofmodern technologies available to merchant ships, which might decide
to advise the State whose war cargo it carries ofan attacker's presence, entitling an
attacking platform to treat a ship as directly aiding the enemy and subjecting it to
destruction on that account, and Protocol humanitarian considerations.
IfCharter law did not apply to a State's actions, the same rules should have been
applied as the law ofarmed conflict. This would be the case for Iraq, if Iraq was
the aggressor; even though perhaps guilty of aggression, Iraq was bound to apply
the LOAC in prosecuting its actions. Ifthe reverse is true, i.e., Iran was the aggres-
sor and Iraq properly asserted self-defense, the result is the same. Iraq would be
governed by the law of self-defense as applicable to its actions against merchant
shipping, and Iran was required to apply the LOAC even though it might be guilty
of aggression. If neither party was entitled to claim self-defense for these actions,
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i.e., because Charter law including the law of self-defense did not apply, LOAC
principles applied to both belligerents. Depending on the view of the Tanker
War by States not party to the conflict, i.e., whether the Charter applied or not,
these States were also required to apply the LOAC as incorporated into Charter
law, if they perceived that the Charter applied, or the LOAC if their view was that
the law of armed conflict, and not Charter law, applied.
These principles apply to States' protection of their flag shipping on the high
seas that was destined for other than belligerents' ports. It was therefore legitimate
for the United States to organize convoys of reflagged tankers or to escort single
merchantmen, for France and the United Kingdom to accompany UK flag mer-
chantmen, and for France to interpose its warships against belligerents' threat-
ened hostile action against these merchant ships if they were not carrying goods to
sustain a belligerent's war effort. IfIran had attacked escorted or convoyed mer-
chantmen as it threatened, convoying or escorting men-of-war could have re-
sponded in self-defense. It was legitimate self-defense for these States to operate,
individually or perhaps informally as a collective group, to protect against or re-
move the mine menace from the high seas of the Gulf. It was legitimate for the
United States to remove the Iran Ajr as a minelaying menace for this reason; l
mines threatened merchantmen and warships alike, as damage to U.S.S. Samuel B.
Roberts attests. The United States attacked Iranian platforms used as a gunboat
base in response to the Iranian missile attack on the US-flagged Sea Isle City with
US nationals in the crew, and Iranian gunboats that had attacked a Pan-
ama-flag, Japanese-owned tanker with US nationals among the crew. This
followed from the policy behind thel986 Libya raid, mounted to destroy State-
supported terrorist bases in Libya after two US nationals were killed in a Berlin
disco. If the US view is correct, that self-defense measures against those who
attack American nationals is lawful, these were legitimate excercises of self-
defense. The Sea Isle City response, like the response to the Berlin disco bombing,
was anticipatory self-defense, in that more threats from these sources could rea-
sonably be expected in the future. The reactive response to the Panama-flag vessel
attack and the Sea Isle City response involved US nationals aboard, and Sea Isle City
was US flagged. The United Kingdom committed to a similar response if a ves-
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sel, although foreign flagged, had more than halfUK beneficial ownership. For-
eign-flag vessels could request US protection, which would be given if US forces
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were in the area and operational commitments allowed it. This too was a legiti-
mate exercise of self-defense, i.e., informal collective self-defense. The request and
acceptance was enough to complete a collective self-defense arrangement. How-
ever, the practice of some masters in tailing convoys or simulating a convoy
would not have entitled those vessels to self-defense protection by warships of
other nations unless it had been agreed upon.
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Warship protection was also subject to the law of self-defense. The collective
and individual States' responses to mines has been noted. It was proper for US
and other countries' warnings to declare a defensive bubble or cordon sanitaire
around their warships to respond to attacks on them. It was also proper for Gulfna-
val forces to cooperate, perhaps informally as the UK Armilla Patrol did, with
other navies for mutual protection. It was proper for the United States to re-
spond to attacks on its seaborne helicopters, to the platform-based attack on Sea
Isle City as a possible threat to its combatants in the Gulf, and to the mining at-
tack on Samuel B. Roberts. Although a US helicopter did not return fire when a
Greek flag tanker shot at it, returned fire might have been appropriate if that
would have been necessary and proportionate under the circumstances, which are
less than clear from the record.
There were several examples ofmistaken fire in the GulfWar. The first was the
Stark attack. US forces fired on several small boats or dhows after the defensive
bubbles were announced. The reason for these latter errors can be attributed to
the real and continuing threat of Iranian small boat attacks on merchantmen and
warships. The U.S.S. Vincennes mistakenly shot down Iran Air Flight 655.
In the Stark and Airbus cases claims were paid and settled without admitting lia-
bility. The United States expressed regret over the other losses and probably
compensated for injuries, loss of life and damage. Whether the attacking Iraqi
aircraft observed proper qualifying principles ofdiscrimination and proportional-
ity is unknown; therefore, whether this was a proper exercise of self-defense is
sealed in Baghdad's archives. Whether US forces observed discrimination or pro-
portionality principles in firing on the small boats is likewise not clear from the re-
cord; certainly if the commanders reasonably believed that these were Iranian
Revolutionary Guard speedboats, they were correct in opening fire to protect their
ships. The same is true for the Airbus tragedy. However, if these were reason-
ably perceived threats, the attacking platforms could fire in self-defense. On the
other hand, if the targets were reasonably perceived to be carrying warfighting or
war-sustaining goods, they were legitimate targets under the law of naval war-
fare.
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The Tanker War thus strengthens the case that a right of anticipatory self-de-
fense exists in the Charter era as before. To be sure, States are not unanimous in
this position, but at the least under the principle ofsovereignty States adhering
to the use ofanticipatory self-defense may continue to advocate it until there is an
authoritative decision to the contrary. This is particularly true if, as analyzed
4.78
above, Iran had a right of visit and search as a means of self-defense. If Iran had
the right to stop and search a ship under a self-defense theory to check for
warfighting/war-sustaining goods that might not be used for some time against
Iran, this could only be under a theory of anticipatory self-defense, as distin-
guished from reactive self-defense. The same can be said for Iraqi attacks on ships
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carrying warfighting/war-sustaining goods for Iran. These interceptions were sub-
ject to self-defense limitations, e.g., necessity and proportionality. And if such
be the case, then those States protecting, escorting, accompanying or convoying
these ships also had a right of self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, if
Iran or Iraq chose to attack instead ofvisiting and searching merchantmen not car-
rying warfighting/war-sustaining goods to a belligerent. These States' warships
also had a right of self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, of their
units.
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The Tanker War strengthens the precedent for informal collective self-defense
among States opposed to the belligerents' sink-on-sight policies. Gulf naval forces
482 483developed these ad hoc coalitions to clear mines, ' to protect each other, and to
protect merchantmen flagged by States other than their own.
The foregoing has proceeded on a theory that the Charter governed these inter-
actions. As will be seen in Chapter V, if certain aspects of the Tanker War were not
governed by the law of the Charter, e.g., Iranian visit and search procedures, those
procedures were strengthened through practice.
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v. Necessity. As noted above, a criterion for invoking self-defense, whether in
the anticipatory defense mode or in the reactive mode after armed attack, is
whether a response with force is necessary, i.e., admitting of no other alternative.
Necessity is an accepted principle of international law conditioning the right of
self-defense. It applies to war at sea. Alternatives to self-defense run the
488 489 490gamut from nonforce reprisals, retorsions, diplomatic protests or other
491 492
diplomatic initiatives, use ofan adjudicative strategy, or perhaps doing noth-
ing at the time, to await a more propitious moment for asserting a claim, perhaps
493
along with others, in a general adjudicative, diplomatic or other resolution. The
difficulty with these choices is that an inappropriate signal may be sent to the ini-
tial actor or other participants in the world community. The strategy offorce, or al-
ternatives to it, may be used alone, in combination, and in varying degrees.
Today the general principle is that self-defense through force is justified only if a
goal ofcompelling compliance with international norms violated in the initial at-
tack cannot reasonably be achieved by other means, i.e., "[FJorce should not be
considered necessary until peaceful measures have been found wanting or when
495
they clearly would be futile." As the San Remo Manual expresses it,
The effect of these principles [of necessity and proportionality] is that the State
which is the victim ofan armed attack is entitled to resort to force against the attacker
but only to the extent necessary to defend itselfand to achieve such defensive goals as
repelling the attack, recovering territory and removing threats to its future
security.496
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Commentators differ on whether Charter self-defense norms apply after war be-
gins. However, since LOAC and Charter law necessity principles are virtually
the same, and LOAC principles may inform Charter standards ifthe principles
are in a treaty or ifArticle 5 1 states;'ws cogens norms, the analysis assumes that
standards are the same, or should be, in any case.
Brownlie and Dinstein advance a hypothetical case ofa target State's submarine
depth-charged by another State's destroyer on the high seas, stating that necessity
permits immediate counterattack by the submarine. The same would be true for a
destroyer againstwhom a submarine fires a torpedo, and for neutral merchantmen
attacked while under individual or collective defensive warship protection, e.g.,
while convoyed or steaming independently and being accompanied or escorted,
502
the Tanker War situations. On the other hand, if a destroyer drops a hand gre-
nade—ifreasonably perceived by a submarine as an unfriendly irritant and not an
attack—or if a frigate tickles a submarine hull with sonar as an unfriendly but
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nonthreatening act, no right of self-defense by a submarine would arise. By the
opposite token, ifa frigate indicates hostile intent to a submarine, e.g., by using ac-
tive, attack-mode sonar and maneuvers demonstrating reasonable probability of
attack, or if a submarine behaves similarly, e.g., by setting up a firing solution
flooding torpedo tubes and opening torpedo tube doors, the target could take im-
mediate self-defense action as a matter of necessity.
These hypothetical cases illustrate necessity in a case of anticipatory self-de-
fense and are similar to Dinstein's hypothetical, justifying interceptive self-de-
fense to destroy the Japanese task force headed toward Pearl Harbor. As with
Israel's 1981 raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, a critical anticipatory self-defense
issue is the qualification of necessity. The submarine-destroyer hypotheticals,
where no weapon has been fired when self-defense action is taken, are relatively
easy cases, and fall into the same category as situations involving missiles, includ-
ing the over-the-horizon variety. If anticipatory self-defense (or interceptive
self-defense as Dinstein has it) is a principle of international law, then target
ship(s) can respond if necessary for self-preservation.
The Japanese task force, as Dinstein recites it hypothetically, may or may not
have been subject to destruction in self-defense. Other alternatives, e.g., interpos-
ing a superior US fleet between it and Hawaii at a point beyond flying range of its
targets on the high seas, might be considered a reasonable alternative, at least in
the 1941 context. If the task force, known to be bound for an attack on Hawaii,
would have proceeded onward after warning, the US fleet would have been justify-
ing in destroying it in anticipatory self-defense. If the Japanese task force inten-
tions were not known or there was no reason to believe that attack on Hawaii was
planned, there would be no necessity for anticipatory self-defense. When its inten-
tions became known, e.g., through positive intelligence, and there was no reasonable
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alternative to forestall attack, the US fleet would have been justified in acting in
anticipatory self-defense.
The fleet hypothetical also articulates the problem of national, as opposed to
unit, self-defense. Although beyond the scope of the Tanker War analysis, the
problem of national survival (as distinguished from survival of a destroyer, for ex-
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ample) may call forth different considerations of necessity. Nations' survival,
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because of their need for Gulf oil, was a policy behind the Carter Doctrine. De-
struction of single tankers could not be pegged on national survival, but necessity
could be predicated on a need to save human life endangered during illegal at-
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tacks. Accumulating these "pinpricks" to justify a massive attack on a belliger-
ent might have provoked claims of disproportionality.
What distinguishes one situation from another in the context of the necessity
component is considering all relevant factors known to the target at the time,
e.g., participants, their perceived goals, methods ofattack and response, conditions
512
at the time, and probable effects. "The most important condition ... is the de-
gree ofnecessity as that necessity is perceived and evaluated by the target-claimant
and incorporated in the pattern of its expectations—which, in the particular in-
stance, impels the claimant to use intense responding coercion," i.e., military
force. The necessity standard—"great and immediate," "direct and immediate,"
or "compelling and instant"—has been carried over from customary law into the
Charter era.
The Tanker War illustrates several examples of necessity in the self-defense
context.
US announcements of a defensive bubble or cordon sanitaire were cases ofpu-
tative necessity. The warning area was advance announcement that unidentified
vessels or aircraft not responding to warnings and threatening US warships were
subject to being destroyed out of necessity for a ship's self-protection.
Applying the principle of self-defense to Iranian visits and searches of mer-
chantmen suspected of carrying warfighting or war-sustaining cargoes for Iraq is
another example of necessity. It was necessary for Iran to visit and search on the
high seas if the offending goods were to be seized; once the cargo was ashore, it
would be difficult to stop its delivery to Iraq. Attempts to bomb truck convoys in
Iraq might have resulted in collateral destruction and more deaths and injuries
than in a properly executed visit and search. Iraq, which had no effective navy, re-
sorted to air attacks on shipping moving Iranian warfighting or war-sustaining
cargoes. The choice was to permit the cargoes to arrive or to attack on the high seas.
A case can be made that the Iraqi attacks were necessary. The same can be said for
Iranian attacks on Iraq-bound cargoes. Whether the belligerents exercised proper
target discrimination or proportionality is another issue. Whether viewed from
a self-defense or LOAC perspective, the standards were the same as under the
LOAC for visit and search or attacks.
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Convoying and other protective measures for innocent merchantmen were also
necessary, in view ofrepeated belligerent attacks on these ships, regardless ofcargo
or flag.
Another example ofnecessity was the US capture and destruction ofIran Ajr.
Given repeated illegal mining in Gulf shipping lanes, it is clear that Iran would
have continued to lay mines. A sure way to end the problem was to end a source of
mines, Iran Ajr. The same considerations justified States' mine clearance opera-
517
tions, necessary to remove the mine menace, regardless of origin.
Operation Praying Mantis, the destruction of Iranian frigates employed in at-
tacks on neutral merchantmen and of offshore oil platforms serving as a base for
speedboats preying on merchant shipping and warships, was also a case of neces-
sity. Ifthe frigates were allowed to continue their deprivations, merchant shipping
would continue to suffer attacks, and if the oil platforms were not destroyed, they
518
would have continued as a haven for the boats. Likewise, firing on attacking
speedboats engaged in shooting up merchantmen was necessary. Ifthere had been
no such response, it is ludicrious to think that other action by naval powers (e.g.,
verbal radio warnings) would have stopped an ongoing attack. Diplomatic pro-
tests, often long after the fact, would have availed nothing to resurrect dead crew-
men, restore a burnt-out hull, or raise a sunken ship.
Given evidence of a strong possibility of an Iranian suicide plane or conven-
tional attack on US warships engaged in self-defense at the time, Vincennes' de-
struction of Flight 655 was necessary from a self-defense perspective, if
tragically mistaken in result.
The same might be said for US responses to Libyan attempts to forcibly inter-
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cept US ships, or to shoot down US aircraft. It takes little logic to justify force
responses if missile have been deployed, or hostile intent has been clearly demon-
strated, under the circumstance of Libya's challenges to freedom of navigation.
vi. Proportionality. In both anticipatory self-defense and self-defense after armed
attack (reactive self-defense) response must be proportional.
(I) Introduction. The limiting principle of proportionality, like necessity, in a
521
self-defense response is well established in custom. It applies to naval war-
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fare. The proportionality principle applies whether self-defense responds to
armed attack or other armed aggression, or whether self-defense measures are an-
ticipatory to imminent armed attack or other armed aggression. However, "re-
sponsibility ... for a war ofaggression may be incurred by the target State, should it
523
resort to comprehensive force in over-reaction to trivial incidents." This is a
decisionmaker dilemma when confronted with an event that reasonable evalua-
tors would say is an act of aggression. The problem is further compounded by a
view that a single so-called trivial act may be rolled into a collection of other
pin-pricks, with the result that a self-defense response against the sum ofthem all
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may be proper. Responses with force that seem disproportionate to a present
pin-prick carry a risk that the target of the response might argue that the response
is disproportionate, is in effect an armed reprisal, and is therefore an armed attack
525by the responding State. "Genuine on-the-spot reaction [would have closed the]
cor
incident" ' and may be a preferable course in many, if not most, situations. "The
effect ... is that a State which is the victim ofan armed attack is entitled to resort to
force against the attacker but only to the extent necessary to defend itself and to
achieve such defensive goals as repelling the attack, recovering territory, and re-
527
moving threats to its future security."
The analysis for necessity, i.e., whether Charter self-defense principles and lim-
itations on them govern throughout a war, or whether the LOAC applies once a
war has begun so that different standards are then employed, also applies to pro-
portionality issues. If proportionality principles are in treaties, the Charter's
clause paramount provision trumps them. If self-defense norms are;ws cogens, they
trump custom or treaty based proprotionality norms. Whether a customary pro-
portionality norm can supersede a Charter norm is not clear. Customary and treaty
based proportionality norms can, and should, inform any binding Charter or jus
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cogens norms. This analysis takes the position that proportionality norms limit-
ing a right of self-defense and those developed under the LOAC should be the
same.
(II) The Elements or Indicia of Proportionality . The foregoing comments on a
self-defense measure's relative position on a time-line between attack (or immi-
nence ofattack, for anticipatory self-defense) and the defensive measure(s) taken is
but one index of whether the action is proportional under the circumstances.
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Another major factor is the methodology and intensity of the coercion. Be-
sides the now threadbare (and refuted) argument that a massive conventional at-
tack cannot be met by a non-conventional (e.g., nuclear) response, i.e., there must
be response in kind, there are finer gradations ofthe problem. US destruction of
IranAjr in response to Iranian minelaying in shipping lanes —in effect, going to
the source ofthe illegality and eliminating it—is one example. Another example is
532
destruction of the oil platforms from which Iranian speedboats had operated.
There need not be identical or even similar response to satisfy the proportionality
requirement.
Moreover, such proportional response, as Ago and others have pointed out,
need not necessarily be proportional in response to force used in the initial aggres-
sion or attack.
The requirement of the proportionality of the action taken in self-defence . . .
concerns the relationship between that action and its purpose, namely—and this can
never be repeated too often—that of halting and repelling the attack or even, in so far
as preventive self-defence is recognized, ofpreventing it from occurring. It would be
mistaken, however, to think that there must be proportionality between the conduct
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constituting the armed attack and the opposing conduct. The action needed to halt
and repulse the attack may well have to assume dimensions disproportionate to those
of the attack suffered.533
Put another way, force used in self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense,
must be "strictly confined to the object ofstopping or preventing the infringement
[of the target State's rights] and reasonably proportionate to what is required for
achieving this objective." Or, as Dinstein comments in a context of full-scale
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war, once a war has started, "it can be fought to the finish. . . . An aggressor State
may lose its appetite for continuing . . . hostilities, but the defending State need not
536
be accommodating." Individual or collective self-defense may carry responses
to the source of the aggression, beyond driving the aggressor back to the line
537(whether geographic or theoretical) until there is total victory if necessary to
achieve proportional response in the sense ofachieving the objective ofending the
538
source of aggression.
Thus, it was proper under pre-Charter law, for US insistence on Japan's uncon-
539
ditional surrender. It was likewise proper for the Netherlands, which declared
war on Japan on December 8, 1941 as anticipatory defense with invasion of the
Dutch East Indies imminent, to also insist on Japan's unconditional surrender.
It would have been proper for Iran, if invaded by Iraq in 1980 to start the war, to
have carried the war to the complete destruction of Iraq, if this were a propor-
tional response necessary to force Iraq to comply with the law. The same is true
with respect to Iraqi responses to Iran, if Iran was the aggressor. (As events had
it, both sides agreed to a UN-sponsored ceasefire, effectively ending the conflict,
including its Tanker War aspects.) Proportionality applies to all levels and in-
tensities of conflict or potential conflict, from anticipatory response to pin-pricks
i 545
to general war.
O'Connell and Greenwood advance a view that self-defense must occur in the
theater of operations generating the claim. In a regional confrontation, a target
State would be limited to responding there. For example, in the Falklands/
Malvinas War, Britain would have been limited to attacks on military units in the
South Atlantic Ocean; a lone Argentine frigate in the Pacific could not have been
attacked unless it gave clear evidence of launching an attack. The US Navy
could not have responded to North Korea's Pueblo seizure except by attacking
North Korean assets in Korean waters. Under this view, Iran could not have at-
tacked the Iraqi frigates in the Mediterranean Sea, or perhaps the Atlantic and In-
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dian Ocean off South Africa if after being launched in Italy they had sailed
through the Mediterranean and either through Suez or around Africa.
This thesis, while appealing in simplicity and symmetry, lacks reality. To be
sure, proportionality means an amount of force necessary to achieve a goal of pre-
549
ventive (i.e., anticipatory) self-defense or repulsing attack. A hypothetical case
from the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War illustrates the fallacy of the position.
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If a UK warship encountering an Argentine frigate in the Pacific, thousands of
miles from the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War theater of operations, in terms of
ship-to-ship combat, what would have stopped the Argentine—as USSR men-
of-war might have during the Cold War—from tailing the other and firing later
(e.g., after dark or in bad weather), when the UK warship could not sense a poten-
tial for attack? To take the other extreme, from either antagonist's geopolitical
world view, a frigate represented a potential asset, wherever located, for prolong-
ing (and perhaps enlarging) the conflict. It might be argued the frigate could only
be attacked when it was apparent it was proceeding to contribute to the war. The
first question is how that could be determined, since most belligerents do not will-
ingly hand over intelligence, or they may distribute disinformation; recall the
cruise of the Goeben into Turkish waters during World War I. The second is a
surveillant power's problem: Must it follow the frigate once located across the Pa-
cific to be sure it does not reappear at the scene of hostilities? To borrow a phrase,
"Use it or lose it"; if ordnance is not used on the frigate in hand, the opportunity
(and the frigate) will be lost, only to reappear in a theater ofoperations. Despite sat-
ellite and similar reconnaisance advantage for certain countries (e.g., the United
States), not all States are so equipped for worldwide tracking, and in a world of
smaller navies and nations less attuned to alliances and friendships, such a State
(even if it is the victim of aggression in the first place) may find itself in a situation
worse than Britain's attempt to locate surface raiders in World Wars I and II or a
wounded Leviathan like Bismarck during World War II. And if targets should be
limited in a full-scale war, how can other military aspects ofproportionality
—
geo-
graphical scope, weapons used, etc.,—be limited? It is incongruous that worldwide
economic sanctions were asserted against Argentina —some ofwhich had clear
reprisal overtones —and yet military options would be limited territorially un-
der the proposed analysis.
The third practical aspect deals with the nature ofwars as belligerents have seen
them. Most since 1945 have been symmetrical, two-State affairs where belligerents
552had about the same quality and quantity of forces. Most conflicts sincel945
have not been wars ofnational survival. A problem for proportionality, from a mil-
itary perspective, arises when some or all of these conditions do not exist. What
may be a routine, middle to low-level conflict for one belligerent may be a war for
national survival for the other, particularly if two or more middle-level States'
forces are opposed to one State's forces, which might have been able to contend
with some but not all opponents. For the sole State, the war is a high-intensity con-
flict; for its opponents, it may be low or medium intensity. During the Korean
War, given other States' overt and covert relationships with North and South Korea,
it was initially a war of national survival for the South, and then for the North.
Israel, nearly always surrounded by opponents, has claimed its wars were mat-
ters of national survival; it is doubtful whether its opponents always perceived
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them thus. The 1980-88 Iran-Iraq conflict, of which the Tanker War was a part,
was a war of national survival, or nearly so, for both sides. These might be com-
pared with, e.g., Falklands/Malvinas, or the India-Pakistan conflicts, where
neither side seriously considered it was involved in a war of national survival. If
one side
—
perhaps because of allies arrayed against it, or for other valid rea-
sons—would validly consider it was fighting a war of national survival where de-
stroying every warship of opponent(s) would make a difference, would this mean
557
that in the hypothetical of the frigate in the Pacific, one side could shoot on
sight because it had to do so to survive, while the other would have to wait for evi-
dence ofimminent attack, because it had a low-intensity conflict on its hands? The
situation is even more egregious if the force-heavy State was a target ofaggression
and would have to await another "first hit" from a State initially in the wrong.
In terms ofinternational law, the theater ofoperations view may be correct from
a perspective for force proportionality, but if proportionality is considered in
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terms ofthe object, i.e., righting the wrong, then the analysis is askew. Ifrectify-
ing the situation
—
i.e., inducing end to aggression—means destroying the Pacific
Ocean frigate, then the frigate is fair game for that reason alone. In terms ofa war of
national survival by a target State, proportionality with respect to the object
sought—maintaining political independence and territorial integrity of equal,
559
sovereign States, all Charter Purposes —necessarily rises to an ever-higher level
ofpermitted violence to preserve these Charter goals for the State affected. More-
over, in a collective self-defense context, the level of military coercion the Charter
permits is that necessary to assure survival of a State threatened with annihilation
by aggression. Thus in the 1990-91 Gulf War self-defense agreements with the
United States, it was the force necessary to assure Kuwaiti survival, not survival
of the United States, Kuwait's alliance partner.
There is no precedent for the theater ofoperations argument. Iran could have
attacked the Iraqi warships, once launched and on their way to Iraq through the
Mediterranean Sea and either the Red Sea and Indian Ocean or the Atlantic and
Indian Oceans. Conversely, Iraq could have attacked Iranian military assets wher-
ever it found them. During the last year ofthe Tanker War, Iranian speedboats and
military aircraft operated in the lower Gulfand the Strait ofHormuz, near the Ara-
bian Sea, a part of the Indian Ocean. Iraq could have attacked these platforms in
the Indian Ocean as well as striking oil facilities near the entrance to the Persian
Gulf.
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The proportionality principle was demonstrated during the Tanker War.
Announced US defensive measures that could be expected if an unidentified
aircraft or ship ventured within the defensive bubble for US warships were pro-
portional. The only object of response would be the intruder, and the warning
area—up to five miles on the surface and relatively low altitude—was minimal. To
be sure, there were mistakes, e.g., when US ships fired on small boats that wandered
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into the bubble, but if they appeared to display hostile intent, the US response was
proportional under the circumstances. The United States expressed regret over
these accidents and undoubtedly offered compensation.
Iranian visit and search procedures for merchantmen suspected of carrying
cargo for Iraq's war effort were also proportionate, in that the ship would be re-
leased if no offending goods were found. However, it is not clear whether ad-
judicatory procedures were established for detained vessels until late in the war.
Whether Iran could detain ships after the ceasefire depended on terms of the
ceasefire and practice under it. For detained ships, the response may not have been
proportionate in terms of time. On the other hand, the belligerents' indiscriminate
firing at or mining merchantmen and neutral warships alike, or neutral military
helicopters, where there was no evidence that they were aiding the enemy, lacked
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any semblance of proportionality.
Belligerents' attacks on ships in neutral territorial waters or neutrals' oil facili-
ties were clear violations of the Charter. Either the littoral State or the State
of the vessel's flag could respond proportionally in self-defense. The coastal State
570
could respond proportionally for attacks on its facilities.
Belligerents' attacks on their opponent's oil tanker convoys, oil platforms and
coastal petroleum facilities in self-defense were legitimate, since belligerents' oil
571
sales financed the war. However, attacks had to be proportional; it is doubtful
572
whether some (e.g., Nowruz) were.
US destruction oilranAjr and the offshore oil platforms were also proportional.
IranAjr was caught laying mines, and its destruction eliminated a source of Iran's
573
illegal action. Oil platforms supported the Iranian speedboats attacking mer-
chantmen; while the response may not have destroyed the same platforms that
supported a particular attack or mode of attack in the case of their destruction in
response to the Silkworm attack on Sea Isle City, this response was also legiti-
mate; it was confined to the kind of platform that could have launched the attack
and was in response to attack on only that tanker. Proportionality contemplates re-
sponses parallel in intensity to an initial aggression and designed to discourage fu-
ture attacks. If the launch platforms were destroyed, there could be no future
attacks from them. There was no need to respond to the particular platform that
575launched the attack on Sea Isle City.
Defense against Iranian speedboats or warships attacking merchantmen, US
military helicopters or US warships was also proportional. As in the case of the an-
nounced defense measures, the only targets were the attacking craft or their bases,
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the oil platforms. The United States was not required to respond, as it chose not
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to do in the case ofthe Stark attack. Any response to the Stark attack would have
had to have been proportional in nature, however. From a self-defense perspective,
578
laying aside the mistaken identity issue, Vincennes' destruction of Flight 655
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was proportional. The perceived threat was an aircraft, mistakenly thought to be
an F-14; only the aircraft was targeted, and only the aircraft was brought down.
Responses to the Libyan aircraft that fired at US aircraft, or electronically
locked on to them, and to Libyan missile boat forays, were also proportional. Only
those aircraft or boats were targeted and hit. Similarly, the 1986 raid on Libyan ter-
rorist bases was proportional. To be sure, there was collateral damage as in any
bombing operation, but the targets were the terrorist operations that had caused
579
the Berlin disco bombing.
(Ill) Forbidden Targets: Per Se Disproportionality . Under the law ofwarfare (jus in
hello) certain targets are forbidden objects of attack, no matter how proportionate
the response in other respects, and even ifproportional armed reprisal is appropri-
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ate under the circumstances. The Corfu Channel Case authoritatively stated
that the general principle of humanity condemned mining of an international
581
strait with resultant loss of life and UK naval vessels when these ships at-
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tempted straits transit passage in a nonwar context. Although the law of naval
warfare has developed a relatively concrete list offorbidden targets for armed con-
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flict situations, there has been little Charter era practice for immunity claims
for these targets in the self-defense (anticipatory or otherwise) context. Neverthe-
less, the Corfu Channel principle should apply to deny amenability ofthese objects
as legitimate targets regardless ofhow proportional or necessary a self-defense re-
584
sponse might otherwise be. The LOAC should inform the law of self-defense
585
under these circumstances.
vii. "No Moment for Deliberation." Anticipatory self-defense, unlike reactive
self-defense, carries a third requirement, from the Caroline Case: there can be no
co/r
moment for deliberation. This principle is often lumped with necessity; the
Tanker War illustrates the difficulty of application as a discrete concept.
587US defensive measures announcements and actions under them are rela-
tively straightforward examples. Given the relatively high speed of aircraft or
small boats, whether carrying shipkilling missiles or on a suicide mission, and a
high risk to a warship of small boats carrying Exocets or the like, it is easy to see
that there can be no time for deliberation
—
i.e., careful consideration up a chain of
command—before action must be taken.
Where analysis begins to break down under current views of anticipatory
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self-defense is in the situation of Iranian visits and searches. If"no moment for
deliberation" means time for investigation by other means, then the concept slides
semantically into necessity. On the other hand, ifthe phrase means no other means
for investigation, the result is the same. The same comments could be made as to
States that ordered or accepted (acquiesced in) convoying or other forms ofprotec-
589
tion, if that is considered anticipatory self-defense.
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The Vincennes incident, ifconsidered an anticipatory self-defense case, illus-
trates the weakness (or elasticity) of the concept as a separate requirement.
Vincennes' commanding officer had five minutes to deliberate, but was that real
"deliberation"? He never knew, due to erroneous information, about Flight 655's
true identity; he thought it was an F-14 homing on his ship. In a sense, he had time
to deliberate, but only enough time to decide that it was imperative, i.e., necessary,
to defend the ship. Under this analysis, there was no moment for deliberation,
and Vincennes' downing Flight 655 satisfied the third principle of anticipatory
self-defense.
Thus the third principle of anticipatory self-defense, "no moment for delibera-
tion," if it exists as a separate concept, was met in these incidents of the Tanker
War.
viii. Rules of Reprisal; Retaliation. Reprisals, i.e., use of force or other methods
(e.g., economic coercion) otherwise illegal to confront a State engaging in illegal
conduct (e.g., aggression) to force compliance with international norms, has been
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characterized as a kind of self-help or sanction. Most say that reprisals in-
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volving force where States are not engaged in armed conflict are illegal. ' Post-
1945 practice tends to confirm this view. Anticipatory reprisal using force is for-
bidden. 594
The Corfu Cannel Case dismissed the UK argument that directing mine clear-
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ance of an international strait was an act of lawful self-help. Israel responded
with massive reprisals against Syria for its repeated armistice violations. These too
were condemned.
The 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration stated that "States have a duty to re-
frain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force," which the Resolution as-
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serted was declaratory of international law. "Subject only to the proviso that
'force' ... be taken to mean military force, the Western States [agreed] on the ques-
598
tion of reprisals."
Even massive economic coercion does not justify a force response, according
599
to the majority view. On the other hand, nonforce reprisals (e.g. , economic sanc-
tions or "economic warfare") remain legitimate in the Charter era. There can be
collective nonforce economic reprisals, like those the European Community im-
posed during the Falklands/Malvinas war. Although many States or their na-
tionals aided one belligerent or the other, or both, there was no apparent declared
system of economic reprisals during the Tanker War.
Even if justified, reprisals cannot be inflicted against third States. The Cysne ar-
bitration held that although Germany might have been justified in reprisals
against Great Britain during World War I, Germany could not destroy a neutral
Portuguese vessel carrying goods covered by the reprisal declaration to Britain.
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All reprisals are subject to three requirements, carried forward from the
pre-Charter era and stated in the Naulilaa Arbitration and the Cysne Case: previ-
ous deliberate violation ofinternational law by the other State, an unsuccessful de-
mand for redress, and the reprisal must be proportional to the injury suffered.
Some objects cannot be an object of reprisals, whether economic or otherwise;
commonly these are considered in the context of the LOAC (jus in bello) and will
be analyzed in that situation. However, such reprisals are be subject to the gen-
eral principles ofhumanity in the context of"peacetime" reprisals, discussed here,
on the same theory that these objects are barred as self-defense targets.
Security Council decisions can, at least in theory, go beyond customary limita-
tions for sanctions amounting to reprisals. A State not injured by illegal actions
of another state might be directed to apply sanctions. Sanctions that some might
perceive as disproportionate to an illegal action might be imposed. Third States
might be harmed by Council decisions, although Charter Article 50 allows a State
confronted with special economic problems arising from carrying out those mea-
sures a right to consult with the Council for solution of those problems. The
Council can be informed by humanity principles and other sources of law, but it
can override treaties to the contrary, and its resolution might state a jus cogens
608
norm.
Sanctions against South Africa, which began in 1977, are an example of the po-
tential for overriding general reprisal sanction principles. The earlier Rhode-
sian embargo, which had law of naval warfare overtones, is another example. In
1965-66, as part of the governance transition from Southern Rhodesia to inde-
pendent, majority-rule Zimbabwe, the Council passed a series of resolutions, de-
nouncing the white Rhodesian government as illegal, and calling on States to
refrain from assisting the white minority regime and to institute an oil embargo.
One resolution requested that the United Kingdom enforce the embargo. Because
the resolution only spoke in terms of embargo and did not authorize blockade or
similar measures, the Royal Navy could not order tankers inbound for the
Mozambican port ofBeira, Rhodesia's access to the sea, to divert. A later resolution
specifically authorized diversion, and the Royal Navy ordered diversion when
other tankers tried to call at Beira. While the oil interdiction operation had an
entirely laudatory purpose, if it is assumed that Rhodesia had no additional petro-
leum sources, and there were essential needs ofthe civilian population
—
e.g., gaso-
line for ambulances, diesel oil for hospital emergency generators, etc.,—a violation
of humanitarian law principles might have occurred, and interdictions might be
said to have gone beyond customary LOAC rules.
The 1990-91 GulfWar, which erupted after the Tanker War ended, is a third sit-
uation where Council sanctions overrode customary law. Resolution 665 autho-
rized Coalition interception of vessels bound for Iraq or occupied Kuwait on
August 15, 1990, without reciting humanitarian exceptions. A month later,
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Resolution 670 imposed an air embargo but permitted food and medical supplies
shipments, subject to Council supervision. At least in theory, the Council could
be said to have overridden humanitarian principles denouncing deprivation ofthe
civilian population of food and medical supplies by the omission in Resolution
665. (It was partly cured a month later by Resolution 666, permitting foodstuffs
shipments under certain conditions, but the Resolution said nothing about medi-
cal supplies.)
ix. The Temporal Problem: When Does Liability Accrue? Convictions at
Nuremberg and Tokyo were based on what the defendants knew, or should have
known, when they made decisions to invade other States. Since then there has
been no authoritative statement on whether liability accrues on what decision-
makers knew, or should have known, when a state responds in reactive or anticipa-
tory self-defense. Commentators seem to have been tempted to justify opinions, at
least in part, on evidence available after a self-defense decision, perhaps years
later.
619
The developing law forjus in hello confirms that the appropriate time for predi-
cating liability is what a decisionmaker knew, or should have known, at the time an
operation is authorized. Hindsight can be 20/20; decisions at the time are often
clouded with the fog of war or crisis.
f\~) 1 f\7~?
Four countries' declarations of understanding to Protocol I to the 1949
Geneva Conventions state that as to protection ofcivilians in Article 51, protec-
tion of civilian objects in Article 52, and precautions to be taken in attacks,
stated in Article 57, a commander should be liable based on a commander's as-
sessment of information available at the relevant time, i.e., when the decision is
taken. Two of the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention's four protocols
have similar terms, i.e., a commander is only bound by information available when
a decision to attack is made.
Protocol I, with its understandings, and the Conventional Weapons Conven-
no
tion are well on their way to wide acceptance among States. These treaties'
common statement that commanders will be held accountable based on informa-
tion they had at the time for determining whether attacks are necessary and pro-
portional has become a nearly universal norm. The San Remo Manual has
recognized it as the standard for naval warfare, and in 1999 the Second Protocol to
629
the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention also adopted this standard. It can
be said with fair confidence that this is the customary standard forjus in helium. It
should be the standard forjus ad helium. A national leader directing a self-defense
response, whether it be reactive or anticipatory in nature, should be held to the
same standard. That leader should be held accountable for what he or she, or those
reporting to him or her, knew or reasonably should have known, when a decision
to respond in self-defense is made.
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There is no public record of what those who initiated self-defense measures,
whether in reaction to an attack or in anticipation of one, knew or should have
known, as was the case in the Nuremberg or Tokyo trials. Therefore, there can
be no appraisal ofwhether the temporal standard was met during the Tanker War.
2. Related Issues
a. State ofNecessity and Self-Preservation in the Charter Era. State of necessity
and the now-outmoded concept of self-preservation have often been confused,
sometimes with the notion that necessity as a component of self-defense or the
LOAC may be so intense that in a situation involving survival of the State that ne-
cessity overrides all other factors to permit any action by the target State. This
claim of self-preservation, or self-help, is now inadmissible. A state may, however,
respond in self-defense.
There is, however, a separate, distinct concept of necessity, apart from a similar
term that is a conditioning factor for self-defense or the LOAC, in that in a separate
claim ofstate ofnecessity, a State against whom action is taken ("a third State") has
committed no wrong against a State that takes the action (an "acting State"), and
an acting State does not consider itselfthe third State's target. In self-defense, a tar-
get State seeks to defend against aggression by a country in the position of a third
State, i.e., the aggressor. State of necessity can be invoked "to preclude the
wrongfulness of conduct adopted in certain conditions ... to protect an essential
interest of the [target] State, without [the latter's] existence being in any way
f.3'2
threatened. " There remain cases "where a . . . [right] of a [third] State can be sac-
rificed for the sake ofa vital interest ofthe [target] State which would otherwise be
obliged to respect that right."
Not all commentators agree on the state of necessity doctrine today. How-
ever, LOS Convention, Article 221 allows States "to take [proportionate] mea-
sures, in accordance with international law, beyond the limits of the territorial
sea" to protect their coastline "or related interests, including fishing, from grave
and imminent danger" from pollution or the threat ofpollution. The Intervention
Convention is to the same effect. " These provisions would have vindicated UK
action in bombing the derelict Torrey Canyon after that Liberian-registered vessel
grounded off Britain, threatening the English coast and its population. " Al-
though frequently decided on other grounds, ICJ decisions and international arbi-
trations have recognized the doctrine in many contexts.
The record of State practice and other sources is thus less than clear, but the In-
ternational Law Commission Special Rapporteur summarizes state of necessity
and its scope today, provided a target State invoking state of necessity acts propor-
tionally to a peril:
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Article 33. State of necessity
1
.
A state ofnecessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for preclud-
ing the wrongfulness of an act of that State not in conformity with an in-
ternational obligation of the State unless:
(a) the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the
State against a grave and imminent peril; and
(b) the act did not seriously impair an essential interest of the State to-
wards which the obligation existed.
2. In any case, a state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground
for precluding wrongfulness:
(a) if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in
conformity arises out of a peremptory norm of general international
law; or
(b) if the international obligation with which the act ofthe State is not in
conformity is laid down by a treaty which, explicitly or implicitly,
excludes the possibility of invoking the state of necessity with re-
spect to that obligation; or
(c) if the State in question has contributed to the occurrence of the state
of necessity.
The Commission draft also says: "[Wrongfulness ofan act ofa State not in confor-
mity with an international obligation of that State is precluded if the act consti-
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tutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter. .
.
Tanker War participants did not claim state of necessity for their actions, but they
could have.
The primary example is US and other States' protecting third-State crews
from attacks by Iranian speedboats and aircraft. Self-defense permitted protect-
ing vessels flagged under the ensign of a covering warship or aircraft or protec-
tion of nationals of the same State and, upon request, third-State crews. States
have a general obligation to act to preserve life at sea, independent of an ongoing
armed conflict. This obligation carries with it a right to engage in necessary
and proportionate response, in the nature of self-defense, with respect to such
ships and personnel. The right to respond could also be based on a theory of state
of necessity.
A clearer case involved the Nowruz oil slick created by Iraqi attacks in 1983.
Although the slick dissipated without any State's having taken action, littoral
countries threatened with loss ofcoastal fisheries or desalination plants could have
acted proportionally with force to eliminate the leakage from Iranian platforms.
Similarly, ifpetroleum leakage from vessels hit on the high seas ofthe Persian Gulf
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was serious enough and threatened a coastal State's shore or other interests, that
State could have acted to intervene. Precedent for this is clear. During the
1990-91 war, US aircraft, as a defensive measure, bombed oil manifolds at termi-
nals in occupied Kuwait opened by Iraq. Besides risk to coalition warships, there
was risk to western Gulfcoastal fisheries and desalination plant intakes. Kuwai-
ti permission was undoubtedly given, but if it had not, the strikes could have been
justified by the state of necessity doctrine.
b. Retorsion. A retorsion, or retortion, is a lawful but unfriendly response of a tar-
get State to another state's unfriendly practice or act whether illegal or not, to co-
erce the latter to discontinue that practice or act. Commentators agree that a
retorsionary response must be proportional.
During the Tanker War, the US defensive bubble or cordon sanitaire warnings in
NOTAMs or NOTMARs may have seemed unfriendly acts, but they were legiti-
mate warnings of the right of self-defense if an aircraft or vessel came within
range. Accompanying, escorting or offering protection to merchantmen not
carrying warfighting or war-sustaining goods to belligerent ports, including out-
bound cargoes of Kuwaiti or Saudi petroleum, may have seemed unfriendly, if le-
gal, acts to the belligerents, particularly Iran. Iran's naval maneuvers in its
territorial sea were legal, but they may have seemed unfriendly acts to its neigh-
bors or to some navies. These retorsions were proportional.
Part B. UN Mechanisms for Breaches of the Peace, Threats to the
Peace, and Aggression
If there has been uneven development of Charter norms as a coherent body of
law for States' individual or collective responses to breaches ofthe peace, threats to
the peace, or aggression, theUN record as an Organization has been even less clear.
This Part first examines the methodology ofUN lawmaking and then sketches the
organizational framework forUN lawmaking and in other groups permitted by the
Charter in the context of situations involving the law of naval warfare.
/. Making the Rules and Stating the Principles: The Security Council
Aside from General Assembly competence forUN Membership, the budget and
trust territories, the only source ofpositive, primary-source norms is the Se-
curity Council. Under Charter Articles 25 and 48, Members agree to carry out "de-
cisions," particularly those related to action to maintain international peace and
security. *" However, the Charter also gives the Council authority to make
nonbinding "recommendations" for pacific settlement of disputes, and "recom-
mendations" on issues involving breaches of the peace, threats to the peace or ag-
gression. It may "call upon" parties to resolve a dispute, whether it threatens the
peace or not, and it can "call upon" Members for measures to assist in enforcing
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decisions. Recommendations and authority to "call upon" Members for action
are nonbinding, although "call upon" connotes a stronger prescriptive principle
than recommendations; if a call for action is coupled with a decision, the call is
binding. A further restriction on Council practice is that Article 25 decisions
can only be taken under Chapter VII, dealing with breaches of the peace, threats to
the peace and aggression, and with an Article 39 determination to that effect.
Thus although Article 25 appears in the Charter just before Chapter VI, stating the
Council role in pacific dispute settlement, it has been used along with Article 48
for Chapter VII decisions.
The narrow problem is whether the Council has made a decision. The Namibia
opinion declared principles of resolution interpretation; there must be reference
to "terms ofthe resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Char-
ter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in deter-
mining the legal consequences of the resolution . . ." In other words, when is a
Council resolution a binding decision? Or, perhaps more important for this
analysis, when is what appears to be a binding decision nothing more than a
nonbinding recommendation, although not so styled?
Analysis of Council decisionmaking—in the broad, nontechnical sense of the
word—reveals a trend toward establishing norms affecting law of naval warfare
standards.
a. The Korean War. Bailey has aptly summarized Council actions for the Korean
War: "The . . . Council decisions on military enforcement . . . were not binding and,
indeed, were only possible because of the fortuitous absence of the Soviet Un-
ion." Resolution 82, calling for ceasing hostilities, calling upon North Korea to
withdraw north of the 38th parallel and calling upon Members to assist the United
Nations, was recommendatory, being issued under Articles 39-41. The Sec-
retary-General felt there had been only a threat to the peace, the United States
charged aggression had occurred, and the Council toned down the Resolution to
find a "breach ofthe peace." Resolution 83 followed two days later, recommend-
ing that Members assist South Korea "to repel the armed attack and to restore in-
ternational peace and security in the area," finding North Korea had breached the
peace. Besides welcoming assistance given South Korea, and "Recommend[ing]"
that Members make forces and assistance available to the United States as head of a
unified command, Resolution 84 followed the pattern. The only decision ofthe
war was a Council invitation to the PRC to be present for its discussion ofaUN Ko-
rean command special report. With the USSR's return and its veto in the Coun-
f."jr\
cil, UN lawmaking potential shifted to the Assembly.
b. Arab-Israeli Conflicts. The Arab-Israeli conflicts generated positive lawmaking
before and after the Korean War.
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After hortatory resolutions based on Articles 39 and 40, Resolution 50 (1948)
called upon Governments and authorities to stop importing or exporting war ma-
terial into or to Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan
or Yemen during a recommended ceasefire. It "Decide[d]" that if this resolution
were rejected, or later repudiated or violated, "the situation . . . [would] be recon-
sidered with a view to action under Chapter VII," i.e., for possible measures involv-
ing force. This, the Council's first attempt to define and regulate warfighting/
war-sustaining material, was only recommendatory. The only decision was for
further action if the parties rejected the resolution's terms. Later resolutions "Or-
der[ed]" a cease-fire, "Decide[d]" the belligerents' responsibility under the cease-
fire, and "Decide[d]" on an armistice. After a recommendatory call upon the
belligerents for a ceasefire late in 1948, the Council "Reaffirm [ed]" its prior "or-
67S
der" for ceasefire and obeying armistice agreements. These were binding in na-
ture. When fighting broke out again in 1951, the Council called upon parties for a
ceasefire, reminding them ofChapter VI obligations to settle disputes by peaceful
means. In September 1951 Resolution 95 "not[ed] . . . present practice of
[Egypt's] interfering with the passage through the Suez Canal ofgoods destined for
Israel" and "[found] further that such practice [was] an abuse ofthe exercise ofthe
right of visit, search and seizuref.]" The Resolution "Further [found] that the
practice in the prevailing circumstances cannot be justified on the ground that it is
necessary for self-defence [,]" and noted that
. . . restrictions on the passage of goods through the Suez Canal to Israel ports are
denying to nations at no time connected with the conflict in Palestine valuable
supplies required for their economic reconstruction, and that these restrictions
together with sanctions applied by Egypt to certain ships which have visited Israel
ports represent unjustified inferference with the rights ofnations to navigate the seas
and to trade freely with one another, including the Arab States and Israel[.]
The Resolution concluded by "Call[ing] upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions
on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez
Canal wherever bound and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond
that essential to the safety ofshipping in the Canal itselfand to the observance of. .
.
conventions in force." Because it ended with a recommendatory "call" upon
Egypt under Article 40, the Resolution could not be considered binding. However,
the Resolution declaration that seizures in the Canal abused traditional rules had
evidentiary weight as to a norm. Resolution 101 (1953) similarly "[found] that
the retaliatory action at Qibya taken by . . . Israel on 14-15 October 1953 and all
such actions constitute^ violations of the ceasefire, the armistice] and the Char-
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ter " Israel was censured. In 1955 Israel was "Condemned] for a similar at-
tack as inconsistent with [the armstice] and under the . . . Charter." The next
year an attack on Syria was "Condemned]" after Israel experienced interference
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using Lake Tiberias by Syria in violation of the armistice. In 1962, after ex-
changes of fire between Syria and Israel, Resolution 171 "call[ed] upon the two
Governments ... to comply with their obligations under . . . the Charter by refrain-
ing from the threat as well as the use of force." The Council reaffirmed its prior res-
olution condemning retaliatory breaches of the armistice, and determined that
Israel's attack on March 16-17 was "a flagrant violation of that resolution." A
"grave Israel military action" in southern Hebron against Jordan in 1966 earned
Israel a censure. The Council "Emphasize[d] . . . that . . . military reprisal cannot be
tolerated and that, if . . . repeated, the . . . Council [would] consider further and
more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against the repetition of
such acts.
When the 1967 war broke out, the Council called upon the belligerents for a
ceasefire and ceasing military activities, on the model of the opening of the Korean
War. Later resolutions "Demand[ed]" a ceasefire and observance of it. Reso-
lution 237 only "Recommend[ed]" compliance with the Third Convention, but
Resolution 242 "Affirm[ed] . . . the necessity . . . [f]or guaranteeing freedom ofnavi-
f\R7
gation through international waterways in the area[.]" ' Resolutions 248 and 256
condemned the "large-scale and massive" or "large scale and carefully planned" at-
tacks on Jordan in response to Jordanian violations of the ceasefire in 1968. A
1969 resolution condemned similar "preplanned" Israeli air attacks on Jordanian
population centers as a "flagrant" violation ofthe Charter and the cease-fire resolu-
tions. It repeated a previous resolution's warning, that the Council would meet
again "to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to
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ensure against repetition of such attacks."
The 1 973 war precipitated a Council call for ending hostilities and a ceasefire.
In 1981, while Iraq was heavily committed in its war with Iran, Israeli aircraft
struck an Iraqi nuclear facility near Baghdad. Israel claimed a right ofanticipatory
self-defense in that the facility was manufacturing nuclear weapons to be used
against Israel. Upon Iraq's complaint, the Council cited Charter Article 2(4)
and "[sjtrongly condemned] the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the
Charter . . . and the norms of international conduct." The Council called upon Is-
rael to refrain from any such acts or threats in the future and stated that Iraq was
entitled to "appropriate redress, responsibility for which has been acknowledged
by Israel."693
In 1982, the Council "[d]emand[ed] that . . . Israel lift immediately the blockade
of the city of Beirut ... to permit the dispatch of supplies to meet the urgent needs
of the civilian population and allow the distribution of aid" by UN agencies and
nongovernmental organizations, particularly the ICRC. The resolution referred to
other resolutions citing the 1949 Geneva Conventions and "regulations attached
to the Hague Convention of 1907."694
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c. Rhodesia: 1965-79. The Rhodesia decolonization process, which included em-
bargo and maritime interdiction before Zimbabwe independence was assured, be-
gan with General Assembly action. Assembly resolutions noted "a threat to
freedom, peace and security in Africa," and called upon States to refrain from ren-
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dering assistance to Rhodesia. Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence,
and the Assembly "[i]nvite[d]" the United Kingdom to implement the Assembly
resolutions and "Recommend[ed that] the . . . Council . . . consider [the] situation
r »696
as a matter of urgency.
Condemning the independence declaration, the Council first "[d]ecide[d] to
call upon all States ... to refrain from rendering any assistance to this illegal re-
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gime." Resolution 217 called upon the UK Government to quell the rebellion
and "to take all other appropriate measures which would prove effective in elimi-
nating the authority ofthe usurpers . . ." The Council also called upon States to de-
sist from providing arms to Rhodesia and to break economic relations, "including
an embargo on oil and petroleum products." Continuance of the rebellion was de-
698
termined to be "in time a threat to international peace and security." Thereafter
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the United Kingdom declined to intercept Beira-bound tankers. The Council
then passed Resolution 221, which "[c]all[ed] upon" Portugal to deny pier and
pumping facilities and "[c]all[ed] upon all States" to divert their vessels "reason-
ably believed to be carrying oil destined for . . .Rhodesia which may be en route for
Beira." The Council also "[c]all[ed] upon" the United Kingdom "to prevent, by
the use offorce ifnecessary, the arrival at Beira ofvessels reasonably believed to be
carrying oil destined for . . . Rhodesia." Specific authority was given to arrest and
detain Joanna V upon departure from Beira if she discharged petroleum cargo
there. The United Kingdom acted upon this resolution, stopping possible
701blockade runners.
A month later the Council, "Acting in accordance with Articles 39-41" of the
Charter, determined the Rhodesia situation was a threat to international peace and
security. The Council "Decid[ed] that . . . Members . . . shall prevent:"
(a) The import into their territories of asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar,
tobacco, copper, meat and meat products and hides, skins and leather origi-
nating in . . . Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present
resolution;
(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are
calculated to promote the export of these commodities from . . . Rhodesia and
any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in any of these commodi-
ties originating in . . . Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the
present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to . . .Rhodesia
for such activities or dealings;
(c) Shipment in vessels . . . of their registration of any of these commodities origi-
nating in . . . Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present
resolution;
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(d) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are
calculated to promote the sale or shipment to . . . Rhodesia of arms, ammuni-
tion of all types, military aircraft, military vehicles, and equipment and mate-
rials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in . . .
Rhodesia;
(e) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are
calculated to promote the supply to . . . Rhodesia of all other aircraft and motor
vehicles and of equipment and materials for the manufacture, assembly, or
maintenance of aircraft and motor vehicles in . . . Rhodesia; the shipment in
vessels . . . of their registration of any such goods destined for . . . Rhodesia;
and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or
are calculated to promote the manufacture or assembly of aircraft or motor ve-
hicles in . . . Rhodesia;
(f) Participation in their territories or territories under their administration or in
land or air transport facilities or by their nationals or vessels of their registra-
tion in the supply of oil or oil products to . . . Rhodesia; notwithstanding any
contracts entered into or licenses granted before the date of the present
resolution[.]
Members were "[r]emind[ed]" of obligations under Article 25; the resolution also
702
"[c]all[ed] upon" them to carry out "this decision of the . . . Council.'"
Resolution 253 followed in 1968; "[reaffirming its determination that the . .
.
situation in . . . Rhodesia constitute[d] a threat to international peace and security
[and ajcting under Chapter VII ofthe Charter . . .," the Council "[d]ecide[d] that . .
Members . . . shall prevent":
(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating
in . . . Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution
(whether or not the commodities or products are for consumption or process-
ing in their territories, whether or not they are imported in bond and whether
or not any special legal status with respect to the import of goods is enjoyed by
the port or other place where they are imported or stored);
(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote
or are calculated to promote the export of any commodities or products
from . . . Rhodesia; and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in
any commodities or products originating in . . . Rhodesia and exported there-
from after the date of this resolution, including . . . transfer of funds to . . .
Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;
(c) The shipment in vessels ... of their registration or under charter to their na-
tionals . . . of any commodities or products originating in . . . Rhodesia and ex-
ported therefrom after the date of this resolution;
(d) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories ofany commodi-
ties or products (whether or not originating in their territories, but not in-
cluding supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, educational
equipment and material for use in schools and other educational institutions,
publications, news material and, in special humanitarian circumstances,
food-stuffs) to any person or body in . . . Rhodesia or to any other person or
World Public Order 169
body for . . . any business carried on in or operated from . . . Rhodesia, and any
activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calcu-
lated to promote such sale or supply;
(e) The shipment in vessels . . . of their registration, or under charter to their na-
tionals, . . . of any such commodities or products which are consigned to any
person or body in . . . Rhodesia, or to any other person or body for the purposes
of any business carried on in or operated from . . . Rhodesia[.]
Members were again reminded of Article 25 obligations. The Council established
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a Committee to receive reports and obtain information. In 1970 the Council
"[d]ecide[d]," in accordance with Article 41, "that Members would inter alia,
sever all trade and transportation ties with Rhodesia; the Council" "[r]equest[ed]"
the UK government to rescind all trade, etc., agreements with Rhodesia and
"[R]equest[ed]" that Members "take all possible further action under Article 41 of
the Charter [i.e., options not involving the use of force], . . . not excluding any . .
.
measures provided in that Article[.]"
In 1972 Resolution 314 deplored the failure of States to abide by the embargo
sanctions and declared that any national legislation to the contrary "would under-
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mine sanctions and would be contrary to the obligations of States." In 1973
Resolution 333 "[c]all[ed] upon" States to enact legislation "providing for the im-
position of severe penalties" for evasion or breach of sanctions. It also
5. Requested] States, in the event of their trading with South Africa and Portu-
gal, to provide that purchase contracts with those countries should clearly
stipulate, in a manner legally enforceable, the prohibition of dealing in goods
of . . . Rhodesian origin; likewise, sales contracts with these countries should
include a prohibition of resale or re-export of goods to . . . Rhodesia;
6. Call[ed] upon States to pass legislation forbidding insurance companies under
their jurisdiction from covering air flights into and out of . . . Rhodesia and in-
dividuals or air cargo carried on them;
7. Call[ed] upon States to undertake appropriate legislative measures to ensure
that all valid marine insurance contracts contain specific provisions that no
goods of . . . Rhodesian origin or destined to . . . Rhodesia shall be covered by
such contracts;
8. Call[ed] upon States to inform the Committee established in pursuance of reso-
lution 253 (1968) on their present sources of supply and quantities of chrome,
asbestos, nickel, pig iron, tobacco, meat and sugar, together with the quanti-
ties of these goods they obtained from . . . Rhodesia before the application of
sanctions. 706
The economic noose was tightened further in 1976 by Resolution 388, decided un-
der Chapter VII of the Charter, that Members would ensure that their nationals
and persons in their territories did not insure:
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(a) Any commodities or products exported from . . . Rhodesia after the date of the
present resolution in contravention of . . . resolution 253 (1968) which they
know or have reasonable cause to believe to have been so exported;
(b) Any commodities or products which they know or have reasonable cause to
believe to be destined or intended for importation into . . . Rhodesia after the
date of the present resolution in contravention of resolution 253 (1968);
(c) Commodities, products or other property in . . . Rhodesia of any commercial,
industrial or public utility undertaking in . . . Rhodesia, in contravention of
resolution 253 (1968)[.]
The Council also decided that
. .
. Member States shall take appropriate measures to prevent their nationals and
persons in their Territories from granting to any commercial, industrial or public
utility undertaking in . . . Rhodesia the right to use any trade name or from entering
into any franchising agreement involving the use of any trade name, trade mark or
registered design in connexion with the sale or distribution of any products,
commodities or services of such an undertaking^] 707
The same approach (graduated embargo, Committee reporting system) under
708
Chapter VII of the Charter was employed with respect to South Africa.
709
Majority rule came in 1979, and the sanctions were lifted that year.
The General Assembly also played a role in the transition to Zimbabwe. Besides
710 711
passing nonbinding resolutions within its sphere, the Council cited the As-
sembly's prior law-declaring resolutions, e.g., the Declaration on Granting of In-
712dependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
d. India-Pakistan: 1965, 1971. The 1965 naval war was part ofa renewed conflict be-
tween India and Pakistan. The Security Council, as in other situations, "[c]all[ed]"
upon the belligerents to take steps for a cease-fire and to respect the frontier line at
713
issue. The 1971 war was over so quickly that Council Resolution 307 only noted
the Pakistani agreement to a cease fire and "[d]emand[ed]" compliance with it.
e. Falklands/Malvinas: 1982. Two Council resolutions impacted this relatively
brief conflict. Resolution 502 was stronger than many initial responses to a crisis.
Finding "a breach ofthe peace," the Council "[d]emand[ed]" immediate cessation
ofhostilities and withdrawal ofArgentine forces from the Falklands/Malvinas and
"[c]all[ed] on . . . Argentina and the United Kingdom ... to seek a diplomatic solu-
715
tion . . . and to respect fully the purposes and principles ofthe Charter." The sec-
ond resolution "[u]rge[d]" parties to cooperate with the Secretary-General's good
offices efforts.
/. The Iran-Iraq Conflict and the Tanker War, 1980-88. As Charter era conflicts
went, the Iran-Iraq war was a long, eight-year affair with heavy losses all around.
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Security Council action was relatively minimal: 17 resolutions in that time.
Several bear upon the Tanker War and the law of naval warfare.
718
Resolution 479 (September 23, 1980, issued shortly after the war began)
"[c]all[ed] upon" the belligerents to refrain immediately from further use of force
and to settle the dispute "by peaceful means and in conformity with international
law," echoing Charter Article 33. The resolution"[w]rg£[<i]" Iran and Iraq to accept
mediation, conciliation, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other
peaceful means. It "[c]all[ed] upon" States to exercise restraint and to refrain from
anything to further escalate and widen the conflict. The Secretary-General's offer
719
to suggest good offices was supported. Although it did not mention freedom of
navigation, Japan and the United States stressed the primary importance of that
720
principle. Iraq accepted Resolution 479, denying it had any territorial ambi-
721
tions; Iran rejected it, demanding condemnation of Iraqi aggression. In Octo-
ber, however, Iraq rejected a UN good offices offer to allow 70 merchantmen
trapped in the Shatt al-Arab by the war to depart under a UN or perhaps an ICRC
722
flag; Iran accepted the proposal.
Nearly two years later, Resolution 514 again u [c]all[ed]for" 2l ceasefire and bel-
ligerent forces' withdrawal. The Council "[d]ecid[ed] to dispatch a team of [UN]
observers to verify, confirm and supervise the ceasefire and withdrawal." Con-
tinuing Secretary-General mediation efforts was "[u]rge[d]." Other States were
again asked to abstain from action that might contribute to continuation of the
723
conflict. An October 4, 1982 resolution was in the same vein, and welcomed a
"part[y's]" (Iraq's) acceptance of Resolution 514's terms and "call[ed] upon the
other [Iran] to do likewise[.]"
Resolution 540 (1983) deplored mutual destruction of civilian lives, cities,
property and economic infrastructures. The Council condemned violations ofhu-
manitarian law, particularly that stated in the First through the Fourth Conven-
tions, and called for "cessation of all military operations against civilian targets,
including city and residential areas[.]" Resolution 540 "[a]ffirm[ed]"
. . . the right of free navigation and commerce in international waters, call[ed] on
all States to respect this right and also call[ed] upon the belligerents to cease
immediately all hostilities in the region ofthe Gulf, including all sea-lanes, navigable
waterways, harbour works, terminals, offshore installations and all ports with direct
or indirect access to the sea, and to respect the integrity ofthe other littoral States[.]
It also "[c]a//[^] upon both parties to refrain from any action that [might] endan-
ger international peace and security as well as marine life in the region of the
Gulf."
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In June 1984 Resolution 552 responded to a letter from the GCC States (Bah-
77 ft
rain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE) complaining of Iranian acts of
aggression on the freedom of navigation to and from their ports. Although Iran
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justified its attacks on reaction against aid to Iraq by States in the region and on
other bases, the Council heard States and the Arab League's complaints concern-
727
ing ship attacks and the right of freedom of navigation, and passed Resolution
552. The Council,
Noting that Member States pledged to live together in peace with one another as
good neighbours in accordance with the Charter . .
.
,
Reaffirming the obligations of Member States with respect to the principles and
purposes of the Charter,
Reaffirming also that all Member States are obliged to refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State,
Taking into consideration the importance of the Gulf region to international peace
and security and its vital role to the stability of the world economy,
Deeply concerned over the recent attacks on commercial ships en route to and from
the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,
Convinced that these attacks constitute a threat to the safety and stability of the
area and have serious implications for international peace and security,
1. Call[ed] upon all States to respect, in accordance with international law, the
right of free navigation;
2. Reaffirmed] the right of free navigation in international waters and sea lanes
for shipping en route to and from all ports and installations of the littoral
States . . . not parties to the hostilities;
3. Call[ed] upon all States to respect the territorial integrity of the States . . . not
parties to the hostilities and to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain
from any act which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the
conflict;
4. Condemned] the recent attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the
ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia;
5. Demand[ed] that such attacks should cease forthwith and that there should be
no interference with ships en route to and from States . . . not parties to the
hostilities;
6. Decide[ed] in the event of non-compliance with the present resolution, to meet
again to consider effective measures . . . commensurate with the gravity of the
situation ... to ensure the freedom of navigation in the area[.l
The Council requested the Secretary-General to report on progress in implement-
728ing the resolution.
Resolutions 540 and 552 had no lasting effect. In February 1986 Resolution 582
"[d]eplore[d] . . . escalation ofthe conflict, especially . . . attacks on neutral shipping
or civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law and other laws
ofarmed conflict and, in particular, the use ofchemical weapons contrary to . . . the
Geneva Protocol." It also "[c]all[ed] upon . . . Iran and Iraq to observe an immediate
cease-fire, a cessation of all hostilities on land, at sea and in the air," to withdraw
their forces behind their borders, and called upon the belligerents to submit the
conflict to mediation or other peaceful settlement methods. The now-familiar
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provision, calling upon other States to refrain from escalating or widening the con-
729
flict, was also included. Resolution 588 (October 1986) expressed alarm over the
continuing and intensifying conflict and called upon the belligerents to imple-
730
ment Resolution 582.
Resolution 598 (July 1987) again "[d]eplore[d] . . . attacks on neutral shipping or
civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law and other laws of
armed conflict and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to . . . the
1925 Geneva Protocol[.]" Citing Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter, the Council
"[a]ct[ed]" "[d]emand[ing] that. . . Iran and Iraq observe an immediate cease-
fire " Other States were admonished not to escalate or widen the war. The Secre-
tary-General was requested to explore, in consultation with the belligerents, en-
trusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict and a
731
report to the Council. This was the first time the Council cited Chapter VII of
the Charter (threats to the peace, etc.) during the war. Iraq accepted Resolution 598
732
almost immediately. The European Community, the Arab League, NATO
countries and the GCC passed resolutions supporting Resolution 598, the GCC
urging the Security Council to implement it. The US Secretary of State and other
733
foreign ministers referred to the binding nature of Resolution 598.
During 1987 a UN naval force was discussed; Italy and the United States had
supported the idea, the United Kingdom was unenthusiastic, and the United
States was willing to consider it but only if a collective action concept was spelled
out clearly. The United States would not support a UN force replacing US and
US-aligned forces. The idea got nowhere.
735
Resolution 612 again condemned chemical warfare in May 1988. Iran ac-
736
cepted Resolution 598 in August 1998, and a ceasefire ended hostilities. Subse-
quent resolutions, 1988-91, condemned use of chemical weapons, called upon
States to control export of such to the belligerents, established the UN Iran-Iraq
Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) to supervise the ceasefire, and disbanded
737UNIIMOG in 1991 with intensification of the crisis over Kuwait.
g. Appraisal ofSecurity CouncilLawmaking. Security Council intervention with
binding or recommended norms affecting war at sea has been episodic and often
limited. There are several reasons for this.
Use ofthe veto, at first largely by the USSR and later by other permanent Coun-
738
cil members (France, Great Britain, United States), has affected lawmaking for
some maritime conflicts. Permanent members filed vetoes on these maritime inci-
dents or wars: Corfu Channel, 1947; Korean War; Arab-Israeli conflicts; India-
739
Pakistan, 1971; Rhodesia; Falklands/Malvinas. In some cases, Council agenda
items have been withdrawn, or the problem has disappeared with time. Time
has been a critical factor in some, but not all, modern conflicts; the Arab-Israeli
Six-Day War and the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict are two examples where military
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action was over within weeks. Even though the Council may be "organized . .
.
to function continuously," perhaps with the most modern telecommunications
facilities, the relatively rapid pace of events can outstrip deliberation, debate and
resolution negotiations and drafting.
Whether the Council can consider a matter depends on discretion ofUN Mem-
bers (whether Council members or not), countries that are not UN Members, the
General Assembly, or the Secretary-General, in bringing matters involving inter-
national peace and security to the Council's attention. The Council can initiate its
own investigation, but that involves discretion before acting on a resolution.
The Secretary-General could perhaps report through his or her inherent power as
head of the UN Secretariat. And while this list may seem impressive, there is
nothing to stop individual States from attempting to settle a dispute by means
other than Council action, perhaps by negotiations with agreement that the issue
not be presented to the Council, or referral to a regional organization, the latter of
which occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The implications of a veto may have influenced the relative strength of resolu-
tions. For example, the Korean War resolutions were only recommendatory in na-
ture. More recently, however, the Council has demonstrated the capacity to
approve decisions under Articles 25 and 48, at least where permanent members
"7 A O *7 A C\
concur with the action, must abstain, or choose to abstain. The latter has oc-
curred occasionally in situations related to armed conflict or the potential for
750
armed conflict.
A more serious problem has been the language of resolutions. Obviously, if a
resolution recommends certain action, that course is optional with UN Members.
751
There have been many affecting the law of naval warfare. Equally obviously, if
the Council "decides" that a State "shall" take certain action, that resolution is
752
mandatory. There have been few of these. Is a resolution "calling upon" Mem-
753
bers mandatory? Respectable authority has differed on the point, and the record
ofcompliance is mixed. For example, the United Kingdom complied when called
upon to interdict tankers during the Rhodesia transition, but the record is
equally clear that Iran largely ignored Council calls during the Tanker War, per-
755haps until forced to comply by outside pressures. (To be sure, Iran accepted Res-
756
olution 598 after prior Iraqi acceptance of it, with a resulting ceasefire. Iraq's
757
"acceptance" record of these resolutions was better, but "accepting" them con-
noted their nonmandatory nature to the belligerents. In the near term, immedi-
ately after passage ofa call for action, about the only sure method is to observe what
States do with the call for action and whether they appear to respond out of a sense
of legal obligation. This choice, like Council decisions that are clearly mandatory
758
under the Charter, is not an option for a military commander. A commander
must await the executive decision to comply with the call, and how Council calls
for action and decisions will be implemented, since they are frequently imprecise,
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and deliberately so, as the Council is addressing a congery of over 180 countries
with widely varying resources.
Since the UN's earliest days Council resolutions have been involved with
759
maritime and law of naval warfare issues. Although nearly all of these resolu-
tions have not carried the binding authority of decisions under Articles 25 and 48,
they do have a sort of"soft law" weight, which when implemented over an undeter-
mined amount of time, may ripen into custom, the oldest source of international
7f>0
law. Moreover, to the extent that the Council can act in relative concert and in
confidence that there will be no veto threat, the future may see more strongly
worded resolutions that are nonmandatory in nature, or decisions that bind all UN
Members. The result in the future is that these resolutions, general as they often
are, may dictate the content ofnaval warfare in the case ofCouncil decisions, or be
informed by it, much as self-defense considerations may be informed by the con-
tent of naval warfare.
2. Making the Rules and Stating the Principles: The General Assembly
The Charter gives the General Assembly only recommendatory powers in the
international peace and security arena, and then only to the extent that the Council
is not seized of a matter. Two practices have developed: recommendations un-
der the Uniting For Peace (UFP) Resolution, and concurrent action with the Secu-
rity Council.
a. The UFP Resolution. When the Soviet Union returned to the Council and be-
gan vetoing resolutions connected with theUN Command in Korea's prosecut-
ing that war, the United States led passage ofthe UFP Resolution, which provides
that if the Council,
because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security . . .
where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression, the . . . Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to
making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures,
including, in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, the use of armed
force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
The Resolution also established a Collective Measures Committee (CMC) to re-
port to the Assembly. On at least five occasions after the Korean War, the Coun-
cil resolved to call emergency Assembly sessions, or refer claims to it. Egypt's
nationalizing the Suez Canal (1956), revolt in Hungary (1956), Lebanon (1958),
765
the Congo crisis (1960), and the India-Pakistan war (1971). Although it was ar-
gued that UFP was not legitimate under the Charter, most find for its legality; East
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and West have invoked it in referring disputes from the Council to the Assem-
bly.
766
UFP was employed in several cases. Assembly Resolution 498 found the PRC
had committed aggression during the Korean War. Resolution 500 recom-
mended a weapons and strategic materials embargo directed at the PRC and North
HC.Q
Korea. Resolution 997, voted by the Assembly during Britain, France and Is-
rael's 1956 Suez Canal intervention, did not determine that a threat to or breach of
the peace had occurred but did note that these States' forces had penetrated, or
were operating against, Egyptian territory. They were urged to withdraw forces
769
and cease hostilities.
Castenada, Higgins and others have analyzed these situations, along with those in
770
Hungary and the Congo. Castenada argues for development of a new customary
771
law arising from acquiescence ofUN Members. Whether these five examples of
conflict can amount to a new found custom is, of course, highly debatable.
Castenada formulates this system of rules from the UFP experience; it is typical of
arguments for Assembly lawmaking:
1. The . . . Council, having determined that there is a threat to the peace, a breach
of the peace, or an act of aggression, may recommend the adoption of enforce-
ment measures, including the use of armed force, on behalf of the United Na-
tions, and directed against states or de facto governments, without following
the procedures and observing the requirements established in Chapter VII of
the Charter for . . . armed force. This means that members can make available
to the Council armed forces in accordance with procedures different from the
special agreements contemplated in Article 43; that plans for the use of such
armed forces need not be drawn up with the assistance of the Military Staff
Committee, as provided in Article 46; and that the strategic direction of
armed forces made available for enforcement action need not necessarily be
the responsibility of the . . . Committee, as set forth in Article 47.
2. The . . . Assembly can recommend, when there is lack ofunanimity among the
Permanent Members . .
., and when there has arisen in the Assembly's opinion
a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the adoption of
enforcement measures, including . . . armed force in the event of an armed at-
tack or an act of aggression, on behalf of the United Nations and directed
against states or de facto governments, also without observing the procedures
and requirements of Chapter VII for . . . armed force.
3. Both the . . . Council and the . . . Assembly may decide, without a previous de-
termination that a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression ex-
ists, to create a United Nations military force to carry out nonenforcement
functions, without complying with . . . Chapter VII for the use of armed force;
and they may recommend—but may not legally require—that members con-
tribute contingents to establish it. The functions of a United Nations Force
may range from mere observation and supervision to the undertaking of typi-
cally military operations, such as engaging in battle with armed groups for . .
.
destroying them as combat units, as occurred in the Congo.
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Up to the present [1969] there has not been a single instance in the practice of the
United Nations that could serve as a legal basis for a new rule authorizing the...
Assembly to recommend the use of armed force, without the legal support of the
Uniting for Peace Resolution, even for nonenforcement purposes.
The legal effect ofthe new rule, per se, is the broadening ofthe competence ofboth the
Council and the Assembly to act in a manner different from that originally
contemplated in the Charter. The degree to which this competence was enlarged is
indicated by the three principles suggested above. It is possible to speak of a legal
effect because there has been a modification of a pre-existent legal situation,
although, from a different point of view, the change in the competence of the organs
constitutes not the effect but the very content of the new rule created by the practice
of the Organization.
The second effect is of a diverse nature. Actually, it is a question here of a legal
effect directly produced by the resolutions adopted by the . . . Council or . . . Assembly
on the basis of the customary rule created by their practice, rather than a direct effect
of that rule as such. This effect consists in the temporary suspension of the Charter
obligation ofmembers to refrain from the use offorce against any state, in conformity
with Article 2(4). That certain Council or Assembly recommendations concerning
the use of force should have as an effect the suspension of the Charter obligation not
to use it, is a consequence of the new rule created by the practice of the organs.
^
While this statement is useful, it is submitted that Castenada errs in two respects.
First, it remains clear after the 1990-91 Gulf War that the Council may also "de-
cide" on the use of force and authorize its agent—the Coalition in the Gulf
773War—to proceed. Moreover, it is highly questionable whether the Assembly
may "decide"—in the sense of the Charter, Articles 25 and 48—on anything, such
that States would be compelled to obey its commands. If the Castanada view is
accepted, that States' acquiescence is enough to create a customary norm, that may
775be true. However, that is not what the Charter says, and any international agree-
ments that conflict with the Charter are trumped by the latter. Treaties, of
course, have been a regular feature of peacekeeping operations, whether under
777UFP authority or the Council.
Moreover, most commentators and courts have said recommendatory resolu-
tions can only restate or evidence customary law. Even Castenada has this view for
778
declaratory resolutions. The Assembly has promoted many LOAC-related
norms through the years; some state rules oflaw, some do not (at least according to
779
some countries), and some are purely aspirational.
b. Concurrent Action with the Council. In several cases the Assembly and the
7X0
Council have issued resolutions during crises or conflicts. Where a Council de-
• • 781
cision adopts a norm stated in an Assembly or Council recommendation, it be-
comes a binding rule oflaw. Where a nonbinding Council resolution adopts such a
norm, it is further evidence of customary law, unless, of course, the original
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resolution declared custom, in which case the Council resolution also restates a
782
customary rule.
c. Appraisalfor the Tanker War. The Council was seized of the Iran-Iraq war from
702
the beginning; therefore, the Assembly had no jurisdiction over the conflict.
However, countries involved in a Council-seized conflict may try to bring matters
784
before the Assembly, which should reject consideration of them.
The Assembly did promote projects whose subject is applicable to the Tanker
War, notably the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)
785
which created the LOS Convention. The same procedure was followed for the
Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols, a product of ICRC confer-
ences. The Council, by citing and incorporating by reference freedom ofnaviga-
tion, the law of armed conflict, and occasionally specific treaties, e.g., the 1925
787Geneva Gas Protocol or the 1 949 Geneva Conventions, thereby gave further evi-
dence of these agreements or customary law as norms. Since no binding Article 25
or 48 decisions incorporated them, these bodies of law did not become mandatory
norms, but Council citation increased the strength of their applicability. Although
the issue is not free from doubt, Resolution 598 may have clarified the debate as to
the status of Article 40-based resolutions calling for action, which may be binding
788
ifthe views ofthe US Secretary of State and other foreign ministers are correct.
3. The Constitutive Process ofDecisionmaking in the Charter Era.
Sub-Parts B.l and B.2 of this Chapter have sketched development of norms of
conduct by the Council and the Assembly. This Sub-Part examines the methodol-
ogy ofimplementation ofthese norms by the Organization and by regional organi-
zations, also contemplated by the Charter.
a. Implementation: Original Intent and Trends. The Charter contemplates that
UN Members will agree to make armed forces, assistance and facilities, including
rights of passage, available to the Council so that it can maintain international
789 • • 790 /->
peace and security. These agreements have not materialized. The Charter
also provides for a Military Staff Committee (MSC) to plan for applying armed
force when the Council directs. The MSC consists of permanent Council mem-
bers' chiefs of staff and would have strategic direction of forces at Council dis-
791
posal. Owing to the Cold War and other factors such as the lack of Article 43
792
agreements, the MSC atrophied.
793
Alternatives to the Charter system have been suggested or implemented.
One was the "agency" principle, by which the Council has requested a State or a
group of States to take leadership and command of an operaton on the Council's
behalf. The United States had this role in Korea, the United Kingdom for Rhode-
sia, and a Coalition in the 1990-91 GulfWar. UFP-based operations have used a
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Collective Measures Committee for data reporting and dissemination. Some
peacekeeping operations have been given to the Secretary-General for leader-
796
ship. In interdiction/embargo operations for Rhodesia, South Africa, and Iraq
in the 1990-91 GulfWar, the Council appointed a Committee to review these pro-
797
cesses.
No peacekeeping forces were active in the Gulf area during the 1980-88 war;
UNIIMOG served after the ceasefire and until the 1990-91 GulfWar.798 The Sec-
retary-General reported on the conflict, at Council direction, but did not administer
799 r
forces. Neither the Council nor the Assembly authorized forces' intervention
similar to the situation in Korea, Rhodesia or Kuwait. The Iran-Iraq conflict and
its Tanker War component were governed by traditional inter-State relations and
the law of self-defense.
b. RegionalArrangements Under the Charter. Article 52 permits regional arrange-
ments or agencies to deal with matters relating to maintaining international peace
and security "appropriate for regional action." Members of these arrangements or
agencies should "make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes"
through these institutions before referring claims to the Council. The Council
must encourage developing pacific settlement of regional disputes through these
institutions, whether a matter is referred to the Council or a regional institution
first. The Council can use these arrangements or agencies for enforcement un-
801
der Council authority. It must be kept informed of action taken "or in contem-
plation" by regional institutions, as distinguished from post-attack reporting
802
required in self-defense situations.
What constitutes an Article 52 regional arrangement or agency has not been re-
solved; the Arab League, the OAS and the Organization of African Unity
80S 8ft6(OAU) qualify. Not all regional organizations are Article 52 dispute resolu-
tion agencies; those whose function is self-defense get authority from Article 51 's
807
inherent right ofcollective self-defense provision. There has been use of Article
52 as an alternative to Council or Assembly dispute resolution. For example, the
United States referred the Cuban Missile Crisis issue to the OAS, obtained a reso-
lution denouncing introduction of the missiles, and proceeded with quarantine.
808As Article 54 requires, the Council was notified. A regional organization resolu-
809
tion was also used in the Grenada crisis.
810
Four organizations, one with Article 52 status (the Arab League), the GCC,
811 812 813
which may have that status, theWEU, and the ICO, which may also have
that status, were involved in the Tanker War. Although hampered from time to
time by internal dissension, the Arab League Summits' resolutions condemned
freedom of navigation violations and urged resolution of the conflict by the
parties. The Arab League governor-general appeared before the Council in con-
nection with debate on Council Resolution 552, brought by the GCC States,
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814
complaining of attacks on freedom of navigation to and from their ports. The
GCC played an active role in the war, evolving from an internal security organiza-
815
tion to promoting joint action for mutual security. The WEU, concerned with
81 ft
European security, was cover for several States' Gulf maritime operations. The
817ICO attempted to serve as a mediator, particularly through GCC support.
Other regional organizations that could be said to have dispute resolution capa-
818
bility today, e.g., the European Community, passed resolutions but were not in-
819
volved because the Tanker War occurred outside their geographic competence.
Other governmental organizations not enjoying Article 52 status, e.g. the Group of
820
Seven, also passed resolutions in connection with the war. None of these made
law for the conflict, but their "soft law" status further evidences the strength of
claims they advanced, e.g., freedom of navigation in the Gulf.
c. The Work ofNongovernmental Organizations and the Tanker War. The princi-
pal nongovernmental organization contributing to the law of the Tanker War was
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a Swiss corporation that
sponsored conferences leading to 1977 Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva Con-
821
ventions. The ICRC also sponsored conferences leading to adoption ofthe Con-
822
ventional Weapons Convention and its protocols in 1980. The Security Council
cited to the law ofarmed conflict generally and to the Geneva Conventions specifi-
oil 874.
cally, the work ofthe ICRC was cited in a Council resolution. ' Early in the war
Iran accepted and Iraq rejected a proposal to move, under the Red Cross or UN
875
flag, 70 ships caught in the Shatt by opening hostilities. The standards of
ICRC-sponsored treaties had impacted norms applicable to the war, regardless of
citation by the Council.
The International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), International Cham-
ber of Shipping (ICS) and the International Shipping Federation (ISF) expressed
concerns over attacks on merchant shipping, and these were transmitted to
827
belligerents by the UN Secretary-General.
Part C. Maritime Neutrality in the Charter Era 828
"There is nothing new about revising neutrality; it has undergone an almost
istant pi
lieved that
829
const rocess of revision in detail," Jessup concluded in 1936. He also be
. . . nothing could be more fallacious than the attempt to test the application of
rules of neutrality by the principles of logic. Since they are products of compromise
and of experience, logic has found practically no place in their development and
cannot properly be used in their application.830
Over half a century into the Charter era, little would change these observations.
Oil
New considerations have appeared, including the Charter itself; the process of
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analyzing the law of neutrality defies a straightforward, positivist, black-letter ap-
proach. Indeed, principles of neutrality for maritime warfare have been seen to be
832
less rigid, from an historical perspective, than those for air or land warfare.
833Some assert that neutrality is in "chronic obsolescence." A major reason, ac-
cording to those who say that future applications of the law of neutrality will be
minimal, is the argument that the Charter has ended the rights and duties of the
834
old law of neutrality. Another argument is that since the Charter has outlawed
war, therefore there can be no state of war, and therefore there is no need for a
law ofneutrality. (The latter position might be considered in light ofthe Pact of
837
Paris (1928), which outlawed aggressive war. World War II began a decade
later.)
Many others, reflecting State practice and claims in the Charter era, have
maintained that the law ofneutrality continues to exist. TheSan Remo Manual rec-
838
ognizes maritime neutrality. The 1992-96 International Law Association Con-
ferences received reports from its Committee on Maritime Neutrality, and the
839
1998 ILA conference accepted the Committee's final report. Individual re-
searchers assert that neutrality remains a valid legal concept, albeit modified by
the impact of the Charter and other considerations.
Like the reports ofMark Twain's passing, accounts of the demise of neutrality
in the Charter era have been greatly exaggerated, as the ensuing analysis
demonstrates.
The law ofneutrality before World War II and the Charter era has been traced in
841
detail by Jessup, his associates and others, more analysis is needlessly repetitive.
However, two groups' research during 1919-39 is worthy of note, particularly for
their collection and summary of State practice. They had considerable impact on
State practice as the war widened but before it became global in 1941 with entry of
the United States and other American countries into the war.
1. Neutrality, 1928-41, and in the Charter Era; "Non-Belligerency"
In 1928 the Pact ofParis was concluded. Subject to later agreements such as the
842
Charter, the Pact remains in force today. The understanding concerning the in-
herent right of of self-defense under the Pact applies in the Charter era and can be
claimed today, subject to principles of necessity, proportionality, and for anticipa-
843
tory self-defense, a situation admitting ofno other alternative. Neutrality prin-
ciples also carried forward into the Charter era, subject to modification by Charter
law and the usual processes of change in the law Jessup saw in 1936.
The Pact did not address the neutrality issue, although other agreements
845
contemporaneous with it stated the term without defining it, except for the Ha-
vana Convention on Maritime Neutrality, with eight American countries party,
including the United States, and the five-State 1938 Nordic Rules of Neutral-
847 848
ity, not a formal treaty but published in the LNTS series.
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The ILA 1934 meeting approved the Budapest Articles ofInterpretation ofthe Pact
of Paris. They provide in part:
(1) A signatory State cannot, by denunciation or non-observance of the Pact, re-
lease itself from its obligations thereunder.
(2) A signatory State which threatens to resort to armed force for the solution of
an international dispute or conflict is guilty of a violation of the Pact.
(3) A signatory State which aids a violating State thereby itself violates the Pact.
(4) In the event of a violation of the Pact by a resort to armed force or war by one
signatory State against another, the other States may, without thereby commit-
ting a breach of the Pact or ofany rule of International Law, do all or any of the
following things:
—
(a) Refuse to admit the exercise by the State violating the Pact of belligerent
rights, such as visit and search, blockade, etc.;
(b) Decline to observe towards the State violating the Pact the duties pre-
scribed by International Law, apart from the Pact, for a neutral in rela-
tion to a belligerent;
(c) Supply the State attacked with financial or material assistance, including
munitions of war;
(d) Assist with armed forces the State attacked.
(5) The signatory States are not entitled to recognise as acquired de jure any terri-
torial or other advantages acquired de facto by means of a violation of the Pact.
(6) A violating State is liable to pay compensation for all damage caused by a vio-
lation of the Pact to any signatory State or to its nationals.
(7) The Pact does not affect such humanitarian obligations as are contained in
general treaties.... 849
850 851
Although some States and commentators said when the Articles were ap-
proved that no State had adopted them as policy, in 1941 the US Congress heard
former Secretary of State Stimson's testimony on the pending Lend-Lease Bill; he
852
interpreted the Articles as an authoritative statement of the law. He echoed
views of Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Attorney General Robert H. Jackson
on the point, that since Axis nations had breached the Pact of Paris, the United
853
States could resort to self-defense. Besides self-defense, under the BudapestArti-
cles States could adopt a status ofnonbelligerency, i.e., decline to observe neutrality
toward a Pact violator. States could supply a State that was a target ofa Pact violator
854
with "financial or material assistance, including munitions of war." (Put
differently, Pact parties could engage in reprisals involving force or other modali-
ties or retorsions. In the Charter era, reprisals involving use of force by States not
party to a conflict are inadmissible. In the pre-Charter era assisting victims of
aggression or armed attacks was styled as nonbelligerency, an intermediate step
between neutrality and belligerency.)
The Lend-Lease Bill was enacted. Congress, by enacting Lend-Lease in this
857
context, can be said to have stated US practice at that time, and the BudapestAr-
ticles as part of that practice. It is submitted that when the Allies and other neutrals
World Public Order 183
accepted Lend-Lease through bilateral agreements, they ratified and accepted this
oco 859
practice. The 1940 UK-US destroyers-for-bases agreements were also exam-
Qf.r)
pies ofthe United States' assuming nonbelligerent status. These, however, were
only bilateral arrangements, although the US general pro-Allied stance was then
apparent.
The United States was not the only country to assume a nonbelligerency pos-
ture during 1939-45. For example, Norway's November 1939 charter arrangement
for 1 .5 million tons oftankers with Britain favored the United Kingdom against
the Axis. Others officially or unofficially adopted policies tending to favor one side
or the other, sometimes before becoming belligerents (e.g., Italy, which supported
Germany, or American States participating in US Lend-Lease agreements before
declaring war) and in other cases staying out of the war but keeping nonbellig-
erent status (e.g., Spain). This World War II practice tends to add support for
recognizing nonbelligerency as an intermediate position, under international law,
between neutrality and belligerency.
The ILA was not the only group of scholars in the interwar years with a view
that there could be gradations or stages between belligerency and neutrality. The
1939 draft Harvard Aggression Convention differentiated among aggressors; de-
fending and co-defending States, entitled to all rights of self-defense; and "sup-
porting States," entitled to discriminate against an aggressor by other than armed
force. A supporting State was entitled to "rights which, if it were neutral, it would
have against a belligerent." An aggressor retained its duties to those entitled to
neutrality status. Other States would have had these rights under Articles 12 and
13:
A State which is not an aggressor, a defending State, a co-defending State, or a
supporting State, does not, in its relations with the aggressor, have the duties which,
if it were neutral, it would have to a belligerent, but, against the aggressor, it has the
rights which, if it were a neutral, it would have against a belligerent.
Subject to . . . Article 7 and 8, a State which is not an aggressor, a defending State, a
co-defending State, or a supporting State, has, in its relations with a defending State, a
co-defending State or a supporting State, the duties which, if it were neutral, it would
have to a belligerent; and has against those States the rights which, if it were a neutral,
it would have against a belligerent. 86 ^
The Comment to the "supporting State" definition elaborates on the term in the
Draft Convention:
. .
. "[Supporting State" is used in a special way. A "supporting State" might give
to a defending State even greater assistance than was given by a "co-defending State"
but it would do so without use of armed force.
The action taken by a supporting State to assist a defending State would take the
form ofsome kind ofdiscrimination against the aggressor or in favor ofthe defending
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State. The State may take such action and assume such status for a variety of reasons
but presumably its reasons will include a desire to deter, restrain or even perhaps to
punish an aggressor. The discriminatory action may take the form of economic or
financial embargoes directed against the aggressor. It might be restricted to a
withdrawal of diplomatic and consular representatives from that State or to
participation in the determination that the State violated its obligation not to resort
to force. It might not take the form of any measures directly against an aggressor but
might rather be in the form of aid—financial, economic or otherwise—to the
defending State.
Recitations of State and League of Nations practice demonstrates that there was
support among States, great and small, for the form of nonbelligerency not involv-
ing direct use offorce. In effect, the Draft Convention's definition ofsupporting
State comes close to the armed neutralities of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries and the Napoleonic Wars when neutrals cooperated to get cargoes
9.f\l
through. This was also almost precisely the circumstance ofthe United States in
the destroyers-bases deal, its convoy operations in the North Atlantic before en-
869 870
try into World War II, and Lend-Lease. It was the US posture during the
871
Tanker War when it convoyed neutral merchantmen to and from Kuwait. The
same was true for States other than belligerents that accompanied or escorted mer-
chantmen flying flags of States other than the belligerents, regardless ofwho was
872
the aggressor during the Tanker War. At least one commentator has stated that
the Budapest Articles principle of aid against an aggressor, or its correlative of sup-
873
porting State action under the Draft Convention, applies in the Charter era.
Most recent commentators say there is no intermediate position between bel-
ligerency and neutrality, i.e., there is no legal foundation, or perhaps need, for
nonbelligerency. Unlike the Harvard Draft Convention view, nonbelligerents can
874
claim no rights from that status. However, the problem may lie more in defining
neutrality, according to Tucker. If neutrality is defined as non-participation in
hostilities, i.e., as a belligerent or nonbelligerent, a non-participant neutral incurs
belligerent responses only when, and to the extent, favoritism is shown. Belliger-
875
ents can respond by non-force reprisals or retorsions. If it is assumed that the
United States and others connected with Gulf commerce in the Tanker War fa-
vored one belligerent over the other, (e.g., Iraq over Iran), Iran could impose pro-
portional non-force reprisals after due notice and opportunity for correction
necessary in the situation. Iraq could do the same, and either could employ
retorsions too. Iran could not, even under this theory of neutrality, move
straightway, without notice, to forcible response, e.g., attacks on and destruction of
877
neutral shipping.
Besides the US position before entry into World War II and its stance during the
Iran-Iraq war, nearly every conflict of reasonable duration during the Charter era
has involved situations of nonbelligerency in maritime warfare. This was true for
878
the Korean War, with its UN law overtones. It was also true for the Arab-Israeli
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conflicts. The India-Pakistan conflicts were less clear on the point. The
United States materially assisted the United Kingdom in the Falklands/Malvinas
war, supplying fuel and intelligence; the United States and other countries,
881
through economic sanctions, also indirectly assisted the United Kingdom.
Moreover, ifthe view is taken that negative preferences for one belligerent over an-
other, e.g., cutting offarms supplies to one side as opposed to aiding one belligerent
while embargoing the other, amounts to nonbelligerency, during the Tanker War
many States had nonbelligerent status: France, most of the Arab States, and the
USSR. The United Kingdom, with its 1987 export credit agreement with Iraq de-
spite its asserting even-handed strict neutrality, might be said to fall into this cate-
882
gory.
Regardless of the commentators' position, the record of armed conflicts since
World War II has been that ifthe confrontation is ofany length, States may declare
and practice strict neutrality, declare neutrality and act as nonbelligerents, or do
883
nothing, perhaps ignoring (or being unaware of) the situation. The law of neu-
trality has been applied in the Charter era, perhaps not consistently, and claims for
a right to act as a nonbelligerent, i.e., favoring one or more belligerents at the ex-
pense of others, persist.
Is nonbelligerency a violation of the law of neutrality, or a status without legal
standing between the traditional roles of neutrality and belligerency? The re-
sponse today lies not in the traditional analyses, stretching back centuries, but in
the developing norms under the Charter. The old principles of neutrality have
884been modified by the advent of the Charter. The same is true for nonbellig-
erency, where an overlay of Charter law helps define these situations and can give
them legitimacy, not as an exception to traditional rules of neutrality, whether
885
stated in treaties or custom, but as application and interpretation ofthe Charter.
Responses to aggressors can include proportional reprisals not involving use of
force and retorsions, and States that are not belligerents whose interests have been
oo/r
damaged by belligerent action can invoke these, along with state of necessity.
These alternatives remain as options in the Charter era, and taking such actions
could demonstrate favoritism for one belligerent because of actions taken against
the other. In effect, the actor State would have the appearance ofbeing a nonbellig-
erent by so acting.
Examples from recent conflicts illustrate the point. During the Falklands/
Malvinas War, States in Europe attempted to isolate Argentina economically,
most likely in violation of international obligations. These reprisal actions were
justified against the aggressor in that war. If actions ofthe United States and other
countries supplying economic assistance, intelligence and other information to
887
the United Kingdom would be deemed unlawful, those actions were also appro-
priate nonforce reprisals under Rio Pact mutual security for Argentina's violation
of territorial integrity. Governments' actions to convoy, escort or offer protection
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to neutral ships not carrying warfighting/war-sustaining goods to belligerent ports
888during the Tanker War were retorsionary in nature. These were unfriendly acts
directed toward a belligerent thought to have violated international law.
In essence, the principles of law applicable to the intermediate status between
belligerency and neutrality need not necessarily depend on development of a cus-
tomary practice recognized as law however the trend may seem to have been since
1939 and continuing into the Charter era, or upon resolution of the debate among
the commentators. The Charter-governed norms apply to fill the void to permit
non-force reprisals and retorsions by neutrals that might have evoked claims of
nonbelligerency before 1945, neutrals that retain an inherent right of self-defense.
Moreover, principles of treaty-based informal self-defense arrangements, which
also continue in the Charter era, permit responses by States not party to a conflict
involving use of force, provided other criteria, e.g., necessity and proportionality,
889
are met. One problem with informal self-defense arrangements, like the prob-
lem of aid to a country which is a target of aggression, is the stance the purported
aggressor may take. If the purported aggressor says, rightly or wrongly, that the
target is the aggressor, then the aiding State may subject itselfto claims, and worse,
of aiding the aggressor. Another problem with relatively clandestine material aid,
or with informal self-defense, is notice. Although security treaties sometimes are
not published, many are, and all can see who is aligned with whom. This is not the
case with clandestine aid to a target or informal collective self-defense agreements.
These kinds of transactions carry with them the same kinds of risks of misinter-
pretation and accusations when States act pursuant to them without notifying
other States ofthe reasons for their actions. States so acting must take these factors
into account when assisting target States pursuant to these modalities.
2. The Law ofNeutrality in the Context ofUNAction Under the Charter
Sub-Part C.l has demonstrated that neutrality, primarily as practiced in the
Nineteenth Century, has been modified in the Charter era, although the general
concept ofneutrality remains. The further question is the impact that UN actions,
particularly by the Security Council, may have on this corpus oflaw. As recited ear-
lier, decisionmaking options under the Charter, and practice under the Charter,
demonstrate that there has been and will be ample room for claims of neutrality or
nonbelligerency.
First, although the Council may make legally-binding decisions under Articles
25 and 48 of the Charter, and therefore may obligate UN Members under Articles
41-42 to take action that might be inconsistent with traditional neutrality princi-
ples, the Council also may make nonbinding "call[s] upon" Members under Arti-
cles 40-41. It also may make nonbinding recommendations under Articles 39-40.
These recommendations have no more force of law, unless they restate custom,
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general principles or treaty-based norms, than General Assembly recommenda-
890
tions under Articles 10-11, 13 and 14.
Thus, Council decisions may compel a State to behave inconsistently with tra-
ditional neutrality practice, either in requiring what would otherwise be belliger-
OQ1
ent acts or in restricting rights traditionally enjoyed by neutrals. Article 50,
invoked by the Council for States affected by the Council-directed embargo ofIraq
892during the 1990-91 GulfWar, allows it to consult with States finding themselves
with "special economic problems" arising from carrying out Council-decided pre-
ventive or security measures. Thus even if Jordan and like-status States would
have lost some or all of their rights and duties as neutrals through initial Council
decisionmaking in that war, an Article 50 reprieve could have restored some or all
of these rights and duties. Council action under Article 50 could result in greater
rights, or lesser duties, than under the traditional law of neutrality.
Second, Council decisions when first taken may include exemptions that
would, in effect, allow reversion to traditional neutrality law. For example, sea and
air embargoes against Iraq in the 1990-91 war and against the former Yugoslavia
beginning in 1991 had exemptions for medical supplies, humanitarian supplies,
and foodstuffs notified to the Council's Sanctions Committee, which includes rep-
893
resentatives from all Council members. To that extent, and except when other-
wise controlled by other effects of Council decisions
—
e.g., the Committee—the
traditional law of neutrality would apply to such shipments. This exception has
been most apparent when the Council has decided to embargo only a single com-
894
modity
—
e.g., petroleum, weapons or military equipment —followed by recom-
mendations on, calls for, or decisions on, enforcement. In that situation the law of
the resolution would apply to selected commodities, while neutrality rules would
be in force as to other goods if armed conflict is involved. Thus far that situation
has not arisen. The classic case was Rhodesia ( 1 965) which did not involve interna-
tional armed conflict, and only selective enforcement as to one commodity, petro-
895leum. y As to commodities not stated in a selective Council decision, neutrality
principles would apply. If Article 42 measures approve use of force for some cir-
cumstances but not for others, and use of force is appropriate in those other cir-
896
cumstances, the law of neutrality will apply in those circumstances.
y
For
example, ifthe Council decides on an air-land campaign against an aggressor, with
no decision on maritime aspects ofthe crisis, the maritime law ofneutrality applies
to maritime aspects ofthe situation to the extent that the Council decision's impact
does not overlap into maritime issues. An example might be air flights over the
seas. Ifan air-land related resolution is in force, it would apply to ocean overflights
to and from the affected State, except as to purely maritime-oriented flights, e.g.,
helicopter resupply from ship to ship.
The third point is the relative infrequency ofapplication ofmandatory Council
decisions. Of the hundreds of crises since 1945 that have involved a potential for
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armed conflict or actual conflict and which could be said to risk a "threat to the
897
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression," mandatory Council decisions
898
have governed only a handful. ' In terms of the potential for or actual warfare at
sea, six crises have produced Council decisions: Rhodesia (1965), the Gulf War
(1990-91), the disintegration of Yugoslavia (1991), Angola (1992), Liberia (1992)
899
and Haiti (1993). ' Even the Korean War evoked only Council calls or recom-
mendations for action before the USSR vetoes, and thereafter General Assembly
recommendations under the UFP Resolution. To be sure, some calls for action
901
and recommendations were well-supported, but they did not carry the force of
decisional law. When the Council approves other than decisions, resulting resolu-
tions, although confessedly highly persuasive and authoritatively stated from po-
litical and policy perspectives, are nonetheless recommendatory as a matter of law.
In the latter case—the overwhelming bulk of resolutions the Council has voted to
date—there has been and will be full opportunity for the law of neutrality to oper-
ate. Widespread compliance with calls for action or recommendations could even-
tually mature into custom, but it is doubtful whether State practice under them
902
would be of sufficient duration, assuming States accept the action as law. (Sanc-
tions practice against Iraq and the former Yugoslavia may be candidates for con-
gealment into custom, however.) In any event, neutrality principles would exist
903between the precipitating event, e.g., breach of the peace, and Council action.
Even ifthe Council decides on action, the enforcement mechanism has not been
the Military Staff Committee and special forces the Charter contemplates.
Rather, it has often used an agency principle, choosing a State or group of States to
respond to the crisis, with one nation perhaps chosen for a leadership role—the
United States for Korea, the United Kingdom for Rhodesia, and a coalition for the
9051990-91 Gulf War. In these situations agent State(s) might be involved in en-
forcing the law of neutrality, even though there are overarching Council resolu-
tions. Such was the case for Korea, where the US-declared blockade involved
observing neutral vessel rights to visit nearby USSRports and a right ofUSSR war-
ships to proceed to North Korean ports. In recently-ordered embargo opera-
907
tions, the Council has not designated a leader, resulting in confusion.
The Security Council's Tanker War resolutions fell into the first and third cate-
gories ofexceptions, i.e., no State including the belligerents was obligated to obey a
Council resolution, except through calls for action, demands, or recommenda-
tions. Thus the principles of neutrality had full potential play for that war. Other
conflicts, particularly the ongoing situation that began with the Gulf War of
1990-91 and disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, demonstrate that gaps in
Council decisions, or its methodology of taking action, leave copious opportuni-
ties for applying neutrality principles. These principles may well not be the same
as those before the Charter era, since actions in individual and collective self-
defense must be factored in, but neutrality as a concept continues to exist.
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Moreover, the Council appears to have approved sub silentio the concepts ofneu-
trality and perhaps nonbelligerency as well. International agreements concluded
since 1945, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the most widely accepted
908
multilateral treaties ofany, have continued to use the terms "neutral" and, more
909
rarely, "nonbelligerent." These conventions were cited by the Council during
the Tanker War, and again during the 1990-91 GulfWar. The Council referred
91
1
to "states not party to the hostilities" in Tanker War Resolution 552. Further-
more, there is nothing in practice under the Charter to indicate that earlier con-
912
ventions dealing with neutrality are invalid under the Charter. To the extent
913
that earlier treaties have crystallized into custom, they exist in that mode as a
914
valid source of law.
3. Appraisal ofNeutrality in the Charter Era
Undeniably neutrality as a general concept has as much vitality today as in the
pre-Charter era. The claim, that there is a customary right to assert an intermediate
status of nonbelligerency between traditional neutrality and belligerency, may
have been strengthened since 1945. The precedents in some cases are almost iden-
tical with those in the last two centuries. Even if nonbelligerency cannnot be as-
serted as a customary norm, the overlay of principles of retorsion, reprisals not
involving use of force, and state of necessity, apply to support actions at variance
with a practice of strict neutrality in the traditional sense. Because of options un-
der the Charter for nonbinding resolutions by the Security Council and perforce
the General Assembly, the potential for exceptions even with a binding Council
decision, and the relative scarcity of Article 25/48 Council decisions, the opportu-
nity for claims ofneutrality
—
perhaps modified by the new nonbelligerency ofthe
Charter era—remains large. "Far from being moribund, these traditional rights
[ofneutrality and self-defense] apply logically in conditions oflimited wars"—the
type ofconflicts that have beset the planet since 1945—"even more rigorously than
915
in conditions of total war."
Part D. Sources of the Law, Principles of the Law of Treaties and
Treaty Succession
This Chapter has integrated Charter interpretation principles, notably the su-
premacy of the Charter over treaties, the problem of custom or general princi-
91
7
pies of law contrary to the Charter, and the possibility that parts of the Charter
918
may restate jus cogens norms, however that concept may be defined. This Part
examines principles of the law of treaties and treaty succession, with a closer re-
view of the effect of war on treaties generally, and the relationship between the
LOS Convention and the law of armed conflict.
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/. Principles of the Law of Treaties and Treaty Succession
919 • 920
Principles of treaty interpretation, treaty succession, and acquiescence in
921
or objection to custom have been noted. The possibility of coercion, e.g., threat
or use offorce contrary to Article 2(4) ofthe Charter, to which might be added vari-
922 • 923
ous forms of error or corruption, has been cited. (If a treaty is negotiated in
connection with a State's aggression in violation ofthe Charter, i.e., an armistice or
924
surrender by the aggressor, coercion principles do not apply. Economic coer-
cion, e.g. sanctions imposed as nonforce reprisal or retorsion, does not invalidate a
925
treaty either. If the Security Council decides on sanctions, or calls for them,
926
Charter law also trumps a target State's economic coercion claims.)
Other assertions of the inapplicability of treaties can arise because of claims of
927 • • 928
material breach, impossibility ofperformance, or fundamental change of cir-
929 930 r • 931
cumstances. Desuetude and state of necessity may vitiate a treaty. In the
view of some, unequal treaties can also negate a treaty's effectiveness.
A treaty may be subject to severability. Part of it may remain in force, part may
be suspended, part may be terminated, all may be suspended, or all may be termi-
933
nated, depending on the nature of the treaty's terms.
Against these must be balanced the principle of pacta sunt servanda—treaties
934
should be observed. Moreover, even though a treaty may not be in force, per-
haps because a State is not a party to it, it may restate a customary rule or a general
935
principle of law. These analyses must be considered in addition to the factoral
936
approach for sources of law. Whether these doctrines, e.g., fundamental change
of circumstances, apply to a given situation, is determined in the United States by
937 i r
the executive and not the courts. In general, a military commander should refer
these matters to an operational law specialist, who can check with higher author-
ity; however, commanders should be aware of these doctrines' implications.
2. War and Termination or Suspension of Treaty Obligations
The Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties takes no position on the effect of
938 939
war on treaties; the issue is left to customary rules. " War might possibly raise a
claim offundamental change of circumstances, or perhaps other bases, e.g., im-
possibility of performance.
Treaties establishing an international organization, such as the United Na-
941
tions, are not affected by conflicts of the parties. States may suspend a treaty's
operation when they exercise the inherent right ofindividual or collective self-de-
942
fense in accordance with the Charter. If complying with a Council resolution
dealing with action on threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggres-
sion conflicts with a treaty or a treaty requirement, States may suspend or end the
treaty's operation to the extent treaty performance is incompatible with the resolu-
943
tion. The Institut de Droit International has stated that an aggressor shall not
terminate or suspend operation of a treaty if it would benefit thereby.
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There is no general rule as to when or which treaties continue in operation dur-
ing armed conflict. A treaty may be subject to severability in this context, i.e., all
of it may remain in force, part may be suspended, part may be terminated, all may
be suspended, or all may be terminated. Treaties may provide for continued op-
947
eration during war; the Chicago Convention explicitly says so. Because of their
nature or purpose, some treaties are regarded as operative during armed conflict,
• i •
• 948
those governing humanitarian law or neutrality being prime examples. In other
cases, e.g., the Treaty ofRome or NAFTA, a treaty may be suspended during armed
949
conflict or when a State's vital national interests are at stake. A treaty may de-
950
clare it does not apply during war. As noted above, these principles may well be
951
subject to the Charter's clause paramountcy.
3. The LOS Conventions and the Law ofArmed Conflict:
"Other Rules " Clauses 952
953The 1958 and 1982 LOS Conventions include clauses, sometimes over-
looked in analysis or commentary, stating the rights under these treaties are sub-
954
ject to "other rules of international law" as well as terms in the particular
convention. For example, LOS Convention, Article 87(1), which declares high
seas freedoms, adds that "Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the condi-
tions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law." The
overwhelming majority ofcommentators—including the International Law Com-
mission, a UN General Assembly agency of international law experts —has
stated that the Conventions' other rules clauses refer to the law of armed con-
956
flict, a component ofwhich is the law of naval warfare. Provisions such as Arti-
cle 88 of the 1982 Convention state a truism, i.e., the high seas are reserved for
957
peaceful purposes. However, high seas usage can be subject to the LOAC, when
Article 87(l)'s other rules clause is read with Article 88. As in the case of the 1958
Conventions,
That provision does not preclude . . . use ofthe high seas by naval forces. Their use
for aggressive purposes, which would . . . violat[e] . . . Article 2(4) of the Charter . .
.
, is
forbidden as well by Article 88 [of the 1982 Convention]. See also LOS Convention,
Article 301, requiring parties, in exercising their rights and p[er]forming their duties
under the Convention, to refrain from any threat or use of force in violation of the
Charter.958
This analysis is buttressed by the Charter's trumping clause; no treaty, including
the LOS conventions, can supersede the Charter. The peaceful purposes lan-
guage in Article 88 and other Convention provisions cannot override Charter
norms, such as those in Article 2(4), but also those in Article 51, i.e., the inherent
right of individual and collective self-defense. Of course, naval forces of States
not involved in armed conflict may use the oceans for military purposes, although
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these forces may be restricted in some maritime zones, e.g., the territorial sea.
The other rules clauses in the LOS conventions come into force for States engaged
in armed conflict.
To the extent that the LOS conventions recite customary norms—and such is
962
the case for the High Seas Convention and the LOS Convention's navigational
articles —the other rules clauses are part ofcustom and are therefore in force for
countries not party to one or the other ofthe Conventions. For those States party to
the 1958 Conventions or LOS Convention, the customary status of the other rules
clause is doubly in force. The LOS conventions may inform, i.e., give content to
gaps in the LOAC, much as the law of self-defense may be informed by the LOAC.
The law ofthe sea also can inform the content ofCharter law, e.g., Security Council
965
resolutions.
The conclusion is inescapable that the 1958 Conventions' other rules clauses,
carried forward into the 1982 Convention, means that these treaties' terms are sub-
ject to the law of armed conflict, of which the law of naval warfare is a part. Since
the High Seas Convention, parts of the other 1958 Conventions and the 1982 Con-
vention's navigational articles are part of customary law, the other rules clause
is also part of customary law governing oceans law during armed conflict. More-
over, the other rules clauses can also inform, i.e., give content to, Charter law, e.g.,
Council resolutions and the law of self-defense.
Part E. Conclusions
The UN Charter has been invoked in many armed conflicts since the Charter
was signed in 1945. In some ways this has changed options available to States. Un-
der the majority view, a State cannot use reprisals involving use of force during
time of peace. The doctrine of necessity, i.e., a State may take what action it
969deems necessary for self-preservation, may be of questionable validity today.
Article 103 of the Charter declares that all treaties are subject to it; whether cus-
970
tomary law is equally subject to the Charter is open to question. The Charter
condemns armed attacks and aggression, and Article 51 permits self-defense
971
against armed attacks and aggression armee, in the French text. This permits re-
sponses for attacks on merchant ships at sea, including those sailing independ-
972
ently, as most do. The Charter also permits the Security Council to make
973
binding decisions that have the force of treaty law for UN Members. The Coun-
cil and the General Assembly may also call upon States for action, or recommend
it; these resolutions have no intrinsic force but may restate law, and practice under
974them may develop into custom.
Article 5 1 preserves the inherent right ofindividual and collective self-defense;
these options have the same content and scope today as they did before World War
975
II. States may respond in individual or collective anticipatory self-defense, so
long as the response is necessary, proportional and admitting ofno other option, as
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976
perceived by the decisionmaker at the time of response. States may also react,
individually or collectively, in self-defense to attack or aggression, i.e., after the at-
tack or aggression has occurred, so long as the response is necessary and propor-
977
tional. States also may respond with retorsions, i.e., action that is unfriendly but
978
lawful, or they may reply with reprisals not involving use of force. Rather than
requesting Security Council action, States may also employ regional organizations
979
to maintain international peace and security.
Besides Charter standards, an independent, customary norm of the right to
980
self-defense exists alongside Article 51. The right to self-defense may have;ws
981
cogens status today. Collective self-defense may be asserted through bilateral or
multilateral treaties, but nothing in the Charter forbids more informal arrange-
982
ments. If Article 5 1 supersedes, through Article 103, treaty norms, e.g. those in
the law ofarmed conflict, any Article 51 response should receive its content from
983
the LOAC. By parity ofreasoning, any self-defense claims based on custom and
not on Article 51 as part of a treaty, i.e., the UN Charter, should also receive their
984
content based on the LOAC.
Besides the appealing symmetry oflogic behind this approach, there are practi-
cal policy reasons for following law ofarmed conflict standards in any self-defense
claim. These are illustrated by the Tanker War.
First, both Iran and Iraq claimed the other was guilty of aggression and that
therefore the response was in self-defense. Even today, despite the opinion ofsome
States through their reactions that Iran was the aggressor, the issue remains unre-
solved, and may remain unresolved for a long time. However, the peripheral legal
consequences flowing from the initial acts by these States in 1980
—
e.g., attacks on
merchant ships—had impact on third States, who had only one known standard to
observe, i.e., the LOAC. Ultimately, only one State, Iran or Iraq, was guilty of ag-
gression, and only one State, Iran or Iraq, could legitimately claim self-defense.
985The aggressor was bound by LOAC standards. Since the issue was and is in
doubt, the only standard for measuring self-defense was the LOAC. This was how
the United States behaved with respect to destruction ofIran Ajr and the oil plat-
forms and in convoy operations. The Iran Ajr crew was repatriated, following hu-
manitarian law standards; oil platforms occupants were warned and given an
986
opportunity to leave, parallelling Hague IX.
Second, this approach is congruent with the longstanding rule, in place long be-
fore the Charter, that humanitarian law treaties or those governing neutrality re-
987
main in effect during war. As a theoretical matter, given Charter supremacy
under Article 103, a State could act under Article 5 1 independently ofthese norms.
The Security Council held the view that these standards should be observed, re-
gardless ofwho had a legitimate self-defense claim, in its resolutions condemning
attacks on civilian centers, merchant ships and in citing the Geneva Conventions
988
and the Geneva Gas Protocol. Any self-defense claim should be conditioned by
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LOAC standards and humanitarian law standards in particular, whether that
self-defense claim is based on Article 51 as treaty law or whether it is grounded in
custom. The policy, public relations and practical considerations are obvious; that
is what States and people expect today, regardless ofthe niceties oflegal analysis.
Third, observing LOAC treaty norms in the context of Article 51, treaty-based
self-defense claims is consistent with the policy ofpacta sunt servanda, itselfa policy
of the Charter, Article 2(2).
989
The law of neutrality remains in full force and vigor in the Charter era, albeit
perhaps conditioned by Charter law in given situations. For example, a Security
990
Council decision could alter traditional contraband rules. Practice of States
since World War II calls to mind the historic claims for the intermediate state of
nonbelligerency, between neutrality and belligerency, although whether this has
ripened into custom is an open question. It could be said that this practice amounts
in some cases to informal collective self-defense, which is permitted under the
Charter. In other situations a debate remains as to whether international law rec-
ognizes an intermediate status between belligerency and neutrality. Most coun-
tries, including the United States, say that there is no intermediate stage of
991
non-belligerency.
Charter considerations apart, decisionmakers must continue to take into ac-
count traditional principles of sources of law, treaty interpretation including the
992impact ofwar, and treaty succession. The LOS conventions' other rules clauses
993
mean that the conventions are subject to the law of armed conflict.
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Policy in Latin America, id. 321; Editorial Comments, 1985 id. 79; Observations on the International Court ofJustice's
November 26, 1 984Judgment on Jurisdiction and Admissibility in the Case ofNicaragua v. United States ofAmerica, id. 423;
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86. Goodrich et al. 343.
87. Linnan, Self-Defense, n. 51, 79-84; but see Simma 30. The Convention can only be a guide, since it does not
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id. with versions in 69 AJIL 482 (1975) and Rifaat, n. 23, 324; see also n. 23 and accompanying text.
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Chapter IV
CLAIMS RELATED TO THE LAW OF THE
SEA (LOS)
Since World War II, States have attempted to negotiate multilateral agree-
ments to delimit boundaries and use of the Earth's oceans and seas. There
have been successes and failures. In 1958 four treaties—the High Seas, Continen-
tal Shelf, Territorial Sea and Fishery Conventions—were signed at the Geneva
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea and are now in force for ratifying States.
Two years later attempts to delimit the territorial sea failed at Geneva. In 1982 an-
other agreement, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), a
comprehensive treaty covering subjects of the 1958 conventions and other princi-
ples, e.g., environmental protection, discussed in Chapter VI, was signed at
Montego Bay, Jamaica after nearly a decade of negotiations; several principal ac-
tors, including the United States, elected not to sign due to problems with the Con-
vention's deep seabed mining provisions. The LOS Convention is now in force,
but not for the United States and an increasingly smaller number of countries.
Besides the LOS conventions, many other agreements, e.g., the ICAO Conven-
tion, impact LOS boundaries and ocean usage, not to mention State practice, the
research of scholars, and occasional judicial and arbitral decisions.
This Chapter analyzes LOS issues relating to the Tanker War under three prin-
cipal topics: the relationship among the law of the UN Charter, the LOS and the
law ofarmed conflict (LOAC), discussed in Part A. Part A also discusses issues re-
lated to treaty interpretation in these contexts. Part B analyzes LOS issues related
to oceans use, and Part C discusses the status of vessels (merchantmen, warships,
etc.) plying the oceans. A conclusion relates these claims to Tanker War issues in
each Part, and a general conclusion, Part D, summarizes Tanker War LOS issues.
Part A. The Charter, the LOS, and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)
The rule for the relationship between the law of the UN Charter as a treaty and
the LOS as stated in treaties is simple. The Charter prevails. Similarly, to the ex-
tent that Charter norms or other norms have;ws cogens status, these rules also pre-
vail. If an LOS norm is stated in a treaty, in custom or in general principles, and
there is a conflicting customary or general principles norm parallelling the Char-
ter as a treaty, the analysis is less clear. If traditional modes of thinking about
sources ofinternational law apply, a balancing process among these norms must be
undertaken; it is conceivable that a non-Charter norm might prevail. In terms of
competition between the Charter and the LOS, however, this is largely a theoretical
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issue, except insofar as the right of self-defense, other Charter norms, or manda-
tory decisions of the UN Security Council might supersede LOS treaty norms.
L The LOS and the LOAC
The relationship between the LOS and the LOAC and its component, the law of
naval warfare (LONW), is somewhat clear but less well known. Chapter III has
discussed them in a context ofgeneral principles ofUN Charter law and principles
of treaty interpretation. They are repeated here for convenience in interpreting
the law of the sea.
The 1958 and 1982 LOS Conventions include clauses, sometimes overlooked in
analysis or commentary, stating that rights under these agreements are subject to
12
"other rules ofinternational law" as well as terms in the particular treaty. For ex-
ample, LOS Convention, art. 87(1), which declares high seas freedoms, also says,
"Freedom ofthe high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Con-
vention and by other rules ofinternational law." Four conclusions can be stated.
First, an overwhelming majority ofcommentators, including the International
1
3
Law Commission, a UN General Assembly agency of international law experts,
state that the other rules clauses in the LOS Conventions refer to the LOAC,
which includes the law of naval warfare. Therefore, provisions such as LOS Con-
vention, art. 88, state a truism: The high seas are reserved for peaceful purposes,
but high seas usage can be subject to the law ofarmed conflict, when Article 87( 1 )'s
other rules clause is read with Article 88. As in the 1958 conventions,
That provision does not preclude. . . use of the high seas by naval forces. Their use for
aggressive purposes, which would. . . violat[e]. . . Article 2(4) of the [UN] Charter. .
.
,
is forbidden as well by Article 88 [of the Convention]. See also LOS Convention,
Article 301, requiring parties, in exercising their rights and p[er]forming their duties
under the Convention, to refrain from any threat or use of force in violation of the
Charter.^"
This analysis is buttressed by the Charter's trumping clause; no other treaty can
17
supersede the Charter. Thus the peaceful purposes language in Article 88 and
other LOS Convention provisions cannot override Charter norms, e.g., Article
2(4), but also those in Article 5\,i.e., the inherent right ofindividual and collective
self-defense.
Second, there is no indication that the 1958 or 1982 LOS Convention drafters
thought the other rules clauses referred to anything else, e.g., to a customary law of
the environment. As discussed in Chapter VI, international environmental law
was a gleam in academics' and futurists' eyes when the 1958 Conventions were
signed; there was only a patchwork of international agreements touching the sub-
ject. There is no indication the International Law Commission, which drafted
the 1958 treaties, considered environmental protection. By contrast, there was an
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established body oflaw, discussed in Chapter V, dealing with armed conflict situa-
tions, including naval warfare, at the time. Since the 1982 LOS Convention carried
over the same language, it must be presumed that the same meaning attaches to the
other rules clauses.
Third, e.g., other agreements dealing with protection of the maritime environ-
ment include clauses exempting, or partially exempting their application during
20
armed conflict or similar situations. Some speak ofwar, others ofarmed conflict
21 22
or a need to protect vital national interests. This includes the NAFTA. This
tends to confirm the view ofapplying the law ofarmed conflict as a separate body of
law in appropriate situations. To the extent that treaties dealing with the maritime
23
environment do not have such clauses, such agreements must be read in the light
ofthe LOS Conventions, which include such provisions. And to the extent that the
1958 LOS Conventions recite customary norms, and such is the case with the High
Seas Convention, applying the LOAC as a separate body oflaw in appropriate sit-
uations as a customary norm must also be considered with LOAC treaties and
25
other sources when analyzing these issues.
Fourth, principles of the law of treaties, e.g., impossibility of performance;
fundamental change of circumstances; desuetude, or lack of use of a treaty for a
28 • 2*9
considerable time; or war, the last applying only to parties to a conflict; may
suspend operation of international agreements during a conflict or other, similar
emergency situations, or may terminate them. Outbreak ofhostilities does not sus-
pend or terminate humanitarian conventions or treaties governing neutrality de-
30
signed to apply during armed conflict, however. The other side of the coin is
pacta sunt servanda, i.e., that treaties should be observed; a manifestation of this is
that States signing treaties should not behave so as to defeat the treaties' object and
32 33
purpose. The often amorphous law of treaty succession must be considered,
particularly for older agreements, including those stating the LOAC, to the extent
that those treaties are not part of customary law today. If these agreements restate
custom, and are subject to treaty succession principles with respect to a particular
country, that country is doubly bound.
The conclusion is inescapable that the other rules clauses of the 1958 Conven-
tions, provisions carried forward into the 1982 LOS Convention, mean that the
LOS conventions' terms are subject to the LOAC, of which the law of naval war-
fare is a part. Since the High Seas Convention is generally considered a restatement
35
ofcustomary law, its other rules clauses are part of the customary law governing
oceans law during armed conflict. Moreover, since many States consider the LOS
Convention's navigational articles, which often copy 1958 conventions' terms,
customary law, and since the navigational articles include other rules clauses,
the case is strong that the LOS is governed by two bodies of rules: (1) the LOS as
stated in the conventions, custom and subordinate treaties, etc., in non-armed con-
flict situations; (2) the LOAC, including the LONW, where LOAC rules apply.
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Iraq's claim that the Kuwait Regional Convention and its Protocol did not ap-
37
ply when it struck the Nowruz oil facilities was without basis in law. Although
the Convention might have been suspended between the belligerents, it continued
to apply to relations between Iran, Iraq and third States, the latter ofwhom were
38
not parties to the conflict, i.e., belligerents. To the extent the Nowruz attack re-
sulted in damage, including environmental harm, to States not party to the con-
flict, Iraq violated the Regional Convention and perhaps other environmental
39
norms. Iraq might have claimed the Convention was suspended because of im-
possibility of performance, or maybe fundamental change of circumstances,
but Iraq did not make these assertions.
2. Relationship ofthe 1982 LOS Convention and Other LOS-Related Treaties
Besides general rules of treaty construction applying to all international agree-
ments, the 1982 LOS Convention has special rules for its relationship as a treaty
with the 1958 conventions and other treaties dealing with LOS issues.
For those States that are or become parties, the 1982 LOS Convention will re-
place the 1958 conventions. Article 311(2), the general supersession provision
for the LOS Convention, declares that the Convention does not alter existing
rights "which arise from other agreements compatible with this Convention" and
which do not affect enjoyment ofother parties' rights or performance of their obli-
gations under the Convention. States may also conclude agreements modifying
or suspending operations of the LOS Convention, provided that the suspension or
modification is not incompatible with effective execution of the object and pur-
pose of the LOS Convention or its basic principles and do not affect enjoyment of
other States' rights or performance of their obligations under the LOS Conven-
tion. States that intend to conclude such an agreement must notify other LOS
Convention parties of their intentions and the modification or suspension for
which it provides. Rules for non-suspendable straits transit passage, and non-
suspension ofinnocent passage in some straits, are examples ofLOS Convention
provisions that no single State may undercut. Article 31 1(3) forbids two or more
States bordering a strait from trying to suspend straits transit or innocent passage,
as provided by the Convention, through a treaty, an example of treaty action the
LOS Convention forbids.
The LOS Convention declares for its environmental norms in Part XII, which
states many principles of maritime environmental law:
1. The provisions of this Part are without prejudice to the specific obligations
assumed by States under special conventions and agreements concluded previously
which relate to the protection and preservation of the marine environment and to
agreements which may be concluded in furtherance ofthe general principles set forth
in this Convention.
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2. Specific obligations assumed by States under special conventions, with respect
to the protection and preservation of the marine environment, should be carried out
in a manner consistent with the general principles and objectives of this
Convention.48
This is a lex specialise i.e. a special rule, for the LOS Convention, Part XII, the prin-
49
cipal source for maritime environmental protection standards, which the LOS
Convention allows for this and other articles varying its basic rules. The rule for
no suspension of innocent passage for certain straits, e.g., those between the high
seas and a foreign State's territorial sea, as distinguished from general innocent
52
passage rules allowing suspension under certain circumstances, is another exam-
ple of lex specialis.
As in the case ofthe Charter, there is the possibility that a parallel but contradic-
tory custom or other source oflaw may develop alongside treaty-based norms.
The developing customary norm might be the same as, and thereby strengthen,
the treaty norm. Ifin opposition, custom can weaken or dislodge a treaty norm.
However, no treaty, and probably no custom, can supersede the Charter, manda-
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tory norms developed under it, ox jus cogens norms.
3. The 1982 LOS Convention and the Tanker War
Bahrain and Iraq ratified the LOS Convention in 1985, and Kuwait in 1986;
many other countries, e.g., France and the UAE, were signatories, but other States
with prominent roles in the Tanker War, e.g., the United Kingdom and the United
States, were not signatories or parties during the Tanker War. Thus for some
States there was an obligation not to defeat the object and purpose ofthe LOS Con-
vention during at least part ofthe Tanker War. These countries also had the duty
to comply with customary norms, perhaps restated in the 1 982 LOS Convention or
the 1958 LOS conventions. Others were bound by the 1958 LOS conventions,^.,
the United Kingdom and the United States. These countries also had the obliga-
tion to comply with customary norms, perhaps restated in the 1958 conventions or
the LOS Convention. Still other countries were not party to any LOS treaty; how-
f\~)
ever, they were bound by customary rules the 1958 and 1 982 conventions restate.
Most Persian Gulf coastal States were in the latter category. The ensuing analysis
proceeds by analyzing and comparing the 1958 and 1982 LOS conventions as
treaty law, to the extent that they applied as such, and seeks to supply customary
rules where these are in accordance with or differ from the conventional law.
Part B. Claims to Oceans Use
Because most armed conflicts in which merchant ships are involved have oc-
curred on the high seas, we begin by examining merchant ships' and warships'
status on the "great common." This method takes the perspective of all seafarers
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except those who sailed from Persian Gulf ports. Mariners, whether aboard mer-
chant vessels or men of war, that approach the Gulf from the Indian Ocean must
traverse the high seas before they encounter special regimes, e.g., straits passage,
the continental shelf, the contiguous zone, or the territorial sea. It is an analysis of
derogation from the general to the specific, in terms of applicable law.
1. Trends in Claims to Ocean Usages on the High Seas
According to the High Seas Convention, the high seas include all parts ofthe sea
(including subsurface water) not included in States' territorial or internal wa-
ters. Beyond these broad exclusions, the LOS Convention, Article 88 says that
the "high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes," which, as analyzed above,
does not mean that navies cannot operate on the high seas. Stated as a positive rule,
States may conduct naval operations on the high seas, subject to other LOS limita-
tions, discussed below. Under Article 2(4) ofthe Charter, no State may use the high
seas for aggressive purposes; this is in essence a cardinal principle of the Charter,
along with the Article 5 1 inherent right to self-defense. LOS Convention, Arti-
cle 89 declares: "No State may validly purport to subject any part ofthe high seas to
its sovereignty." The LOS conventions declare that every State may sail ships on
the high seas under its flag, and list certain rights, among others, with respect to
the high seas:
1. freedom of navigation;
2. freedom of overflight; 70
3. freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; 71
4. freedom of fishing; 72
5. freedom to build artificial islands and other installations permitted by
international law; 73
6. freedom to conduct scientific research. 74
Both agreements say all States must exercise these rights with reasonable, or due,
75
regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of high seas rights. The
LOS Convention adds that high seas users must have due regard for others' rights
in those parts ofthe sea-bed ocean floor and subsoil beyond national jurisdictional
limits, i.e., beyond the territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf. All States,
whether landlocked or not, may sail ships flying their flag on the high seas. War-
ships and government ships on noncommercial service enjoy complete immunity
77
on the high seas from other than the flag State.
78The clear trend, since the triumph of Hugo Grotius' open seas theory over
79
John Selden's closed sea concept, has been for freedom of navigation, particu-
larly the high seas. Another pattern ofclaims since Grotius' era has been, however,
limitation of that right. Succeeding Parts of this Chapter examine trends in these
limitations, looking landward.
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2. Trends in Claims ofRestrictions on High Seas Rights: From Fisheries to the
EEZ
One class of claims on merchant vessels' and warships' rights to navigation on
the high seas deals with coastal States' assertions to competence over belts of the
high seas outward from the territorial sea for exclusive fishing rights. At first sub-
ject to conflicting claims, if not outright violence on the high seas, the issue has
been largely resolved by treaties in many areas of the world. Historically the Gulf
80
has been a primary source for pearls and there are offshore fishing areas. More re-
cently, agreements have attempted to regulate offshore fishing areas. The US ex-
perience with fishing issues may point toward problems and solutions for the Gulf
and its seaward fishing zones and EEZs in particular. "[T]he fishery question has
been the focal point of the whole problem of territorial waters from its very begin-
ning." Riesenfeld wrote this in 1942; today doubtless he would amend this anal-
ysis to include EEZ-related claims.
a. From Fishery Claims to Sovereignty Claims to the EEZ Concept. The oldest
claims for offshore use of the high seas surface and water column involve fishing,
and from these came assertions of rights in offshore fishing zones, the continental
83
shelf, and EEZs. However, ocean fishing "has never been an unfettered right,"
and, as will be seen, neither have continental shelf or EEZ claims. Although more
of historical interest in some respects, fishing rights claims analysis develops this
thesis, and this sub-Part starts by examining fishing rights claims in US practice.
The Treaty ofParis ending the American Revolution gave US fisherman access
to the Grand Banks, other fishing areas off Newfoundland, the Gulf of St. Law-
• 84
rence, the Newfoundland coasts and other coasts off British North America.
85
France also had fishing rights in the area. These rights were not considered ces-
sion of territory; therefore, no navigation rights were impaired. An 1818 Brit-
87ish-US convention confirmed and refined fishing rights and liberties, and this
88
process continued in 1854. The Treaty of Washington, in effect 1873-85, again
89
confirmed these rights and approved reciprocal rights in US waters. In 1906
90
British-US notes relating to purse seining off Newfoundland were exchanged;
this modus vivendi continued into 1912. A 1908 bilateral treaty, providing for an
International Fisheries Commission, resulted in authority for restricted halibut
and lobster fishing in territorial waters.
In 1909 the two countries agreed to submit issues related to fishing in waters
northeast of the United States to arbitration. The Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion decided in Britain's favor with respect to regulating the fishing industry
subject to the 1818 Convention but held US fishermen could hire crews of non-
inhabitants (i.e., Newfoundlanders). Although US fishermen had to report to local
authorities if they landed to dry or cure fish, they could fish in certain local
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95Newfoundland and Magdalen Islands waters. A treaty later recited procedual
rules and methods for future disputes that the Court had recommended.
British-US bilateral agreements of 1923, 1930 and 1937, Britain acting for Can-
ada for the latter two, established a Pacific coast International Fisheries Commis-
97
sion and regulated Pacific high seas halibut fishing. Similar 1930 and 1956
98
agreements later protected sockeye salmon.
In none ofthese fishing rights claims and counterclaims was there any assertion
of a right to regulate merchant ship or warship navigation except with respect to
taking fish. The same trend may be observed in claims to hunt seals in the North
Pacific and Arctic Oceans.
Russian ukases of 1799 and 1821 gave the Russian-American Company Bering
Sea whaling and fishing rights, along the northwest coast ofAmerica, and in other
seas northeast of Russia. Russia also asserted a right to forbid approaches to Rus-
sian lands closer than 100 miles. After British and US protests, Russia-US and
99
Britain-Russia treaties were ratified in 1 824 and 1825. The Russia-US agreement
provided: "[I]n any part of the [Pacific] Ocean,. . . Citizens or Subjects of the high
contracting Powers shall be neither disturbed nor restrained either in navigation,
or in fishing, or in resorting to the coasts upon points which may not already have
been occupied, for. . . trading with the Natives," subject to certain exceptions.
Reciprocal rights to fish and to trade with natives were given, except for sale offire-
luni
102
arms, munitions ofwar and liquor. The 1 825 Britain-Russia treaty followed the
pattern.
The 1867 treaty selling Alaska to the United States ceded Russian land and wa-
ter territory in North America, including the Aleutian Islands, to the United
States. Although US legislation implementing the treaty would seem to have as-
serted dominion over the Bering Sea, an 1 893 arbitral award held that only three
marine miles offshore were subject to US sovereignty, and that US high seas sei-
zures ofBritish ships in the Bering Sea violated those ships' right ofnavigation. "
The award established regulations for concurrent British-US jurisdiction over fur
seal fishing in Bering Sea high seas areas. British and US legislation confirmed
the award's regulations in 1894. Nothing in the award or a treaty establishing
1 no
the tribunal claimed to impair high seas navigation.
Other governments' reactions to the 1893 regulations were mixed, but the only
admitted claim of control related to seal fishing. In 1894, a Russia-US modus Vi-
vendi confirmed reciprocal policing rights for regulating seal fishing. In 1902,
pursuant to a protocol, an arbitrator found for the United States in the Cape Horn
Pigeon case, where a Russian cruiser seized and detained a US-flag fishing vessel on
the high seas when the Russian naval commander "had been in error in his suspi-
cions that the bark was engaged in an illicit pursuit, and the Russian Government of-
it?
fered to pay a proper indemnity .... Similarly, in theJames Hamilton Lewis, C.H
White and Kate and Anna claims, where Russian seizures had been attempted on
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the high seas for possible illegal fishing in Russian territorial waters, the award
went to the United States. The arbitrator noted that absent a treaty there was no ju-
risdiction for Russian naval commanders to seize US-flag vessels. ' The signifi-
cance of these awards is that even as to seal fishing, which occurs when seals
migrate on the open sea, there was no claim to restrict freedom of navigation be-
yond a territorial sea without international agreement.
A 1911 Britain-Japan-Russia-US agreement, limiting North Pacific high seas
fur seal fishing, did not restrict navigation rights in these waters. A decade later,
a treaty regularizing the Spitsbergen Archipelago's status under Norwegian sover-
eignty declared fishing and hunting rights but imposed no limitations on free-
dom of navigation; its Article 3 assured "nationals of all. . . Parties equal liberty of
access and entry for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports of
the territories; subject to the observance oflocal laws and regulations, they [might]
carry on. . . maritime and commercial operations on a footing ofabsolute equality."
Transit rights were subject to Norwegian most-favored-nation treatment. Bi-
lateral fishing agreements between the World Wars followed the same pattern of
limiting fishing operations while expressly not restricting the general freedom of
1 17
navigation or not mentioning it at all.
The 1931 and later multilateral conventions regulating whaling, although ap-
118
plying in territorial waters and on the high seas, imposed no limits on naviga-
tional use of these waters.
During the 1930's and until the outbreak ofWorld War II, the United States ex-
pressed concern to Japan over depletion of Pacific salmon fisheries near Bristol
Bay, Alaska; initial proposed solutions included extension of the US traditional
1 19
three-mile territorial sea limit. During the war the United States considered
linking territorial sea expansion (and therefore possible restriction of freedom of
navigation) with limitations on fishing based on the continental shelf below the
120 121
water column. Eventually the linkage idea was discarded, and a US Fisheries
Proclamation (September 28, 1945) asserted national jurisdiction to establish fish-
eries conservation zones in high seas areas contiguous to US coasts, either for US
fishermen's exclusive use or by international agreement with other States, with as-
surance that the United States would recognize other States' proclamations on a
reciprocal basis. However, "[t]he character as high seas of the areas in which such
conservation zones [were] established and the right to their free and unimpeded
122
navigation [was] in no way thus affected."
Despite these trends, three South American countries—Chile, Ecuador and
Peru (CEP States)—took a claim to possible assertion ofa 200-mile fisheries zone a
step further, first by decrees in 1947 and 1950. The August 18, 1952 Declaration
ofSantiago on the Maritime Zone followed, proclaiming, "[E]ach [State] possesses
sole sovereignty and jurisdiction over the area ofsea adjacent to the coast of its own
country and extending not less than 200 nautical miles from the said coast." The
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Declaration added: "[It] shall not be construed as disregarding the necessary re-
strictions on the exercise ofsovereignty and jurisdiction imposed by international
law to permit the innocent and inoffensive passage ofvessels of all nations through
the zone " In 1954 the CEP States formalized the Declaration with a Supple-
mentary Agreement to consult to uphold the 200-mile territorial sea, including de-
1 25
termining action to be taken if force were used against them. The United States
1 -yc
protested the executive decrees, and a 1953 Ecuador-US agreement on fishery
127
relations noted "differences in views" on the territorial sea. The international
response to these expansive claims was immediate and strong. An Ecuadoran pro-
posal, similar to the Declaration, was subjected to such "sweeping modifications"
128
that its impact was negated at the 1954 Inter-American Conference. Negotia-
tions in 1955 led nowhere, and the 200-mile Santiago Declaration territorial sea
belt, linked with fishing rights claims, remained in effect although protested by
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the United States. By 1958, however, the CEP States had agreed to separate the
territorial sea width and fishing control jurisdiction issues. Ecuador, e.g., contin-
ued to adhere to the 200-mile Declaration jurisdiction but asserted only a 12-mile
territorial sea. In 1966, however, Ecuador's presidential proclamation claimed a
200-mile territorial sea; the United States does not recognize this claim. Other
130
claims exceeding LOS Convention limits persist; these too have been protested.
The USSR, as successor to the tsarist regime with its propensity to claim wide
territorial sea jurisdiction through asserting fishing control, distinguished be-
tween territorial sea claims and fisheries regulation jurisdiction. A 1927 Soviet or-
dinance asserted a 12-mile defensive limit of territorial waters; a 1935 ordinance
132
claimed a 1 2-mile fishing regulation jurisdiction. Repeating a pattern ofan ear-
133
lier agreement, the USSR concluded the Barents Sea Pact with the United
Kingdom in 1956, permitting fishing by UK vessels up to three miles from the
Barents Sea coast. Following a decree restricting Sea of Okhotsk, western Be-
135
ring Sea and other contiguous North Pacific waters salmon fishing, the USSR
signed a bilateral agreement with Japan to regulate salmon fishing in these wa-
ters. As in the Barents Sea Pact, the treaty omitted territorial sea claims with a
right of excluding shipping.
Thus it was entirely consistent with customary international law that the 1958
Fishery Convention implicitly recognized an unimpeded right of navigation in
high seas areas potentially subject to fisheries conservation. Apart from treaty obli-
gations, special interests and rights ofcoastal States, and special Convention provi-
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sions, all States have a right to fish on the high seas. States must adopt
provisions for their nationals who fish on the high seas, and must negotiate agree-
ments with other users ofhigh seas fisheries or arbitrate differences. Coastal States
138
are deemed to have special interests in areas off their shores. This agreement
does not limit high seas navigation except insofar as fishing regulation is involved.
The High Seas Convention, proclaiming separate high seas navigation and fishing
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freedoms, confirms this principle. The Territorial Sea Convention declares
that passage is not innocent in the territorial sea if fishermen do not observe pub-
lished coastal State regulations on territorial sea fishing. Coastal States may
pass laws to prevent and punish infringement of customs, fiscal, or health regula-
tions in their contiguous zone or territorial sea; these rules may also impact off-
shore fishing.
Decades after 1958 witnessed assertions of wider exclusive offshore fishing
zones, two Cod Wars between Iceland and the United Kingdom, and an ICJ deci-
sion holding that custom had crystallized into allowing coastal States to claim an
exclusive 1 2-mile offshore fishing zone. The 1 976 US Fishery Conservation and
Management Act, declaring a regulatory regime for a 200-mile area from territorial
sea baselines and otherwise proclaiming a national right to regulate all but highly
migratory fish species, did not assert a right to regulate high seas navigation. Al-
though Title II provided for foreign fishing pursuant to existing or future agree-
ments, no later US treaty has impinged on general overflight or navigation
rights in fishing zones. In the Persian Gulf area, Iran proclaimed a 50-mile exclu-
sive fishing zone in the Gulf of Oman and to the limits of its continental shelf
boundary in 1973. The next year Saudi Arabia established an exclusive fishing
zone with median lines as boundaries with other countries.
The LOS Convention continues a theme of generally free navigation access to
high seas fishing areas, but largely in the context of a claimed EEZ. Allowing the
possibility of a 200-mile EEZ, the LOS Convention declares for general high seas
freedoms including navigation and overflight, subject to a coastal State's right to
explore and exploit natural resources of the water column, the seabed and subsoil;
to establish artificial islands, installations and structures; to scientific research;
and to protecting and preserving the coastal environment. The LOS Conven-
tion EEZ is subject to the treaty's regime ofpeaceful uses of the high seas, invalid-
ity of sovereignty claims for the high seas, navigation rights, status of ships, visit
and search, hot pursuit, rights to lay submarine cables and pipelines, and suppres-
sion of slavery, piracy, the drug traffic and unauthorized broadcasting, as well as
148
"other pertinent rules ofinternational law," i.e. the law ofarmed conflict. As in
the Fishery Convention, States with competing interests must give due regard to
149
other States' interests. This principle parallels the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case. Although it has been argued that the LOS Convention does not allow mil-
itary exercises in the EEZ, and some States have claimed a right to bar military ac-
tivities, it is submitted that the LOS Convention reference to high seas
freedoms includes a right to use an EEZ for military exercises, subject to due re-
152
gard for coastal State interests. Even those who argue against this position con-
cede that the LOS Convention permits unimpeded EEZ overflight.
Islands capable of human habitation or economic life can have an EEZ, but
rocks, low-tide elevations and human-made offshore installations such as oil
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derricks, etc., cannot. In those cases the EEZ is measured from shore baselines.
A State's EEZ proclamation, while asserting regulatory rights over a 200-mile
band of the sea and its bottom, cannot claim a right to regulate navigation outside
the territorial sea. The presumption is that high seas freedoms prevail, subject to
requirements of due regard for coastal State jurisdiction and sovereignty validly
asserted, and, in appropriate situations, the LOAC, and in all cases the law of the
Charter. High seas freedoms also prevail in high seas fishing areas as well, sub-
ject to principles of due regard for others' high seas freedoms and, in appropriate
situations, the LOAC, and in all cases the law ofthe Charter. The LOS Conven-
157
tion EEZ formula is customary law.
b. Conclusions. Claims to use ocean resources, whether in the water column or on
the seabed, may have begun as attempts to encroach upon the great common of
.
. . 158 . .
high seas navigation rights. Episodic proclamations have claimed sovereignty
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since then. However, today international law firmly declares merchantmen's
and warships' rights to navigate those potentially resource-rich areas, subject to
coastal States' rights to regulate activity that might impair those resources, e.g., en-
vironmental damage, and subject to other limitations on high sea navigation, e.g.,
peaceful use. Fishing zones and general EEZs are subject to high seas freedoms
for purposes of overflight and navigation by warships and merchant vessels alike.
Warships and merchantmen must, however, have due regard for coastal State in-
terests in the EEZ.
c. High Seas Fisheries, EEZs, Pipelines, Freedoms ofNavigation and Overflight,
and the Tanker War. Among Persian Gulf States, Iran claimed a 50-mile fishery
zone off its coasts, subject to median line boundaries in the Gulf. Qatar proclaimed
1 f\7
a 200-mile fishery zone, and the UAE were among 80 States claiming an EEZ.
However, Iran is among four States forbidding foreign military exercises in her
EEZ, a derogation unlawful under the LOS that the United States has protested.
(Iran asserted this claim in 1993; it is not relevant for this analysis.)
Insofar as the high seas parts ofGulf fishery zones or EEZs are concerned, there
appears to be no record ofimpairment ofusage by neutrals during the Tanker War.
Belligerents and neutrals alike owed neutrals due regard for those neutrals' exer-
cise of EEZ or fishing zone rights. To be sure, there is evidence of attacks on
dhows, i.e., possibly fishing vessels operating in a proclaimed zone, on offshore oil
facilities and on vessels that may have been servicing installations in a zone.
Since these incidents are concerned as much with attacks on a ship engaged in nav-
igation in the Gulf, analysis of the legitimacy ofthe attacks appears in Chapters III
and V. Iraq attacked Iranian offshore installations, including pumping stations
and other facilities. Iran attacked Iraqi facilities but also neutral countries' instal-
lations. Insofar as these were a belligerent's attacks on its opponent, the LOAC
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applied through the LOS other rules clauses, by then a customary as well as a treaty
norm. On the other hand, attacks on neutrals' facilities were violations of the UN
I fin
Charter, art. 2(4). Chapter V discusses legitimacy of these attacks from an
LOAC perspective; Chapter VI examines them in the context ofthe law ofthe mar-
itime environment. Although pipelines necessarily led from the shores of Gulf
States, e.g., Kuwait and Iran, to these countries' offshore pumping stations, there
were no reports ofattacks on the pipelines or any other submarine pipelines during
the Tanker War.
The United States responded to Iranian attacks on US-flagged tankers by de-
stroying Iranian offshore platforms that were a source of the attacks and which
may have been sites oflegitimate EEZ activity under the LOS. This was a legiti-
mate act of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter; whether seen as a jus
170
cogens-protected right or as trumping the LOS. As explained in Chapter V, the
171
attacks were also proportional under the law ofnaval warfare; since there appar-
ently was no appreciable environmental damage resulting from the attacks, no
claim ofenvironmental derogation was at stake. Thus to the extent that the at-
tacks might not have enjoyed primacy as ajus cogens norm of the inherent right to
self-defense or as a superior treaty norm under Charter Article 103, the United
States had a customary right to respond in self-defense under the law ofnaval war-
fare, which as part of the LOAC applied under the circumstances in derogation of
LOS norms through the other rules clauses of the LOS conventions, which are
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now customary law as well. In terms ofbehavior toward Gulf States not parties
to the conflict, i.e., those that had proclaimed neutrality, the United States and
other maritime powers that sent naval forces to the Gulf owed due regard for
coastal State operations and installations in proclaimed EEZs or fishing zones.
There is no evidence the United States or other powers did not show due regard for
proclaimed EEZs or fishing zones; i.e., there do not appear to have been LOS viola-
tions pertaining to fishing zones or EEZs.
When the United States and other neutral countries launched aircraft, fixed-
wing or helicopters, whether on training flights or to support protection of ship-
ping, those aircraft were entitled to high seas freedom of overflight as long as due
175
regard was given high seas freedoms and rights of neutrals and belligerents
alike. As between neutral air forces and other high seas users, neutral or belliger-
1 nc.
ent, the law ofthe sea governed, subject to the LOAC. When Iran attacked those
aircraft, they or surface naval forces operating with them were entitled to respond
177
in proportional self-defense.
Neutral warships also had freedom of navigation on the high seas of the Gulf,
I JO
subject to their obligation to give due regard to other countries' high seas rights
and freedoms, whether the other country was a neutral or a belligerent. As in the
1 7Q
case of high seas overflights, the LOS governed, subject to the LOAC. When
neutral surface naval forces engaged in freedom of navigation or naval maneuvers
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(also legitimate under the law of the sea), were attacked, by fire from bellig-
erents' aircraft or by belligerent surface naval forces, those surface naval forces
could respond immediately in proportional self-defense. Thus it was lawful for the
United States to attack Iranian aircraft, surface naval forces, and minelaying
forces, e.g., Iran Ajr, in self-defense. It was also lawful to remove mines laid in the
181
high seas as a self-defense measure. Just because a neutral did not respond im-
mediately in self-defense, as in the case of the Samuel B. Roberts, did not mean that
a right of response did not exist.
Belligerents also had rights offreedom ofnavigation and overflight. It was legit-
imate, e.g., for Iran to conduct naval exercises on the high seas, as well as in its terri-
torial waters, with due regard for others' high seas rights and freedoms, but not in
182
the Strait ofHormuz so as to obstruct or block navigation. It was legitimate for
both belligerents to exercise freedom of overflight, as long as they gave due
183
regard for neutrals' high seas rights, on the way to attack targets ofan opponent.
Belligerents' exercise of high seas freedoms, like the exercise of these freedoms by
neutrals, were qualified by the requirement that belligerence give due regard for
neutrals' exercise of these freedoms. Belligerents' conduct under the LOS was also
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qualified by the LOAC and other States' rights of proportional self-defense
1 or
where it applied. Thus Iran's Airbus had a right to overfly the Gulf as a civil air-
liner. US forces, engaged in a surface and air naval action with Iranian speedboats
at the time, were exercising a right of self-defense. If the U.S.S Vincennes honestly
(but mistakenly) believed the Airbus was an attacking Iranian aircraft, and that a
short-range surface-to-air missile was a proportional self-defense response, then
the tragic shootdown was legitimate under self-defense principles. US compensa-
tion to victims ofthe accident was made ex gratia, as was Iraqi compensation for the
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Stark attack, i.e., there was no admission of fault by the United States. ' (There is
nothing unusual about ex gratia payments; defendants in civil lawsuits include
such a clause in settlement agreements every day, to the effect that any payment or
other performance is not an admission of fault. Payment in either case does not ad-
mit liability.)
3. The Regime of the Continental Shelf in the Persian Gulf
Claims relating to the offshore adjacent seabed and its subsoil began in the nine-
teenth century with assertions of national jurisdiction over subterranean mines;
these claims occasionally went beyond what a coastal State claimed for a territorial
188
sea. Other early assertions ofrights to the adjacent waters' seabed and subsoil re-
lated to claims to fishing rights, and these also sometimes went beyond territorial
189
sea^claims. Early writers disagreed as to whether the seabed surface beyond a
territorial sea was equivalent to the high seas or appurtenant to the adjacent land
and subject to effective occupation "subject only to no unreasonable interference
in the free use of the high seas above." Great Britain claimed prescriptive rights
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for offshore pearl fisheries near Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and in the Persian Gulf, and
there were Australian and Tunisian claims to offshore sedentery fisheries, partly
191
based on municipal law. The only known early treaty dividing a continental
shelf was the 1942 UK-Venezuela agreement for exploiting oil resources between
Trinidad and Venezuela in the GulfofParia. The parties disclaimed claims to high
192
seas rights or to passage or navigation rights.
a. Developments Since World War II. Contemporaneous with publishing a fisher-
193
ies jurisdiction claim, the United States issued another executive proclamation
194
in 1945, asserting jurisdiction and control over natural resources of the subsoil
and seabed ofthe continental shelfbeneath the high seas offthe United States. The
claim was subject to international agreements with adjacent nations "in accor-
dance with equitable principles," and, equally importantly, the proclamation
unequivocally asserted, "The character as high seas of the waters above the conti-
nental shelfand their right to free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus af-
fected." Although national security had been advanced during World War II State
195
Department considerations of the proclamation, it asserted use and conserva-
tion ofshelfnatural resources and "self-protection compelling] the coastal nation
to keep close watch over activities off its shores. . . necessary for utilization ofthese
resources" as rationales for the claim. The US Congress passed the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) 197 and the Submerged Lands Act in 1953. 198
OCSLA specifically provides that the Act should not be construed to affect high
199
seas fishing and navigation rights.
A spate of continental shelf claims followed. While most States followed the
US lead in not asserting jurisdictional rights over high seas areas to control naviga-
tional or passage rights, a handful did claim, or would seem to have claimed,
such:
201
Argentina; 202 the CEP States, Chile,203 Ecuador204 and Peru,205 culmi-
yOf. 707 70S 70Q
nating in the Declaration ofSantiago; El Salvador; Honduras; Mexico.
In each ofthe latter cases the United States and other countries protested claims of
210jurisdiction or right to regulate high seas freedoms, navigation or passage. As
late as 1985 Chile and Ecuador asserted claims beyond 200 miles, which the United
21
1
States protested.
During the early postwar era, Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, on behalf
of certain Persian Gulf sheikdoms, proclaimed sovereignty over offshore conti-
212
nental shelves but only for exploitation purposes. In 1955 Iran proclaimed a
continental shelffor the Gulfand the GulfofOman, but it did not purport to affectin
superjacent waters or other States' installation of submarine cables. Iraq also
claimed a continental shelfwithout a reservation like Iran's. Other Gulf States
(Bahrain, Dubai and Sharjah of the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar) had continental
2 1 S
shelfclaims and negotiated boundary treaties for these rights. Nevertheless, all
Gulf States—Bahrain (1949, when under UK protection; 1958, 1971), Iran (1955,
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1958, 1968, 1969, 1971, 1974, 1975), Iraq (1957), Kuwait (1949, when under UK
protection; 1965, 1968), Oman (1972, 1974), Qatar (1949, when under UK protec-
tion; 1965, 1969), Saudi Arabia (1949, 1958, 1965, 1968), States of the UAE (1949,
when under UK protection; 1968, 1969, 1971, 1975)—have asserted offshore sea-
bed rights by unilateral proclamation (e.g., those of 1949) or by agreement with op-
posite or adjacent countries. These treaty-defined areas end at an agreed meeting
line in mid-Gulf for the most part or extend the coastal boundary seaward.
The Continental Shelf Convention resolved definitional, dimensional and ju-
717
risdictional issues erupting after the US and other proclamations or treaties.
The shelf is defined as adjacent submarine seabed and subsoil outside the territo-
rial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or beyond that where superjacent waters' depth
permit natural resources exploitation. Islands can have a continental shelf.
Agreements must determine opposite States' boundaries; absent a treaty, the
median line is the boundary, "unless another boundary is justified by special cir-
cumstances." Similarly, agreements were to determine adjacent States' shelf
boundaries, without which the line was to be "determined by. . . the principle of
equidistance from the nearest points ofthe baselines from which the breadth ofthe
219
territorial sea of each State is measured." In 1965 the Restatement (Second), For-
220
eign Relations accepted Convention principles. The 1969 North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases, however, concluded that the Convention's "special circumstances"
rules had not yet crystallized into custom, in a controversy not covered by the Con-
vention—being not between adjacent or opposite States—and where one State was
221
not then a treaty party.
Although a coastal State has sovereign rights to explore and exploit shelf natu-
222
ral resources, which include both living and non-living resources, "rights ofthe
coastal State. . . do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas,
223
or. . . the airspace above these waters." Article 5(a) underscores this, declaring:
"[EJxploration of the. . . shelfand the exploitation of its natural resources must not
result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the conserva-
tion of the living resources of the sea[.]" Exploration or exploitation cannot inter-
fere with fundamental oceanographic or other scientific research whose results
will be published.
Certain special continental shelfuses—submarine cables or pipelines, artificial
225
installations, tunnelling—are subject to special rules. The High Seas Conven-
tion declares the rights to lay submarine cables and pipelines are high seas usage
rights, but that they are subject to the principle that these freedoms, and others rec-
ognized by general principles of international law, must be recognized by States
with "reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise ofthe free-
y?fi 727dom ofthe high seas." This is also a customary rule ofinternational law. The
Convention says that a coastal State many not impede other States' submarine ca-
ble or pipeline laying, subject to the coastal State's rights to take reasonable
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measures for exploiting its continental shelfand exploitation of the shelfs natural
110
resources. This is in effect a restatement of the High Seas Convention "reason-
able regard" principle in the context of the continental shelf and pipelines or ca-
bles that might cross the shelf. Similarly, the Shelf Convention provides that
exploring the shelfor exploiting its resources "must not result in any unjustifiable
interference with navigation, fishing or the conservation ofthe living resources of
the sea, nor result in any interference with fundamental oceanographic or other
scientific research carried out with the intention of open publication."
"[Installations or devices [permitted on the shelf], nor the safety zones around
them, may be established where interference may be caused to the use of recog-
229
nized sea lanes essential to international navigation." Subject to these limita-
tions, coastal States may build, maintain or operate installations and other devices
necessary to explore and exploit their shelfs natural resources. Coastal States may
establish safety zones of up to 500 meters around these installations and devices
and take, within these zones, measures necessary for their protection. All ships
must respect these zones, which do not have the status of islands and therefore do
not have a territorial sea around them. Coastal States must give due notice ofinstal-
lation construction and maintain permanent means to warn of their presence.
230Abandoned or disused installations must be removed.
The LOS Convention made few changes relevant to high seas rights and free-
doms issues. High seas navigation and other rights are not affected by a State's con-
tinental shelf declaration of sovereign rights to explore and exploit its shelf; the
superjacent water and air space are not affected, as in the Conventions, and a
231
coastal State cannot unduly interfere with these high seas rights and freedoms.
The 200 meter depth-exploitability criteria were changed to a flat 200 nautical mile
232
limit, the EEZ limit, or the continental margin, whichever is greater, with a
233
maximum 350-mile seaward extension. The seabed and subsoil formula re-
mained the same. Opposite and adjacent State claims must be resolved by
"agreement on the basis ofinternational law, as referred to in Article 38 ofthe [ICJ]
Statute. . . to achieve an equitable solution." (Disputes relating to treaties already
in force will be determined by the treaties' terms.) If there is no agreement, LOS
235
Convention dispute resolution procedures must be used.
Coastal State exploration and exploitation rights are the same under the LOS
Convention, and the same exploitable resources are listed. The 1958 treaty,
however, placed the burden on scientific research installations or equipment to
stay out of "established international shipping lanes" and to display appropriate
237
warning signals to ensure safety at sea. Research must not "unjustifiably inter-
fere with other legitimate uses ofthe sea. . . and shall be duly respected in the course
ofsuch uses." The LOS Convention sets forth a full range ofpotential claims re-
lating to conservation, environmental control and research for all ocean areas;
these will be examined separately insofar as they pertain to Tanker War issues.
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As in the Shelf Convention, the LOS Convention provides for special uses of the
::tinental shelf: submarine cables and pipelines, artificial islands and similar
structures, drilling and tunneling
En 1969 the ICJ had been reluctant to declare Continental Shelf Convention Ar-
tides o 1 andc _ asdeclan -.shell boundaries;" by 1984,however,
a
Coon panel in the G id the LOS Convention continental shelf
Dint at present with general international
TheL'mtec tested a few States' legislation or proclamations.
Ml
i g . Chile a: extend jurisdiction beyond LOS Convention limits.""*
b. Conclusions. Thus ct to obligations to avoid interfering unduly with shelf
ex" D M exploitation, or to exerc ise safety it sea. the right of warships and
merchant vessels to navigate the high seas water column covering the continental
shelfcontinues una:- >y the LOS Convention, whether binding as a treaty or
reflect errations such as the Santiago Declaration,
unilateral pre uncements some treaties' to the contrary- notwith-
Moreover, :he:e is nothing in the law of the sea conventions to bar a
j State from using its continental shelf for placing its military installations
there First, since a proclaimed shelf is subject to the coastal State's sovereignty for
puj thee istal State has the inherent right of
j ^
self-defense under the Chi: .end those interests. Second, to the extent
that the LOAC. which includes the law ofnaval warfare, might apply to a situation,
those bodies ;: laa are >eparate from the LOS . The relationship between
belligerents1 operations in warns -rove a neutral's proclaimed continental shelf,
or to use a neutral's shelffor emplacement ofweapons directed against an opposing
-
-~
bellicerer.:. is more complex; this is analyzed in Chapter V-
The Seabed Anns Control Treaty forbids placing nuclear weapons, or other
weapons of mass destruction, on these^r^i and ; :ean floor bevond 12 miles from
the baseline bom which the territorial sea is measured.""*" The treaty does not de-
fine weapons of mass destruction, nor does it covet weapons in the water column,
as k nsj ai :r.zy nc not tethered I :he bottom, or other weapons, e.g., conventional
mines, that are not a i : : mass ~e>:ruction. There are opposing positions on
the point, but the foregoing appears to be the better view.""* From the LOS per-
>::::.:. all the coastal State obtains with a proclaimed continental shelf is the
tight :: expk re and exploit it for purposes stated in the law of the sea: the shelf is
no: subject to an unlimited i : treignty claim. LOS freedoms apply to the water
c .:mn: in any event other States' Charter rights to self-defense and LOAC options
are separate from LOS principles." The Treaty recognizes the ditterence by stat-
ing that its terms do not support or prejudice positions under the Territorial Sea
mention and other as? sets :: die law of the se; . * Those placing such devices
must have due regard for ^ coastal State's continental shelf rights, however.""
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c. The Continental Shelf in the Persian Gulfand the Tanker War. The Persian
253
Gulf is a relatively narrow, shallow body of water. For all practical purposes,
there is no deep seabed in the sense of the Continental Shelf Convention or the
LOS Convention. There is no Area within the meaning of the LOS Convention.
Since it is a basin without any continental slope or deep seabed, theoretically the
Gulf has no continental shelf. There are no reports of excessive claims with
respect to Gulf States' offshore sea floor claims. Disputes over offshore islands
continue, however.
Insofar as the high seas parts ofthese offshore areas (which in a sense can be con-
sidered continental shelves) are concerned, there appears to be no record of
belligerents' impairing usage by neutral coastal States during the Tanker War.
Belligerents and neutrals alike owed neutrals due regard for those neutrals' exer-
756
cise ofcontinental shelfrights. To be sure, there is evidence ofattacks on dhows,
i.e., possibly vessels operating above a proclaimed shelf, or other vessels that may
257
have been servicing installations on a shelf. Since these incidents are concerned
as much with attacks on a ship engaged in navigation in the Gulf, analysis ofthe le-
gitimacy of the attacks appears in Chapters III and V. Iraq attacked Iranian off-
shore installations that may have been connected with shelf operations, including
258pumping stations and other facilities. Because these were attacks by a belliger-
ent upon its opponent, the law ofarmed conflict applied through operation of the
259LOS other rules clauses, by then a treaty and customary norm. Chapter V dis-
cusses legitimacy of these attacks from an LOAC perspective, and Chapter VI ex-
760
amines them in the context ofthe developing law ofthe maritime environment.
The United States responded to Iranian attacks on US-flagged tankers by de-
stroying Iranian offshore platforms that were a source of the attacks and which
may have been connected with shelf activities legitimate under the LOS. This
was a legitimate act ofself-defense under Article 5 1 ofthe Charter, whether seen as
ajus cogens-protected right or as trumping the LOS. As explained in Chapter V,
the attacks were also proportional under the law of naval warfare; since there
was no appreciable environmental damage resulting from the attacks, no environ-
mental derogation claim was at stake. Thus to the extent the attacks might not
have enjoyed primacy as exercise of a jus cogens norm of the inherent right of
self-defense or as a superior treaty norm under Article 103 of the Charter, the
United States had a customary right to respond in self-defense under the law ofna-
val warfare, which as part of the LOAC applied under the circumstances in der-
ogation of law of the sea norms through the other rules clauses of the LOS
765
conventions, which are now customary law as well. In terms ofbehavior toward
Gulf States not parties to the conflict, i.e., those which had proclaimed neutrality,
the United States and other maritime powers that sent naval forces to the Gulf
owed due regard for their operations and installations in proclaimed continental
shelves. There is no evidence that the United States or other powers did not do
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so; i.e., there appears to have been no violations of the law of the sea as it pertained
to continental shelves in the Gulf.
4. The Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
Commentators have traced States' claims to territorial seas from the Middle
Ages through the 1958 LOS conference, the 1958 conventions, the unsuccessful at-
tempts to establish a limit in 1 960 and thereafter. Aside from examining general
claims patterns, with particular examination of the 1958 Conventions and 1982
LOS Convention, those waters will not be navigated again. This Part also reviews
principles of the contiguous zone. Claims going beyond the territorial seas, apart
from the contiguous zone, however measured and for whatever purpose, have been
addressed in previous parts, and that material will not be repeated here either.
a. Analysis: From a Three-Mile Rule to a Twelve-Mile Norm Under the 1982
LOS Convention. ". . . [B]y 1926, the three-mile limit was in every sense a rule of
Jf.0
international law," according to the commentators. However, even in the early
part of this century there were exceptions.
The trend had begun with Great Britain's Customs Consolidation Act of 1876,
which asserted a one-league belt ofwaters in which England claimed a right to visit
269
and search all vessels. "Of all the factors influencing the growth of the three-
mile rule—treaties, laws, court decisions, and writings of the experts—the. . .
Act. . . probably went the furthest in establishing the three-mile limit as a rule in
270
the law ofnations.'" (At the time, ofcourse, Brittania ruled the waves, not only in
terms of merchant fleet tonnage, but also because of the Royal Navy.) Two years
later Britain asserted criminal jurisdiction over only one league ofcoastal waters in
271
the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act. The United States had claimed a
three-mile territorial sea in 1793, when US Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson
272
wrote the British and French ministers to the United States. A year later Con-
gress passed legislation asserting criminal jurisdiction; the United States had be-
273
come the first country to formally claim three miles. To be sure, the rest of the
nineteenth century saw conflicting claims that spilled over into the twentieth cen-
tury, but by 1901 the United States had formally reaffirmed three miles as its
275
territorial sea. Its short-lived Naval War Code of 1900 had similarly asserted a
three-mile limit for armed conflict situations. Other States, bowing to British
277
diplomatic pressure, began to redefine their territorial belt as three miles. Arbi-
trations and prewar treaties seemed to point the way to universal acceptance of the
278
norm. However, before 1926 there remained substantial dissent. Hague Con-
vention VIII (1907) forbade laying mines within three miles of a neutral's coast,
but the Second Hague Peace Conference failed to agree on a uniform general rule
279 t •
for naval warfare situations. Just before and during World War I important
maritime powers, e.g., France, Italy, Russia, and other States asserted claims to
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more than three miles." And although the International Law Association had
281
modified its stance by 1 924 to opt for a three-mile limit, the Institute ofInterna-
tional Law declared for the same limit but added that "International usage may
282
justify the recognition of an extent greater or less . . .." In 1927 the influential
Harvard Research Draft supported a similar basic three-mile limit with an adjacent
band of the high seas subject to customs, navigation, health or police regulations,
283
"or for [a State's] immediate protection." The 1930 First Act of the League of
Nations Conference for the Codification ofInternational Law could not agree on a
284
limit. Iran claimed a 6-mile territorial sea in 1934, recognizing a right of inno-
cent passage for warships, including submarines navigating on the surface, except
for vessels in a state ofwar, in which case the law of maritime neutrality would ap-
ply. Iran also reserved the right to prohibit foreign ships from entering certain ter-
285
ritorial waters, i.e., "closed zones," for national security reasons.
Bilateral agreements between the United States and its major trading partners,
1924-30, to assist in US national prohibition law enforcement, carefully divided
between those nations agreeing with the United States on the three-mile limit and
IQf.
those which reserved their position on the issue.
After World War II certain Latin American States tried to fold claims for a wide
continental shelf and EEZ into a territorial sea of the same breadth; the claims
287
were protested. The Soviet bloc and the People's Republic of China asserted
288
12-mile territorial sea claims during 1950-60. In 1951 the United Kingdom con-
ceded Norway's historic claim to a four-mile limit in the Fisheries Case, which re-
289
solved a method of determining baselines. In 1949 Saudi Arabia declared a
290
6-mile territorial sea as part of its sovereignty. In 1955 the Philippines, and in
291
1 957 Indonesia, asserted a 1 2-mile territorial belt around their archipelagoes." In
292
1958 Saudi Arabia expanded its territorial sea claim to 12 miles. The 1958 Terri-
torial Sea Convention failed to settle on a limit for the territorial sea, but declares
293
coastal State sovereignty over the belt of coastal waters and airspace. The next
294
year Iran claimed a 12-mile territorial sea.
The Convention does, however, allow coastal States to declare a contiguous
zone ofup to 12 miles, subject to opposite States' agreeing on a dividing line (in the
absence ofwhich the median line from baselines forms the division), for: prevent-
ing infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or health regulations within
its territory or territorial sea, and for punishment ofinfringements ofthese regula-
295
tions committed within its territory or territorial sea. The contiguous zone is
part ofthe high seas outside ofthe territorial sea under the Territorial Sea Conven-
tion. Thus in the case of the United States, which had a 3-mile territorial sea in
1958, the outer 9 miles of its 12-mile contiguous zone were high seas. The High
Seas Convention provides for a right of hot pursuit from the zone if coastal State
authorities have reason to believe a foreign ship has violated its customs, fiscal, im-
migration or health laws in the coastal State's territory or territorial sea." Iran
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had proclaimed a 12-mile "zone ofmaritime supervision" when a 6-mile territorial
sea was claimed in 1934; the claim was amended in 1959 to assert a 12-mile territo-
299
rial sea. ' Saudi Arabia had claimed a 6-mile contiguous zone for "maritime sur-
veillance" relating to security, navigation and fiscal matters beyond its 6-mile
coastal sea in 1949; this was expanded to a 12-mile contiguous zone, coincident
with the Territorial Sea Convention limit, in 1958. However, just before the 1958
UN LOS Conference, Saudi Arabia expanded its contiguous zone to 18 miles and
its territorial sea to 12 miles.
The Convention establishes methods for measuring baselines for the territorial
301
sea, and declares rules for innocent passage through the territorial sea. All
States' ships enjoy a right ofinnocent passage through the territorial sea, subject to
the Convention's other principles. Passage means navigation through the territo-
rial sea for traversing that sea without entering internal waters, for proceeding to
internal waters, or for making for the high seas from internal waters. Passage in-
cludes stopping and anchoring, but only incident to ordinary navigation or if nec-
essary because offorce majeure or distress. Passage is innocent "so long as it is not
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State." Such passage
must take place in conformity with the Convention and "other rules of interna-
tional law." Foreign flag fishing vessel passage is not considered innocent if these
vessels do not observe published coastal State regulations designed to prevent
these vessels from fishing in the territorial sea. Submarines must navigate on the
302
surface and show their flag, unless a State consents to submerged transit; no
State has done so publicly. Aircraft do not have a right of innocent passage
above the territorial sea, unless allowed to do so by the coastal State; most
coastal States have agreed to allow commercial aircraft overflight, but not neces-
sarily military or other State aircraft. Coastal States may not hamper innocent
passage and must give appropriate publicity to dangers to navigation within their
territorial seas ofwhich they have knowledge. However, surface warships enjoy
307
a right of innocent passage.
Coastal States may act to prevent passage that is not innocent. For ships pro-
ceeding to internal waters, a coastal State may take necessary steps to prevent
breaches ofconditions to which admission ofthose ships to those waters is subject.
Subject to a provision related to straits passage declaring that there can be no sus-
pension of international straits passage, a coastal State may, without discrimina-
tion among foreign-flag vessels, suspend temporarily innocent passage of these
vessels in specified areas of its territorial sea if the suspension is necessary for pro-
tection of the coastal State's security, and only after the suspension has been pub-
308
lished. How long a temporary suspension may be imposed is not clear, but it
309
cannot be factually permanent. Foreign-flag vessels in innocent passage must
conform to coastal State regulations enacted in conformity with the Convention
and "other rules of international law," as well as regulations relating to transport
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and navigation. The Convention also provides for charges on merchant ships
31
1
and criminal and civil jurisdiction over merchantmen. All of the foregoing ap-
plies to government ships operated for commercial purposes, and all but the civil
jurisdiction rules apply to government ships operated for non-commercial pur-
poses. The Convention does not affect government ships' immunities enjoyed un-
312
der the Convention or "other rules of international law." If a warship does not
comply with a coastal State's regulations on territorial sea passage and disregards a
request for compliance, the coastal State may require that warship to leave the ter-
313
ritorial sea.
A 1960 conference failed to resolve the issue of the width of the territorial sea;
debate centered around a 6 or 12-mile belt, and a compromise ofa 6-mile territorial
sea coupled with a 6-mile fishing zone failed by one vote. The 1965 Restatement
(Second) cautiously says that "A state does not violate the rights ofanother state by
315
setting the breadth of the territorial sea at three nautical miles," but otherwise
generally confirms Convention principles. Whether the Iranian and Saudi
317
claims as of 1980 to 12-mile territorial seas were legitimate is debatable, but by
the end of the war they were in the clear majority.
The 1982 LOS Convention declares a 12-mile belt as the maximum claim over
which a coastal State may claim sovereignty, including its airspace, seabed and
318
subsoil. The LOS Convention adopts Territorial Sea Convention baselines
measuring methodology, adding provisions for low-tide elevations, mouths of
rivers and reefs, and states that offshore installations and artificial islands are not
319permanent harbor works in determining baselines near ports. The Restatement
320
(Third) takes the LOS Convention position on breadth ofthe territorial sea, not-
ing that some countries, including the United States at that time (1987), might
321
claim less than 12 miles.
In 1958, 9 of 75 coastal States had claimed a 12-mile territorial sea; 2 claimed
over 12, and 45 asserted the traditional 3-mile limit. By 1965 26 of 85 coastal States
claimed a 12-mile sea, 3 claimed over 12, and 32 claimed a 3-mile limit. A decade
later the figures were: of 1 16 coastal nations, 54 claimed a 12-mile sea, 20 claimed
more than 12 miles, and only 28 clung to the 3-mile limit. Within a year of the be-
ginning of the Tanker War (1980) the numbers were: of 131 coastal States, 76
32?
claimed a 1 2-mile limit, 25 claimed more, and 23 held to a 3-mile limit. This was
the trend as delegates began negotiating the 1982 LOS Convention in the Sev-
enties. It continued as a trend as the Tanker War began in 1980.
Besides permitting a 1 2-mile territorial sea claim, the 1 982 LOS Convention
copies the Territorial Sea Convention contiguous zone provisions; its breadth has
been expanded to 24 miles. The LOS Convention provides that at least the outer
12 miles of a declared contiguous zone are subject to high seas freedoms of naviga-
tion and overflight if a coastal State has declared a 12-mile territorial sea. If the lit-
toral State has a territorial sea of less than 12 miles, it may declare a contiguous
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zone ofup to 24 miles, with the balance ofthe zone retaining high seas freedoms.
The coastal State's right of hot pursuit from its contiguous zone under the LOS
Convention follows High Sea Convention principles. The LOS Convention
adds a new provision, permitting States to control traffic in archaeological or his-
torical objects found at sea, stating a presumption that these objects' removal from
a contiguous zone without coastal State approval results in an infringement within
327
coastal State territory or territorial sea of its contiguous zone-related laws.
In 1983 the US Oceans Policy Statement recognized the rights of other States in
waters offtheir coasts, as reflected in the LOS Convention, on the basis ofreciproc-
ity, i.e., if a coastal State recognized the US' and other countries' rights and free-
doms in the waters ofthe coastal State. The United States would exercise and assert
its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis consistent
with the balance of interests reflected in the Convention. The United States would
not acquiesce in other States' unilateral acts designed to restrict the international
community's rights and freedoms in navigation, overflight and other related high
seas uses. The United States continued to claim a 3-mile territorial sea, how-
328
ever. The result was that the United States would recognize other countries'
329
valid claims under the 1982 LOS Convention navigational articles. ' In that year,
of 1 39 coastal States, 79 claimed a 1 2-mile territorial sea, the number claiming over
12 miles had declined to 20, and those claiming a 3-mile limit stood at 25. " In
1987 the Restatement (Third) recognized a 12-mile territorial sea. The next year
the United States claimed a 12-mile territorial sea in accordance with the LOS
332
Convention.
By 1989 the number of States claiming a 3-mile limit had declined to 10, among
them Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE; a decade later it was down to 4. By 1989 Iran,
Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had joined the United States and 103 other States in
333
proclaiming a 12-mile territorial sea. " Whether a State was party to the LOS
Convention or not, and many 12-mile claimants were by 1997, it is fairly safe to say
the 12-mile limit had become a customary norm by the end of the Tanker War
(1988), and more certainly so a decade later. A few countries—19 in 1989 and 15
335
in 1997—continued to assert territorial sea claims greater than 12 miles. These
336
were the subject of US and others' diplomatic protests.
New rules for innocent passage was another major change between the Territo-
rial Sea Convention and the LOS Convention. The basic right ofinnocent passage,
the meaning ofpassage, and the rule that submarines must navigate on the surface
unless there is coastal State consent that they remain submerged, remain the same,
as do rights ofprotection for the coastal State, principles for charges for traversing
the territorial sea and criminal and civil jurisdiction applicable to all ships, and the
statement that with certain exceptions in the treaty, the Convention does not affect
immunity of warships and government ships operated for non-commercial pur-
poses. The rule—that if a warship does not comply with coastal State regulations
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on territorial sea passage and disregards a request for compliance made to it, a
coastal State may require that warship to leave the territorial sea—was also re-
tained, the Convention adding that the offending war vessel must leave "immedi-
ately."
337
Principal innovations in the LOS Convention deal with defining innocent pas-
sage; laws and regulations a coastal State may impose relating to innocent passage;
providing for sea lanes, traffic separation schemes, foreign nuclear-powered ships
and vessels carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances;
a coastal State's duties; definition of a warship; and flag State responsibilities for
damage caused by a warship or a government ship operated for non-commercial
purposes.
As in the Territorial Sea Convention, the LOS Convention declares that pas-
sage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the coastal State's peace, good or-
der or security. Such passage must take place in conformity with the Convention
"and with other rules of international law," referring to the law of armed con-
339
flict. The LOS Convention enumerates activities during passage considered
"prejudicial to the peace, good order or security" of the coastal State:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of the coastal State, or in any manner in violation of the princi-
ples of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or secu-
rity of the coastal State;
(d) any act ofpropaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal
State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to
the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary [i.e., health] laws and regulations
of the coastal State;
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to [the] Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other
facilities or installations of the coastal State;
(1) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage. 340
Most commentators say the list is exclusive. As under the Territorial Sea Con-
vention, submarines transiting the territorial sea must navigate on the surface and
show their ensign, and innocent passage does not include a right ofoverflight.
A coastal State may adopt regulations, in conformity with the Convention and
"other rules of international law," i.e., the LOAC, relating to innocent passage
through the territorial sea with respect to safety of navigation and regulation of
maritime traffic; protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities
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or installations; protection ofcables and pipelines; conservation ofthe sea's living
resources; prevention of infringement of the coastal State's fisheries laws; preser-
vation of the coastal State's environment and prevention, reduction and control of
pollution of the coastal State; marine scientific research and hydrographic
surveys; and prevention of infringement of the coastal State's customs, fiscal, im-
migration or health laws. These laws do not apply to foreign ship design, construc-
tion, manning or equipment unless the laws give effect to "generally accepted
international rules or standards." The coastal State must publicize these laws. For-
eign ships in innocent passage must comply with these laws and all generally ac-
cepted international regulations relating to prevention of collisions at sea. The
Convention list of regulations is "exhaustive and inclusive."
The Convention allows coastal States to require foreign ships exercising the
right of innocent passage to use sea lanes and traffic separation schemes, where
necessary for navigational safety. Tankers, nuclear-powered vessels and ships car-
rying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances or materials
may be required to confine their passage to these sea lanes. A coastal State must in-
dicate these sea lanes and separation schemes on publicized charts. Foreign nu-
clear-powered vessels and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or
noxious substances must carry documents and observe special precautionary mea-
sures established for them by international agreements while in innocent pas-
348
sage.
The LOS Convention modified the coastal State's duties and obligations with
respect to innocent passage. Besides declaring that a coastal State may not hamper
innocent passage in form or fact, the Convention stated that in particular, in apply-
ing the Convention or regulations adopted in conformity with the Convention, a
coastal State may not "(a) impose requirements on foreign ships which have the
practical effect ofdenying or impairing. . . innocent passage; or (b) discriminate in
form or fact against ships ofany State or against ships carrying cargoes to, from or
on behalf of any State." As in the 1958 Convention, a coastal State must publicize
any danger to navigation, ofwhich it has knowledge, in its territorial sea. A coastal
State may suspend innocent passage temporarily in specified areas of its territorial
sea if suspension is necessary for protecting its security. This suspension may take
349
effect only after it has been published.
If a warship or other non-commercial government vessel does not comply with
legitimate coastal State regulation concerning innocent passage, the flag State
bears responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from this
non-compliance.
Despite Territorial Sea Convention and LOS Convention articles according a
right ofwarship unnanounced and unimpeded innocent passage, as of 1989, 43
States, including Iran, claimed a right to control foreign-flag warship entry into
their territorial seas, requiring prior authorization or permission, prior notice, or
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limits on numbers present at one time. Twenty-six States, including Iraq and
353Oman, specifically recognized the right of warship innocent passage.
By 1996 57 States had claimed contiguous zones of4 to 24 miles, including Bah-
rain, Iran, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Although the Con-
gress considered in 1991-92 legislation to extend the US contiguous zone to 24
355
miles, it failed to pass. In 1 999, however, the United States proclaimed a 24-mile
contiguous zone, as reflected in the LOS Convention. The US proclamation stated
that high seas freedoms, e.g., of navigation and overflight, apply in the zone and
that the proclamation did not alter US or other States' rights and duties in the US
EEZ. Two countries bordering the Persian Gulfwere among 1 8 States asserting
a right to include protecting national security interests; Iran did so in 1993 and
Saudi Arabia at some earlier date. The United States and other countries have pro-
tested most ofthese claims as not being within rights permitted under the Territo-
357
rial Sea Convention or the LOS Convention. These general security claims
might be contrasted with the US defense zones of the early part of this century,
358
which limited or temporarily excluded navigation. The latter, promulgated de-
cades before standards were stated in the LOS conventions, would still pass muster
in most cases.
The rules for baselines determinations are virtually the same under the 1958
359
and 1982 conventions. However, the measurement of them has caused numer-
36ft
ous diplomatic protests and US FON operations, the principal problem being
declarations of straight baselines under the Territorial Sea Convention and the
LOS Convention. If a country claims a territorial sea and a contiguous zone or
other area, e.g., an EEZ, fishing zone or continental shelfbased on erroneous calcu-
lation ofbaselines pushing lines toward the high seas, the result may be that these
areas' outer boundaries will encroach on what should be high seas under the 1958
or 1982 conventions. There have been numerous cases where States have protested
36?
erroneous assertions ofstraight baselines. Ofover 75 States and their dependen-
cies in a 1996 list, 4 countries bordering the Persian Gulf, Iran, Oman, Saudi Ara-
bia and the UAE, had baselines the United States considered miscalculated.
However, only those of Iran, Oman and Saudi Arabia were declared before or dur-
363
ing the Tanker War. Since the Persian Gulf is so narrow, its coastal States when
asserting claims to the continental shelf, etc., have been forced to divide sover-
eignty or jurisdiction among them, and the only issues related to erroneous
baseline claims involve territorial sea and contiguous zone claims that may be ex-
cessive. If these claims were excessive, the result could be that a Persian Gulf
365
coastal State might claim policing authority in a contiguous zone area that is
subject only to high seas law, such law perhaps being limited by legitimate EEZ,
366
continental shelf, etc., claims considerations. Similarly, a territorial sea claim
that extends too far into the high seas could result in claims by the coastal State of
improper activity in the disputed waters, with a counterclaim by the State of the
268 The Tanker War
flag of, e.g., a transiting warship that the area is high seas for navigational and other
purposes, although perhaps limited by legitimate continental shelf, etc., claims
considerations.
b. Conclusions. A US movement toward ratifying the 1982 LOS Convention may
mean that tangles ofclaims resulting from Territorial Sea Convention deficiencies
will gradually be eliminated. However, issues of warship innocent passage, exces-
sive baseline claims, excessive territorial sea and contiguous zone claims and dis-
putes over whether the LOS Convention lists of activities for declaring passage
prejudicial to coastal State peace, good order or security is exclusive, will continue
to fuel debate on the meaning ofthe LOS Convention as it applies to the territorial
sea and contiguous zone.
c. The Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, and the Tanker War. There were few
LOS issues related to territorial sea or contiguous zone passage during the Tanker
War. Although Iran purported to restrict the right ofwarship innocent passage in
her territorial sea, there is no record of any incidents arising during the Tanker
War; Iran's claim to assert national security as a basis for contiguous zone jurisdic-
tion came over a decade after the conflict. There is no record of Saudi Arabia's
claim ofnational security for her contiguous zone figuring in the war. Although
many Persian Gulf States began the war with territorial seas of less than 12 miles,
by the end ofthe conflict most had asserted a 1 2-mile belt as the 1982 LOS Conven-
tion and customary law allow, and two (Iraq, Oman) had explicitly said warships
369
were entitled to innocent passage like merchantmen. Saudi Arabia proclaimed
a safety corridor through her and GCC States' territorial sea, presumably with
those States' authorization, to facilitate tanker traffic; there was nothing in the law
ofthe sea forbidding this. Indeed, the LOS Convention allows establishment ofsea
lanes and traffic separation schemes. Similarly, Iran was free under the LOS to di-
rect coastal convoying of its ships in its territorial sea as a means ofcontrolling ter-
ritorial sea traffic lanes and traffic separation. However, these convoys were
subject to Iraqi attack under the LOAC if they were carrying war-fighting or
370
war-sustaining goods, e.g., oil.
Two aspects of Iranian naval maneuvers deserve mention, however. When Iran
371
conducted naval maneuvers in Saudi territorial waters, Iran committed a clear
377
violation ofthe LOS Convention and a violation ofthe more general standard of
the Territorial Sea Convention, i.e., which forbids "Passage. . . prejudicial to the
373
peace, good order or security of the coastal State." Given the Iranian track re-
cord by then, these maneuvers were clearly prejudicial to Saudi Arabia under both
the LOS Convention and the Territorial Sea Convention. The maneuvers, de-
pending on their nature, also may have violated the law of naval warfare, appli-
cable under the other rules clauses of the Territorial Sea Convention and the LOS
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Convention. On the other hand, to the extent that Iran proposed to conduct na-
val maneuvers in its own territorial sea, whether part of territorial waters permit-
ted under the LOS or high seas included within an excessive claim due to
"inf.
erroneous baseline claims, such military activity was allowable; its territorial
377
sea was under Iranian sovereignty. Only if Iran coupled these maneuvers with
closure of its territorial sea more than temporarily, without equal treatment of all
378 379
seafarers, or without notice was Iraq's protest justified. The record does not
show that any of this was the case. However, to the extent Iranian maneuvers may
have affected traffic through the Strait ofHormuz, which was nearby, different cri-
380
teria, i.e., those for straits passage, were involved.
5. Access to Ports, Roadsteads and Internal Waters
"Among writers, the better line ofauthority supports the view that as a point of
law, foreign merchant vessels in port are subject to the local jurisdiction On the
other hand,. . . [other authorities] indicate that there are exemptions from the local
jurisdiction as a matter of right, and not merely as a matter of courtesy or co-
381
mity." Similarly, territorial waters and ports are, "as a rule, open to men-of-war
as well as to merchantmen of all nations, provided they are not excluded by special
382
international treaties or special Municipal Laws of the littoral States." Never-
theless, "[t]he status ofthe waters in ports, harbors, roadsteads, and the mouths of
rivers is. . . different from that ofthe waters ofthe maritime belt. .
.
; for the former
383
are national or internal, and the latter territorial." While Oppenheim's treatise
made these statements before the LOS conventions were negotiated, they are still
384
true. Modern port facilities are much more complex today, but principles gov-
erning access to them are similar.
The ensuing analysis examines the general right of access to internal waters (a
collective term for ports, roadsteads, rivers and canals) for warships and merchant
vessels under the law of the sea. Particular claims for protection of values {e.g.,
power, through attempts to assert jurisdiction over ships) will be noted. The geo-
graphic arena for analysis ends, however, at the water's edge; no attempt will be
made to explore manipulation of the wealth or other processes through devices
such as customs duties, or access to the land through immigration.
a. Analysis. Principles of relatively exclusive coastal State control ofthe territorial
385
sea apply to internal waters. They are part of the State's sovereign territory. In-
ternal waters have been variously defined and titled, and in some cases national
legislation whose primary impact is from the sea, e.g., the US Inland Rules of the
387
Nautical Road, governing signals and lights for transiting US navigable waters,
388
may require compliance while in coastal State territorial seas. The principal
concern here is the arena of port facilities, "a place where ships are in the habit of
389
coming for the purpose of loading or unloading, embarking or disembarking;"
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roadsteads; and access to these, as through the territorial sea, internal waters and
navigable rivers. "Internal waters," for purposes of this study, are, as stated in the
Territorial Sea Convention, "Waters on the landward side of the baseline of the
territorial sea;" this is also the 1982 LOS Convention definition. Since the
outermost permanent harbor works forming an integral part ofa harbor system are
part of the coast, and the coast is the fundamental baseline, waters on the
other side of the line are internal waters. Roadsteads, ifnormally used for loading,
unloading and anchoring ships, and ifwholly or partly outside the territorial sea's
394
outer limit, are included in the territorial sea. Thus roadsteads within the
territorial sea and extending outward into the high seas create a jurisdictional
395
"bulge" in favor of the littoral State. On the other hand, if a roadstead is partly
396
within territorial and internal waters, the baselines approach operates to split it
into two parts. The LOS Convention adds that offshore installations and artificial
397
islands are not considered permanent harbor works and therefore are not part of
the territorial sea. Since the baseline division for rivers flowing into the sea is a
398
straight line across the mouth, all landward river waters are internal in nature,
399
except rivers forming a boundary or rivers declared open to all traffic by treaty.
The Shatt al-Arab is an example of such a waterway.
Early nineteenth century State practice permitted receiving, during peacetime,
vessels of all countries into. . . ports, to whatever party belonging, and under whatever
flag sailing, pirates excepted, requiring of them only the payment of the duties, and
obedience to the laws while under their jurisdiction without adverting to. . . whether
they had committed any violation of the allegiance or laws obligatory on them in the
countries to which they belonged,. . . in assuming such a flag, or in any other
respect.401
That is still the rule today.
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon restated the customary right of foreign war-
ships to enter ports in time ofpeace unless local law closed the ports. Customary
law once stated that during war enemy warships can be kept from ports by force,
e.g., blocking access by obstructions that result in also barring neutral merchant
traffic, but such obstructions should "be retained only as long as needed for bellig-
erent purposes." If a channel for nonbelligerent shipping was left open, with
designated hours for travel, then customary principles would be satisfied. To-
day the LOS Convention allows closure of the territorial sea on a temporary basis,
without discrimination in form or fact among foreign ships, ifsuspension is neces-
sary to protect a coastal State's security and if the coastal State publishes notice of
closure. Territorial sea closure under these circumstances necessarily impli-
cates closure of a port within the territorial sea and those on the internal waters
side of the line. The coastal State and the flag State of a transiting warship or
merchantman retain their self-defense rights under these circumstances, the
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coastal State its territorial interests and the vessel's flag State its interests in the
ship
408
The 1982 Convention also follows prior rules in the 1965 Transit Trade Con-
vention governing landlocked States, i.e., those countries that have no seacoast, the
Territorial Sea and High Seas Conventions, and the 1921 Freedom of Transit
Convention, and principles in the GATT, art. V. Landlocked States have
rights ofaccess to and from the sea to exercise their rights under the law of the sea,
including transit through countries (transit States) whose territory a landlocked
State must use to access the sea. Landlocked and transit States must agree on terms
of transit through bilateral, multilateral or regional agreements. Landlocked
and transit States may agree upon overland pipelines in place of rail, road or water
transport. Vessels flying a landlocked State flag must be treated equally in mari-
time ports. Transit States, "in the exercise of their full sovereignty over their
territory,. . . have the right to take all measures necessary to ensure that the rights
and facilities provided for in this Part [ofthe LOS Convention] shall in no way in-
fringe their legitimate interests." The Transit Trade Convention declares that
it does not prescribe belligerents' and neutrals' rights and duties during war, say-
ing that it continues in force during wartime "so far as such rights and duties [of
belligerents and neutrals] permit." The Convention is also subject to the Char-
ter. The LOS Convention and the 1958 LOS conventions achieve the same re-
sult through application of the other rules clauses, which declare that the law of
armed conflict applies in certain situations. To the extent that Trade Transit
Convention, the LOS Convention and High Seas or Territorial Sea Convention
provisions coincide, they reinforce customary law on the subject of access of land-
locked States.418
The LOS Convention prevails over the Territorial Sea Convention for parties
419
to the LOS Convention; however, as noted above, many of its provisions are
similar to or identical with the 1958 Convention, and therefore should be given
similar or identical application. The LOS Convention also provides that it does
not alter States' rights and obligations arising from other treaties compatible with
it if they do not affect enjoyment of other States' rights and obligations under the
Convention, nor does the Convention affect international agreements expressly
permitted or preserved by it. Moreover, the LOS Convention must be consid-
ered in connection with other sources. Similarly, the Territorial Sea Con-
vention does not affect treaties already in force and must be considered in
connection with custom and other sources. Therefore, examination of past
trends in the law, with particular emphasis on US practice, is appropriate.
States have exercised the option stated in Schooner Exchange to limit entry of
foreign warships, particularly during times of crisis. In 1805, seven years before
Exchange, the US Congress authorized the President to forbid entrance ofa foreign
armed vessel or its master upon proof that a trespass, tort or spoilation had been
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committed, or that vessels trading in US commerce had been interrupted or vexed.
The legislation expired in 1807. In that year President Thomas Jefferson ex-
cluded British vessels by proclamation because ofthe Chesapeake affair. In 1 820
Congress forbade warship entry into all but designated major commercial ports ex-
428
cept in distress situations. The legislation expired two years later. During the
Civil War President Abraham Lincoln directed that foreign warships would be
treated on the basis ofreciprocity accorded US warships abroad. (By 1 878, how-
ever, the United States had declared an open-ports policy, reserving the right to
ask foreign warships to leave if the law of nations or US treaties required depar-
ture). Other States continued to claim exclusionary or regulatory rights, and
by 1909 the United States, through the Navy Department General Board, could ex-
cept certain ports from warship visits. Otherwise, no permission was required. i
Besides customary claims ofmerchant ships' right to enter another State's ports
to load or unload cargo, the United States and other nations have concluded bilat-
eral agreements (for the United States, often in the form of peace, amity or friend-
ship, commerce and navigation (FCN) treaties), usually guaranteeing reciprocal
rights. The first for the United States came in 1778 with France, and the trend
continued through the next two centuries. Warships were occasionally given ac-
cess on the same terms as merchantmen. Often warships were not mentioned;
sometimes they were given restricted access. Coastal trading, i.e., cabotage, was
nearly always reserved for port State ships. Many agreements included most fa-
vored nation (MFN) clauses, which grants all favors granted to others in the
past or future, to other States. Other States have negotiated similar networks.
In some situations, e.g., China, entry was restricted to designated Chinese ports,
with nothing said about Chinese vessels trading in US ports. There is nothing
in the record ofthe latter treaties to indicate that these agreements restricted entry
for national security reasons; undoubtedly national policies of exclusion of for-
eigners generally, and foreignors' ideas, were behind the Asian exclusion policies.
438
Ifone accepts the view that these "many hundreds of bilateral treaties" create a
customary right, then by the early twentieth century a right ofentry founded in
custom existed, at least for merchantmen. The 1 982 LOS Convention would ex-
clude MFN clause applicability to agreements with landlocked States for goods
and people transiting countries to and from the sea.
In 1898 an Institute of International Law resolution had provided that "As a
general rule access to ports. . . is presumed to be open to foreign vessels." By
1928 the Institute had changed its resolution to read, "as a general rule access to
ports. . . is open to foreign vessels." Lowe, citing the rapporteur for the Institute,
asserts the 1928 formulation was de legeferenda. Nonetheless, if the proposition
is accepted that the hundreds ofbilateral agreements, and practice under them by
1928, amounted to custom, which under traditional analysis when coupled with a
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bilateral agreement between contending States overrides the secondary source of
publicists, then today there is a basic right of peacetime entry.
The 1923 Convention and Statute Concerning Regime of Maritime Ports pro-
vided for free and equal access of all vessels, public and private, to parties' ports,
subject to equality of usual port charges. The Convention does not apply "to
warships or vessels performing police or administrative functions, or. . . exercising
any kind ofpublic authority, or. . . vessels which for the time being are exclusively
employed for. . . Naval, Military or Air Forces of a State." The Convention also
does not apply to fishing vessels, their catch, or cabotage. The Statute does not
require admitting passengers or goods where health, security or municipal laws
forbid such. States may suspend equality of treatment, but this is subject to
World Court review. An "emergency affecting the safety ofthe State or the vital
interests of the country may, in exceptional cases, and for as short a period as
possible, involve a deviation from" equal treatment. Nor does the Convention
prescribe belligerents' and neutrals' wartime duties, although the Convention
"continue[s] in force in time of war so far as such rights and duties permit."
These latter clauses are consistent with the LOS Convention and Territorial Sea
Convention suspension and their "other rules" clauses. Ifthey are not, the LOS
• 454 i • 455Convention clause paramount or the later in time treaty construction rules
would give primacy to the other rules clauses. The Ports Convention is also subject
to the Charter and the right of self-defense. By 1999, 42 States were party, in-
cluding Iraq since 1929; treaty succession principles may move the total up.
The 1921 Barcelona Convention and Statute Concerning Freedom ofTransit has
458
similar terms for vessel transit across the territory of its parties, which includes
the territorial sea and inland waters. As of 1999 there were 33 parties, none of
459
which bordered the Persian Gulf; many are also Ports Convention parties. The
Barcelona Convention is subject to the same considerations, e.g., the Charter, as
the Ports Convention.
The 1963 Mar del Plata Convention pledges parties' best efforts "to prevent un-
necessary delays to vessels, passengers, crews, cargo and baggage in [administer-
ing] laws relating to immigration, public health, customs and other provisions
relative to arrivals and departures of vessels." The OAS Inter-American Port
and Harbor Conference is charged with adopting standards and recommended
practice for signatory States. If a State cannot comply, it must notify the OAS
General Secretariat immediately. Although the Convention does not distin-
guish between merchant ships and warships, its language appears to relate more to
the former. No rules for suspension of territorial sea innocent passage, warships or
armed conflict are stated, but under principles of treaty interpretation applicable
to the Territorial Sea Convention and the LOS Convention, the latter's suspension
provisions and other rules principles, as a matter of custom and treaty law, ap-
ply. Likewise, the Charter applies in self-defense situations. Presently 12
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American States are party to this regional treaty, including the United States.
To the extent its principles are consistent with the general LOS, the Convention
reinforces them.
The 1965 Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic repeats
Af.0
Mar del Plata pledges but excludes warships and pleasure yachts from cover-
age. Allowing better treatment under national law or other treaties, the Conven-
tion also permits "temporary measures. . . necessary to preserve public morality,
order and security or to prevent the introduction or spread of diseases or pests af-
fecting public health, animals or plants." Matters for which the Convention does
470
not provide are subject to national laws. No specific provisions declare when
territorial sea innocent passage may be suspended, or the effect of armed conflict,
but under principles of treaty interpretation applicable to the Territorial Sea Con-
vention and the LOS Convention, these rules as treaty and customary law ap-
ply. Likewise, the Charter applies in self-defense situations. Eighty States,
including Iran and Iraq, are party to the Convention, Iraq's accession dating from
1976. To the extent the Convention's principles are consistent with the general
LOS, they reinforce them.
The results of arbitral awards are consistent with LOS principles. The Saudi
Arabia-ARAMCO arbitration (1958) confirmed that "according to a great princi-
ple of public international law, the ports of every State must be open to foreign
merchant vessels and can only be closed when the vital interests of the State so re-
quire." The Kronpnns GustafAdolf arbitration, considering Sweden-US bilat-
eral agreements, noted the right of policing outbound wartime traffic stated in
the treaties derogated from a general right of free navigation to and from ports, also
477
recited in the bilaterals.
In 1945 Hyde said that there was a corresponding obligation upon each mari-
time power not to deprive foreign vessels of commerce of access to all of its
478
ports. Similarly, the Institute of International Law returned to the subject in
1957, declared for free access of commercial vessels, save in exceptional circum-
stances "imposed by imperative reasons. . . . [I]t is consistent with general prac-
479
tice. . . to permit free access to ports and harbors by such vessels." Colombos
thus aptly summarized competing claims for ports in 1967:
(i) in time of peace, commercial ports must be left open to international traffic. The
liberty of access to ports granted to foreign vessels implies their right to load and
unload their cargoes; embark and disembark their passengers. . . . Freedom for
foreign vessels to enter the ports of a State implies the right to load and unload goods;
(ii) no port can ever be shut against a foreign ship seeking shelter from tempest or
compelled to enter it in distress; (iii) purely military ports may be closed to all foreign
warships or merchant vessels on the ground of justifiable precaution; (iv) entry of
ships ofwar even into commercial ports may be subjected to certain restrictions both
as regards the number of vessels allowed to enter and the length of their stay.480
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481Whiteman took essentially the same position in 1 965 . The Restatement (Second),
Foreign Relations said in 1965 that "In the case ofvessels not in military service, the
ports of a state are open to their visit without any prior notification, except where
482
the state has expressly provided otherwise." For military vessels, the Restate-
ment said "notification ofan intended visit is customary. It is not necessary that the
coastal state expressly communicate. . . its consent to the visit [T]hat it does not
483
expressly prohibit the visit is sufficient consent." Although comments and re-
porters' notes for these Restatement sections do not support these propositions, it is
clear the Restatement drafters saw a general right of entry under international law
for merchant ships and warships, subject to advance notice for the warship and a
right ofexclusion otherwise, presumably by international agreement or special no-
tice from the littoral State, as in the case of quarantine for plague. O'Connell says
there is no general port access right, arguing that if a State opens its ports, it must
open them to all merchantmen, subject to usual rules pertaining to health, etc. A
State may close its port or ports but must do so as to all ships.
The Restatement (Third) takes no clear position on warship entry: "In general,
maritime ports are open to foreign ships on condition of reciprocity,. . . but the
coastal state may temporarily suspend access in exceptional cases for imperative
485
reasons, such as the security of the state or public health." The reporters' note
does not mention warships, being content to say that "States may impose . . special
restrictions on certain categories ofships[,]" citing Convention on Liability ofOp-
erators ofNuclear-Powered Ships and New Zealand's barring US nuclear-powered
ships, i.e., US warships, from its ports. The likely Restatement position appears
to be that merchantmen have an unfettered right to enter foreign ports, subject to
principles of temporary closure for security and other reasons, and that there is a
presumption that warships may also enter but subject to permission from the
coastal State. (The Restatement (Third) is very clear, however, in saying that war-
487
ships have a right ofinnocent passage, as distinguished from right ofentry into
port without coastal State permission.)
Recent United States bilateral agreements involving some former Soviet bloc
States and the People's Republic ofChina (PRC) may evidence a trend toward less
open access. Agreements with the PRC, Poland and the former USSR all provide
for advance notice—24 hours to four days—with respect to any merchant vessel
488
wishing to enter port. The agreements do not apply to warships or fishing ves-
489
sels. By clear implication, permission to enter any party's port requires advance
notice and permission.
The PRC and USSR Agreements designate ports for entry in each country, the
PRC agreement stating that the list is subject to review. Notably absent from the
lists are major ports related to defense installations
—
e.g., in the former USSR,
Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok; in the United States for the former USSR,
Charleston, South Carolina; all Rhode Island ports; Norfolk, Virginia area; San
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Diego, California; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. However, some ports with nearby de-
fense facilities are included: in the former USSR, Murmansk, Arkhangel'sk,
Odessa, Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), Yalta, among 40 ports open; in the
United States, Seattle and Newport, Rhode Island among ports open to the
PRC 490
These recent bilaterals reflect the present status of competing claims today for
voluntary access to ports. There is a general right of access to ports for merchant
ships to discharge or load cargo in time of peace. To the extent that the former
USSR-US and PRC-US bilateral agreements list ports and thereby deny merchant
vessels under their flags access to others without reason, the agreements could be
said to violate general international law. However, because these are bilateral trea-
491
ties establishing special or local rules between States, affecting only them, there
is no violation of international law. Special State interests
—
e.g.,quarantine to pro-
tect health, customs inspection to prevent smuggling, barring warships to ensure
national security—may override the general claim of access for reasonable periods
of time, and perhaps forever in the case ofwarships. For example, a quarantine ex-
clusion could be imposed during the epidemic. Strict customs enforcement, dur-
ing an actual or anticipated influx of illicit goods, might be required for years, e.g.,
in narcotics trafficking. Ships considered dangerous because of cargo (e.g., liquid
natural gas, LNG) or propulsion system (e.g., nuclear power), may be regulated as
to access. Ports might be barred to some or all foreign merchant or war vessel traffic
because of national security concerns for greater or lesser periods of time, ranging
from an indeterminate period of low-intensity conflict through defined periods of
actual war to a few hours needed for critical fleet or other evolutions. Relief
through access for vessels in distress or driven in byforce majeure remains a univer-
sal right with few, if any, restrictions.
Thus voluntary access to ports by merchantmen stands as a right, with excep-
tions depending on temporary circumstances such as incidence of infectious dis-
ease necessitating quarantine precautions, or, in the situation of relative intensity
of security interests ranging from low-level conflict (e.g., the now-concluded Cold
War) to all-out protective exclusivity (e.g., for vital military installations or during
a hot war) for military ships. However, the right offoreign-flag military vessels to a
right of innocent passage, qualified as, e.g., in the case of submarines, as distin-
493
guished from port calls, remains a cardinal rule of international law.
Thus far voluntary port entry has been considered; international law also pro-
vides principles for entry in distress or due toforce majeure. As Colombos stated in
his 1967 summary ofprinciples on ports entry, a general claim of right of entry
for all vessels has been recognized for situations of entry in distress or due toforce
majeure. "Ifa ship is driven in by storm, carried in by mutineers, or seeks refuge for
vital repairs or provisioning, international customary law declares that the local
495
state shall not take advantage of its necessity," Jessup wrote in 1927.
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The customary claims developed through court decisions, at least as early as
1 803 in England and 1 809 in the United States. French courts applied a simi-
498 499
lar principle. By 1820 the principle had been echoed in US legislation. ' The
United States and other States began to include clauses in bilateral agreements, of-
ten FCN treaties with MFN clauses, as a further assertion of the unqualified
right of entry due toforce majeure or distress from the eighteenth century onward.
Early treaties often added enemy or piratical attacks as reasons to grant safe haven;
agreements frequently pledged repair facilities availability or return of pirate-
seized goods. These treaties usually were the same as those permitting free or
502
qualified entry into ports, or were in agreements touching upon such rights.
The treaties did not discriminate against warships, and Schooner Exchange consid-
ered immunity of a French privateer, the Balaou, driven into Philadelphia by bad
503
weather. Legal opinions within the British and US governments, instructions
to their representatives and diplomatic correspondence ofthe era, further confirm
that the bilaterals did, and do, articulate custom. Nineteenth century arbitra-
tions took the same position. Current commentators also recognize the princi-
pie.
506
Ship and aircraft commanders have an obligation to assist those in danger of being
lost at sea. This long recognized duty. . . permits assistance entry into the territorial
sea or under certain circumstances aircraft without [coastal State permission]. . . to
engage in bona fide efforts to render emergency assistance to those in danger or
distress at sea. This right applies only when the location of the danger or distress is
reasonably well known. It does not extend to entering the territorial sea or [its]
airspace to conduct a search. Efforts to render assistance must be undertaken in good
faith and not as a subterfuge.^7
Prudence would suggest notifying the coastal State ifpossible, perhaps through
national communications, and if the situation warrants and national notification
508
is not possible, notification by the entering vessel or aircraft.
b. Conclusions. The Territorial Sea Convention and 1982 LOS Convention con-
tributed little that is new to principles governing access to and from inland waters
and ports, etc. The principal points of change or difference are that States can use
their rights to temporarily suspend access to ports and inland waters through the
LOS conventions' provisions for temporary suspension of innocent passage
through the territorial sea, and there is a stated right of transit for landlocked
States to and from the sea, subject to agreement with transit States and those
State's rights to protect their "legitimate interests." The LOS conventions' pro-
visions are subject to the LOAC, which includes the law of naval warfare, through
the other rules clauses in particular situations, whether the LOS conventions ar-
ticulate treaty or custom based norms. Other general treaty suspension doc-
trines, e.g., impossibility ofperformance, fundamental change ofcircumstances or
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armed conflict, might apply. UN Charter principles, e.g., the right of self-de-
513
fense, which trump treaty and perhaps customary norms, might apply.
c. The Tanker War andAccess to andfrom Inland Waters andPorts. Iraq became a
defacto landlocked State early in the Tanker War, when Iran seized all of its coasts
and effectively closed the Shatt al-Arab. However, no obligations under the
LOS Convention arose because ofclosure by armed conflict; the LOS Conven-
tion phrase "no sea-coast" means no physical sea-coast. Thus although States
like Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey negotiated transport of Iraqi
goods, including Iraqi-originated oil to finance the war, through their territories
517by road, air and pipeline means, there was no obligation under the law ofthe sea
to conclude these agreements. To the extent that these materials contributed to the
Iraqi war effort, and the LOS might be deemed to have applied, the LOAC gov-
518
erned through the conventions' other rules clauses. Any LOAC obligation was
also subject to objection on grounds of treaty suspension: impossibility, funda-
519
mental change of circumstances and war.
On the other hand, Iran's attempts to disrupt neutral traffic to and from neutral
520
Gulfports violated general LOS principles ofaccess to ports. Besides being a vi-
olation of UN Charter, Article 2(4) insofar as the attacks violated or threatened
neutrals' territorial integrity or political independence, the Security Council
521
passed a resolution condemning this action. The resolution was thus supportive
of well-established law.
6. Passage Through International Straits: The Strait ofHormuz
522A major Tanker War issue was passage through international straits, e.g., the
523
Strait ofHormuz, a choke point vital for transporting oil from the Persian Gulf.
This sub-Part examines straits passage under the law ofthe sea, with particular em-
phasis on that waterway.
Before the LOS Convention negotiations, the law of the sea was unsettled as to
rights governing straits passage. The Territorial Sea Convention provides that
"There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through
straits. . . used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and
another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign state," thus tying
most straits passage to concepts of territorial sea innocent passage and declared
525
nonsuspendable by Convention Article 1 6(4) in most cases. In 1 965 the Restate-
ment (Second), Foreign Relations declared that innocent passage in straits between
one high seas area and another high seas area "or the territorial sea ofanother state"
526
could not be suspended.
At the same time other LOS issues were emerging. For example, territorial sea
527
claims asserted sovereignty beyond the traditional three-mile limit; questions
arose as to the meaning of innocent passage under the Convention, particularly
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with respect to military aircraft and warships; States began claiming EEZs, for
529
which the 1958 Conventions stated no general rules; and States began asserting
special status for archipelagic waters. Broadened territorial sea claims by Iran and
the UAE, plus Iranian claims to Abu Musa and the Tunis and Iranian and Omani
530
baseline assertions, implicated the Strait of Hormuz during the Tanker War.
The law of the sea as stated in large part in the 1982 Convention responds to
these trends, recognizing six types of international straits and restoring the cus-
531
tomary law of international straits:
(1) straits used for international navigation and not completely overlapped
by the territorial sea;
(2) straits used for international navigation connecting the high seas or an
EEZ with the territorial sea of another country;
(3) straits used for international navigation between one part ofthe high seas
or an EEZ and another part of the high seas or an EEZ;
(4) straits used for international navigation and connecting one part of the
high seas or an EEZ with another part of the high seas or an EEZ, where
the strait is formed by an island of the State bordering the strait and the
mainland of that State;
(5) straits used for international navigation and governed by treaties; or
(6) straits used for international navigation in archipelagic waters.
The Strait ofHormuz, connecting the Gulfwith the Indian Ocean, today is in cate-
532
gory (3). To place the law governing the Strait ofHormuz in perspective, it may
be useful to examine briefly the principles governing other kinds of straits, i.e.,
Cases (l)-(2),(4)-(6).
a. Straits Connecting High Seas orEEZ Areas,
Case (1). If a strait connecting a high seas area or EEZ with another high seas
area or EEZ has a corridor ofhigh seas completely through it, i.e., there is a band of
navigable water over which no coastal State has claimed a territorial sea through-
out the strait, that band ofwater is subject to the high seas LOS regime. High seas
freedoms of overflight, navigation, etc., subject to high seas users' obligations to
533
observe due regard for others' exercise offreedom ofthe seas, apply. Nearly 50 of
these straits existed in 1989 because littoral countries had not claimed as much as
they might for their territorial seas under the LOS Convention, i.e., 12 miles or
53524 miles at a strait's narrowest point if both coastal States claimed 12 miles.
536
Only 25 existed in 1997. The 1989 list included the Bahrain-Qatar Passage, and
537
perhaps waters around Abu Musa Island in the Gulf. (Iran occupied Abu Musa
no
before the beginning of the Tanker War, and whether the island is considered
part of the UAE or Iran, there are enough waters around it and the Greater and
Lesser Tunbs to support claims of high seas passage around them, between either
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Iran or the UAE.) There are 60 straits where the narrowest passage is greater
than 24 miles, none of which are in the Gulf, except for the possibility of waters
around Abu Musa. Case (1) might be resolved differently by a strict reading of
the Territorial Sea Convention and its nonsuspendable innocent passage regime
for all straits except those covered by prior treaty, with attendant problems of
defining innocent passage under the Convention. The 1958 Conventions also
do not address EEZ issues. The LOS Convention resolves the Case (1) issue; if a
high seas route with similar convenience with respect to navigational and
hydrographical characteristics exists in the strait, straits passage special rules do
not apply. General rules for, e.g., freedom of navigation or overflight, apply. If
the high seas or EEZ corridor is not of similar convenience in navigational or hy-
drological characteristics, transit passage principles apply. Before expanded
territorial sea claims became admissible, the Strait of Hormuz would have fit
within Case (1); its narrowest breadth is about 22 miles.
Case (2). Where a strait connects high seas or EEZ waters with a coastal State's
territorial waters, the territorial sea innocent passage regime applies, except
that the right of innocent passage is not suspendable. The Bahrain-Saudi Ara-
548
bia Passage is among these "dead-end" straits. Here the LOS Convention coin-
cides with the Territorial Sea Convention, except for the new LOS Convention
549innocent passage definition and the 1958 Conventions' omission ofEEZ rules.
The innocent passage rules apply to straits connecting the high seas or an EEZ
with an historic bay.
Case (4). Where a strait connects a part of the high seas or an EEZ and another
part of the high seas where an island of a coastal State and the coastal State's main-
land forms the strait, the LOS Convention provides that territorial sea passage, i.e.
innocent passage, applies, ifa route to the high seas or EEZ seaward ofthe island is
of equal convenience with regard to navigational and hydrographic characteris-
tics. As in Case 2 dead-end straits, passage through these straits cannot be sus-
552
pended. The 1958 Conventions give no clear response to this kind of claim;
presumably the Territorial Sea Convention's nonsuspendable innocent passage
regime applies. There are no such straits in the Gulf.
Case (5). The LOS Convention exempts longstanding treaty regimes govern-
ing straits passage from treaty regimes; here the analysis is nearly the same under
the Territorial Sea Convention. It subjects its rules to all prior treaties; the LOS
Convention permits derogation only ifa treaty is longstanding. Another kind of
treaty that might govern straits passage would be a more recent treaty that is com-
patible with the LOS Convention. No straits treaties apply to the Gulf.
Case (6). The LOS Convention gives special rules for straits through archi-
pelagic waters, which are substantially the same as innocent passage through inter-
national straits, except that archipelagic innocent passage is suspendable, while
ceo
straits innocent passage is nonsuspendable. This situation might occur if a
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strait under prior law becomes encapsulated in an LOS Convention-permitted ar-
chipelago. There is no clear answer under the 1958 Conventions, but the Territo-
rial Sea Convention general rule of nonsuspendable innocent passage in the
absence of treaties, ofwhich there are none, may apply. "' There are no claimed ar-
chipelagos in the Gulf, and no island groups eligible for claims.
Conclusions as to Cases (l)-(2), (4)-(6). The first and most important conclu-
sion from the foregoing is that the Territorial Sea Convention, despite its omis-
sions and ambiguities, when combined with the other 1958 Conventions'
principles, and the LOS Convention, state a general policy of relative freedom of
access through most straits, a high seas and EEZ regime in Case (1), straits through
which there is high seas passage; Cases (2) and (4), nonsuspendable innocent pas-
sage for dead-end straits and straits between an island and the mainland where
there is an alternate high seas route around the island; Case (6), transit passage
through archipelagic straits. For Case (5), straits governed by treaty regimes, the
result is virtually the same under the 1958 Conventions and the LOS Convention;
the treaty applies. The second is that the LOS Convention clarifies the law of
straits while recognizing LOS developments, e.g., the EEZ.
Only Case (1), concerning the Bahrain-Qatar Passage and waters around Abu
Musa; Case (2), concerning the Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Passage; and Case (3), the
Strait ofHormuz; apply to the Gulf. There is no record ofclaims regarding restrict-
ing passage, etc., around Abu Musa or through the Passages. The Tanker War in-
volved navigation and other passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and therefore
the question of transit passage under the law of the sea as stated in the LOS
Convention.
b. Passage Through the Strait ofHormuz. As a technical point oflaw, it is possible
to argue that two regimes governed passage through the Strait ofHormuz during
the 1980-88 Tanker War.
(i) High Seas Passage Through Hormuz? The Strait is about 22 miles wide at its
narrowest points. Ifa view is taken that the maximum territorial sea claim admissi-
ble under the LOS was three miles, the position of the United States until 1983,
when the conflict had been raging for about three years, navigation, overflight,
warship activity, etc., within the Strait was subject to LOS high seas principles
in the middle 1 6 miles ofthe Strait and territorial sea principles within the terri-
torial seas of Iran, Oman and the UAE. Under this analysis, the Strait presented a
Case ( 1 ) scenario. There is no record ofclaims to this effect. Analysis now exam-
ines passage under Case (3), passage from a high seas area or EEZ through a strait to
another high seas area or EEZ on the other end of a strait.
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(ii) Case (3): Strait ofHormuz Transit Passage and the Tanker War. If the Ter-
ritorial Sea Convention nonsuspendable innocent passage rule for straits used in
international navigation is combined with limitations on territorial sea inno-
cent passage in the Convention, it is clear that a coastal State may not temporarily
suspend passage in a strait for security reasons as it might for territorial sea inno-
cent passage. Passage in either case does not mean entry into internal waters.
It does mean stopping and anchoring incident to ordinary navigation or if ren-
569dered necessary byforce majeure or distress.
The general definition of innocent passage in the Territorial Sea Convention,
"Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the good order or security of
570
the coastal State,"" leaves open a question ofwhether innocent passage is totally
571 r
equated to straits passage under the Convention, and therefore whether transit-
ing fishermen engaged in fishing that is not contrary to coastal State regulations
572
are in innocent passage. ' The Convention also leaves open issues of whether
flight (particularly by military aircraft) through the strait, forbidden without prior
573
permission under the general territorial sea innocent passage regime, or whether
transiting submarines must navigate on the surface and show their ensign unless
prior permission has been granted. There were also questions ofwhether weap-
ons practice (no matter how innocuous, such as topside loading machine drills);
launching, landing or taking aboard aircraft (including, e.g., aircraft involved in
mail delivery or medical evacuation cases); launching, landing or taking aboard
any military device; or electronic interference with coastal State facilities (e.g.,
575
while tuning radars) could be conducted. There can be issues related to jurisdic-
tion over merchantmen, rules applying to State-owned commercial shipping, and
whether a coastal State can ask a transiting warship to leave the strait of the coastal
State for failure to comply with its otherwise legitimate territorial sea regula-
576
tions. Because the Territorial Sea Convention is subject to the law ofarmed con-
577 578
flict in situations where the LOAC applies, and to the right of self-defense,
an anomolous result is that naval forces may transit a strait under those circum-
stances without regard to Convention rules. A further possible result is that strict
insistence on the Convention by a coastal State or third States could result in more
assertions of unnecessary claims under these principles, with attendant counter-
579 r 580
claims of violations of the Charter or the law of naval warfare. These are
581hardly the kinds of results the Convention drafters contemplated.
For Case 3 straits, those used for international navigation and connecting a part
of the high seas or an EEZ with another part of the high seas or an EEZ and which
582
include most strategically important straits including Hormuz, the LOS Con-
vention provides that all ships and aircraft enjoy a right of unimpeded transit
583
passage. Transit passage means exercise ofthe freedoms ofnavigation and over-
flight solely for continuous and expeditious transit ofthe strait between one part of
the high seas or EEZ and another part of the high seas or EEZ. Continuous and
Law of the Sea 283
expeditious transit includes strait passage to enter, leave or return from a country
584
bordering the strait, subject to that country's conditions for entry. Transit pas-
sage exists throughout the strait, including its approaches, and not just a territorial
585
sea overlapped area. These approach areas are high seas or EEZ areas, for which
586
high seas freedoms apply, and are therefore not subject to a territorial sea inno-
cent passage or straits transit passage regime. Activity not an exercise of transit
587
passage is subject to other LOS Convention provisions, including the law of
588
armed conflict through the Convention's other rules clauses. The LOS Conven-
589
tion transit passage rules are also subject to the Charter. During early LOS Con-
vention negotiations Saudi Arabia advocated the rules eventually adopted; Iran
590
supported regulated passage and a special regime for the Gulf.
While in transit passage, ships (including warships) and aircraft (including
military aircraft) must: proceed without delay through or over the strait; refrain
from activities other than those incident to their normal modes ofcontinuous and
expeditious transit unless they experience/ore^ majeure or distress; refrain from a
threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of straits-bordering States in violation of the Charter; and otherwise
591
comply with LOS Convention transit passage rules. Ships in transit passage
must also comply with generally accepted SOLAS standards and international
regulations, procedures and practices for preventing, reducing and controlling
592
pollution from ships. Aircraft in transit passage must observe ICAO-estab-
lished Rules ofthe Air as applicable to civil aircraft; State aircraft, e.g., military air-
craft, "will normally comply" with these and will always operate with due regard
for aviation safety. They must monitor air control and distress frequencies as-
signed by the competent internationally designated air traffic control author-
593
ity. There is, of course, unquestionably a right of warship transit through and
military aircraft overflight of these straits, unlike the rule against territorial sea
594
overflight where warships, like all vessels have innocent passage rights. Ocean-
ographic research or surveys cannot be conducted without bordering States' prior
595
authorization. In terms of normal mode of transit under the LOS Conven-
tion, this means submarines and other undersea vehicles may transit sub-
597
merged; for today's submersibles, that is their normal operational mode. Sur-
face vessels may steam in formation, zig-zag, or deploy aircraft incident to normal
598
modes of operation; they may use, e.g., radar for navigation but not for attack.
They must not threaten bordering States' sovereignty, territorial integrity or po-
i • • 599 c-
htical independence. There is no requirement of prior notification of intent to
exercise straits transit passage by aircraft or warships.
Bordering States may designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic separation
schemes for straits if necessary to promote safe navigation and must publicize
these after approval by a competent international organization, i.e., IMO. Vessels
in transit passage must respect these lanes and schemes. Hormuz was among
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major straits subject to a traffic separation scheme during the Tanker War.
States bordering straits may prescribe rules relating to transit passage for safety of
navigation and regulating traffic; preventing, reducing and controlling pollution;
prevention of fishing and stowing fishing gear; loading or unloading goods, cur-
rency or persons in violation of a coastal State's customs, fiscal, immigration or
health laws, and must publicize them. If a strait is bordered by two or more
countries, those countries may cooperate through agreements to establish naviga-
tional and pollution prevention, reduction or control devices. However, these
rules may not discriminate in form or fact among foreign ships or in application
have the practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing the right of transit
passage. This differs from territorial sea innnocent passage, which can be sus-
pended temporarily; rules for straits cannot stop transit passage, even tempo-
rarily. This principle applies to dangers to navigation that a coastal State must
publicize. ' Vessels in transit passage must comply with these rules, and the
country ofa State aircraft registered under its flag, or ofa vessel registered under its
flag, bears international responsibility for loss or damage to coastal States from vi-
f\C\l
olating these rules.
c. Conclusions. During and before the Tanker War there were threats from Iran to
close the Strait. The United States and other countries rightly resisted these
claims, insisting on the right offreedom of transit through the Strait for all ships or
/TAO
aircraft entering or leaving the Gulf. Ifthe Strait had a strip ofhigh seas through
it (Case 1), under no circumstances could a coastal State lawfully close it. If the
Strait is considered under the LOS Convention straits transit passage regime (Case
3), no coastal State could close it either.
Iran delivered a diplomatic note concerning transit of the Strait in 1987. The
United States asserted that the right of transit passage was a customary norm, a
correct interpretation. There were no other coastal State claims to limit warship
or military aircraft transit; under the LOS Convention regime, States bordering
straits may not limit passage of these platforms, which were entitled to transit the
Strait in their normal mode, subject to LOS Convention rules on transit passage,
which might include submarines transiting submerged and formation steaming
by surface combatants. Although the record is sparse as to exactly where warships
began escorting or convoying tankers, since this was also a normal mode ofopera-
tion and a proper defensive measure, convoying, escorting or accompanying
through the Strait would have been permissible. Iran's traffic management
scheme for the upper Gulf required merchant ship notification before coming
close to its ports. The LOS did not require prior notification of straits passage
by any merchantman, and certainly not by any warship or State aircraft; there is
no indication in the record that this was required, however. Strait of Hormuz
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traffic separation schemes did not figure in the war, except insofar as they may
have channeled shipping, making it easier to attack ships.
The belligerents attacked neutral-flag vessels in or near the Strait, including its
traffic separation schemes. It was permissible for warships to defend them-
selves, and to come to the aid of stricken merchantmen, under these circum-
stances. Thus it was lawful for the Vincennes and other US warships to defend
themselves from Iranian speedboat and air attacks. It would also have been
proper for neutral navies, including those ofOman and the UAE, to remove mines
and conduct other mine countermeasures in the Strait, so long as they did not im-
pede straits transit passage and, in the case ofnavies of States bordering the Strait,
giving adequate notice oftheir operations to remove these menaces to neutral navi-
gation.
619
Part C. Nationality of Ships, Cargo and Other Interests
Ownership, financing and use of merchant ships has been a complex business
for centuries. Ownership of cargo aboard vessels in bulk (e.g., oil, cement,
{.JO
grain), break-bulk (e.g., bagged goods, crates), perhaps stowed on deck (e.g.
earth-moving equipment, railway locomotives), or containerized, and sub-
ject to freight charges or other liens, has become a complex business. This Part be-
gins by examining transnational aspects ofship and cargo ownership and issues
arising during the Tanker War before proceeding to development of trends in
claims on the public international law plane.
Warships have always been under State registry, but even here lines can be less
than clear. Privateering, where States commission private vessels to attack enemy
shipping, was a practice that ended only in the mid-nineteenth century. In-
creasingly today, governments own or charter vessels that are merchant vessels in
appearance and use. Some, although seeming to be merchant ships in function,
serve warships as naval auxiliaries, e.g., tankers, cargo carriers, and refrigerator
(TIC
ships. Still others serve military purposes, such as troopships, but may be con-
trolled by a country's institutions other than its navy. Other government vessels
with a law enforcement mission may be operated by government departments
other than its navy, e.g., the US Coast Guard, or local governments may operate
craft like police or fire boats. In some cases these functions may be combined with
naval forces. Dividing lines can be far from bright, especially for States with mini-
mal coasts or maritime forces. This Part ends by examining these principles, with
analysis of the Tanker War "reflagging" debate.
1. Defining "Ships"
There is no general definition of "ship" in the law of the sea, even in the 1958
conventions and the LOS Convention. The 1962 amendments to the 1954 Oil Pol-
lution Convention say that a ship is "any sea-going vessel of any type whatsoever,
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including floating craft, whether self-propelled or towed by another vessel, mak-
ing a sea voyage," and the MARPOL 73/78 definition is similar: "a vessel of any
type whatsoever operating in the marine environment. . . including] hydrofoil
boats, air-cushion vehicles[ACVs], submersibles, floating craft and fixed or float-
ing platforms." The 1986 Ship Registration Convention defines a ship as "any
self-propelled sea-going vessel used in international seaborne trade for the trans-
port of goods, passengers, or both " Here the definition might be said to ex-
no
elude warships, since they do not carry passengers or goods as a general rule.
General as they are, the 1962 and the MARPOL 73/78 definitions are more inclu-
629
sive and have been accepted by most seafaring States, although MARPOL's
reference to fixed platforms might raise some seafarers' eyebrows. National legisla-
tion occasionally supplies varying definitions, most of which are in accordance
nn
with the Convention statement.
631
Definition of a merchant ship under the law of the sea has fared similarly;
there is no agreed definition except by way of exclusion: merchant ships are any
privately or publicly owned vessels that are not warships or are otherwise in gov-
ernment public service, e.g., police or fire boats and therefore entitled to sovereign
63?
immunity, engaged in commercial activity. The law of naval warfare has much
to say about merchant ships and cargoes, but those principles apply in appropriate
situations through the LOS conventions' other rules clauses and will be ana-
lyzed for the Tanker War in Chapter V.
2. Ownership in Merchant Ships and Cargoes; Crews; Insurance
Individuals have owned ships since the earliest times; even today ownership of
pleasure boats, some ofwhich may be as large as small commercial vessels, is likely
to be in an individual. Since one person might not be able to advance enough capi-
tal to buy and outfit a ship, a practice of joint venture, i.e., ownership of shares in
63S
ships, perhaps for the voyage or longer, developed. Some of British North
636
America's colonial charters reflect this kind of business relationship. Begin-
ning in the nineteenth century, concurrent with evolving business forms on land,
637
the corporation came to be the dominant modality for vessel ownership. Even
command economies have used the corporate form, i.e., State-owned trading com-
638
panies. " By the opposite token, free enterprise-based nations have owned and op-
erated ships, usually through corporations. Countries with government-owed
shipping fleets included many Gulf States during the Tanker War: Iran, Iraq, Ku-
wait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE among them. Vessels may travel inde-
pendently as tramp steamers, picking up cargo at one port, discharging it at
destination, and picking up another cargo for a third port, etc., or along regular
routes as liners. Today most US shipping operates as liners, but many tramp
steamers still transit the oceans. Shipping corporations may cluster in one of
over 350 liner conferences to set carriage rates for certain routes and manage
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sailings efficiently. This can result in noncompetitive pricing and competition be-
tween conference and non-conference shipping companies, however. Associations
of shipowners also may influence decisions, particularly those in the political
arena. Corporations may own many ships; they may establish each vessel in a
subsidiary corporation for tax and liability minimization.
A vessel owner may "rent" a ship to others through a "charter party" or char-
ter. An owner can charter only part of a ship, but usually an owner lets the
whole vessel by one of three methods: demise or bareboat charter, time charter, or
voyage charter. In a demise or bareboat charter, "the charterer takes over the ship,
lock, stock and barrel, and mans her with his own people." In a time charter, the
owner's people continue to work the ship, and the owner retains possession; the
charterer buys the vessel's carrying capacity for a fixed time to go anywhere.
The other non-demise arrangement, the voyage charter, is a contract for hire ofthe
ship for one or more voyages. It is probably the most common form. Subcharter-
ing to another party, for part or all ofthe ship or the time, may occur unless prohib-
ited by a charter party. Brokers in major maritime centers, e.g., London or New
York, carry on "fixture" ofa ship under a charter far from the ship, its owner or the
charterer. Today an owner may telex or radio a vessel to give directions on its use
after a charter has been fixed.
Today charters are standardized documents. Usually a nondemise charter in-
cludes a "safe ports" clause, allowing a master (an employee of the owner) the op-
tion of discharging the charterer's cargo at a port that is safe to enter. For
example, ifa charterer directs a master to proceed to a port with a bar across the in-
let, the master can refuse and go to another port; the owner can claim damages.
"Safe port" also means political dangers to the vessel's safety; development ofan
armed conflict situation can affect these private contracts. A safe port clause does
not apply after a vessel's arrival. However, ifa port becomes unsafe after a charterer
nominates it, the charterer must nominate another if that port is reasonable under
the circumstances. Reasonable deviation is permitted in proceeding to a nomi-
nated port, and doctrines of frustration of performance or commercial im-
practability, perhaps caused by armed conflict or requisition clauses in the charter,
may end a charter. Governments may charter ships instead of requisitioning
them during wartime. Ifgovernment cargo is stowed on a vessel that carries pri-
vately held goods as well, there is the possibility of multiple ownership interests,
the vessel owner, the charterer, the subcharterers, and consignors and consignees
of the goods.
The holder of a mortgage or other financing device on a ship is another im-
portant ownership interest. Although nearly all maritime States have national leg-
islation governing ship mortgages, many (but not the United States) are parties
to multilateral conventions establishing rules for ownership of mortgages by per-
sons that are nationals of States other than that ofthe registry ofthe ship. Other
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provisions of national law may condition transfer ofmortgage interests from a na-
tional ofa registry State on mortgage registry State approval or accord lower lien
priorities for a foreign-owned ship mortgage, which may be given parity or near
parity with mortgages held by nationals of the ship of registry. A ship, regis-
tered in State A may be subject to a mortgage in State B whose trustee is a State C
national, with ownership in a State D corporation, whose shareholders may be na-
tionals of States E, F, G, etc. When the possibility of fleet mortgages —a security
interest in several vessels of different flags with a common owner—is contem-
plated, the issue becomes even more complex. When States guarantee or insure
ship financing, as the United States may under federal legislation, yet another
participant—this time a sovereign nation—may have potential interests. Under
these kinds offinancing arrangements, a vessel owner may appear to be in some re-
spects a lessee (charterer in maritime terminology) and the financing institution
may appear to be the owner of the vessel. Whatever the issues as to who are
proper owners, charterers or others who can limit liability under treaties or na-
tional law, the variety offinancing arrangements add to the complexity of deter-
mining ownership interests under the Intervention Conventions and perhaps
issues of nationality of the ship for law of the sea issues.
Transnational arrangements for carriage ofgoods at sea are equally complex.
While ordinarily a military commander or the commander's lawyer will not be
concerned with the nuances of these transactions, except incident to visit and
search, the following illustrates the complexity of trade by sea and the possible
multitude of private parties, and therefore the countries potentially involved.
Seller and buyer of goods sign a contract of sale. If the transaction is F.O.B.
(Free on Board), it may be either a shipment contract or a destination contract. If
the former, perhaps stated F.A.S. (Free Along Side a named vessel), a seller places
the cargo with a carrier at a designated point or ship; the buyer bears the risk dur-
ing transit. (Doubtless a buyer will buy insurance.) If it is an F.O.B. destination
contract, the seller bears the risk of transit and tenders delivery at port of arrival.
The alternative, C.I.F. (Cost, Insurance, Freight), obligates a seller to buy insur-
ance and pay freight to the carrier; these are added to costs for the buyer's price at
destination.
The buyer may obtain a letter ofcredit from a bank, by which the bank promises
to honor the seller's draft if the buyer submits shipping documents for the goods,
i.e., the shipment's negotiable bill of lading, invoice and insurance contract. The
letter is forwarded through the seller's bank for payment on submission ofthe doc-
cnc\
uments. A buyer may have credit arrangements to finance the letter of credit or
to finance sale ofthe goods. Although these transactions are technically independ-
ent of the sales contract or the contract of carriage, they are linked to the sales con-
tract, and participants in letter of credit transactions—usually banks—also have
interests in safe, timely and orderly carriage of cargo on the seas. Today
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multimodal transportation using containers is very common, the result being that
many land-based companies under different ownerships (and therefore different
national interests) may be involved if goods do not arrive or arrive damaged,
perhaps because of military action at sea.
Whether cargo is sent F.O.B. (perhaps F.A.S. for ocean transit), F.O.B. destina-
tion, or C.I.F., risk of loss during shipment must fall on a shipper or a carrier. As
f\T)
noted earlier in the context ofdirection ofshipping, carriage ofgoods by sea in-
volves many ownership interests regulated by the customary, treaty and national
law ofadmiralty. Most such arrangements are covered by the COGSA Convention
as supplemented by more recent treaties. These standards may be incorporated
in a private contract, e.g., a charter party.
Clauses in contracts ofcarriage or affreightment may affect ownership interests
in freight charges for transportation and hence ownership interests in transport-
ing the goods. For situations related to armed conflict, these include fire, perils of
the sea, acts of war, acts of public enemies, arrest or restraint of princes {i.e., re-
straints by governments), seizure under legal process, riots or civil commotions,
saving life or property at sea, and deviation. Although armed conflict may trig-
ger invocation of the war exception, the peripheral impact of armed conflict may
cause ships to deviate from planned courses, or they may be tied up in port due to
departure restrictions or domestic unrest resulting from armed conflict, etc. Thus,
armed conflict can result in private parties' raising claims against other private
parties, all ofwhich may hail from different countries, and governments in these
fnf\
countries may hear from affected parties, who may urge measures affecting the
conflict, ranging from entry into the conflict to less coercive measures. The result
is that cargo interests or others, faced with a carrier claim of exemption under
COGSA, may look elsewhere, perhaps to their insurers, perhaps to the country that
(Jin fCTZ.
allegedly caused them harm, but possibly to their governments for espousal,
if the ultimate cause of their loss is cognizable and compensable under interna-
tional law. This was the basis of claims for the Stark and Vincennes attacks, al-
though injury and death claims were primarily involved.
Besides these claims related to cargo carriage, a ship owner is also concerned
with claims related to illness, injury or death of mariners aboard the ship. At the
least, an owner must pay maintenance, cure and wages; all States recognize the
principle that injured or sick merchant seamen are entitled to food and lodging,
medical services and unearned salary for the remainder of the voyage, plus burial
expense, if death, injury or illness occurs while enrolled as a seaman on a ship.
States may accord other relief for injured seamen or mariners who die at sea. In
the United States and many industrialized countries, maritime workers (mariners,
shipyard employees, and stevedores who work the docks) are heavily unionized;
the unions themselves can be potent forces for claims involving members, as some
countries discovered during the Tanker War.
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Passengers and others involved in maritime-related business, e.g., oil platform
workers, may claim for injuries or death under maritime law, perhaps augmented
/TOT
by national legislation. The same can happen when there is loss or damage to
civil aircraft. While these claimants might be content with claims against other
private parties who allegedly harm them, there is a possibility of claims against an
allegedly offending State or perhaps requests for espousal by their govern-
ments.
684
Overarching these primary claims is a potential for insurance coverage and
subrogation to an insured's claims, i.e., where an insurance company steps in an
insured party's shoes, a common procedure for property damage claims under US
law. Participants in the marine insurance field may be of entirely different nation-
alities than the insured ship owner, charterer or cargo interests. UK underwriters,
usually operating from Lloyd's syndicates, have dominated the field, but
other nationals or their companies may be involved. ' Reinsurance, where a rein-
surer agrees to indemnify another insurance company against risks assumed by it
689
on insurance in favor of a third party, (e.g., vessel owner, charterer or cargo in-
terests), may introduce more potential claimants (a reinsurer as ultimate subrogee)
for a maritime law claim. Today three kinds of marine insurance are written. Hull
insurance covers a vessel or a fleet, ships' machinery and certain collision liabili-
ties plus general average and salvage charges. Cargo insurance protects a ship-
691
per. Protection and indemnity (P & I) insurance covers nearly everything not
under a hull policy, including personal injury, illness and death of those aboard
ship; other collision liability; pollution liability; omnibus coverage for new risks
not within the express provisions in use. P & I is underwritten through "clubs" of
insurers, most ofwhich are in the United Kingdom. UK P & I clubs have insured
692
about 65 percent of the world's shipping. Although ownership interests can in-
693
sure nearly everything, and can buy an "all risks" policy, war risk insurance is
written separately because of the "free of capture and seizure" (F C & S) clause in
typical policies. Thus insureds must buy a separate policy and pay an additional
premium for war risk.
Obtaining insurance or writing it are voluntary acts. Owner interests can elect
to operate ships uninsured because of high premium costs, but they are foolish to
do so because ofthe high risk ofpersonal liability beyond the value ofthe vessel, as-
suming that the ship or cargo survives the mishap for imposition ofmaritime liens,
because of the possibility of failure of limitation of liability. Insurers can elect to
charge relatively high premiums when the risks are high, e.g., projected transit ofa
dangerous zone of the ocean, or choose not to write policies at all for certain
risks, e.g., war. Today all oceangoing vessels carry basic war risk insurance. The re-
sult has been that States have war risk insurance legislation for coverage "when-
ever it appears. . . that such insurance adequate for the needs of the water-borne
commerce of the United States cannot be obtained on reasonable terms and
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conditions from companies . . .," as the US legislation has had it. Recognizing
697
growing use of flags of convenience, legislation may permit coverage for these
vessels besides nationally registered ships; cargoes on both national-flag and flag
698
of convenience ships; and personal injury, death or detention of crews. Other
699
maritime risks may be covered as well. The government may provide reinsur-
ance coverage to spread commercial carrier risk. Private coverage, if available,
701
may continue. The result is that governments may become subrogated to claims
caused by war situations besides their building and operating, chartering or requi-
702
sitioning vessels during crisis.
3. Nationality ofMerchant Vessels
The foregoing sub-Part has analyzed the plethora ofgovernment and private in-
terests that may claim in transactions involving merchant ships. This sub-Part an-
alyzes trends in claims to ships' nationality in international law. Jurisdiction over
703
such ships in, e.g., territorial waters, has been mentioned separately.
Bilateral agreements, often in the form of FCN treaties, of the late eighteenth
century, and continuing through the nineteenth into this century, provided for
mutual recognition ofeach State's ships as national vessels ifthe master produced
a passport, sea letter or other sufficient document issued by competent national au-
thority. Although early treaties stated this requirement as a wartime measure,
perhaps requiring periodic renewal ofpapers, later agreements were more general
705
and not so limited. When bilateral treaties began to include MFN clauses to
grant each party the highest favor any other treaty partner of either held, the prac-
706
tice and necessity ofincluding sea letter clauses declined. Occasional treaties re-
707
cited requirements for these documents. In 1906 Moore said these papers
should be included: passport, sea letters, charts, bill ofhealth, bill ofsale or owner-
708
ship certificate, manifest, charter party, bills of lading, and invoices. A few
agreements also based vessels' nationality on the crew's composition and the mas-
ter's nationality, perhaps with a statement that national recognition was suffi-
709
cient. US Prohibition Era bilateral antismuggling treaties also infer a need for
710
ship's papers. To the extent these treaties had common or similar terms, it can
be argued that they point to establishing a customary norm for determining the na-
71
1
tionality of a vessel. Treaty succession principles applied their terms to other
712
countries in some cases.
Early admiralty cases upheld the presumptive validity of bills of sale or similar
documentation for vessels and therefore the nationality of the ship. By the
71
5
mid-nineteenth century these papers were required to be aboard neutral ships.
The flag, Moore wrote in 1906, was only "prima facie evidence, on the high seas,
71 ft
that the nationality of the ship corresponds to that of the flag."
In 1873 a Spanish man-of-war overtook 5.5. Virginius on the high seas; Virginius
717
was accused ofcarrying arms and insurgents to Cuba, then a Spanish possession.
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Virginius had been registered fraudulently as a US vessel, as later investigation
showed; her real owners were Cubans resident in New York. The United States
710
protested Virginius' seizure; Spain admitted an international law violation for
having taken the ship on the high seas while flying a US ensign and carrying US
registry papers.
In 1896 the International Law Institute adopted a recommendation that na-
771
tionalities ofcaptain and crew should not be criteria of a ship's nationality. The
1905 Montijo arbitration rejected the argument that a ship could not be considered
a US vessel because only a third of her crew was American, a violation of US law.
72?
That was a domestic matter for the United States, the arbitrator ruled. The Per-
manent Court ofArbitration in the 1 905 MuscatDhows Case held a State was free to
773
decide which ships could fly its flag and to prescribe rules for the privilege.
"What that case reveals is that there is no unique connection between the national
identity of a ship for jurisdiction purposes and the flying of a flag." Even though
the dhows flew a French flag, they were Muscati manned and could be claimed as
Muscat vessels.
Although bilateral treaties continued to provide for mutual recognition of
725
ships' papers to establish nationality, advent of flags of convenience—vessels
nominally registered under certain States' municipal legislation but beneficially
owned by other States' nationals—in the early twentieth century challenged the
basic principle ofexclusively national decisionmaking as to which vessels could fly
Uft 777
a State's flag. Adopting another State's flag was nothing new, but a general
practice came into vogue with attempts to evade Prohibition and in sale ofUS and
728
other flag vessels incident to World War I demobilization.
The 1927 Lotus Case reiterated the principle that a vessel has a nationality con-
729
ferred on it by a State and is subject to the authority of the flag it flies.
Multilateral agreements following World War I began to vindicate establishing
nationality by ship's papers with the flag as a symbol. The 1 928 Convention on Pri-
vate International Law (Bustamante Code),730 1929 SOLAS,731 1930 Load Line
732 733Convention and 1 948 SOLAS echoed these principles. Given widespread ac-
ceptance in multilateral agreements, these principles began to reflect custom.
In 1953 the US Supreme Court repeated the traditional national determination
principle:
Perhaps the most venerable and universal rule of maritime law relevant to our
problem is that which gives cardinal importance to the law of the flag. Each State
under international law may determine for itselfthe conditions on which it will grant
its nationality to a merchant ship, thereby accepting responsibility for it and
acquiring authority over it. Nationality is evidenced to the world by the ship's papers
and its flag. The United States has firmly and successfully maintained that the
regularity and validity of a registration can be questioned only by the registering
State. 735
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Two years later the Nottebohm Case articulated the "genuine link" test for deter-
mining nationality for espousal purposes in a dual-national situation.
The 1958 High Seas Convention repeats traditional principles that every State
may fix conditions for granting nationality to ships, registering them and granting
the right to fly its flag. Nodding to Nottebohm, the Convention requires that a "gen-
uine link" must exist between a ship and the State ofregistry; a State must exercise
jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over its
flagged vessels. A State must issue documentation to vessels under its flag. Except
for bonafide transfers ofownership or registry changes, a ship may not shift flags in
port or on the high seas. Ships sailing under two or more States' flags may not as-
737
sert them to any other State and may be assimilated to a Stateless vessel.
The ICJ, however, in rendering its advisory opinion on the Constitution of the
Maritime Safety Committee ofIMCO, stated that the phrase "largest ship-owning
nations" in the IMCO Convention meant registered tonnage, and not beneficially
738
owned tonnage, thereby supporting a view that registry, and not metaphysical
linkage, controls for purposes of nationality of ships.
Other multilateral agreements restate the familiar nationality rule, e.g., 1960
SOLAS, 739 1 974 SOLAS,740 and marine pollution conventions;741 they key State
responsibility to ships entitled to fly the flag, or in some cases ships operating un-
der a party's authority, fundamentally the High Seas Convention rule. Commenta-
tors also recognized the principle ofnational decisionmaking to determine a ship's
nationality. Boczek also claimed, "[T]he practice of registering ships has be-
come universal and it is an established rule of international law that all maritime
States make registration a formal condition oftheir nationality, the only exception
being small craft. . . not intended for long-distance navigation." Issuing a docu-
ment to evidence registration "is also universal." The Convention on Facilita-
tion of International Maritime Traffic confirms this view.
The 1982 LOS Convention follows the High Seas Convention's theme with ad-
ditional requirements for flag States. The genuine link concept is preserved, to-
gether with requirements for jurisdiction over administrative, technical and social
matters in vessels. The LOS Convention also requires registry of all vessels, ex-
cept small craft, flying a State's flag, and mandates flag State responsibility for
safety at sea through adequate manning, construction and safety equipment, and
signalling to communicate and prevent collisions. If another State has clear
grounds to believe a flag State is not exercising proper jurisdiction and control
over a ship, the other State may report the facts to the flag State, which must inves-
748
tigate the matter and take appropriate action.
The 1986 Ship Registration Convention elaborates on the LOS Convention.
Few States are party to it, but they include two Gulf States (Iraq, Oman), which rat-
ified after the Tanker War. After declaring that ships have the State's national-
7S
1
ity whose flag they are entitled to fly, the Convention requires that parties must
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have a competent, adequate national maritime administration to manage and con-
752
trol vessels flying their flags. Registration requirements are stated with particu-
753
larity. Although the Registration Convention does not mention genuine link, it
lays down specific rules for nationality. First, a State's national laws may provide
for ownership rules, which must "include appropriate provisions for participation
by the State or its nationals as owners of ships flying its flag or in the ownership of
such ships and for the level ofsuch participation." These laws must "be sufficient
to permit the flag State to exercise effectively its jurisdiction and control over ships
flying its flag." Alternatively, States may "observe the principle that a satisfac-
tory part of the complement" of a ship be flag State nationals, domiciliaries or law-
ful permanent residents. This goal must be considered in the light of available
seafarers meeting the criterion, "sound and economically viable operation of [the
flag State's] ships," and other international agreements. This alternative must be
755
applied on a ship, company or fleet basis. Other nationals may serve on a State's
ships, but its own nationals, domiciliaries or permanent residents should be given
opportunity for education and training in maritime work.
Under either alternative, a registry State must ensure that a shipowning com-
pany, or a subsidiary, is established "and/or has its principal place of business
within its territory in accordance with its laws and regulations." If a company is
not a flag State-established enterprise or does not have its principal place of busi-
ness there, a flag State national—either a natural or juridical person, e.g., a corpora-
tion—in a management or representative capacity must be available for legal
process. Moreover, a flag State must ensure that those accountable for or managing
757
a ship are financially responsible as to potential tort liability and crew wages.
Registration and documentation requirements are detailed; there are provi-
758
sions for bareboat charterers. The Convention encourages joint ventures to
759
enlarge developing States' national shipping industries and protecting labor-
760
supplying nations' interests. IMO and other international organizations may
761
assist in implementation.
Because oflow acceptance since 1 986 and its emergence during the Tanker War,
the Registry Convention does not represent customary law. Its confirming LOS
76?
Convention rules, which build on the High Seas Convention's, i.e., means that
although the LOS requires a genuine link between a registry State and a ship, reg-
istry details must be left to that country.
763
Few claims with respect to separate chartering interests ' have been asserted.
In 1921 the United States allowed US charter interests to fly the national ensign at
the masthead and a Chinese ensign at the stern, despite US Navy concerns about
identification. Chinese municipal law permitted the practice. This practice
would have tended to run afoul of High Seas Convention and LOS Convention
765
rules for single flags from ships. The Ship Registration Convention permits a
State to register a vessel bareboat chartered-in, for the time of the charter, and to
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allow the vessel to fly its flag. This would not have violated the rule against two
flags, for the chartered ship will be registered in only the chartering-in State.
States may espouse charterer claims like other claims. The intervention
conventions require charter interests to be consulted ifpossible; certain limita-
tion ofliability treaties may equate some charterers with owners for private civil li-
770
ability purposes, even as a charterer may be equated with an owner when cargo
771
interests claim for damage during transit.
4. Warships; Other Public Vessels
The definition ofa warship under the law ofthe sea and the law ofnaval warfare
are nearly identical today. Thus whether a warship operates under the LOS or the
LOAC, to which the LOS is subject under the other rules clauses of the LOS con-
772
ventions or customary law, the analysis results are the same. The first defini-
tions of warships were published in the law of naval warfare.
Hague VII, announcing rules for conversion of merchantmen into warships,
was the first general treaty to state rules that would apply to converted vessels:
... A merchant ship converted into a war-ship cannot have the rights and duties
accruing to such vessels unless it is placed under the direct authority, immediate
control and responsibility of the Power whose flag it flies. . . . Merchant ships [so]
converted. . . must bear the external marks which distinguish the war-ships of their
nationality. . . . [Its] commander must be in the service of the State and duly
commissioned by the competent authorities. His name must [be] on the list of the
officers of the fighting fleet. . . . The crew must be subject to military discipline.
Vessels so converted must observe the law and customs of war; belligerents must
773
announce conversion as soon as possible. The Convention, although all States
have not ratified it, restates customary law except perhaps as to where conver-
775
sion must take place, today a moot issue because of merchantmen's size and
complexity, which demands conversion in a shipyard and not on the high seas as
occurred with the C.S.S. Alabama during the Civil War.
The 1913 Oxford Manual of Naval War defined "War-ships [as] Constituting
part of the armed force of a belligerent State and, therefore, subject as such to the
laws of naval warfare. . . which, under the direction of a military commander and
manned by a military crew, carry legally the ensign and the pendant ofthe national
777 119k
navy," plus ships converted as warships, the customary rule of that time.
In 1916 the US Secretary of State published this definition of a warship:
A belligerent warship is any vessel which, under commission or orders of its
government imposing penalties or entitling it to prize money, is armed for the
purpose of seeking and capturing or destroying enemy property or hostile neutral
property on the seas. The size ofthe vessel, strength ofarmament, and its defensive or
offensive force are immaterial.^9
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The 1930 London Naval Treaty did little to help definition. Although carefully
categorizing ships usually considered men of war, e.g., capital ships or battleships,
aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, minelayers, etc., including "special vessels,"
yon
e.g., yachts, tenders, transports, depot ships, etc., as "naval combatant vessels'
did not clarify whether these were warships or not. The 1 936 London Naval Treaty
categories for vessels usually considered warships was a second effort at particular-
781
ity by again describing existing combatant vessels; naval auxiliaries were ex-
782
eluded from classification as men of war. The 1936 Montreux Convention,
78 3
regulating Turkish Straits passage, followed this formula.
Forty years and two World Wars involving major maritime conflict later, the
1958 High Seas Convention defined "warship" as
a ship belonging to the naval forces of a State and bearing the external marks
distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly
commissioned by the government and whose name appears in the Navy List, and
manned by a crew. . . under regular naval discipline."784
785
This represents the customary rule. It is repeated, nearly verbatim, in the 1962
70/T
Convention on Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, the 1972 INCSEA
787 788
Agreement and the 1977 Panama Canal neutrality treaty. Except for referring
to vessels "belonging to the armed forces of a State," thereby recognizing present
realities of unified armed services, e.g., the Canadian Forces, or that military ser-
789
vices other than navies may operate warships (e.g., the US Coast Guard). The
LOS Convention followed virtually the same language in 1982, but for all ocean ar-
790 ii i-ii 791
eas. " Nuclear and conventionally powered warships have identical status;
792
there is no requirement that a warship be armed. Title to sunken or wrecked
793
warships and military aircraft remains in the State whose flag they flew. J Under
the law of the sea, warships, wrecked, sunken or in service, enjoy sovereign immu-
nity from authorities of States other than the flag State. In wartime situations, to
the extent the LOS continues to apply, e.g., between a belligerent and a neutral,
LOS immunity rules continue to apply, including title to sunken vessels or air-
795
craft. On the other hand, operation of the other rules clauses as between
belligerents during war means that attacking and capturing an opponent's warship
or military aircraft vests title immediately in the captor. This includes wrecked or
sunken warships or aircraft if successfully recovered or otherwise brought into an
796
opponent's possession,
Protocol I, Article 43(1), one of that treaty's few provisions applying to naval
797
warfare, is more general, applying to all armed forces but echoing the LOS
definition:
The armed forces ofa Party to a conflict consist oforganized armed forces, groups and
units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its
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subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not
recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal
disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict.798
Undoubtedly the LOS Convention rule is a customary norm for the law of the sea
today. However, as Swarzenberger and others have pointed out, the LOS def-
801
inition is subject to the LOS treaties' other rules clauses, the result being that in
the future the definition of a warship for law ofnaval warfare purposes may chart a
different course than the LOS definition. For example, States could invoke and
build gloss on Protocol I, art. 43, or apply Article 43 as a base for a customary norm
ifthey are not party to the Protocol, the present case for the United States. For now,
802
however, the definitions have merged for the LOS and the LOAC. The definite
trend of the law is that if a ship meets the LOS warship definition, regardless of its
size, means of propulsion and armament or lack of it, it is a warship.
Although the LOS conventions have mentioned other ships owned or perhaps
803
operated under charter by or for States for public purposes, no definitional
claims have been asserted, beyond statements that they may be totally immune
from other States' jurisdiction on the high seas. These issues should be differen-
805
tiated from the law of naval auxiliaries, which applies during wartime. On the
other hand, there were issues related to State-owned commercial vessels, e.g., tank-
ers owned by governments such as Kuwait. In general the law ofthe sea applies the
same rules for these ships as for privately owned merchantmen.
The LOS Convention also provides that the genuine link and single-flag re-
quirements do not prejudice the issue of vessels "employed on the official service
ofthe United Nations, its specialized agencies or the International Atomic Energy
Agency, flying the flag of the organization." The High Seas Convention includes
807
similar provisions. Protocol I forbids flying the UN flag unless "authorized by
808
that Organization." TheUN flag has been flown on several occasions; when em-
ployed in peacekeeping operations, in practice it has been flown alone after agree-
809
ments with the Host Country, i.e., the State supplying the platform(s) or unit(s).
Protocol I also prohibits improper use of the red cross, red crescent, and red lion
810
and sun, the inference being that it can be used with ICRC permission and by
agreement of State(s) concerned.
5. Ocean Transit in Company; Warship Formation Steaming; Convoys
Although as a general rule, merchantmen of any size travel independently, al-
beit in the case ofliners on predetermined paths through the seas, or on prescribed
routes, perhaps on the high seas as a matter of private initiative, or through straits
Oil
or the territorial sea at coastal State direction, small ships, e.g. fishing vessels,
may proceed in convoy for mutual assistance in case ofcasualties or heavy weather.
on
They may operate together for commercial purposes, e.g., fishing. Warships
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may also steam independently, which is the usual situation in the case of subma-
rines. However, for safety and mutual protection, warships may proceed in com-
pany, often in formation as ordered by the force commander. The law of the sea
does not restrict these freedoms ofthe seas, even in the case ofwarships steaming in
813
formation in straits, except that all oceans users must have due regard for others'
814LOS rights. By extension of this analysis, the law of the sea, as distinguished
from the law of armed conflict, applicable in certain situations through the LOS
815
other rules clauses, does not forbid or qualify the right of "mixed company" us-
age of the oceans, i.e., when merchant ships and warships travel together in con-
voys for reasons of safety and perhaps protection by the warship(s). Royal
Navy warships accompanied and attempted to protect UK flag trawlers fishing be-
818
yond the three-mile territorial sea limit off Iceland during the First Cod War,
for example. Convoy principles in armed conflict situations are different, how-
819
ever.
6. The Tanker War: Analysis
Even today the record is less than clear and full as to the identity of transna-
tional claimants involved in the Tanker War. Civil litigation and government-es-
820 821poused claims may proceed for years in the future. It is certain, however, that
there were significant claims during the war. Merchant shipping losses, and the
822
deaths and injuries ofmerchant mariners, were the highest since World War II,
there were claims arising from attacks by and on naval vessels, some ofthem defen-
823 824
sive in nature, and the environment suffered. There were also questions in-
volving the nationality of ships.
The clear inference from the LOS conventions and customary law is that as
long as a new registry State has a genuine link to a vessel through compliance with
the new State's registry requirements for ship safety, etc., and there is ownership of
the vessel, perhaps beneficial ownership through corporate shares, in nationals of
the new registry State, LOS requirements are satisfied. The LOS leaves registra-
tion details to the new registry State. It may be presumed that reflagging Kuwaiti-
registered tankers to US registry satisfied the LOS basic requirements. Proper US
825
registration procedures were followed, and US nationals served as masters. It
was also appropriate for US and other navies to convoy, escort or accompany mer-
chantmen, exercising a right of proportional self-defense if the merchant ships
were attacked or threatened with attack.
Neutrals also observed the rule ofrescuing persons in danger ofbeing lost at sea
when they picked up survivors of attacks on merchantmen or naval vessels (e.g.,
IranAjr), whether flying the same or another flag, people on offshore platforms, or
at least one aviator who went down at sea. (In many cases the record is silent on in-
dividual rescue efforts, but available sources indicate neutrals, including warships
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and merchant vessels, attempted to perform rescues commensurate with their
827
ships' safety, as the rule allows.)
Late in the war Iran used speedboats to attack tankers and other ships exercis-
ing freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf These
boats apparently exercised in naval maneuvers. Crew surviving neutrals' self-de-
fense responses were repatriated to Iran as the 1949 Geneva Conventions provide.
Presumably other speedboaters Iraq may have captured were treated as prisoners
828
ofwar and repatriated at the war's end. It is not clear, from the available record,
829
whether these vessels met the customary definition ofwarships. Although their
personnel were perhaps imbued with a spirit of suicide not unlike World War II
kamikaze and other pilots and midget submarine crew, the boats themselves appear
to have been warships.
On at least one occasion when the reflagged tankers were ready to leave Kuwait,
commercial tug crews refused to man tugs to accompany them. US Navy volun-
830
teers manned the tugs, which were equipped with minesweep gear. The record
is not clear whether the tugs met two standards of the definition of a warship, i.e.,
under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the United States, or
whether the tugs bore external marks distinguishing ships of the United States.
831
Probably the crews were under US military discipline. Nor can it be determined
832
whether the tugs were government ships used for non-commercial purposes;
they may have been privately owned but manned by military personnel, or they
may have been State-owned by Kuwait but operated for commercial towage. Ifpri-
vately owned but crewed by military personnel of a nationality other than the
833
owner(s), this would make the tugs subject to the LOS genuine link principle. If
owned by Kuwait, the issue is whether they were operated for commercial pur-
poses or whether they were used for noncommercial purposes. The available re-
cord does not give an answer. The nature of the minesweep gear aboard the tugs is
834
not clear either; this is a law ofnaval warfare issue. Based on the scanty record, it
may be presumed that it was admissible under international law to man the tugs
under the circumstances. If the tugs were commercial in nature, having a foreign
crew made no difference; merchantmen the world over sail with crews of mixed
nationalities. If the tugs were non-commercial, owned by Kuwait, it was the busi-
ness of Kuwait to determine who would man them. The tugs did not become war-
ships because they were operated by US Navy personnel, however.
Early in the war it was proposed evacuating merchant ships trapped in the Shatt
83S
al-Arab under theUN or ICRC flag. Iraq rejected this. TheUN flag proposal fol-
836
lowed UN practice in seeking affected parties' agreement. When this was not
forthcoming, the proposal died. The ICRC flag proposal also required affected par-
837
ties' agreement, and when this was not forthcoming, this proposal also died.
838
Merchant shipping losses, and claims arising from dislocations during the
839 840
war, were many. In many instances owners' losses were covered by insurance.
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841
There is always a possibility of government espousal, where the genuine link
842
issue will arise. Thus far there appear to be no such claims.
Although there were charter interests afloat in the Gulfduring the Tanker War,
843
e.g., USSR tanker charters to Kuwait, there appear to have been no published
claims in connection with losses to charter interests. In many instances these may
have been subrogated to insurance carriers, although there is the possibility of
845
espousal for these claims as well.
Aside from possible subrogation claims in connection with pollution interven-
tion or private claims, no separate identification of insurance claims with, or apart
from, the vessel have been noted. Insurance rates for war risk and other coverage
rose spectacularly during the war, predicated on shipping losses, which were the
QAf.
heaviest since World War II. Insurance and cargo claims usually follow the law
847
ofthe flag, although States may espouse nationals' claims here as in other situa-
848
tions. National cargo preference legislation may direct that certain cargoes, e.g.,
849
military supplies, be carried only in vessels flagged under that State. ' In that cir-
cumstance the flag of cargo and ship will coincide. The cabotage trade of most
States is restricted to carriage in national bottoms; this is often confirmed by trea-
850
ties. Although it would not necessarily be true, in many cases nationality of the
ship and its cargo will coincide. This would be particularly true with respect to pe-
troleum products, e.g., crude oil from Valdez, Alaska, bound for US refineries.
This might be contrasted with Persian Gulf oil lift, which was almost never in cab-
otage. Tanker convoys may have proceeded along the Saudi or Iranian coasts, but
these were not engaged in coastal trade, at least as far as the record shows. The oil
851
was for world trade. Local oil shipments, e.g., from northern to southern Iran,
852
went by pipeline.
853There seems to be no record ofgovernment-espoused claims for cargo or in-
surance interests. Nor does the record reveal the extent of claims by banks and
other holders of ship mortgages; since vessels are almost invariably mortgaged,
usually to the hilt, undoubtedly these claims figured in economic losses of the war
854
to the extent not covered by insurance. As the record of claims after any crisis,
855
economic dislocation or war shows, there was and is potential for espousal of
these claims.
There was heavy loss of life and injury to merchant seamen during the war from
857
belligerents' attacks on neutral shipping. Others may have been injured or may
858have died because ofIranian attacks on neutrals' offshore oil pumping facilities.
There were 290 deaths in the Vincennes-Airbus tragedy, and the United States
859
compensated victims' families. There may have been deaths or injuries result-
ing from other mistaken defensive actions, e.g., the United States' firing on fishing
860
vessels or dhows. There were deaths and personal injuries among the U.S.S.
Stark and U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts crews. Other military personnel from neu-
tral countries may have been hurt or may have died because of belligerents'
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war-related actions. There probably were deaths or injuries connected with US de-
fensive attacks on oil platforms, and there were deaths or injuries connected
with US defensive attacks on IranAjr and other Iranian vessels or aircraft, notably
the speedboats. In the Vincennes-Airbus and Stark cases, governments paid
compensation, the United States in the Vincennes incident and Iraq for Stark
QC.A
deaths and injuries. Transnational litigation may resolve other death and per-
sonal injury claims, particularly for the merchant mariners, or parties may be com-
pensated through espousal. In many cases insurance may protect owners,
Qf.fi
charterers, etc., from personal liability for these claims. Governments may com-
pensate their military personnel or their survivors under national law for active
service injury or death, and these sums might be added to espoused claims.
The record is sparse as to proceedings involving these claims, and their amount
and number, other than those involving Stark, Vincennes and the Rostum
platforms.
Part D. General Conclusions and Appraisal for the Law of the Sea
The Tanker War was a long conflict, eight years from the first shots and four
years of more intensive war at sea. It produced nearly every conceivable issue re-
lated to the law ofthe sea, the law ofarmed conflict, and law under theUN Charter.
Chapter III analyzed Charter law in the Tanker War, and Chapter V will discuss
LOAC issues.
The Tanker War began while LOS Convention negotiations were underway.
When the war ended in 1988, the ratification process was underway, but not
enough countries had ratified the treaty for it to be effective as an international
agreement. Some Tanker War participants had ratified the LOS Convention by
1988, however. For these States, there was an obligation not to defeat the treaty's
object and purpose besides their duties under customary law (which might include
customary rules restated in the LOS Convention) and perhaps the 1958 LOS con-
ventions, if they were party to them. Other countries, e.g., the United Kingdom
and the United States, were not signatories or parties to the LOS Convention dur-
ing the war but were parties to the 1958 LOS conventions. These countries were
also bound by the customary law of the sea, including custom restated in the LOS
Convention. Some States, including many Persian Gulf nations, were party to
none of the LOS conventions. Nevertheless, these countries were bound by the
customary law of the sea restated in the conventions, as well as other customary
norms. The Tanker War era, 1980-88, was a time of transition for the law ofthe sea,
requiring analysis ofevery issue under custom and five LOS conventions, in addi-
tion to other special LOS-related agreements.
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1. High Seas Freedoms: Navigation and Overflight
Neutral countries' warships and military aircraft, whether launched from air-
craft carriers or the land, had freedom of navigation or overflight in the Gulf, sub-
ject to the LOS norms limiting those freedoms, e.g., due regard for others' exercise
ofthese high seas freedoms, and the LOAC when it applied. Similarly, belligerents
in their relations with neutrals had high seas freedoms of overflight and naviga-
tion, again subject to LOS norms limiting those freedoms, e.g., due regard for neu-
trals' exercise ofhigh seas freedoms, and the LOAC when it applied. In all cases, as
between treaty-based norms and the U.N. Charter, the Charter prevailed. One ex-
ample of this was the Airbus tragedy. Iranian aircraft had Gulf overflight rights,
but the United States had a right to respond (in this case, in error) in self-defense
when its warship appeared threatened by what was mistakenly perceived to be an
incoming Iranian military aircraft.
In terms ofcustomary LOS norms, the same principles were at stake, unless one
takes the view that a separate customary Charter-based norm at variance from
principles under the Charter was at issue, or that the customary Charter-based
norm had been elevated tojus cogens status and therefore prevailed over custom or
treaty-based rules. There is no evidence of claims involving these issues.
During the Tanker War belligerents interfered with neutrals' freedom of navi-
gation through indiscriminate mining. Moreover, although it was an LOAC issue
because they chose to fire indiscriminately on neutral merchantmen or neutral
military aircraft in many instances, belligerents also violated neutrals' high seas
rights of freedom of navigation and overflight. It was proper under the law of
self-defense for neutral military forces (air, surface warships) to respond propor-
tionally to attacks on warships, merchantmen flying the warship's flag, or (if re-
quested, under a theory of informal self-defense) merchant ships flying other
neutrals' flags, if the merchant vessels had not acquired enemy character through,
e.g., carrying war-fighting or war-sustaining goods for the opposing belligerent
pursuant to that belligerent's direction or control as discussed in Chapter V.
Belligerents could announce and conduct naval maneuvers in Gulfhigh seas ar-
eas so long as they observed due regard for neutrals' high seas freedoms. Similarly,
neutrals could announce and conduct these maneuvers, so long as they observed
due regard for others' high seas freedoms, whether the other States were neutrals or
belligerents.
2. EEZs, Fishing and the Continental Shelf in the Persian Gulf
There appear to have been no claims of LOS violations regarding Gulf EEZs,
fishing or continental shelfzones. (As a technical matter, the Gulf does not have a
continental shelfas defined in the law ofthe sea; there is no continental slope to the
deep abyss.) All States, neutral or belligerent, continued to have high seas free-
doms ofnavigation and overflight through these areas claimed by neutrals, subject
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to limitations imposed by the LOS regime, e.g., due regard or the equivalent for
rights ofcoastal States in their EEZ, fishing or continental shelfoperations. There
were one or two attacks by neutrals on neutral fishing vessels operating legiti-
mately in these areas when these craft were mistaken for attacking belligerent
forces. As in the Airbus case, the response was in self-defense to a mistakenly per-
ceived threat. The LOAC governed belligerents' attacks on an opponent's offshore
facilities, as analyzed in Chapter V. Belligerents' attacks on neutrals' offshore facil-
ities were governed by Charter-based law, i.e., Article 2(4). Similarly, the US de-
struction of Iranian offshore platforms was a self-defense response to attacks
launched or directed from those and other platforms on innocent neutral
merchantmen.
3. The Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone in the Persian Gulf; Entry into
Neutral Ports
During the Eighties more and more States shifted from traditional three-mile
territorial sea claims to more expansive sovereignty claims, up to and beyond the
12-mile limit the LOS Convention would allow. There were also claims to offshore
contiguous zones. These claims in some cases exceeded LOS limits, in terms of
breadth (particularly under the 1958 Territorial Sea and similar customary re-
gimes) and because ofbaselines declarations that did not always square with LOS
definitions. None of these claims figured in the sea war, however.
Territorial sea usage did, however. Iran could use its territorial sea as well as the
high seas for naval maneuvers. Iran could suspend territorial sea innocent passage
temporarily for security reasons in connection with these maneuvers. It could use
its territorial sea for coastal convoys oftankers under the LOS regime. (As Chapter
V will point out, the LOAC allowed attacks on its warships during these maneu-
vers and attacks on the convoys if they carried war-fighting or war-sustaining
goods.) However, Iran could not permanently bar territorial sea innocent passage,
even as it could not permanently bar transit passage through the Strait ofHormuz.
Saudi Arabia could legitimately proclaim territorial sea safety corridors to facil-
itate neutral tanker traffic. It was unlawful for Iran to use neutrals' territorial seas
for naval maneuvers; this was a violation ofneutrals' territorial integrity under the
Charter, Article 2(4). It was also unlawful for belligerents to attack neutral ports or
attempt to frustrate entry into or egress from neutral ports, and the UN Security
Council was fully justified in denouncing this behavior. The LOS principle, which
is congruent with Article 2(4) and LOAC principles regarding neutrals, was
thereby strengthened and reinforced.
4. Passage Through the Strait ofHormuz
As noted, the Tanker War began while LOS Convention negotiations were
on-going. When the war ended in 1988, the ratification process was underway.
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During the Eighties more and more States shifted from traditional three-mile ter-
ritorial sea claims to more expansive sovereignty claims, up to and beyond the
12-mile limit the LOS Convention would allow. This had important ramifications
for the law of straits passage. If three miles was all a coastal State could claim, the
Strait ofHormuz had a narrow band ofhigh seas through which ocean traffic could
exercise freedoms of navigation and overflight under the 1958 LOS conventions'
high seas regime. On the other hand, if the LOS Convention territorial sea defini-
tion was the law and 12 miles could be claimed, the territorial seas of Iran and the
UAE could (and did) totally overlap, so that the LOS Convention straits transit
passage regime applied. Claims of Iraq and neutrals, e.g., the United States, that
Iran could not deny straits passage under either regime were well-founded in inter-
national law. This was one of the major victories of the Tanker War in terms of the
law of the sea.
The war also pointed out one of the major weaknesses of the 1958 conventions,
confusion over straits passage, particularly if territorial seas of opposite States
overlap, which is now the situation for the Strait if, as most (including the United
States) believe, countries may legitimately claim a 12-mile territorial sea. Does the
territorial sea innocent passage regime, with its potential for temporary straits clo-
sure when a State bordering a strait like Hormuz asserts its security is threatened,
apply through the Territorial Sea Convention, or does the customary rule of unfet-
tered straits passage apply? Given worldwide dependence on Persian Gulf oil, and
similar navigational needs for other straits (e.g., Bab el-Mandeb in the Red Sea,
through which tanker and other traffic may pass to transit the Suez Canal and serve
Mediterranean Europe and Africa and the rest of the Earth through the Straits of
Gibraltar), this remains a critical issue. Successful assertion of a straits passage re-
gime, perhaps founded on the LOS Convention rules, was another critical victory
of the Tanker War for the law of the sea.
5. Merchantmen and Warships: Reflagging and Other Issues
The Tanker War raised no countries' claims concerning the definition of a war-
ship, although there was the possibility of it with respect to the Iranian speedboats
and US crewing of tugs for at least one voyage of reflagged tankers from Kuwait.
The High Seas Convention defines warships in traditional terms; other ofthe 1958
conventions have no definitions, and 1 958 convention parties must depend on cus-
tomary rules, which are relatively well-established, for high seas situations. The
LOS Convention repairs this gap.
Reregistration, i.e., reflagging of the Kuwaiti tankers complied with the LOS
genuine link doctrine; for LOAC purposes, as Chapter V will point out, the flag of
the tanker was all that counted. The rejected proposal for reflagging neutral mer-
chant ships trapped in the Shatt al-Arab under the UN or Red Cross flag followed
LOS Convention principles; Iraq's refusal to allow this was within Iraq's rights.
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However, ifthe Security Council had decided to allow this under Charter Articles
25 and 48, the procedure would have been allowed.
Because of the complex business of today's international shipping, where own-
ership, cargo, insurance, financing and other interests may be spread among na-
tionals and companies of many nations, there was, and remains, the potential for
espousal of claims related to damage to or destruction of ships and cargoes during
the war. None of these claims appear to have surfaced, however. No espoused
claims for deaths of or injuries to merchant mariners or other maritime workers
have appeared, but that potential for the future also exists. The United States set-
tled death claims arising from the Airbus destruction by ex gratia payments, and
presumably similar settlements were made for deaths or injuries related to self-de-
fense responses connected with Gulf shipping, e.g., the dhows and fishing boats.
Iraq settled claims arising from its mistaken attack on the U.S.S. Stark on the high
seas.
6. Final Thoughts
For most countries, the LOS Convention has become treaty law to serve, along-
side customary rules often embedded in the Convention along with developing
customary norms, as a relatively stable legal regime for the oceans. That this Con-
vention is needed is most apparent in several areas. The Convention restates and
thereby strengthens traditional rules, e.g., freedoms of high seas navigation and
overflight, vital to navies but also to merchant traffic and civil aviation. The Con-
vention provides rules for new developments in the law of the sea since the 1958
treaties, e.g., the EEZ, which is not covered at all in those earlier conventions.
Rules for today's reality of a 12-mile territorial sea have crystallized. Knotty prob-
lems of straits passage are now closer to solution and will be solved through the
transit passage regime for watery isthmuses like the Strait of Hormuz. The same
warship definition will apply for all ocean areas.
Some countries, e.g., the United States, have thus far chosen not to ratify the
LOS Convention, even though a protocol, the Boat Agreement, revises what the
United States and other nations have perceived as weaknesses in the LOS Conven-
tion's deep sea mining provisions. These countries must depend on customary
norms, which can change through practice and acceptance as law, an example be-
ing the 12-mile territorial sea. Nonratifying countries' positions can be weakened,
despite the vehicle of protests of nonacquiescence, as worldwide practice changes
and more States accept the changes as law. If these countries, like the United
States, are 1958 LOS conventions parties, their position is less strong than if they
had not ratified these treaties, because opponents can argue that 1958 treaty
norms, e.g., the dangerously confusing straits passage principles, apply, and not
the customary norm restated in the LOS Convention or in general customary law.
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The final lesson from the Tanker War, as it applies to the law of the sea, is an ar-
gument for ratifying the 1982 LOS Convention. That Convention is not perfect
and may not cover all situations; no contract, no will, no statute, no treaty, no legal
document does or ever will. The straits passage and warship definition issues aris-
ing from the 1958 LOS conventions are two examples. It is hoped that nonratifying
countries will study the Tanker War record as it applies to the LOS and give seri-
ous consideration to ratifying the 1982 LOS Convention and its protocol. Ratifica-
tion of these treaties, and observance of them, may help prevent future crises or
wars.
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Restatement (Third) § 334(3) & cmts. b,c, r.n. 2,3.
47. LOS Convention, arts. 37-45; see also Part B.6.
48. LOS Convention, art. 237; see also nn. VI. 47-50 and accompanying text.
49. 4 Nordquist U 237.7(a); see also Jonathan I. Charney, The Marine Environment and the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 28 Int'L Law. 879, 884 (1994).
50. LOS Convention, art. 3 1 1(5); see also 5 Nordquist H 3 1 1 . 1 1 ; Vienna Convention, art. 30(2); 1 Oppenheim § 590,
at 1213; Sinclair 97-98. See nn. VI.90-184, 207-09 and accompanying text for analysis of the LOS Convention's
environmental protection standards.
51. LOS Convention, art. 45; see also Part B.6.
52. LOS Convention, arts. 17-32; see also Part B.4.
53. Vienna Convention, preamble, arts. 38, 43; see also n. III. 10 and accompanying text.
54. ICJ Statute, arts. 38(1), 59; Restatement (Third) §§ 102-03; see also n. III. 10 and accompanying text.
55. Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 31-38, 91-135; Corfu Channel, 1949 ICJ 22.
56. Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BYBIL 49-52 (1974). LOS Convention, art.
22(1) seems to anticipate this possibility with respect to proportionate anticipatory action to ward off pollution
threats. Id., art. 310 provides:
Article 309 does not preclude a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, from making
declarations or Statements, however phrased or named, with a view, inter alia, to the harmonization of its laws
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resources conservation, but also under id., art. 116(a), any "treaty obligations." The High Seas Convention has no
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95. North Atlantic Fisheries (Gr. Brit. v. US), 11 UNRIAA 167, 188-89, 193, 194, 195, 202 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1910).
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Can. -US, arts. 1, 3, 47 id. 1872-73, implemented for the United States by Northern Pacific Halibut Act ofMay 2, 1932,
47 id. 142; Convention on Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean & Bering Sea, Jan. 29, 1937, arts. 1, 3, 50 id.
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146. Id. 141, 146-47.
147. LOS Convention, arts. 55-58(1). The Convention also provides for high seas fishing rights, subjecting them to
existing treaties, cooperation in achieving agreements on high seas fishing, and Convention rules for certain fish
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those with Germany and Italy. TIF22, 52, 66, 72, 97, 11 1,155, 203, 213,222, 236, 263, 270, 304. Jessup.The Law, n. 267,
56-57, in zeal for the three-mile limit, does not note the distinction, although several treaties leaving the issue open
were concluded by 1927.
287. See nn. 123-30, 200-16 and accompanying text; see also Colombos §§ 87, 88A; Swarztrauber 162-65.
288. See Swarztrauber 171-72.
289. Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Nor.), 1951 ICJ 116, 119-21, 143; see also Brown 24-26 (Fisheries Jurisdiction
formula followed in Territorial Sea Convention, art. 4); Colombos §§ 124-28A, 131, 134 (same); 1 O'Connell, Law of
the Sea 199-206.
290. MacDonald 86-87.
291. Philippines Ministry of Foreign Affairs note to UN Secretary General, Dec. 12, 1955, 4 Whiteman 282-83;
Republic of Indonesia, Announcement on Territorial Waters, Dec. 14, 1957, id. 284. The United States noted
non-acquiescience to the Philippines claim and protested the Indonesia Announcement. Id. 283-85.
292. MacDonald 87-88.
293. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1-2, reaffirmed by LOS Convention, art. 2;seealso 2 Nordquist 111 11.1,11.3,
2.8(0; 1 Oppenheim § 187; Restatement (Third) § 512 & cmts. a, b, r.n.l, 2.
294. The 12-mile claim was an amendment of its 1934 assertion of a contiguous zone. MacDonald 88, 107; see also
nn. 300, 354 and accompanying text.
295. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24, which is also the limit for emplacing nuclear weapons or weapons of mass
destruction, as stated in the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, arts. 1-2. See nn. 248-52 and accompanying text. To the
extent that States assert a right to punish offenses committed within the zone, as Lowe, The Commander's, n. III. 318,
112 says, this exceeds the scope of the Convention's grant. However, States may arrest, try and punish persons who
commit offenses in the zone pursuant to jurisdictional bases other than the territorial principle, e.g., the protective
principle cited by id. n. 14 in United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 938-39 (11th Cir. 1985). See Restatement
(Third) §§402-04, 421-23.
296. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24(1) ("In a zone of the high seas contiguous to the territorial sea . . .").
297. The US contiguous zone was reasserted in US State Department Public Notice 358, n. 275. Most countries'
pre-Convention contiguous zone claims were part ofwidespread practice for protecting revenue and health interests.
See Brown 128-30; 1 Oppenheim § 205. In 1999 the United States proclaimed a 24-mile contiguous zone. Proclamation
No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48701 (1999). See also n. 536 and accompanying text.
298. High Seas Convention, art. 23; see also Brown 135-36; Colombos §§ 171-79; NWP 1-14M Annotated 1
3.11.2.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated 1 3.9; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1075-93; Restatement (Third) § 513 cmt. g;
Craig H. Allen, Doctrine ofHot Pursuit: A Functional Interpretation Adaptable to Emerging Technologies and Practices, 20
ODIL 309 (1989) (analyzing LOS Convention rules); Susan Maidmtni, Historic Aspects ofthe Doctrine ofHot Pursuit, 46
BYBIL 365 (1972).
299. MacDonald 100, 107.
300. Manley O. Hudson and Richard Young of the Harvard Law School, acting in private capacity, drafted the
1949 claim, noting regional practice for a 6-mile territorial sea. Id. 87-88, 100-07.
301. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 3-13; see also Brown 24-26 (Territorial Sea Convention, art. 4 follows
Fisheries Jurisdiction, n. 289); Colombos §§ 118-10, 134 (same); 1 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 170-235;
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Swarztrauber 204-11; 4 Whiteman passim. For discussion of Iranian and Saudi baseline claims through 1959, see
MacDonald 92-98.
302. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14; its other rules clause refers to the LOAC. See nn. III. 953-67, IV. 10-25 and
accompanying text. What is "prejudice" under the Convention, art. 14(4) was left to coastal State interpretation and
failed to limit prejudicial activities to those in which a foreign ship engaged while transiting the territorial sea. See also
1 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 294-97; Restatement (Second) § 45, cmts. f-g; 48; id. (Third) §§ 512, cmt. c & r.n.3-6;
513(1)-513(2) & cmts. a-c, e, f, r.n.1-2; Roma Sadurska, Foreign Submarines in Swedish Waters: The Erosion of an
International Norm, 10 Yale Int'l L.J. 34 (1984). LOS Convention art. 19 tries to eliminate some subjective
interpretative difficulties that have arisen concerning the 1958 Convention innocent passage rules. NWP 9A
Annotated H 2.3.2.1 n.25. O'Connell does not rule out using force against a submerged transiting submarine but says
"every measure should be taken short of force to require the submarine to leave, as provided in Article 23 of the
[Territorial Sea Convention]." 1 O'Connell 297. A coastal State retains a right of self-defense, including anticipatory
self-defense, under UN Charter, arts. 51, 103. See nn. III.10-11, 48-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying
text. See also 2 Nordquist H1I19.1-19.11.
303. NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.3.2.4 n.33; NWP 9A Annotated H 2.3.2.4 n.32.
304. 1 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 294 (right to exclude rooted in treaty law, e.g., ICAO Convention, arts. 1, 3(c));
NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 2.3.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated H 2.3.2.1; Restatement (Second) §45, cmt. \;id. (Third) §513,
cmt. i & r.n.6.
305. Special agreements can give military and other State aircraft overflight or landing rights. Restatement
(Third) § 513, r.n.6, citing Chicago International Air Services Transit Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1693, 84
UNTS 389, which does not cover military or State aircraft.
306. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 15.
307. Eight countries appended reservations to protect their claims that surface warship passage was subject to prior
notification or authorization. Nevertheless, the weight ofauthority is that the Convention permits innocent passage of
warships without prior notice or authorization. Brown 64-66; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.3.2.4; NWP 9A Annotated
H 2.3.2.4; 1 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 274-91 (customary trends, which apply to warship innocent passage under the
Convention; no evidence of State practice before very recent times of other than free, uncontested warship passage);
Restatement (Second) § 49 (implication of coastal State waiver); id (Third) § 513, cmt. h & r.n.2; but see 1 Oppenheim
§ 201 (right doubtful). Saudi Arabia opposed warship innocent passage; Iran claimed warship passage required prior
authorization. MacDonald 170-71, 178.
308. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16; see also 1 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 297-98; Restatement (Third) §
513(2) & cmts. b-c. For analysis of straits passage, see Part.B.6.
309. McDougal & Burke 592-93; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.3.2.3 n.31; NWP 9A, Annotated H 2.3.2.3 n.30.
310. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 17; see also Restatement (Third) § 513(2) & cmts. b, c. Art. 17's other rules
clause refers to the LOAC; see nn. III.953-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying text.
311. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 18-20; see also Restatement (Second) §§ 46-47; id. (Third) §§ 512, r.n. 5;
513(2) & cmt. e.
312. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 21-22. The other rules clause refers to the LOAC. See nn. III.953-67,
IV.10-25 and accompanying text.
313. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 23.
314. Brown 44-45; Colombos §§ 119-20A; MacDonald 171; 1 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 161-64;
Swarztrauber 214-18; 4 Whiteman 122-35; Powers & Hardy, n. 2, 70-71.
315. Restatement (Second) § 15(2); accord, Colombos § 121, citing inter alia McDougal & Burke 562, asserting
two years later that the three-mile limit was the only common denominator.
316. See generally Restatement (Second) §§ 11-15, citing Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 3-4, 6-12.
317. MacDonald 90-91; see also nn. 299-300 and accompanying text.
318. LOS Convention, arts. 2-3; see also 2 Nordquist HH 2. 1-3. 8(e).
319. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 4-16, with Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 3-13; see also Brown 22-36; 2
Nordquist HH 4.1-16.8(e); NWP 1-14M Annotated H 1.3; NWP 9A Annotated H 1.3; 1 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea
175-235; 1 Oppenheim §§ 188-95; Roach & Smith Ml 4.1-4.5. 2 O'Connell 842-47 notes the LOS Convention's
ambiguity on whether deepwater ports are artificial islands. The US Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 USC §§ 1501,
1502(10), provide for them; see also NWP 1-14M Annotated H 1.4.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated H 1.4.2.2.
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320. Restatement (Third )§§ 511(a) & cmt. b; 512.
321. Id. §511, r.n.4.
322. In 1958 19 States claimed 4 to 11 miles; in 1965 24 claimed 4 to 11 miles; in 1974 14 claimed 4 to 11 miles; in
1979 7 claimed 4 to 1 1 miles. Table A 1 -6: The Expansion ofTerritorial Sea Claims, in NWP 1 - 14M Annotated, at 1 -84;
Table 3: Territorial Sea Claims, in Roach & Smith 149; see also Brown 45-50. Newly independent States claimed
12-mile limits, while many that had claimed 4 to 1 1 miles moved to 12 miles as the number of countries adhering to a
3-mile limit declined.
323. LOS Convention, art. 3; see also 1 Oppenheim § 196.
324. Compare LOS Convention, art. 33, with Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24. Restatement (Second) § 21
approves Territorial Sea Convention principles.
325. This analysis is derived from the LOS Convention. Compare id., art. 33(1) ("In a zone contiguous to its
territorial sea . .
.
") with id., art. 24(2) ("The . . . zone may not extend beyond 24 . . . miles from the baselines from which
. . . the territorial sea is measured."). See also Brown 129-35; 2 Nordquist §§ 33.1-33.8(i); 1 Oppenheim § 205;
Restatement (Third) §§ 511(b) & cmt. k; 513 cmt. f.
326. Compare LOS Convention, art. Ill, with High Seas Convention, art. 23; see also Brown 135-36; 2 Nordquist 11
33. 8(g); 3 id.W 111. l-11.9(i); NWP 1-14M Annotated 113. 11.2.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated H 3.9; Restatement (Second)
§ 22; id. (Third) § 513 cmt. g; Allen, n. 298; Maidment, n. 298; n. 298 and accompanying text.
327. LOS Convention, art. 303(2); see also Brown 135; Restatement (Third) § 521 r.n.6; nn. VI. 141-50 and
accompanying text. Article 303 also says its terms are also "without prejudice to other international agreements and
rules of international law regarding the protection ofobjects ofan archaeological and historical nature," an example of
derogation permitted by art. 311(2) and the Convention's other rules clauses, which allow applying the LOAC in
appropriate situations. See nn. III. 953-67, IV. 10-25 and accompanying text.
328. President Ronald Reagan, United States Oceans Policy, Mar. 10, 1983, 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 383 (Mar.
14, 1983); see also Brown 50-51; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 1.2; NWP9A Annotated II 1.2; Restatement (Third) § 511
r.n.4; Mark B. Feldman & David Colson, The Maritime Boundaries of the United States, 75 AJIL 729, 730 (1981).
329. Restatement (Third), Part V, Introductory Note 5; see also n. 328 and accompanying text. Five years later the
United States proclaimed a 12-mile territorial sea. Proclamation No. 5928, Territorial Sea of the United States, Dec.
27, 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (1989); see also n. 332 and accompanying text.
330. Only 5 claimed 4 to 11 miles. Table 3: Territorial Sea Claims, in Roach & Smith 149.
331. Restatement (Third ) § 511(a) & r.n.4.
332. Presidential Proclamation No. 5928, Dec. 27, 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Jan. 9, 1989).
333. By 1997 Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE had joined 1 1 9 other States in proclaiming 1 2-mile territorial seas. NWP
1-14M Annotated, Table Al-5; NWP 9A Annotated, Table ST1-5; see also Brown 45-50.
334. Cf. Brownlie, International Law 5; 1 Oppenheim § 10, 28; Restatement (Third) § 102(3) & cmt. f.
335. NWP 1-14M Annotated, Table Al-5 at 1-84; NWP 9A Annotated, Table ST1-5; see also Table 6.1 : Territorial
Sea Claims as at 1 June 1993, in Brown 46-49.
336. Roach & Smith HH 5.4-5.5.
337. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(5) omitted reference to foreign flag fishing ships, as did the straits
innocent passage rule in id., art. 16(4). The 1982 LOS Convention, art. 20 also requires "other under\vater vehicles" to
navigate on the surface and to show their flag. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 17-18, 20, 25-28, 30, 32 with Territorial
Sea Convention, arts. 14-15, 18-20, 22(2), 23; see also Brown 51-53, 62-64; 2 Nordquist 1111 17.1-18.6(f), 20.1-20.7(c),
25.1-28.4(e), 30.1-30.6, 32.1-32.7(b); NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 2.3.2.1, 2.3.2.4; NWP 9A Annotated H11 2.3.2.1, 2.3.2.4;
1 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 294-97; Part B.5. Although LOS Convention, art. 30, like Territorial Sea Convention,
art. 23, limits a coastal State to requiring a submerged submarine to leave, and this might be the only step a coastal
State takes, that State also has self-defense and any LOAC rights, the latter applying to the territorial sea through other
rules clauses in LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1), 21(1), 31; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17, 22(2). UN
Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10-11, 47-630, 914-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
338. Compare LOS Convention, art. 19(1) with Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(4); see also 2 Nordquist U
19.10(a); 1 Oppenheim § 615; Restatement (Third) § 513(1) & cmt. b, r.n.l.
339. See nn. III.952-67, IV. 10-25 and accompanying text.
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340. Compare LOS Convention, art. 19(2) with Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(5).
341. Compare Joint Statement with Uniform Attached Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing
Innocent Passage, Sept. 23, 1989, USSR-US, 11 3, in 28 ILM 1444, 1446 (1989) (Joint Interpretation) (list exhaustive); 2
Nordquist HH 19.2-19.9, 19.10(b)-19.11 (although negotiations may indicate list open-ended, Joint Interpretation
likely to be influential for view that list is exhaustive); NWP 1 - 14M Annotated 11 2.3.2. 1 n.27 (art. 19[2] list exclusive);
NWP 9A Annotated 11 2.3.2.1 n.26 (same); F. David Froman, Uncharted Waters: Non-innocent Passage of Warships in the
Territorial Sea, 21 San Diego L. Rev. 625, 659 (1984) (same); Robert J. Grammig, Comment, The Yoronjima Submarine
Incident ofAugust 1980: A Soviet Violation of the Law of the Sea, 22 Harv. Intl L. J. 331, 340 (1981) (same); John R.
Stevenson & Bernard H. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on theLaw ofthe Sea: The 1975 Geneva Session, 69
AJIL 763, 771-72 (1975) (same) with Brown 56-58 (taking no position); 2 Nordquist H 19.10(/) (diplomatic conference
criticism of list as being open-ended); 1 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 270 (list does not say these activities are the
"only" ones; art. 19(2)(/) so general as to comprehend anything); 1 Oppenheim § 199, 616 ("possibly comprehensive
list"); Lowe, The Commander's, n. III. 318, 116 (list illustrative; erroneous citation ofNWP 9A Annotated H 2.3.2.1 as
agreeing with this point). Restatement (Third) § 513 cmt. b takes no position.
342. Compare LOS Convention, art. 20 with Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(6); see also 1 Oppenheim § 201, 620;
Sadurska, n. 302, 57; nn. 302, 337 and accompanying text.
343. 1 O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea 294 (citing inter alia ICAO Convention, arts. 1, 3(c)); NWP 1-14M Annotated H
2.3.2.1, at 2-9; NWP 9A Annotated H 2.3.2.1, at 2-11; Restatement (Third) § 513 cmt. i.
344. See nn. III.952-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying text.
345. LOS Convention, art. 21; see also Joint Interpretation, n. 341, arts. 5-7, 28 ILM 1446-47; 2 Nordquist H11
21.1-21.12; NWP 1-14M Annotated U 2.3.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated 11 2.3.2.2.
346. NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.3.2.2 n.30; NWP 9A Annotated H 2.3.2.2 n.29; see also Brown 58-59 (no view); 1
Oppenheim § 198 (same); Restatement (Third) § 513 cmt. c (same).
347. In designating sea lanes and traffic separation schemes, a coastal State must consider competent international
organization recommendations, channels customarily used for international navigation, particular ships' and
channels' special characteristics, and traffic density. LOS Convention, art. 22. See also Brown 59-61 ; 2 Nordquist IW
22.1-22.9; 2 O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea 833-36, noting their use in straits and on the high seas; 1 Oppenheim § 200;
Restatement (Third) § 513 cmt. d.
348. LOS Convention, art. 23; see also Brown 60; 2 Nordquist 111 23.1-23.9; 1 Oppenheim § 200; Restatement
(Third) § 513 cmt. d.
349. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 24-25 with Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 14-16; see also Brown 61; 2
Nordquist HH 24.1-25.9; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 2.3.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated U 2.3.2.3; 1 Oppenheim §§ 198, 200;
Restatement (Third) § 513 cmt. c; 4 Whiteman 379-86; n. 337 and accompanying text. The President ofthe United
States has authority to suspend innocent passage in US territorial waters. 50 USC § 191.
350. LOS Convention, art. 31; see also 2 Nordquist 1111 3 1 . 1 -3 1 .7(b).
351. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(1); LOS Convention, art. 17, confirmed by Joint Interpretation, n. 341,112,
28 ILM 1446; see also Brown 64-66; 2 Nordquist H 17.9(b); NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.3.2.4; NWP 9A Annotated H
2.3.2.4; 1 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 274-91 ; Restatement (Third) § 51 3, cmt. h & r.n.2; Froman, n. 341, 625; Bruce
Harlow, Legal Aspects ofClaims to Jurisdiction in Coastal Waters, JAG J. 86 (Dec. 1969-Jan. 1970); Bernard H. Oxman,
The Regime, n. III.956, 854; but see 1 Oppenheim § 201 (expressing doubt as to the rule). See also nn. 337-50 and
accompanying text.
352. Table ST2-2: Nations Claiming a Right to Control Entry of Warships into Own Territorial Sea, in NWP 9A
Annotated, at 2-1 7; see also Froman, n. 341,651-55; Lowe, The Commander's, n. 111.318,119. 1 O'Connell, Law of the
Sea 292-93 says the shift has been from a Cold War orientation to States wishing to demonstrate positions detached
from global seapower politics.
353. Table ST2- 1 : Nations Specifically Recognizing the Right ofInnocent Passage, in NWP 9A Annotated, at 2- 1 2. The
US view is that surface warships possess the same innocent passage right as any vessel in the territorial sea, and that
right cannot be conditioned on prior notice or authorization of passage. NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 2.3.2.4 n.32; NWP
9A Annotated 11 2.3.2.4 n.31; accord, Brown 66-72; 1 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 292-93; Froman, n. 341, 625; Harlow,
n. 351, 86; Oxman, The Regime, n. III.956, 854; see also nn. 337-50 and accompanying text.
354. All listed countries except Saudi Arabia, which claimed an 18-mile zone and a 12- mile territorial sea,
proclaimed a 24-mile zone. Table 7: States Claiming a Contiguous Zone Beyond the Territorial Sea, in Roach & Smith 164
n.7.
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355. Id. 164 n.7.
356. Presidential Proclamation No. 7219, n. 297, referring to Presidential Proclamation No. 5030, n. 157; see also
nn. 157, 297, 329 and accompanying text.
357. The most egregious is North Korea's 50-mile military maritime boundary. Roach & Smith 11 6.2; see also
Restatement (Third) § 511 cmt. k (international law does not recognize coastal State assertions of special zones to
protect security or environment).
358. Colombos § 170A, referring to Defensive Sea Areas, in 46 Naval War College, International Law
Documents 1948-49, at 157-68 (1950); Defensive Sea Areas, in MacChesney 603-04.
359. See nn. 301, 319 and accompanying text.
360. See generally Roach & Smith 1 4.6; Dennis Mansager, The U.S. Freedom ofNavigation Program: Policy, Procedure
and Future, Liber Amicorum ch.6.
361. LOS Convention, art. 5, 7; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 3-4; see also Brown 23; 2 Nordquist 11 5. 1-5. 4(d),
7.1-7.9(h); NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 1.3.2; NWP 9A Annotated 11 1.3.2; 1 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 170-218; 1
Oppenheim § 188; Restatement (Third) § 511 cmt.h; nn. 289, 301, 319, 359 and accompanying text.
362. See, e.g., Table 2: Claims Made to Straight Baselines, Roach & Smith H 4.6, at 77-81, with notation, "Absence of
protest or assertion should not be inferred as acceptance or rejection by the United States of the straight baseline
claims." See also id. n.63, listing scholars' criticism of 17 States' claims.
363. Table 2, n. 362, in Roach & Smith 11 4.6, 79-81.
364. See nn. 11.66-69, IV.2 12-16 and accompanying text.
365. See nn. 296-300, 324-27 and accompanying text.
366. See nn. 80-157, 188-243 and accompanying text.
367. See n. 357 and accompanying text.
368. See nn. 300, 357 and accompanying text.
369. See nn. 333, 353 and accompanying text.
370. LOS Convention, art. 22; see also nn. II. 103, 262, IV. 347 and accompanying text. See Parts V.B, V.C.3, V.C.5,
V.J.I, V.J. 3, for analysis of Iranian coastal convoying in the LOAC context.
371. See n. 11.365 and accompanying text.
372. See, e.g., LOS Convention, arts. 19(2)(a) (threat, use of force against coastal State sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence, or in any other manner violating principles of international law in the UN
Charter), 19(2)(b) (exercise, practice with weapons of any kind), 19(2)(/) (any other activity not having direct bearing
on passage); 1 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 293-94; see also nn. 338-43 and accompanying text.
373. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(4); see also nn. 338-43 and accompanying text.
374. See generally Hague XIII; San Remo Manual, 111 15-16 & Commentaries; nn. V.485-92 and accompanying
text; Parts V.F.2, V.F.5, V.J.6.
375. LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1), 21(1), 31; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17, 22(2); see also nn.
III. 953-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying text.
376. See n. 363 and accompanying text.
377. LOS Convention, art. 2; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 1 ; see also nn. 293, 318-21 and accompanying text.
378. LOS Convention, art. 25(3), adding weapons exercises; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3); see also 1
O'Connell, Law of the Sea 297-98; n. 349 and accompanying text.
379. See nn.II. 379-81 and accompanying text.
380. See Parts IV.B.6, IV.D.4, V.F.I, V.F.2, V.F.5, V.J.6.
381. 381. Jessup 144-45; see also Colombos §§ 180-81; 1 Oppenheim §§ 193, 203; Memorandum of Frank Boas,
Attorney Adviser, US Department ofState Office ofthe Legal Adviser (Sept. 1957), reprinted in 4 Whiteman 259-61.
382. 1 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law §449, 853 (HerschLauterpachted., 8th ed. 1955); accord, Colombos
§ 1 8 1 ; but see A. V. Lowe, The Right ofEntry into Maritime Ports in InternationalLaw, 1 4 San Diego L. Rev. 597-98 ( 1 977)
.
383. 1 Oppenheim, n. 382,§ 190c; see also Colombos § 181, 177.
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384. Cf. Whitehurst, U.S. Merchant Marine, n. 11.59, ch. 16 (US ports).
385. LOS Convention, arts. 2(1), 8; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 2(1), 5(1).
386. See Swarztrauber 4-6.
387. Inland Navigational Rules Act of 1980, 33 USC §§ 2001-38. In most countries COLREGS, i.e., treaties
governing high seas ship maneuvering and collision minimization principles, also apply to those countries' inland
waters. Schoenbaum § 12-2, 716.
388. Schoenbaum § 12-2; Swarztrauber 95, 239.
389. The Mowe, 1915 P. 1, 15 (Adm.); see also Colombos § 180.
390. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 5(1); for baselines definitions, see id., arts. 3-4, 8, 1 1. Restatement (Second)
§§ 11-14 accepted the Convention definitions.
391. LOS Convention, arts. 2(1), 5-8(1), 13-14, 16; seealso Brown ch. 5; 2 Nordquist 1H2.1-2.8(f), 5. 1-8.6, 13.1-14.6,
16.1-16.8(e);NWPl-14M Annotated TI 1.4.1; NWP9A Annotated H 1.4.1; 10ppenheim§ 171; Restatement (Third) §
511, cmt. e.
392. LOS Convention, art. 1 1; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 8; see also 2 NordquistUH 11. 1-11.5(d); 1 Oppenheim
§193.
393. LOS Convention, art. 5; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 3; see also 2 Nordquist UH 5. 1-5.4(d); 1 Oppenheim §
188; Restatement (Second) § 14, accepting Territorial Sea Convention definitions; id. (Third) § 5 1 1 & cmt e, r.n.2.
394. LOS Convention, arts. 12, 16; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 9; McDougal & Burke 423-27; 2 Nordquist HH
12.1-12.4(c), 16.1-16.8(e); NWP 1-14M Annotated H 1.4.1; NWP9A Annotated H 1.4.1; 1 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea
218-21; 1 Oppenheim § 193; Restatement (Second) § 15, cmt. c & r.n.3; id. (Third) § 511, cmt. e & r.n.2.
395. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(l)(B) for an example of a jurisdictional "bulge" in a private law context.
396. See nn. 390-91 and accompanying text.
397. LOS Convention, art. 11; see also 2 Nordquist HH 11.1-1 1.5(d); 1 Oppenheim § 193.
398. LOS Convention, art. 9; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 13; see also 2 Nordquist HH 9. l-9.5(e); 1 O'Connell,
Lawofthe Sea 221-25; 1 Oppenheim § 189.
399. NWP 1-14M Annotated H 1.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated H 1.4.1; 1 Oppenheim §§176-77; 3 Whiteman 872-1075.
400. See nn. 11.66-69 and accompanying text.
401. US Secretary ofState James Monroe note to Spanish Minister Chevalier deOnis, Jan. 19, 1815, 2 Moore 269.
402. McDougal & Burke 99-100.
403. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 US (7 Cranch) 116, 141 (1812).
404. 2 Moore 270, citing id. 855-58, referring to the US' sealing Charleston harbor during the Civil War by sinking
blockships; China's sinking them during the 1884 China-France war, and Japan's near closure of Foochow harbor
during the China-Japan war.
405. 7 Moore 855, 858.
406. LOS Convention, art. 25(3); compare Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3); see also n. 349 and accompanying
text.
407. See Parts V.F.I, V.F.2, V.F.5, V.J.6 for LOAC analysis. The LOAC, which includes the LONW, applies
through the LOS conventions' other rules clauses, e.g., LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1), 21(1), 31; Territorial Sea
Convention, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17, 22(2); see also nn. 111.953-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying text.
408. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. HI.10-1 1, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
409. Compare LOS Convention, art. I24(l)(a),with Transit Trade Convention, art. 1(a), which has 37 States parties.
TIF 458. S*? a/so McDougal & Burke 113; 3 Nordquist HI X.5, 124.1-24.8(f); 1 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 580-81; 1
Oppenheim § 240. The number may be higher because of treaty succession for the USSR and Yugoslavia. Symposium,
State Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.
410. Convention & Statute Concerning Freedom of Transit & Statute on Freedom of Transit, Apr. 20, 1921, 7
LNTS 11 (Freedom of Transit Convention), which has 50 parties and perhaps more if treaty succession principles
apply. For some States, however, the Transit Trade Convention or the LOS conventions may have superseded it in
part. See generally 1999 UN Treaties 955; Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.
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411. 3 Nordquist 1 X :
Zomtpare LOS Convention, arts. 124,1 \b\ 125 took Transit Trade Convention, arts. l(c .
:
onventioc - tedom ofTransit Convention. Statute, n. 410. arts 1-4. " LNTS I" LOS Convention, art. 17;
erritoriai Sea Convention, art. 14(1) affirm a right of all ships, flagged under coastal or landlocked States, to
xritorial sea innocent pusige, thereby giving them ports access. A 1957 UN Gcncol Assembly resolution was an
npetus far the High Seas Convention provision- Colombos 5 200.
.— ... -
.
!4<2) talk Trans:: Trade Convention, art. 1(c).
414. Compare LOS Convention, art. 131 z^iih Transit Trade Convent:: 1 1 -III. an. 2(1 \and High Seas
Convention, art. 3(1); see also 3 Nordquist 11 131.1-31.7(e); Restat . hird) 5 512 r.n.3.
rmpare LOS Convention, art. 125(3) tnrA Transit Trade Convention, arts. 11-12; Freedom of Transit
Convention, Statute, n. 410, an.
"
29.
416. Transit Trade Convention, arts. 13-14; see also Freedom of Transit Convention, Sutute, n. 410, arts. 8-9, 7
same; subject to League .sCovenar .-.aner,ans.2(4),51,103;nn. 111.10-11,47-630,916-18,
aid accompanying text.
41" Et L-OS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1), 21(1), 31; Temtorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17, 22(2); See
md accompanying text.
418. Bftov ?v\l L\v/ 5; 1 Oitekheim S 10, 28; Restatement (Third) $ 102(3) & cmt f The High
Seas Convention, preamble, says it restates customary law. and most accept this; the LOS Convention navigational
articles are also widely thought to : :om. See nn. Ill 962-63 and accompanying text.
119 LOS Convention, an. 311 1 '; see oho n. 44 and accompanying text.
120. LOS Convention, an. 31 1(2); see oho nn. 45-46 and accompanying text.
-11. LOS Convention, art. 31 1(5); see obo n. 50 and accompanying text.
i-.ute, art. 38(1); Restatement Third) SS 102-03; see also n. 111.10 and accompanying text-
rial Sea Convention, ar.
Me, an. 38(1); Restatement (Third) $S 102-03; see also nn. IIL10 and accompanying texL
.-.-..-.
-.-
-..
.
e Thomas F. Bayard letter to Manning, May 28, 1886, 2 Moore
718, 720, refemng to Proclamation of Nov. 19. 1807,3 Am. St. 1
. v Act ofMay 15, 1820 ", designated Boston. Mass: Charleston. S C ; Mobile London, Ct.;
New York City, Norfolk, Va.; Philadelphia; Portlan i I C. See nn. 480, 492, 494-506 for analysis of
entry in distress.
-. President Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation of Apr. 11, 1865, 1865M . FRUS 310.
430. Re ::58(1878).
431. See generally 2 Moore 564-70 (Austria, Germany, Netherlands, South Australia, Venezuela, others).
432. Permission to enter Guam; Kiska Islands. Alaska: Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Subic Bay, Philippines; Tonugas,
Fla.; and ^actual limitsofany navy yards" was necessary and could be obtained from the Secretary ofthe Navy through
d iplomatic channels US Secretary of d Frank Knox Nov. 19, 1909 letter to Mr. Ekengren, Swedish Charge
:kworth 416.
433. Treat.. 4 Commerce, Feb. 6, 1778, Fr.-US, arts. 3-4, 8 Sul 12, 14, abrogated by Act ofJuly 7, 1798,
1
«£578.
434. See^e : :eswith Algiers, Sept, 5, 1795, arts. 2, 10,8 Stat.133-34, superseded, June 30-July 5, 1815, arts.
9,12,uLZ. __ :newedandrnodified,Dec.22-23,1816,arts.9,12,ui2-u 245 .:gentina,July20,1853,arts.2^,10
Stat. 1001,1002; July 27,1853,an. 2, uL 1005,1006; Austria, Aug. 27, 1829,ans. 1, 7-8, 8 ui. 398, 399-400; June 19, 1928,
art. 7, 47 uL 1876, 1881; Belgium, Nov. 10, 1 845, arts. 1, 6, 8 id. 606, 608, superseded,July 17, 1858, arts. 1,5, 12 uf. 1043,
1045-46; superseded Mar. 8, 1 875, arts. 1, 4, 1 9 id. 628, 630; partially terminated Feb. 21, 1961, MUST 1284,480 UNTS
149; Bolivia,May 13, 1858, an. 3, 12 Stat. 1003, 1004;BraziL Dec. 12, 1828, arts. 3-4,8ui 390-91; Brunei,June 23, 1850,
arts. 2, 7, 10 uL 909-10; Bulgaria, Apr. 15, 1974, art, 48, 26 UST 687, 717; Central American Federation, Dec 5, 1825,
arts. 3-», 6, 8 Stat. 322-24; Chile, May 16, 1832, arts. 3-*, uL 434-35; Colombia, Oct. 3, 1824, arts. 3-4, id 306-08,
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superseded Dec. 12, 1 846, arts. 3-7, 9 id. 88 1, 882-84; Congo, Jan. 24, 1891, arts. 1, 6, 27 id. 926, 927, 930; Costa Rica, July
10, 1851, an. 2, 10 id. 916, 917; Danzig, Mar. 9, 1934, 48 id. 1680; Denmark, Apr. 25, 1826, art. 2, 8 uf. 340; Oct. 1, 1951,
art. 2, 12 UST 908, 910, 421 UNTS 105, 108; Dominican Republic, Feb. 8, 1867, arts. 3, 7, 15 StaL 473, 475, 477;
Ecuador, June 13, 1839, arts. 3, 7, 8 id. 534, 536; Egypt, Nov. 16, 1884, art. l,24id. 1004, 1005; El Salvador, Jan. 2, 1850,
arts. 3, 7, 10 id. 891-92; superseded Dec. 6, 1870, arts. 3, 7, 18 id. 725, 726, 728; Estonia, Dec. 23, 1925, arts. 1, 7, 44 id.
2379, 2381; Ethiopia, an. 14, 4 UST 2134, 2145, 206 UNTS 41, 76; Fiji, June 10, 1840, an. 2, 7 Bevans 684; Finland,
Feb. 13, 1934, art. 6, 49 Stat. 2659, 2663, 152 LNTS 45, 50, modified by protocols of Dec. 4, 1952, 4 UST 2047, 205
UNTS 149 & July 1, 1991, TIAS ; France, Feb. 6, 1778, arts. 3-4, 8 Stat. 14; renewed, Sept. 30, 1800, an. 6,uL 178,
180; superseded June 24, 1822, id. 278; modified, July 17, 1919,41 id. 1723; modified, Nov. 25, 1959, 11 UST 2398,401
UNTS 75; Germany, Dec. 8, 1923, an. 7, 44 StaL 2132, 2137; terminated June 3, 1935, art. 1,49 ii. 3258; reinstated June
3, 1953, an. 1, 5 UST 1939, 1941, 253 UNTS 89, 90; partially terminated Oct. 29, 1954, an. 20 & Protocol 1 20, 7 id. 1839,
1860, 1908, 273 UNTS 3, 26, 44; Great Britain, Nov. 19, 1794, ans. 3, 12-14, 8 Stat. 116, 117, 122-24, modified May 4,
1796, id. 130, July 3, 1815, arts. 1, 3,id. 228-29, continued Aug. 6, 1827, an. l,u£ 361; Greece, Dec. 22, 1837, arts. 1-5, 8
id. 498-500; replaced Aug. 3, 1951, art. 21, 5 UST 1829, 1889, 224 UNTS 279, 324; Guatemala, Mar. 3, 1849, arts. 3, 6, 10
Stat. 873, 874, 876; Haiti, Nov. 3, 1864, arts. 6, 12, 13 id. 711, 713, 716; Hanover, May 20, 1840, arts. 1-2, 8 id. 552; July
10, 1846, art. 1, 9 id. 857; Hanseatic Republics, Dec. 20, 1827, arts. 1, 6, 8 id. 366, 368; Hawaii, Dec. 23, 1826, an. 2, 8
Bevans 861 (entry ofUS ships into Hawaii); Dec. 20, 1849, arts. 2, 5-7, 9 id. 977-78; Honduras, July 4, 1864, an. 2, 13 id.
699, 700; superseded Dec. 7, 1927, arts. 1, 7, 1 1, 45 id. 2618-19, 2622, 2625; Iraq, Dec. 3, 1938, an. 3, 54 id. 1790, 1792;
Ireland, Jan. 21, 1950, art. 18, 1 UST 785, 798, 206 UNTS 269, 290; Israel, Aug. 23, 1951, an. 19, 5 id. 550, 570, 219
UNTS 237, 276; Italy, Feb. 26, 1871, ans. 1, 7, 17 StaL 845, 848; replaced Feb. 2, 1948, ans. 19, 22, 63 id. 2255, 2284,
2286, 79 UNTS 171, 200, 204; Japan, Mar. 31, 1854, an. 2, 11 Stat. 597 (designated pons in Japan, no reciprocity);
modified June 17, 1857, art. 1, id. 723 (Nagasaki opened); July 29, 1858, an. 3, 12 id. 1051, 1052 (more pons opened);
Nov. 22, 1894, art. 2, 29 id. 848-49 (full, reciprocal commerce, navigation rights); Feb. 21, 1911, an. 4, 37 id. 1504-05
(same); replaced Apr. 2, 1953, art. 19, 4 UST 2063, 2077, 206 UNTS 143, 214; Korea, May 22, 1882, an. 5, 23 StaL 720,
722, replaced Nov. 28, 1956, 8 UST 2217, 302 UNTS 281; Lagos, July 31, 1854, 9 Bevans 513-14; Lama, Apr. 20, 1928,
ans. 7, 12, 45 Stat. 2641, 2643, 2645; Liberia, Ocl 21, 1862, an. 2, 12 id. 1245; replaced Aug. 8, 1938, ans. 7, 21, 54 id.
1739, 1742, 1747,201 LNTS 163, 168, 176; Loochoo [Ryukyu], July 11, 1854, 10 id. 1101; Luxembourg, Feb. 23, 1962,
an. 13, 14 UST 251, 260, 474 UNTS 3, 22; Madagascar, Feb. 14, 1867, arts. 2-3, 15 StaL 491-92, replaced May 13, 1881,
an. 4(1), 22 id. 952, 955; Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Dec. 9, 1847, arts. 1-2, 9 StaL 910, 912; Mexico, Apr. 5-Dec. 17, 1831,
art. 3, 8 id. 410, replaced Feb. 2, 1848, an. 17, 9 id. 922, 935; Morocco, June 23-July 15, 1786, arts. 7, 14, 8 id. 100-02,
replaced Sept. 10 & Ocl 1, 1836, ans. 7, 14, id. 484-85; Muscat, Sept. 21, 1833, ans. 2, 6, id. 458; Netherlands, Ocl 8,
1782, arts. 2-3, id. 32; superseded Jan. 19, 1839, an. l,id. 524; Aug. 26, 1852, ans. 1-2,4, 10 ui 982-84; Mar. 27, 1956, an.
19 & Protocol 1 17, 8 UST 2043, 2073, 2089, 285 UNTS 231, 259, 273; Nicaragua, June 21, 1867, an. 2, 15 StaL 549-50;
Jan. 31, 1956, an. 19, 9 UST 449, 463, 367 UNTS 3, 26; Norway, June 5, 1928, arts. 7, 15, 47 Stat. 2135, 2140, 2146, 134
LNTS 81, 86, 92; Oman, Dec. 20, 1958, an. 10, 1 1 UST 1835, 1840, 380 UNTS 181, 206; Ottoman Empire, May 7, 1830,
arts. 1, 5, 8 Stat. 408-09; Paraguay, Feb. 4, 1859, an. 2, 12 id. 1091-92; Persialran, Dec. 13, 1856, an. 3, 11 StaL 709;
superseded Aug. 15, 1955, an. 10, 8 UST 899, 907, 284 UNTS 93, 122; Peru, July 26, 1851, ans. 2, 12, 10 StaL 926, 931;
replaced July 4, 1854, 11 id. 725; Sept. 6, 1870, arts. 2, 8, l%id. 698-99, 701; Aug. 31, 1887, ans. 2, 7,25 id. 1444-45, 1447;
Peru-Bolivia Confederation, Nov. 30, 1836, arts. 2-3, 8 id. 487, 488; Poland, June 15, 1931, an. 6, 48 id. 1507, 1512;
Portugal, Aug. 26, 1 840, arts. 1 , 7, 8 id. 560, 564; Prussia, July 9, 1 785, ans. 2-3, id. 84; superseded July 11,1 799, arts. 2-3,
id. 162; May 1, 1828, arts. 1, 7, id. 378, 380; Russia, Apr. 5/17, 1824, arts. 1-2, id. 302; replaced Dec. 6 18, 1832, an. 1, id.
444; Samoa, Jan. 17, 1878, an. 2, 20 id. 704; Sardinia, Nov. 26, 1838, arts. 1, 7, 8 id. 512, 514; Saudi Arabia, Nov. 7, 1933,
art. 3, 48 id. 1826; Serbia, Oct. 14, 1881, arts. 1, 13, 22 Stat. 963, 966; Spain, Ocl 27, 1795, arts. 15-16, 8 id. 138, 146 (by
implication), replaced July 3, 1902, ans. 2, 9, 33 id. 2105, 2106, 2110; Sweden, Apr. 3, 1783, arts. 7-8, 8 id. 60, 64;
superseded Sept. 4, 1816 (Sweden & Norway), arts. 1, 12, id. 232, 240 & July 4, 1827, arts. 1, 6, 17, id. 346, 348, 354:
Thailand (formerly Siam), Mar. 20, 1 833, art. 2, id. 454 (entry into Thai pons only); replaced May 29, 1856, an. 4, 1 1 id.
683, 684 (same); replaced Dec. 16, 1920, arts. 3, 9, 42 id. 1928, 1929-30 (reciprocity), Nov. 13, 1937, an. 1, 53 id. 1731
(same); May 29, 1966, an. 10, 19 UST 5843, 5855, 652 UNTS 253, 282; Togo, Feb. 8, 1966, an. 1 1, 18 id. 1, 8, 680 UNTS
159, 174; Tonga, Oct. 2, 1886, arts. 4, 6-8, 25 StaL 1440-41; Tripoli, Nov. 4, 1796 & Jan. 3, 1797, an. 9, 8 id. 154-55;
replaced June 4, 1805, an. 11, id. 214-15 (same); Tunis, Aug. 28, 1797, art. 12, ui 157, 159 (rights for US ships only);
replaced Feb. 24, 1824, art. 12,id. 298-99; Turkey, Oct. 1, 1929, art. 3,46 Stat. 2743, 2744; Two Sicilies, Dec. 1, 1845. art.
1,9 id. 833; replaced Oct. 1, 1855, art. 8, 11 id. 639,645; Venezuela, Jan. 20, 1836, arts. 2-3,8 id. 466; replaced Aug. 27,
1860, ans. 6-7, 12 id. 1 143, 1 147-48; Yemen, May 4, 1946, art. 3, 60 id. 1782, 1783. See also nn. 488-90 for recent treaties
with Bulgaria, Poland, PRC, and the former USSR
435. While MFN clauses usually appear in bilateral treaties, they can be in multilateral agreements, e.g., the
GATT, n. III. 949. These contrast with national treatment, reciprocity or preferences clauses. McNair ch. 15; 1
Oppenheim § 669; Restatement (Third) § 801 & cmts. a-d, r.n.1,2.
436. For a sampling, see 6E Benedict, Docs. 18B-1 - 18B-4 (selected bilateral treaties, including FCN\ consular
treaties).
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437. Treaty, July 3, 1844, China-US, arts. 3-5, 8 Stat. 592-93, supplemented by Treaty of Peace, Amity &
Commerce, June 18, 1858, China-US, art. 14, 12 id. 1023, 1026; supplemented, Treaty for Extension of Commercial
Relations, Oct. 8, 1903, China-US, art. 3, 33 id. 2208, 2209; superseded, Treaty of Friendship, Commerce &
Navigation, Nov. 4, 1946, arts. 2, 21, 24, 63 id. 1299, 1301, 1316, 1318, 25 UNTS 69, 92, 128, 132. The later agreements
opened doors to other Chinese ports, first on an MFN basis and later to all Chinese ports and all US ports. The first
agreement with Hawaii, Article of Arrangement, Dec. 23, 1826, Hawaii-US, art. 3, 8 Bevans 861, applied only to US
vessels; the second, Friendship, Commerce & Navigation Treaty, Dec. 20, 1849, Hawaii-US, arts. 2, 6-7, 9 Stat. 977,
978, extended reciprocal rights but confirmed the Hawaii practice of limiting access to designated ports as in the case
ofChina. Agreements with Japan followed a similar pattern. Treaty of Peace & Amity, Mar. 31, 1854, Japan-US, art. 2,
1 1 id. 597 (designated ports in Japan); Convention, June 17,1 857, Japan-US, art. I, id. 723 (Nagasaki opened); Amity &
Commerce Treaty, July 29, 1858, Japan-US, art. 3, 12 id. 1051, 1052 (additional ports); Commerce & Navigation
Treaty, Nov. 29, 1894, Japan-US, art. 2, 29 id. 848, 849 (full reciprocal commerce, navigation rights); Commerce &
Navigation Treaty, Feb. 21, 191 1, Japan-US, art. 4, 37 id. 1504, 1505 (same). Thailand, formerly Siam, had the same
arrangement until 1920. Amity & Commerce Treaty, Mar. 20, 1833, Siam-US, art. 2, 8 id. 454, (entry into Siamese
ports); Amity & Commerce Treaty, May 29, 1856, Siam-US, art. 4, 1 1 id. 683, 684 (same); Amity & Commerce Treaty,
Dec. 16, 1920, Siam-US, art. 3, 42 id. 1928, 1929 (reciprocity); Friendship, Commerce & Navigation Treaty, Nov. 12,
1937, Siam-US, art. 10, 53 id. 1731, 1736 (same); Treaty ofAmity & Economic Relations, May 29, 1966, Thailand, art.
10, 19 UST 5843, 5855, 652 UNTS 253, 282 (same).
438. Lowe, Right ofEntry, n. 382, 619.
439. Brownlie, International Law 13-14; 1 Oppenheim § 10, 28; Restatement (Third) § 102(3) & cmt. f. Jessup,
The Law, n. 267, xxxii, 60, 192-93 asserts these treaties were not norm-creating, being mere attempts to obtain mutual
benefits by a bargaining process. Lowe, Right ofEntry, n. 382, 619, argues that these bilaterals "lack the 'fundamentally
norm-creating character' necessary for the transition[;] the mere repetition of rights ofentry . . . could not constitute a
rule of customary international law."
440. Compare custom's impact through the bilaterals, n. 434, with Lowe, Right ofEntry, n. 382, 607.
441. LOS Convention, art. 126; see also Transit Trade Convention, arts. 10, 15, (same; Convention applied on
reciprocity basis); see also 3 Nordquist Ml X.5, 126.1-126.8(d); nn. 409-18.
442. Institute de Droit Internationale, 17 Annuaire 274 (1898), in Resolutions of the Institute of
International Law 144 (James Brown Scott ed. 1916).
443. Id., 35 Annuaire 736(1928), in James Brown Scott, The Institute ofInternationalLaw, 22 AJIL 844, 847 (1928).
444. Lowe, Right ofEntry, n. 382, 602.
445. ICJ Statute, art. 38(1); Restatement (Third) §§ 102-03; see also n. 10 and accompanying text.
446. Convention & Statute on International Regime ofMaritime Ports, Dec. 9, 1923, Statute, arts. 2-3, 5-7, 10-13,
58 LNTS 285 (Ports Convention). MFN status is not permitted. Id., Statute, art. 15, 58 LNTS 305.
447. Id., Statute, arts. 13-14, 58 LNTS 305.
448. Id., Statute, arts. 9, 14, 58 LNTS 303-05.
449. Id., Statute, art. 17, 58 LNTS 305.
450. Id. , Statute, art. 8; 58 LNTS 303; see also id., arts. 21-22, 58 LNTS 307-09. The ICJ has succeeded the PCIJ.
451. Id, Statute, art. 12, 58 LNTS 305, cited in Saudi-Arabia v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co., 27 ILR 117, 212 (1955),
criticized by Lowe, Right ofEntry, n. 382, 598-600, 606.
452. Ports Convention, n. 446, Statute, art. 18, 58 LNTS 307; for further analysis, see Colombos §§ 182, 418; 1
Oppenheim § 204.
453. E.g., LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1), 21(1), 25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 2(2), 14(4), 16(3), 22(2);
see also nn. III.952-67, VI. 10-25 and accompanying text.
454. LOS Convention, art. 311(2); see also n. 45 and accompanying text.
455. Vienna Convention, arts. 30, 59; brownlie, international law 624-25; McNair 215-33; 1 Oppenheim § 591;
Restatement (Third) § 323; Restatement (Second) § 156; Sinclair 184-85.
456. Ports Convention, n. 446, art. 2, 58 LNTS 295, declares it is subject to the Treaty ofVersailles, which included
the League ofNations Covenant, succeeded by the UN Charter in 1945; the Convention, Statute, art. 24, 58 LNTS 309,
declares the Convention may not be construed to affect parties' rights and duties under the Covenant. Since
self-defense was recognized as an inherent right under the Covenant, there would have been no inconsistency between
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the Convention and the Covenant on that score. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; nn. III. 10-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67,
IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
457. 1999 UN Treaties 961-62; see also Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.
458. Compare Convention & Statute Concerning Freedom of Transit, Apr. 20, 1921, art. 1 & Statute, arts 1-15,
7
LNTS 11, 19, 27-33, with Ports Convention, n. 446, discussed nn. 446-57 and accompanying text.
459. 1999 UN Treaties 957-58, 961-62; see also n. 446 and accompanying text. An Additional Protocol, Apr. 20,
192 1 , 7 LNTS 65, extends certain obligations to navigable waterways normally not ofinternational concern. There are
23 parties, none of them Gulf States. 1999 UN Treaties 959. Treaty succession principles may bind more States. See
Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.
460. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 51, 103; see a/so nn.III.10-1 1,47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
461. Inter-American Convention on Facilitation of International Waterborne Transportation (Convention of
Mar del Plata), June 7, 1963, TIAS 12064, in 6E Benedict, Doc. 19-12, arts. 1-3, id. 19-104 - 19-105.
462. Id., arts. 4-5, 6E Benedict 19-105.
463. Id., art. 6(a), 6E Benedict 19-106.
464. E.g., LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1),21(1),25(3), 311(2); Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 2(2), 14(4), 16(3),
22(2); see also Vienna Convention, arts. 30, 59; nn. III.952-67, IV. 10-25, 455 and accompanying text.
465. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.10-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
466. TIF 404.
467. Brownlie, International Law 5; 1 Oppenheim § 10, 28; Restatement (Third) § 102(3) & cmt. f.
468. Compare Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, Apr. 9, 1965, arts. 1-3, 18 UST 410,
412, 591 UNTS 265, 266-68, with Convention ofMar del Plata, n. 461, arts. 1-3, 6E Benedict 19-104.
469. Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, n. 468, art. 2(3), 18 UST 412, 591 UNTS
266-68.
470. Id., art. 5, 18 UST 414, 591 UNTS 268. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) plays a similar role
for achieving standards through proposals or conferences as the OAS Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference
does for the Convention of Mar del Plata, n. 461. Compare Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime
Traffic, n. 468, arts 4, 6-8, 18 UST 414-16, 591 UNTS 26S-72,with Convention ofMar del Plata, arts. 4-6, 6E Benedict
19-105 - 19-106. For amendments and annexes to the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic,
see generally 6E Benedict, Doc. 19-1 1; see also 1 Oppenheim § 204.
47 1
.
E.g., LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 1 9( 1 ), 2 1( 1 ), 25(3), 3 1 1(2); Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 2(2), 14(4), 1 6(3),
22(2); see also Vienna Convention, arts. 30, 59; nn. HI.952-67, IV. 10-25, 455 and accompanying text.
472. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.10-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
473. TIF 404; 6E Benedict 1 9-93, which does not list Iran. Treaty succession principles may add to the total for the
former USSR and Yugoslavia. Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.
474. Brownlie, International Law 5; 1 Oppenheim § 10, 28; Restatement (Third) § 102(3) & cmt. f.
475. Saudi-Arabia v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co., 27 ILR 1 17, 212 (1955), citing inter alia Ports Convention, Statute, n.
446, art. 12, 58 LNTS 305; criticized, Lowe, Right ofEntry, n. 382, 598-600, 606.
476. Seen. 434.
477. The Kronprins Gustaf Adolf (Swed. v. US), 2 UNRIAA 1239, 1256 (1932).
478. 1 Hyde §187.
479. Institute ofInternational haw, ResolutionsAdopted at Its Session ofAmsterdam: Distinction Between the Regime of
the Territorial Sea and the Regime ofInternal Waters, preamble, Sept. 18-27, 1957, 1957[2] Annuaire, reprinted in 52 AJIL
103(1958).
480. Colombos § 181; see also id. §§ 273-75; for analysis of port access for ships in distress or forced in by force
majeure, see nn. 492, 494-506 and accompanying text.
481. 4 Whiteman 258-60, quoting Boas Memorandum, n. 381; see also 1 Hyde § 187.
482. Restatement (Second) § 50, cmt. a.
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483. Id. § 49, cmt. a. Perhaps significantly, Restatement (Third) § 512 does not cite these references in analyzing
the law of ports.
484. 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 848; see also Lowe, Right ofEntry, n. 382, 598-600, 606.
485. Restatement (Third) § 512, cmt. c, citing id. r.n.3.
486. Id. r.n. 3, citing inter alia Convention on Liability of Nuclear-Powered Ships, May 25. 1962, in 57 AJIL 268
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Convention, art. 25(3); see also nn. 301-13 and accompanying text.
568. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(1); accord, Restatement (Second) § 45(2)(a) & cmt.b; see also nn. 381-521
and accompanying text.
569. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(3); accord, Restatement (Second) §45(2)(b)& cmt.b; see also nn. 302,492,
494-95, 500-01, 507 and accompanying text.
570. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(4); accord, Restatement (Second) § 45(1); see also nn. 301-13 and
accompanying text.
571. 1 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 331. Corfu Channel, 1949 ICJ 29-33, which spoke in terms of "innocent
passage," influenced the Convention drafters. Brown 78-79; 2 Nordquist 11 III. 5; O'Connell 314-16; Alexander, n.
523, 96-99. Promoting territorial sea innocent passage in the straits context as a rule ofinternational law continues. See
Brownlie, International Law 281, 284 (Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16[4] the straits passage rule; the LOS
Convention "a substantial departure from . . . customary law"); 1 Oppenheim § 210; but see id. § 211, recognizing the
LOS Convention transit passage regime. In later LOS discussions, maritime States made it clear that maintaining an
unrestricted ships straits passage regime was essential for a future LOS treaty. 2 Nordquist 11 III.6.
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572. See Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(5); Restatement (Second) § 45, cmt. f; by contrast, LOS Convention,
art. 19(2)(i) declares that "any" fishing is considered under id., art. 19 as prejudicial to a coastal State's peace, good
order or security; see also nn. 301-02, 337, 340-41 and accompanying text.
573. Cf. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1 -2; see also nn. 304-05 and accompanying text. In later LOS discussions
maritime States made it clear that maintaining an unrestricted straits aircraft overflight passage regime was essential
for a future LOS treaty. 2 Nordquist II III.6.
574. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(6); see also Restatement (Second) § 45 cmt. g; but see id. § 48; nn. 302-03
and accompanying text. In later LOS discussions maritime States made it clear that maintaining an unrestricted
submarine straits passage regime was essential to a future LOS treaty. 2 Nordquist H III.6.
575. LOS Convention, art. 19(2) declares these activities and others in an all-inclusive list are considered under id.,
art. 19 to be prejudicial to a coastal State's peace, good order or security; see also nn. 338-41 and accompanying text.
576. Cf. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 18-23; see also n. 313 and accompanying text.
577. Territorial Sea Convention, arts.l(2), 14(4), 17, 22(2) (application of "other rules of international law"); see
also nn. III.952-67, IV. 10-25 and accompanying text.
578. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
579. E.g., UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 103. LOS Convention, art. 19(2)(a) declares "any threat or use offorce against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of
the principles ofinternational law embodied in the Charter" is considered under id., art. 19 as conduct prejudicial to a
coastal State's peace, good order or security. See also nn. III. 10-1 1, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying
text.
580. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2), 14(4). For example, Restatement (Second) § 45 cmt. i, following the
Convention, declares a "coastal state may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage that is not
innocent, regardless ofthe type ofvessel involved," adding that the vessel's immunity is not affected. While the latter
covers warship immunity, reading the "necessary steps" language broadly without considering warship immunity
could lead to an erroneous conclusion that warships can be treated like merchantmen for straits passage.
581. See MacDonald 170 for Saudi Arabia's position on innocent passage through straits under the 1958
Convention.
582. Others include the Straits of Gibraltar, between the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean; Bab el
Mandeb, between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean; Malacca, between the Indian Ocean's Andaman Sea and the
Pacific Ocean's South China Sea. See Fig. A2-2: Strait of Gibraltar; Fig. A2-3: Strait ofBab el Mandeb; Fig. A2-5, in
NWP1-14M Annotated, at 2-72, 2-73, 2-75; sec also 10'Connell,Lawofthe Sea 318-22; Alexander,n. 523, 104-05.
583. LOS Convention, arts. 36-38(1), 44; see also 2 Nordquist Ml 36.1-36.7(e), 37.1-37.7(c), 38.1-38.8(c),
44.144.8(c); NWP1-14M AnnotatedH2.3.3.1,at2-15;NWP9A Annotated 11 2.3.3. 1, at 2-23; Alexander, n. 523,91,94.
584. LOS Convention, art. 38(2); see also Brown 89 (transit passage is "a right akin to freedom of the high seas but
for one purpose only—. . . continuous and expeditious transit"); 2 Nordquist ITU 38.1-38.8(b), 38.8(d)-38.8(e); NWP
1-14M Annotated 11 2.3.3.1, at 2-15; NWP 9A Annotated H 2.3.3.1, at 2-23; Restatement (Third) § 513(3) & cmt. j,
r.n.3 (right of unimpeded transit passage a customary norm); Alexander, n. 523, 91-93; for analysis of conditions of
entry, see nn. 381-513 and accompanying text.
585. NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 2.3.3.1 n.37, citing US Navy Judge Advocate General message 061630Z June 1988 11
4, at 2-59; NWP 9A Annotated 11 2.3.3.1 n.37; Roach & Smith H 11.2, 286, quoting Dec. 21, 1984 telegram to US
Embassy, Santiago, Chile.
586. LOS Convention, arts. 58, 87-115; High Seas Convention, arts. 1-2; see also nn. 68-79, 147-57 and
accompanying text.
587. LOS Convention, art. 38(1).
588. Since waters in and around these straits are necessarily part ofcoastal State territorial seas, an EEZ or the high
seas, the other rules clauses of id., arts. 2(3), 19(1), 21(1), 31, 58(3), 87(1) apply; see also High Seas Convention, art. 2;
Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17, 22(2). LOS Convention, art. 34(2) declares straits-bordering States'
sovereignty or jurisdiction is exercised subject to id., arts. 34-45, and "other rules of international law." Other rules
clauses refer to the LOAC. See 2 Nordquist 1111 34.1-34.8(g); Akira Mayama, The Influence ofthe Straits Transit Passage
Regime on the Law ofNeutrality at Sea, 20 ODIL 1 (1995); nn. 111.953-56, IV.10-25 and accompanying text.
589. E.g., UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 51,103; LOS Convention, arts. 39( 1 )(b), 30 1 ; see also nn. III. 1 0- 1 1 , 47-630, 916-18,
952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
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590. MacDonald 183-84; see also 2 Nordquist Ml IH.9-IH.14.
591. LOS Convention, art. 39(1); see also 2 Nordquist MI 39.1-39.10(h); NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.3.3.1, at 2-15;
NWP9A Annotated 11 2.3. 3.1, at 2-22; 1 0'Connell,Lawofthe Sea 331-336; Moore, Regime ofStraits, n. 547, 95-102.
592. LOS Convention, art. 39(2); see also 2 Nordquist H 39.10(j); nn. VI. 136-40 and accompanying text.
593. LOS Convention, art. 39(3); see also 2 Nordquist Ml 39.10(k)-39.10(/).
594. 2 Nordquist 11 39.10(k); NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.3.3.1, at 2-15; NWP 9A Annotated II 2.3.3.1, at 2-22;
Alexander, n. 523, 93; Lowe, The Commander's, n. III. 318, 119.
595. LOS Convention, art. 40; see also id., art. 19(2)(j) (territorial sea research, survey activities considered
prejudicial to coastal State's peace, good order or security if conducted by ships otherwise in id., art. 19(1) innocent
passage); 2 Nordquist HH 40. 1-40. 9(e); Alexander, n. 523, 92-93. However, research may be conducted in a
strait-bordering State's territorial waters within the strait if that State consents. 2 Nordquist H 40.9(d). Research does
not include transiting platforms' normal mode of operations while going through a strait, e.g., sonic depth sounding
by fathometer or position plotting by radar, etc. These activities are not prohibited if legitimately incidental to
continuous, expeditious transit in the normal mode. Id. 1111 39.10(0, 40.9(c).
596. LOS Convention, art. 39(l)(c); see also nn. 591, 595 and accompanying text.
597. 2 Nordquist 11 39.10(e); NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 2.3.3.1, at 1-15; NWP 9A Annotated 11 2.3.3.1, at 2-22;
Alexander, n. 523, 91 ; William T. Burke, Submerged Passage Through Straits: Interpretations ofthe ProposedLaw ofthe Sea
Treaty Text, 52 Wash. L. Rev. 193, 212-14 (1977); Ronald Clove, Submarine Navigation in International Straits: A Legal
Perspective, 39 Nav. L. Rev. 103(1990); Lowe, 77^ Commander's, n. III.318, 120, 122; Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Passage
Through International Straits: A Right Preserved in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law ofthe Sea, 20 VJIL 801,
843-44 (1980); Schachie, International Straits, n. 558, 184-86; but see Lowe, The Commander's, 122; W.Michael Reisman,
The Regime of Straits and National Security: An Appraisal of International Lawmaking, 74 AJIL 48, 71-75 (1980). By
contrast, under territorial sea innocent passage rules submarines must transit surfaced, flying the ensign. LOS
Convention, art. 20; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(6); see also nn. 302, 338, 342, 493, 574 and accompanying text.
598. For special maritime vehicles, e.g., hovercraft or hydrofoils, normal mode transit passage means the mode
normal to them under the circumstances. For aircraft normal mode is altitude and speed appropriate under the
circumstances. 2 Nordquist HH 39.10(e), 40.9(c); US Navy Judge Advocate General message, n. 586, HH 5, 9, in NWP
1-14M Annotated, at 2-60 - 2-61; 1 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 333; Alexander, n. 523, 92; but see Lowe, The
Commander's, n. III.317, 122. As the Navy Message H 5 makes clear, this is for navigation safety and ships' protection,
i.e., self-defense. UN Charter, arts. 5 1,103; see also nn. 10- 11, 47-630, 916- 18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
599. LOS Convention, art. 39(l)(b); see also 1 Nordquist 207, 450; 2 id. H 39.10(c); 5 id., 11 301.5; discussing LOS
Convention, art. 301.
600. Brown 78. If prior notification or permission is unnecessary for warship territorial sea innocent passage, as
argued nn. 337-52 and accompanying text concerning LOS Convention, arts. 17-32 and Territorial Sea Convention,
arts. 14-23, surely there is no prior notification or permission requirement for straits transit passage where a strait
includes territorial seas.
601. Sea lanes and traffic separation schemes must conform to generally accepted international regulations. Iftwo
or more States border a strait, they must cooperate in formulating proposals to IMO. LOS Convention, art. 41 ; see also
id., art. 22(1) (coastal State may prescribe sea lanes, traffic separation schemes for its territorial sea); 2 Nordquist 111
41. l-41.9(h); NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 2.3.3.1, at 2-26; NWP 9A Annotated U 2.3.3.1, at2-23; Alexander,n. 523, 94-95.
602. NWP 1-14M Annotated I 2.3.3.1 n.43, referring to Fig. A2-4, at id. 2-74; NWP 9A Annotated 11 2.3.3.1 n.41,
referring to Fig. SF2-4.
603. LOS Convention, arts. 42(1), 42(3); see also 2 Nordquist IM 42.1-42.10(e), 42.10(h); Alexander, n. 523, 94-95;
nn. VI. 122, 136-40, 175 and accompanying text.
604. LOS Convention, art. 43; see also 2 Nordquist IM 43.1 -43.8(e).
605. Compare LOS Convention, art. 42(2) with id., art. 25(3) (no discrimination in form or fact when territorial sea
innocent passage temporarily suspended); see also nn. 301-13, 337-50 and accompanying text.
606. LOS Convention, art. 44; see also 2 Nordquist 11 44.8(b); Alexander, n. 523, 94-95.
607. LOS Convention, arts. 42(4)-42(5); compare id., arts. 21,31 (similar rules for territorial sea innocent passage);
see also 2 Nordquist Ml 42.10(i)-42.10(/); Alexander, n. 523, 94-95; n. 350 and accompanying text.
608. See nn. 11.104-06, 220, 277, 290, 325, 357, 375, 379-81, 463 and accompanying text.
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609. LOS Convention, arts. 36,87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. 533-45, 561-65 and accompanying
text.
610. LOS Convention, arts. 38(1), 44; see also nn. 566-607 and accompanying text.
611. See nn. 11.325 and accompanying text.
612. Lowe, The Commander's, n. III.318, 120.
613. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.10-1 1, 48-626, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
614. See n. 11.102 and accompanying text.
615. See n. 600 and accompanying text.
616. See, e.g., nn. 11.357 (mines), 457 (Iran's Larak oil terminal by air attack), 463-64 (speedboat attacks) and
accompanying text.
617. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10-11, 48-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
618. See nn. 11.459-69 and accompanying text.
619. Cf. LOS Convention, arts. 41-44; see also n. 11.357 and accompanying text.
620. See Whitehurst, U.S. Merchant Marine, n. 11.59, ch. 7.
621. See Gilmore & Black 188; Schoenbaum § 8-33; Whitehurst, U.S. Merchant Marine, n. 11.59, 201-02.
622. See Gilmore & Black 14, 144; Schoenbaum § 8-33; Whitehurst, U.S. Merchant Marine, n. 11.59, 202.
623. Philip C. Jessup, TransnationalLaw 2 (1956) coined the phrase, now in general use, to define private parties'
and governments' relationships in the international context. Transnational law is a mix of public international law,
e.g., the LOS or the LOAC with which this study is primarily concerned, and conflict of laws, also known as private
international law.
624. US Const., art. I, § 8 gives Congress power to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal," i.e., authorizing
Congress to approve privateering. The general view is that privateering is outlawed, despite US equivocations half a
century or more ago. Colombos § § 536-3 8 ; 2 O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea 1 1 02-03, 1 1 06; Tucker 40-4 1 ; Harvard Draft
Convention on Naval & Aerial War, art. 50 & cmt.; Hisakazu Fujita, Commentary, in Law of Naval Warfare 66, 68.
See Paris Declaration, H 1. Whatever its weight as a customary norm, the Declaration's 53 original and acceding
parties, except the United States, which has not ratified the Declaration, represent nearly all nations if treaty
succession principles are taken into account. Schindler & Toman 789-90; Symposium, State Succession; Walker,
Integration and Disintegration.
625. See NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.1.3; NWP 9A Annotated U 2.1.2.3; Whitehurst, U.S. Merchant Marine, n.
11.59, ch. 11 (US National Defense Reserve Fleet, Military Sealift Command, naval fleet auxiliaries, RDJTF, Ready
Reserve Fleet); except as a "fleet in being," RDJTF played no active role in the Tanker War. See nn. 11.40, 77, 80, 175,
219 and accompanying text. Insofar as the record indicates, no State employed naval auxiliaries during the war.
Properly speaking, under the LOS, naval auxiliaries are State-owned vessels operated for noncommercial purposes
that are not warships and, in territorial waters, are governed by LOS Convention, arts. 31-32; Territorial Sea
Convention, art. 22. On the high seas they enjoy immunity as well. LOS Convention, art. 96; High Seas Convention,
art. 9. See generally 2 Nordquist HH 31.1-32.7(b), 3 id. 96.1-96.96.10(d); NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.1.3; NWP 9A
Annotated H 2.1.3; 1 Oppenheim § 565. Where the law of armed conflict applies through the other rules clauses ofthe
LOS conventions, they would be considered under Law of Naval Warfare principles applicable to naval auxiliaries.
Applicable international agreements include 1936 London Naval Treaty, art. 1(B)(6); Montreux Convention, n. 557,
Annex II, art. B(6), 173 LNTS 237; Convention on Maritime Neutrality, arts. 12-13. However, because there were
apparently no naval auxiliary issues, as distinguished from issues of government-owned or operated vessels for
commercial purposes, during the Tanker War, Chapter V will not analyze this difficult issue.
626. 1962 Oil Pollution Convention Amendments, art. 2(2)(b); compare MARPOL 73/78, art. 2(4); 1960
COLREGS, Rule l(c)(i). Some ILO conventions offer partial definitions. 2 O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea 749.
627. Ship Registration Convention, n. 11.61, art. 2(4), 26 ILM 1237, (1987) excluding vessels under 500 gross
registered tons (GRT). See also Restatement (Third) § 501 r.n.l.
628. See Part C.4 for analysis of the definition of a warship.
629. By 1995 MARPOL 73/78 had been accepted by countries, including the United States, representing 92
percent of world merchant fleets, measured in GRT. Bowman & Harris 292-93 (1995 Supp.); TIF 400-01.
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630. See,e.g., 16 USC § 916(e); 33 USC §§1471(5), 1502(19); 46 USC §23 (includes seaplanes on the v/nti); see also 2
O'Connell, Law of the Sea 747-50.
631. San Remo Manual, cmt. 13.23.
632. NWP1-14M Annotated H 2.1.3 n.l3;NWP9A Annotated U 2.1.2.3 n.13; San RemoManual H 13(i)& Commentary.
633. E.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); see also nn. III.953-67, IV. 10-25 and accompanying text.
634. See Parts V.C.-V.E, V.J.3-V.J.5.
635. Gilmore & Black 12.
636. See, e.g., First Charter of Virginia, Apr. 10/20, 1606, arts. 1-2.
637. Gilmore & Black 12.
638. Alford, n. III. 833, 84-88. The USSR, a command economy State, has since collapsed and is moving to a free
enterprise economy. However, other command economies and those transitioning to a capitalist system may still use
these. Many free enterprise-based economies also have the form, e.g., Israel and its State-owned ZIM shipping line.
639. Table 2.2 : Non-Communist Countries with Government Owned Shipping Fleets, in Lawrence Juda, The UNCTAD
Liner Code: United States Maritime Policy at the Crossroads 46 (1983).
640. Gilmore & Black 13-14, 197; Schoenbaum § 8-5,491; Whitehurst, U.S. Merchant Marine, nn. 11.59, chs.
8-9.
641. Gilmore & Black 12, 990-95; Juda, n. 639, ch. 1; Lawrence, n. 11.60, 14-16, 30, 198-202, 289-91, 293-95;
Daniel Marx, Jr., International Shipping Cartels: A Study of Industrial Self-Regulation by Shipping Conferences
(1953); Whitehurst, U.S. Merchant Marine, n. 11.59, 35.
642. See, e.g., arrangements in In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F.Supp. 228 (S.D.N. Y. 1968), rev'd, 409 F.2d 1013
(2d Cir. 1969), (1967 Torrey Canyon oil spill disaster); In re Amoco Transp. Co. (Amoco Cadiz), 1979 AMC 1017 (N.D.
111. 1979), affd, 954 F.2d 1279, 1302-04 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Frankel, n. 11.60, 66; Gilmore & Black 841-43;
Schoenbaum § 13-2 n.4; Whitehurst, U.S. Merchant Marine, n. 11.59, 225; Andreas Lowenfeld, Public Law in the
InternationalArena: Conflict ofLaws, InternationalLaw, andSome Suggestionsfor their Interaction, 163 RCADI 31 1, 322-26
(1979); nn. 664, V. 12-15 and accompanying text.
643. "Charter party" derives from the Latin charta partita (divided document), the ancient custom of splitting a
ship rental document drafted in duplicate, so that only the whole could give rise to rights and remedies. Each party
kept a part; comparing the halves proved the document's authenticity. Schoenbaum § 9-1 n.l.
644. See, e.g., Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. M/S Norse Commander Corp., 264 F.Supp. 625 (S.D. Tex. 1966); see
also Schoenbaum § 8-6, 492.
645. Gilmore & Black 194. If an owner provides master and crew, tendering them as the charterer's agents, the
charter is a demise, although not technically a bareboat charter. Schoenbaum § 9-3 n.l -2.
646. Gilmore & Black 194; Schoenbaum § 9-1, 631.
647. Gilmore & Black 193; Schoenbaum § 9-1, 631-32.
648. Gilmore & Black 195.
649. Id. 197-98; Schoenbaum § 9-2. Satellite-based communications through INMARSAT (International Maritime
Satellite Communications), established by Convention on International Maritime Satellite Organization, Sept. 3,
1976, 31 UST 1; Operating Agreement on International Maritime Satellite Organization, Sept. 3, 1976, id. 135,
accomplishes this for many ships. Whitehurst, U.S. Merchant Marine, n. 11.59, 152. See, e.g., Dominant Navig. Ltd.
v. Alpine Shipping Co., 1982 AMC 1241 (R Glenn Bauer, Manfred W. Arnold, Jack Berg, arbs.).
650. Gilmore & Black 202-07; Schoenbaum § 9-10.
651. The Gazelle, 186 US 474 (1902); see also Schoenbaum § 9-10, 654.
652. Schoenbaum § 9-10, 653-54.
653. Id. § 9-10, 654.
654. Gilmore & Black 209-10; Schoenbaum § 9-14.
655. Gilmore & Black 223-28; Schoenbaum §§ 9-14, 9-16; George K. Walker, The Interface ofCriminalJurisdiction
and Actions Under the United Nations Charter, 20 Tulane Maritime L.J. 217, 241 (1996).
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656. E.g., Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Scott, 345 US 427, 439-40 (1953); Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines, 272 F.2d 253 (2d
Cir. 1960) (voyage charter); Navious Corp. v. The Ulysses II, 161 F.Supp. 932 (D. Md.), affd, 260 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.
1958); The Claveresk, 264 F. 276, 281-82 (2d Cir. 1920) (time charter); Denali Seafoods, Inc. v. Western Pioneer, 492
F.Supp. 580 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (voyage charter); see also Gilmore & Black 240.
657. Bottomry bonds, loans on the security of a ship and its cargo, and respondentia bonds on cargo are now
obsolete. Although they created liens on vessel or cargo, the liens {i.e., the security) were discharged if a ship did not
complete a voyage, i.e., if it sank. Gilmore & Black 632, 690; Schoenbaum § 7-5 n.2.
658. E.g., Ship Mortgage Act, 46 USC §§ 31322, 31325.
659. Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime Liens & Mortgages, Apr. 10, 1926, 120
LNTS 1 87; Convention for Unification ofCertain Rules Relating to Maritime Liens & Mortgages,May 27, 1967, in 6E
Benedict, Doc. 15-5; Convention on Maritime Liens & Mortgages, May 6, 1993, 33 ILM 353 (1994). Each supersedes
the previous one; the 1993 IMO-sponsored convention is not in force for many States, the situation for earlier treaties.
See Jan M. Sandstrom, The Changing International Concept ofthe Maritime Lien as a Security Right, 47 Tulane L. Rev. 68
1
(1973). The United States is not party to any maritime lien treaty. See John M. Kriz,Ship Mortgages, Maritime Liens and
Their Enforcement: The Brussels Conventions of 1926 and 1967, 1963 Duke L.J. 670, 674-75.
660. E.g., Ship Mortgage Act, 46 USC 31328, requires US Department of Transportation approval of trustees
holding a US ship mortgage in trust for the benefit of a foreignor who cannot hold a US ship mortgage; see also
Schoenbaum § 7-5.
661. US law, e.g., subordinates foreign preferred ship mortgages in US courts to repair facilities' lien claims. 46
USC § 31326(b); see also Gilmore & Black 709-12; Schoenbaum § 7-6.
662. See generally Gilmore & Black 702-06; Schoenbaum § 7-5, 444.
663. See generally Gilmore & Black 702-06.
664. See, e.g., In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., n. 642; see also n. 642 and accompanying text.
665. See generally Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Limitation of Liability of Owners of
Sea-Going Vessels, Aug. 24, 1924, 120 LNTS 123 (1924 Limitation Convention); Convention Relating to Limitation
of Liability of Owners of Seagoing Ships, Oct. 10, 1957, 6 Benedict, Doc. No. 5-2 (1957 Limitation Convention);
Protocol, Dec. 21, 1979, id., Doc. No. 5-3; Convention on Limitation ofLiability ofMaritime Claims, Nov. 19, 1976, 16
ILM 606 (1977) (1976 Limitation Convention); Schoenbaum ch. 13; In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., n. 642; n. 642 and
accompanying text. The United States is not party to these treaties; Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act, 46 USC
§§ 181-89, governs in US courts.
666. See nn. VI. 14-15, 160-65, 195-97 and accompanying text. Maritime liens, inchoate (i.e., hidden) in rem
interests in a ship because of collisions with other merchantmen, personal injury and death aboard ship, contracts for
vessel repair, charter claims, towage, pilotage, wharfage, cargo damage claims, etc., add still another dimension (and
therefore more possible claimants) relating to the vessel. See generally Gilmore & Black 586-688; Schoenbaum ch. 7.
667. See LOS Convention, art. 91; High Seas Convention, art. 5; see also Part B.3. The vessel's flag governs its
nationality for LOAC situations. San Remo Manual 1IH 60 & cmt. 60.4; 112-14 & cmts.; see also Parts V.B-V.E,
V.J.2-V.J.5.
668. Much of what follows has been distilled from Schoenbaum § 8-1, who publishes a helpful diagram of typical
maritime sale, financing and transportation contracts.
669. Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980,—UST— , 19 ILM 668 (1980),
increasingly governs maritime transactions' sales aspects. At least 52 countries, including the United States and more
if treaty succession principles apply, are parties. TIF 459; Symposium, State Succession; Walker, Integration and
Disintegration. See also John Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations
Convention (1982); Symposium on the International Sale ofGoods Convention, 18 Int'L Law. 3 (1984).
670. This was the transaction in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 US 398 (1964).
671. See generally Schoenbaum § 8-4; Whitehurst, U.S. Merchant Marine, n. 11.59, ch. 17.
672. See nn. 635-67 and accompanying text.
673. Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, 120
LNTS 155 (COGSA Convention), modified by Protocol to Amend 1924 Convention for Unification of Certain Rules
ofLaw Relating to Bills ofLading, Feb. 23, 1 968, in 6 Benedict, Doc. 1 -2, and UN Convention on Carriage ofGoods by
Sea, Mar. 31, 1978, 17 ILM 608 (1978); neither of the latter are in force for the United States. US trading partners are
parties to the modifications, albeit with reservations or domestic law gloss. Comparative Table of Ratifications of the
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Hague Rules and the Hamburg Rules (1996), Doc. 1-3A, 6 Benedict; see also Schoenbaum § 8-14. The US COGSA
Convention reservation, 51 Stat. 252, declares US law, i.e., the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 USC §§ 1300-15, is
paramount to the Convention for cases in US courts, thereby perhaps creating different results in US courts from cases
in other countries' courts. Parties can modify the contract of carriage to a certain extent, perhaps incorporating US
COGSA rules, such that even more parties, such as shoreside freight handling companies, also may be involved.
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Chapter V
THE TANKER WAR AND THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT (LOAC)
The 1980-88 Tanker War nearly ran the gamut of issues related to the law of
armed conflict (LOAC), or the law ofwar (LOW) and its component, the law
of naval warfare (LONW). The general law of maritime neutrality, general issues
of necessity and proportionality, and issues of specific concern—visit and search
including operations against convoyed, escorted or accompanied neutral mer-
chant ships; commerce ofbelligerents including belligerents' convoys and contra-
band; acquisition of enemy character; blockade, maritime exclusion and other
zones and other uses of the ocean for warfare; capture of neutral vessels; humani-
tarian law and belligerents' personnel interned by neutral governments; targeting
of ships and aircraft including convoys; conventional weapons; mine warfare;
treatment ofnoncombatants, £.£., merchant seamen; deception (ruses ofwar) dur-
ing armed conflict—all figured during the Tanker War. These are the subjects of
this Chapter as they applied to belligerents and neutrals during the war.
Chapter III analyzed UN Charter law with particular reference to the law of
self-defense and its relationship to the law ofneutrality, the law oftreaties, custom-
ary law, andjus cogens-based norms, and the general principles ofneutrality as they
apply to war at sea, and to conduct between neutrals and belligerents. This Chapter
will not repeat that analysis, except as it interfaces with the LOAC in situations in-
volving neutrals, e.g., mine warfare, discussed in sub-Part G.2.
Chapter IV analyzed the law ofthe sea, and those principles will not be repeated
in here, except as LOS concepts, e.g., due regard for others' uses of the sea, apply
by analogy in the LOAC. The LOS conventions are subject to the LOAC during
war because of operation of these treaties' "other rules of international law"
clauses. Because these clauses, at least for high seas areas and perhaps other parts
of the ocean, restate customary law, LOS customary rules are also subject to the
LOAC for countries not party to the LOS conventions. This Chapter tries to give
content to those other rules ofinternational law, the LOAC, to which the law ofthe
sea is subject. Law of treaties principles declaring suspension or termination of
treaties' operation during war may also apply. This Chapter also attempts to place
LOS principles in the LOAC context, e.g., by analyzing how the LOS rules for the
territorial sea interact with LOAC principles governing war at sea.
While many international agreements governing land, sea and air warfare
remain primarily subject to customary norms, general principles of law, com-
mentators' research including military manuals, occasional judicial decisions,
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resolutions of international organizations, e.g., the UN General Assembly and Se-
7 8
curity Council, and perhaps;w5 cogens-bastd norms. Council "decision" compli-
ance is mandatory for UN Members, but other international organizations'
resolutions can restate or help crystallize rules ofinternational law, and this was
the Tanker War experience.
As in the case of LOS analysis, law of treaties principles may apply to agree-
ments governing the LOAC, e.g., impossibility, fundamental change of circum-
stances, desuetude, or material breach. Some LONW treaties have "escape
clauses," e.g., "do their utmost" and the like, and these treaties'/ore^ majeure and
distress clauses may or may not amount to a restated form of impossibility or fun-
damental change, but the possibility remains for these kinds of claims. Armed
18
conflict does not vitiate treaties governing humanitarian law, e.g., the 1949
19Geneva Conventions, or agreements governing the law ofwarfare, including the
law ofneutrality. Law oftreaties principles cannot operate to suspend or terminate
custom, including custom derived from or restated in international agreements,
e.g., those governing armed conflict. Thus claims of impossibility, fundamental
change ofcircumstances or desuetude cannot be applied to customary law derived
20from treaties. If a treaty has an exception clause, e.g., for entry in distress, and if
that exception is also a customary rule, that exception must be applied to the basic
rule in the treaty that has become custom. If treaty-based custom has lapsed into
disuse, a new custom or treaty norm may have taken its place. There is always the
possibility ofapplication of other sources, e.g., general principles oflaw including
humanity and chivalry, and rules laid down by courts and commentators.
Part A. Basic Principles: Necessity and Proportionality;
ROE; the Spatial Dimension
The principles of necessity and proportionality apply when the inherent right
21
of individual or collective self-defense is invoked. However, the law of armed
conflict also requires application of necessity and proportionality; it has its own
22
standards for these principles, now firmly embedded in custom. Necessity is, of
course, not the same as military necessity or kriegsraison, a defense rejected by the
Nuremberg trials. NWP 9A Annotated, published at the end of the Tanker War,
ably recites the customary rules of necessity, proportionality and the rule against
perfidious conduct during armed conflict:
The law of armed conflict seeks to prevent unnecessary suffering and destruc-
tion by controlling and mitigating the harmful effects of hostilities through
minimum standards of protection . . . accorded to "combatants" and "noncomba-
tants." . . . [T]he law of armed conflict provides that:
1 . Only that degree and kind offorce, not otherwise prohibited by the law of
armed conflict, required for the partial or complete submission of the
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enemy, with a minimum expenditure oftime, life, and physical resources
may be applied.
2. The employment ofany kind or degree offorce not required for . . . partial
or complete submission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure of
time, life, and physical resources, is prohibited.
3. Dishonorable (treacherous) means, . . . expedients, and . . . conduct dur-
ing armed conflict are forbidden.24
However, the LOAC is not intended to impede waging war:
Its purpose is to ensure that the violence of hostilities is directed toward the
enemy's forces and is not used to cause purposeless, unnecessary human misery and
physical destruction [T]he law ofarmed conflict complements and supports the
principles ofwarfare ... in the concepts ofobjective, mass, economy offorce, surprise,
and security.
The LOAC and principles ofwarfare underscore the importance ofconcentrating
forces against critical military targets while avoiding expending personnel and re-
25
sources against militarily unimportant persons, places and things.
NWP 9A Annotated also explains policies behind the customary rules of neces-
sity and proportionality:
As long as war is not abolished, the law of armed conflict remains essential.
During such conflicts the law of armed conflict provides common ground of
rationality between enemies. This body of law corresponds to their mutual interests
during conflict and constitutes a bridge for a new understanding after the end of the
conflict. The law ofarmed conflict is intended to preclude purposeless, unnecessary
destruction of life and property and to ensure that violence is used only to defeat the
enemy's military forces. If followed by all participants, the law ofarmed conflict will
inhibit warfare from needlessly affecting persons or things of little military value. By
preventing needless cruelty, the bitterness and hatred arising from armed conflict is
lessened, and thus it is easier to restore an enduring peace. The legal and military
experts who attempted to codify the laws of war more than a hundred years ago
reflected this when they declared that the final object of armed conflict is the
"reestablishment of good relations and a more solid and lasting peace between the
belligerent States."26
The return of Tanker War prisoners of war illustrates the point of a potential for
"bitterness and hatred" long after the shooting stops. Humanitarian law requires
that prisoners ofwar be repatriated promptly after hostilities end, ifthey have not
been returned previously because ofwounds or illness. Nevertheless, a decade af-
ter the war ended, most prisoners of war had not been repatriated, and this was a
28
central issue in protracted final settlement negotiations. This might be con-
29
trasted with rapid US turnover of surviving Iran Ajr crew after that incident.
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Beyond the broad sweep of the customary rules of necessity, proportionality
and prohibition against perfidy, problems in law and practice remain.
1. Necessity and Proportionality in Self-Defense and in the Conflict Context
The same terms, necessity and proportionality, are employed in thejus ad hello
context of the inherent right of self-defense, and particularly anticipatory self-de-
30
fense, as in^'ws in hello situations. What passes muster as a necessary and propor-
tionate response in self-defense may not necessarily pass muster as a necessary and
proportionate response against the same object once armed conflict has begun, and
vice versa. Comparing the definition of anticipatory self-defense and the LOAC
principles demonstrates this. NWP 1-14M Annotated, differing slightly from its
predecessor, says: "Anticipatory self-defense involves the use offorce where attack
is imminent and no reasonable choice ofpeaceful means is available." Under either
31
this view or Caroline Case principles, it is clear that necessity in combat need not
await the enemy's attack or threat of attack. LOAC necessity principles apply in
that context, to be sure, but also when a belligerent attacks or if it is necessary to de-
fend against a belligerent's attack. The same can be said about proportionality dur-
ing combat; the principle applies for attack or defense during war as well as in
self-defense situations, but what is proportional for LOAC situations may or may
not be proportional in a self-defense scenario. Moreover, the law of self-defense
says little, if anything, about the third LOAC principle, prohibition against per-
fidy, although it should. Lawful ruses should be part of the law of self-defense as
well as the LOAC, although their content and what is permitted as a lawful ruse
32
will necessarily differ from LOAC situations.
In a situation involving multiple States, e.g., three countries, two ofwhom are at
war, LOAC principles of necessity and proportionality apply as to the two
belligerents. If a third State individually (and not pursuant to a defense treaty) at-
tacks either belligerent, the attacked belligerent may respond in self-defense but
must observe necessity and proportionality principles attached to that inherent
33
right, which may be different from those attaching to defenses under the law of
armed conflict. Once in a war situation, the attacked belligerent (the target in the
latter scenario) and the new belligerent (the attacker) must observe LOAC princi-
ples. It is, ofcourse, entirely possible that necessity and proportionality standards
may be the same in a given self-defense or LOAC scenario.
It is impossible to lay down black-letter rules forLONW necessity, proportion-
ality and humanity principles to be observed during war. The San Remo Manual,
relying on Protocol I land warfare provisions by analogy, does about as good a job
as any in its Precautions in Attack principles:
With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:
Law of Armed Conflict 353
(a) those who plan, decide upon or execute an attack must take all feasible mea-
sures to gather information which will assist in determining whether or not
objects which are not military objectives are present in an area of attack;
(b) in the light of the information available to them, those who plan, decide upon
or execute an attack shall do everything feasible to ensure that attacks are lim-
ited to military objectives;
(c) they shall furthermore take all feasible precautions in the choice of methods
and means [of warfare] ... to avoid or minimize collateral casualties or dam-
age; and
(d) an attack shall not be launched if it may be expected to cause collateral casual-
ties or damage . . . excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military ad-
vantage anticipated from the attack as a whole; an attack shall be cancelled or
suspended as soon as it becomes apparent that the collateral casualties or dam-
age would be excessive . . .
.
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"Attack" includes defensive as well as offensive measures and includes measures
taken against shipping or aircraft that have acquired enemy character as well as the
enemy.
The question then arises as to whether, and how, these general principles relate
to other LOAC principles, e.g., prohibitions against attacking coastal traders or
coastal fishermen when engaged in their usual occupations and not contributing
36
to the enemy war effort. The traditional, correct view is that necessity and pro-
portionality must be considered when attacking or defending any target. Ifa target
is a forbidden object, e.g. a coastal trader or fisherman, customary necessity and
proportionality principles cannot be weighed against customary or treaty-based
rules forbidding attacks on that object. The same might be said about using ne-
cessity and proportionality as qualifying use of a means of warfare otherwise for-
bidden. Thus attack on a coastal fishing vessel engaged in its trade and not
contributing to the enemy war effort cannot be legitimized by factoring in neces-
sity; to do so would be to invoke the military necessity (kriegsraison) doctrine con-
37demned at Nuremberg. Similarly, necessity does not enter into the equation of
using gas warfare the Geneva Gas Protocol forbids; again, to do so would be to in-
voke the condemned kriegsraison doctrine. A target, e.g., a coastal fishing boat,
can lose protected status if it aids the enemy, and under those conditions it may
properly be an object of attack, subject to LOAC necessity and proportionality
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principles. Similarly, if an opponent uses gas warfare, the Protocol no-first-use
reservation is triggered, and the target State can respond. Other options are
proportional reprisals involving use of force or other unlawful means not involv-
ing force to compel compliance with the law, or retorsions, i.e., unfriendly but law-
ful acts to compel compliance with the law. Here again the law ofjus ad helium
differs from the LOAC, the law ofjus in bello; by the majority view only reprisals
not involving use offorce can be used before war begins, but afterward, during war,
reprisals involving use of force or non-force reprisals can be used. Retorsions can
354 The Tanker War
be used in either context. The US and perhaps other States' policy is that only the
national command authority, i.e. at the presidential level, can order reprisals.
The relationship between objects of attack, whether during the offensive or in
defense, should be understood to mean that ifan object is a lawful target, necessity
and proportionality dictate that methods and means of attack should be chosen to
minimize or avoid, if at all feasible, damage to or destruction of objects that enjoy
protected status. Where there is no specific prohibition against attacking an object
defensively or offensively, here too the principles require using methods or means
that best achieve the objective without damage to other objects that are not neces-
sary for achieving the objective. Therefore, the two concepts—the customary prin-
ciples of necessity and proportionality, and in some cases, rules against attacking
some objects or using some means ofwarfare—travel alongside each other as sepa-
rate rules of law.
2. The Temporal Factor: When Does Liability Accrue?
I have urged application of a rule from the law of armed conflict, that a
decisionmaker should be held to what he or she knew or should have known at the
time the decision is made as to the necessity for or proportionality of a response
when these issues arise incident to a claim of a right of self-defense. That princi-
ple arises from the LOAC and is in four States' declarations of understanding to
Protocol I and in two Conventional Weapons Convention protocols, interna-
tional agreements governing the LOAC. Because ofwidespread acceptance ofPro-
tocol I and the Convention as treaty law, and these provisions as customary
norms by those States that have not ratified, this principle is well on its way to ac-
ceptance as a rule of law among all States for the LOAC. This rule also follows
Nuremberg principles for initiating armed conflict and recognizes a com-
mon-sense observation that hindsight can be 20/20, but decisions at the time may
be clouded with the fog of war and should be judged accordingly.
3. Rules ofEngagement (ROE)
The place of rules of engagement (ROE) in the context of the law of self-
48
defense has its analogue in the relationship ofROE to the law ofarmed conflict.
As with the supremacy of Charter-based norms, including the right of individual
49
and collective self-defense, over treaties and perhaps the customary LOAC, a
military commander has the option, indeed the duty under US ROE, to defend his
or her unit, ship or force. ROE may impose limitations on options for actions the
law ofarmed conflict would permit, or they may allow a commander a full range of
options the law permits. In the context ofneutral merchant ship visit and search
operations, for example, current law allows a belligerent to visit and search or di-
vert a neutral-flag merchantman for later visit and search. A belligerent's ROE
might direct a commander to divert and not search immediately. However, that
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commander always retains the right to defend his or her ship, unit or force. If dur-
ing a merchant ship interception that vessel displays hostile intent, a commander
of a belligerent warship, unit or force may initiate appropriate necessary and pro-
52
portional self-defense measures.
The same is true for the law of self-defense if, e.g., a warship of a belligerent or
neutral country exercises its analogous law ofthe sea right ofapproach and visit of
a merchant vessel on the high seas upon suspicion ofpiracy, slave trading or pirate
radio broadcasting, ifthe ship has no nationality, or the ship is ofthe warship's na-
53
tionality. In this case the law ofarmed conflict does not apply through the LOS
other rules clauses, and the sole basis for force, unit or ship protection is neces-
sary and proportional self-defense, which preempts the law ofthe sea under the cir-
cumstances. The right of visit and search, part of the LONW and therefore the
LOAC, does not and cannot apply to merchant ship visits on suspicion of piracy,
slave trading, etc.
4. The Spatial Dimension
Robertson has aptly analyzed the differences between oceans areas, and areas
above the oceans, under the law of the sea and under the law ofnaval warfare. The
LOS has developed a relatively detailed structure oflaw for the high seas, the EEZ,
fishery zones, the continental shelf, the Area and the contiguous zone. The
LONW, still mostly stated in custom and older treaties, recognizes only two sea ar-
eas, territorial waters and their correlative, internal waters, and the high seas and
airspace above these sea areas; belligerents may conduct warfare on the high seas,
in their side's territorial and inland waters, in opposing States' territorial and in-
land waters and airspace above these areas, but not in neutrals' territory, territorial
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or inland waters and airspace above these areas, with certain exceptions. The
high seas are a legitimate arena for combat, subject to neutrals' rights to navigate or
overfly the high seas, with neutrals' and belligerents' having due regard for the
CO
other's exercise of high seas freedoms, and neutrals' right to exercise propor-
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tional self-defense. Writing in the context of the impact of changes in jurisdic-
tional zones upon the law ofneutrality, Robertson notes modern military manuals'
acceptance of the expanded territorial sea for LOAC purposes, adoption of LOS
straits principles for the LONW, and advocates applying LONW principles to the
EEZ, fishing zones in the high seas whether qualified by an EEZ claim or not, the
continental shelf and the contiguous zone inasmuch as these areas are subject to
high seas freedoms ofnavigation and overflight for LOS purposes. NWP 1-14M
and the San Remo Manual continue the view that these areas are subject to high
seas freedoms, and that belligerents may exercise straits passage in accordance
with LOS principles.
Robertson and the Manual also make the important point that belligerents
must have due regard for neutrals' rights under the law ofthe sea in the newer areas
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(e.g., EEZ, continental shelf) recognized by the LOS Convention and the 1958
LOS conventions, in addition to the high seas, where there is no explicit LOAC
rule to cover the point.
5. Necessity, Proportionality,ROEand the SpatialDimension in the Tanker War
The historical record is slim with respect to belligerents' general observance of
the principles of necessity, proportionality and prohibitions against perfidy dur-
ing the Tanker War. Parts B-J of this Chapter comment on observance of them in
specific circumstances ofwarfare, e.g., mine warfare, attacks on shipping, etc. Simi-
larly, the historical record does not disclose what Iranian or Iraqi decisionmakers
knew or should have known when planning offensive or defensive measures. Nor
is there any record ofperfidy or ruses ofwar in the self-defense context. That in-
formation, if it exists, is in government intelligence and military archives.
The US self-defense response and other States' potential responses to Iranian
attacks, including those during the Airbus tragedy, were necessary and propor-
tional. This is an example of the three-State scenario discussed above. At the
time of this and similar attacks on neutrals and opposing belligerent platforms, as-
suming they were thought to have acquired enemy character, Iran and Iraq were
required to use LOAC principles of necessity and proportionality in attacks and
defensive measures. There is no published record of what any country knew, or
should have known, during these situations, apart from information the US had on
origins of the attacks, i.e., from platforms, helicopters and ships involved.
There is no published record ofIranian or Iraqi ROE, ifany. US and other coun-
tries' ROE, to the extent that they have been published, deal largely with
CO
self-defense issues, although their other aspects, undoubtedly classified, might
cover LOAC subjects such as neutral convoy protection of neutral merchantmen.
These have not been published; therefore analysis ofLOAC topics like convoy and
accompanying merchant ships must look to the facts and the law, and not to any
self-imposed restrictions imposed by ROE. ROE dealing with self-defense show
awareness of necessity and proportionality principles for self-defense reasonable
under the circumstances.
Iran appeared not to observe the distinction between restricting its territorial
waters, i.e., its territorial sea, for military operations and its territorial waters that
were within the Strait ofHormuz, the implication from Iran's announcements be-
70
ing that it could restrict Strait transit passage. Under the LOS and the LONW,
71
Iraq or Iran could not deny straits passage to neutral vessels. Iran's using neutrals'
72
territorial waters for naval maneuvers, besides being a clear LOS violation, also
violated the LOAC. The same is true concerning Iran's attacks on merchantmen
or facilities in or landward of neutral territorial waters. Whether Iran or Iraq
showed due regard for neutrals' high seas freedoms in air attacks on neutral mer-
75
chantmen and warships is also questionable.
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Part B. Visit and Search; Capture, Destruction or Diversion
Warships have had an LOS right to approach and visit vessels on the high seas
as an exception to the rule that ships sailing the high seas are immune from the ju-
risdiction of any country other than the flag State. This includes merchant ships,
fishermen, boats, etc., ifthe vessel to be approached and visited is a suspected pirate
ship or slaver, refuses to show its flag, or flies a flag ofanother State but is in reality
registered under the warship's flag. The LOS Convention adds two categories:
ships without nationality, or a ship engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the
warship's flag State has jurisdiction as the Convention provides. The approach and
visit right does not extend to warships or government vessels on noncommercial
service, e.g., naval auxiliaries; they are immune from this procedure.
States have also concluded treaties, sometimes bilateral, with other countries,
to allow high seas approach and visit of the other country's merchant ships, etc., to
inspect ships suspected of carrying illicit cargoes destined for that State, e.g., the
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Prohibition Era treaties, or more recently, drug interdiction agreements. In the
latter cases permission to board may be obtained by telecommunications as the
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agreement provides. Agreements also exist for suppressing terrorist acts against
79
maritime navigation and offshore oil platforms.
In either case, traditional LOS approach and visit or interdiction operations, a
r 80
warship retains its right of self-defense. The LOAC applies through the LOS
conventions' other rules clauses, or applying treaty suspension or wartime termi-
81
nation principles, in war situations.
1. Visit and Search Pursuant to the Law ofNaval Warfare
The right ofwarship visit and search on the high seas and in a belligerent's terri-
torial sea during armed conflict differs from the LOS right of high seas approach
82
and visit. First, visit and search rights obtain through the other rules clauses of
the LOS conventions or applying treaty suspension or termination principles dur-
83ing wartime situations. Second, the right applies only incident to the visit and
search, and does not spill over into a right of approach and visit; the right of ap-
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proach and visit is governed by LOS principles. If a warship closes on a mer-
chantman with visit and search and approach and visit in mind during an armed
conflict situation, the rules for each procedure must apply. Third, neutral war-
ships and neutral noncommercial vessels retain immunity they have under the law
ofthe sea from visit and search. Fourth, warships conducting visit and search re-
Of.
tain a right of self-defense.
Visit and search may be conducted in belligerents' territorial seas and internal
waters and on the high seas, including areas subject to States' contiguous zone,
EEZ, fishing zone or continental shelf claims, and in the Area. Visit and search
may not be conducted in neutral States' territorial seas, in international straits
358 The Tanker War
overlapped by territorial seas in that part of a strait whose waters comprise neutral
States' territorial seas, and in a neutral's archipelagic sea lanes. Hague XIII, art. 2,
forbids visit and search in neutral State "territorial waters," a customary rule,
but the previous formula takes into account Hague XIII's more general language
oo
in a context of modern LOS principles. Although coastal States have rights in
the contiguous zone, EEZ, fishing zone and the continental shelf, these zones' wa-
ters remain subject to high seas freedoms ofnavigation and overflight as do waters
89
above the Area, i.e., the deep seabed the LOS Convention reserves as human-
90
kind's common heritage. Visit and search operations in these areas, and on high
seas not subject to any of these claims, are subject to a requirement that a belliger-
ent observe due regard for neutral States' rights, whether that be high seas rights,
neutrals' rights in these zones, or humankind's rights in the Area, besides specific
91LOAC rules applying to the situation. A belligerent may conduct visit and
search in its territorial sea and internal waters without applying the due regard
92
principle; that is part of its sovereign territory. Even here, however, belligerents
must apply LOAC rules, including humanitarian and neutrality law principles.
Similarly, a belligerent may conduct visit and search in an opposing belligerent's
territorial sea and internal waters, but here visit and search must observe due re-
gard for neutral State rights, i.e., innocent passage by neutral shipping in an oppos-
93ing belligerent's territorial sea, in addition to positive rules of the law of armed
conflict. However, this innocent passage in a belligerent's own territorial sea
might be subject to the LOS rule that a coastal State may suspend innocent passage
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temporarily for security reasons, and the LOAC rule that belligerents may order
neutral shipping away from the immediate area ofnaval operations or may impose
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special restrictions on this shipping. In an opposing belligerent's territorial sea,
only the LOAC naval operations rule would apply, territorial sovereignty continu-
ing to reside in the coastal State. In either case belligerents may not deny territorial
sea access to a neutral nation unless there is a route of equal access.
Hague XIII and customary law say nothing specific about visit and search in
straits; however, the customary rule against visit and search in neutral waters
should apply by extension for straits bordered by neutral State territorial seas. If
one side of a strait is belligerent territorial seas and the other is neutral territorial
seas, visit and search may be conducted in the belligerent's territorial sea but not in
the neutral's territorial sea. Besides this restriction, a belligerent must observe due
regard for high seas rights through straits with a high seas passage in the middle,
neutral State transit passage, or innocent passage through a strait, or treaties gov-
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erning a particular strait, depending on the kind of strait involved. As a practical
matter, this could well mean barring visit and search in a particular strait, depend-
ing on the strait's geographic, navigational and hydrographic configurations; the
nature of the vessel to be searched; methodology of visit and search (e.g., surface
98
vessel, small boat or helicopter); and other factors. Ifa littoral State cannot close
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a strait under the law ofthe sea for temporary security protection as it may for ter-
ritorial sea innocent passage, a belligerent cannot cite this reason for closing its
side of a strait, even if incident to an otherwise valid visit and search. The same
principle applies to invoking the rule that a belligerent may order neutral shipping
out of the immediate area of naval operations or impose special restrictions on
them; this LOAC rule cannot have the effect ofimpeding neutral shipping straits
passage, unless another route ofsimilar convenience is open to neutral traffic.
Recent operational law manuals restate traditional visit and search rules:
1. Visit and search should be exercised with all tact and consideration.
2. Before summoning a vessel to lie to, the warship should hoist its national flag.
The summons is made by firing a blank charge, by international flag signal . .
.
,
or by other recognized means. The summoned vessel, if a neutral merchant
ship, [must] . . . stop, lie to, display her colors, and not resist. (If the sum-
moned vessel is an enemy ship, it is not so bound and may legally resist, even
by force, but thereby assumes all risk of resulting damage or destruction).
3. If the summoned vessel takes flight, she may be pursued and brought to by
forcible measures if necessary.
4. When a summoned vessel has been brought to, the warship should send a boat
with an officer to conduct the visit and search. If practicable, a second officer
should accompany the officer charged with the examination. The officer(s)
and the boat crew may be armed at the discretion of the commanding officer.
5. If visit and search at sea is deemed hazardous or impracticable, the neutral
vessel may be escorted by the summoning, or another, . . . warship or by a . .
.
military aircraft to the nearest place (outside neutral territory) where the visit
and search may be conveniently and safely conducted. The neutral vessel is
not obliged to lower her flag (she has not been captured) but must proceed ac-
cording to the orders of the escorting warship or aircraft.
6. The boarding officer should first examine the ship's papers to ascertain her
character, ports of departure and destination, nature of cargo, manner of em-
ployment, and other facts deemed pertinent. Papers to be examined will ordi-
narily include a certificate of national registry, crew list, passenger list,
logbook, bill of health clearances, charter party (if chartered), invoices or
manifests of cargo, bills of lading, and on occasion, a consular declaration or
other certificate of noncontraband carriage certifying the innocence of the
cargo [navicert].
7. Regularity of papers and evidence of innocence of cargo, employment, or des-
tination furnished by them are not necessarily conclusive, and, should doubt
exist, the ship's company may be questioned and the ship and cargo searched.
8. Unless military security prohibits, the boarding officer will record the facts
concerning the visit and search in the logbook of the visited ship, including
the date and position of the interception. The entry should be authenticated
by the signature and rank of the boarding officer, but neither the name of the
visiting warship nor the identity of her commanding officer should be dis-
closed. 102
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Although once a debatable issue, today the diversion option (11 5) instead of visit
103
and search on the spot is accepted practice. "Although there is a right of visit
and search by military aircraft, there is no established international practice as to
how that right should be accomplished." The common practice today, given
availability of seaborne helicopters on smaller surface warships or perhaps land-
based aircraft, is to launch a helicopter. Under those circumstances, the same rules
for approach and visit using boats, which are frequently impracticable, given the
size of modern merchantmen and frequently sea conditions, should prevail.
Aircraft may also be used for scouting for merchantmen and escorting the mer-
chant ship to a diversion point for search or to a belligerent port, instead of using
warships for those purposes.
As the visit and search principles suggest, a resisting merchant ship, or one that
attempts to flee, risks capture, damage or destruction, like merchantmen who as-
sist the enemy's intelligence system by signaling or are otherwise integrated into
1 AT
the enemy's war effort, unless exempted under the law of naval warfare. If the
vessel is found to carry contraband or warfighting/war-sustaining cargo, she may
108be declared a prize ofwar. The right to visit and search continues during an ar-
109
mistice, unless the armistice's or other ceasefire's terms provide otherwise.
A right of belligerent visit and search extends to other vessels beyond typical
merchant ships, e.g., ships carrying cultural property, hospital ships, perhaps
112
mail ships, and other vessels exempt from capture, etc., e.g., coastal trading and
113
fishing vessels, although there are no specific treaty provisions permitting visit-
ing and searching these other exempt vessels. They are subsumed under the gen-
eral rubric of being merchant ships for this purpose.
Two exceptions to belligerents' right of visit and search, besides neutral war-
ships or neutral-flag government ships operated for noncommercial purposes,
are neutral-flag vessels not engaged in an opposing belligerent's war effort or not
carrying contraband and under convoy by a neutral warship, or neutral-flag vessels
not engaged in a belligerent's war effort or not carrying contraband and escorted or
accompanied by a neutral warship. Under the London Declaration, only neu-
tral-flag convoys are subject to exemption; however, practice during other wars or
crises {e.g. World War II, before the United States entered the war, during the
Formosa Straits crisis) confirms that neutral warships flying a country's flag other
than that ofthe vessel(s) convoyed may escort or convoy neutral merchantmen not
in support of the belligerents' war effort and not carrying contraband if the mer-
chantman's flag State so requests. Traditional practice has been for a belligerent
warship to request information as to the character ofcargo and vessels convoyed or
escorted, and for the escort or convoy commander to certify the innocent nature of
the convoy or escorted ship(s) by signal to the belligerent warship. Given modern
practice of instant, reliable worldwide communications, the 1998 Helsinki Princi-
ples on Maritime Neutrality rightly advocate authorizing communications between
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neutral and belligerent States' governments and their ships at sea for this purpose
as a progressive development. Even if the belligerent warship believes the privi-
lege of neutral convoy or escort has been abused, it is up to the neutral warship
escort or convoy commander to withdraw protection. If a neutral warship com-
mander does not do so, a belligerent government may protest this. For a belligerent
to attack a neutral warship, or its convoyed, escorted or accompanied merchant-
men, invites self-defense responses.
The traditional law ofnaval warfare states no principles for neutral military air-
craft convoy, escort or accompaniment ofmerchantmen that do not carry contra-
band or material contributing to a belligerent's war effort. However, the same
principles should apply. The main problem is communications with a belligerent
warship or aircraft proposing to conduct visit and search. Aircraft must have capa-
bility to communicate with belligerent warships or aircraft wishing to conduct
visit and search; this is usually the case with today's aircraft. Even ifthere has been
prior communication between governments, prudence suggests a clear under-
standing between the platform proposing visit and search (perhaps another air-
craft, perhaps a warship) and the convoying, escorting or accompanying aircraft.
1 17The same principles for risk ofself-defense response also apply to this situation.
In the case of "mixed" convoy, escort or accompaniment situations, i.e., when
neutral military aircraft and warships operate together, the same principles should
apply. This should be true whether there is symmetry of flag between the aircraft
and warships or situations where aircraft ofone flag convoy, escort or accompany,
along with warships of other nationalities. Here communications are critical, not
only between neutrals and belligerents, but also among neutrals. The traditional
law, including the law of self-defense, has nothing to say about this situation, yet
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another reason for clear communications, particularly with belligerents.
Different principles apply ifbelligerent warships and/or aircraft convoy, escort
or accompany merchantmen, however; these merchantmen are subject to attack
119
and destruction by opposing belligerents.
Under the customary law ofnaval warfare, the flag the merchantman flies, and
not the LOS genuine link analysis, counts forprimafacie attribution ofvessel na-
120
tionality, yet another example of the operation ofthe LOS conventions' other
121
rules clauses. (Different rules apply if a belligerent transfers flags from its
122
merchantmen to neutral flags, not a Tanker War issue, insofar as the historical
record shows.) Ifthere is a transfer from one neutral flag to another, this may raise
LOS issues, but the LONW rule ofprima facie attribution of neutrality covers
the transfer to attribute prima facie neutral flag status to the reflagged vessel.
(The principle is different ifa vessel flies theUN or ICRC flag; under the LOS and
1 2Spresumably the LONW jurisdiction remains vested in the registry State.) Thus
neutral-flag warships may convoy, escort or accompany neutral-flag merchantmen
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that have been reflagged under the same circumstances as they could if no
reflagging has taken place.
Transfers of goods follow the same kind of rules. If there has been a bona fide
transfer ofcargo from a belligerent to a neutral before a voyage from a neutral coun-
try to another neutral begins, that is considered neutral cargo. Rules concerning
delivery of neutral cargo to a belligerent from a neutral, or transfer of title from a
belligerent to a neutral, once the cargo has been lifted and is on its way, i.e., the con-
tinuous voyage rule, do not apply. The continuous voyage rule might apply, for ex-
ample, to contraband consigned to an enemy destination with intermediate
1 7 ft
overland transportation from a neutral port to a belligerent.
2. Visit and Search: Tanker War Issues
There are no reported cases of attempts by belligerent or neutral warships to
conduct approach and visit on suspect merchant ships under the law ofthe sea, nor
were there any accounts ofterrorist attacks on vessels or Persian Gulfoil platforms,
during the Tanker War. If there had been, principles applying to these situations,
127
and not LONW principles, would have governed.
Iran conducted visit and search operations with ships and aircraft against neu-
tral merchant ships inbound to Iraq through Kuwaiti or other ports, and vessels
outbound with Kuwaiti or other cargo destined for neutral ports, throughout most
128
of the war. Despite neutral governments' protests on some occasions, Iran was
within its LOAC rights to conduct these visits and searches, including visit and
search after the cease-fire, if international law criteria for these operations were
met. For example, it was not proper to shoot up a merchantman before conducting
visit and search, unless that ship tried to evade visit. Iran complied with visit and
search rules some ofthe time, but in other cases the evidence may point toward vio-
lations of the law. It is not clear, e.g., whether vessels that were attacked tried to
evade visit, or whether Iran shot first and asked questions later. In the latter cases
Iran violated LOAC rules. Although Iran threatened to close the Strait ofHormuz
129from time to time, the purpose ofthreatened closure appeared not to be incident
to visit and search operations. If visit and search occurred near or in the Strait,
there are no reports of these actions impeding neutrals' straits passage.
Belligerents kept merchant ships plying the Gulf pursuant to their high seas
and straits passage rights under surveillance, Iraq primarily through aircraft and
1 30
Iran through aircraft and surface vessels. This surveillance, ifinterpreted as the
first step in a projected visit and search, was legitimate under the LOS as high seas
overflight, freedom ofnavigation or straits transit rights, as long as it did not inter-
I 21
fere with the merchant ships' high seas or transit passage rights. These States'
warships and military aircraft also could conduct surveillance as a self-defense
1 2T
measure. However, once the visit and search process began with notice to the
merchantman, Iran and Iraq were bound by its LONW procedures. This did not
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include initial indiscriminate attacks by aircraft or surface vessels, or mines, par-
133
ticularly if a vessel's identity, cargo and destination were not known. Whatever
the result under Charter law analysis, these were also violations ofthe law ofna-
val warfare proportionality and necessity principles as they related to visit and
search.
The United States and other neutral nations were within their rights to form
convoys of neutral-flag merchant ships, or to escort or accompany neutral-flag
merchant ships, carrying cargoes to and from neutral States, e.g., Kuwait, where
cargoes did not directly contribute to a belligerent's war effort, i.e., were not prop-
erty of a belligerent or destined to a belligerent when lifted. The fact that the cargo
may have been legitimately sold to a neutral or may have been legitimately ex-
changed before lift from a belligerent did not change the cargo's characterization
when on the high seas. There is no evidence that the convoyed or escorted neutral
flag merchant ships, reflagged or otherwise, carried belligerents' cargoes that con-
135
tributed to war efforts.
Early in the war, Iraq rejected overtures to allow neutral merchant ships
trapped in the Shatt al-Arab to leave under a UN or ICRC flag. Toward war's
end, there was no consensus on substituting aUN naval flotilla, supported by Italy
and the USSR, for warships operating in the Gulf pursuant to each country's or-
137 138
ders. (TheUN ensign has been used on several prior occasions.) Ifvessels re-
leased from the Shatt had traveled in convoy or had been escorted or accompanied
by warships, an issue might have arisen on whether these ships were legitimately
139
reflagged under the LOAC for purposes of the evacuation. If they were re-
flagged legitimately, a further question would be whether the United Nations or
the ICRC could legitimately request convoy protection for these ships. The United
Nations, possessing legal personality, could request protection, preferably
through a Security Council decision, but the ICRC as a nongovernmental orga-
nization would not have had status necessary in international law to request con-
voy, unless the ICRC were placed in UN service. Ifthe merchantmen had flown
a UN or ICRC flag under these circumstances, presumably the same principles
would have applied for convoying, i.e., a warship with a different ensign could
have convoyed, escorted or accompanied the merchant ships, provided there had
been a request for protection from the flag State and, as a precautionary measure,
from the United Nations. If a Security Council decision had established terms,
those would be mandatory, even ifthey were different from the usual LOAC rules
for these operations. The same issues could have arisen, except perhaps re-
flagging questions unless merchantmen as well as warships flew the UN flag, in
connection with the UN flotilla proposal late in the war. They did not because the
flotilla was never approved.
Indiscriminate shooting at, damage to, and destruction of, neutral merchant
ships by surface ship or aircraft weapons subjected both belligerents to possibilities
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of self-defense responses. If a merchantman was flagged under the same ensign as
its convoying, escorting or accompanying warships, the right of self-defense
stemmed from a right to protect the merchant ship as an act of individual self-de-
fense. If the merchantman was flagged under an ensign different from the war-
ship's, and convoy, escort or accompanying had been requested, there was a right
to protect those merchant ships under an informal collective self-defense the-
ory. Merchant ships painted grey to simulate warships, feigning convoys, or
which snuggled close to convoyed, escorted or accompanied ships without request
for protection, were not entitled to self-defense protection on those accounts,
whatever might be said of these measures as ruses.
To the extent that belligerents used mines to deter, threaten or attack convoyed,
148
escorted or accompanied merchantmen, this too was a violation ofLONW prin-
ciples. Besides neutral warships' rights to remove the mines, neutrals could also
149
defend against these by removing the source of the mines, e.g., Iran Ajr, as inci-
dent to legitimate self-defense of their warships; as legitimate self-defense of ves-
sels convoyed, escorted or accompanied; or as incident to legitimate self-defense of
their and others' neutral flag shipping ifassistance had been requested. Nothing in
the law of naval warfare forbade removal of the mines.
3. Projections for the Future
The Tanker war thus strengthened traditional visit and search rules, albeit with
some cases where neutral countries wrongly protested the actions. Valid protests
against belligerents' indiscriminate attacks on innocent neutral merchant ships
vindicated the strength of those principles. Traditional principles of convoy, es-
cort or accompaniment of neutral merchantmen were reinforced, with added di-
mensions of developing rules for potential use of aircraft with surface ships as part
of operations, and using warships of one neutral flag for convoy, etc., of another
neutral flag's merchantmen when requested by that neutral.
Given downsizing of naval forces worldwide, and ready availability of aircraft,
particularly helicopters aboard ship but perhaps shore-based, a trend of conduct-
ing visit and search by aircraft, perhaps operating with warships and perhaps alone
(i.e., helicopters), is likely to continue. The same is true with respect to neutral con-
voys of merchantmen; it is likely that this kind of operation, i.e., use of aircraft as
part of a convoy, escort or accompaniment operation, will be seen in future wars.
Similarly, convoying operations employing aircraft and warships of different flags
are likely. Traditional principles should apply in these situations as well. Because
ofrelative ease ofcommunications between governments, and a risk oflack ofcom-
munications on the high seas, the Helsinki Principles option of government-to-
government communications during convoy operations should be adopted as a
rule of law.
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Part C. Belligerents' Seaborne Commerce; Belligerents' Convoys
Part B discussed the law ofnaval warfare relating to neutral flag commerce during
the Tanker War. This Part analyzes issues ofthe belligerents' seaborne commerce,
principles of convoying applicable to belligerent-flag shipping, and principles of
contraband.
/. The Law ofNaval Warfare and Belligerents' Seaborne Commerce
Enemy warships and military aircraft, including naval and military auxiliaries,
are subject to capture, attack, or destruction anywhere beyond neutral territory,
i.e., outside neutrals' inland waters or territorial seas, including the high seas and
areas governed by contiguous zone, EEZ, fishing zone, continental shelf, or Area
regimes. Captures, attacks and destruction of vessels in these areas are subject to
the principle ofdue regard for neutrals' uses ofthese areas and a belligerent's right
152
to exclude neutrals from the immediate area of naval operations. Capture of a
153
warship, naval auxiliary or military aircraft immediately vests title in a captor.
Crews of captured, attacked or destroyed aircraft or military vessels become pris-
oners of war when captured. If the wounded, sick or shipwrecked are taken
aboard a neutral warship or military aircraft, "it shall be ensured, where so re-
quired by international law, that they can take no further part in operations of
war."
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Although enemy merchantmen sailing outside neutral territorial seas or inland
waters may be subject to visit and search, they may be captured without visit
and search if positive determination of enemy status may be made by other
157
means. (Hague VI principles, regulating conduct toward belligerents' mer-
158
chant ships in enemy ports at war's outbreak, are considered not to reflect cus-
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tomary law. Before 1907 some countries observed a usage that enemy merchant
ships in a belligerent port could not be captured; there was no rule oflaw to that ef-
fect. Today they too may be captured.) Enemy merchant ship officers and crews
must be made prisoners ofwar. Ifmilitary circumstances preclude sending it in
as prize, a captured ship may be destroyed after all possible measures are taken to
provide for passenger and crew safety. Ship and cargo documents and papers and,
if possible, passenger and crew personal effects should be preserved.
Enemy merchant ships may be attacked and destroyed without prior warning
or an attempt to capture them if they are a legitimate military objective and: (1)
persistently refuse to stop upon being summoned to do so, e.g., incident to visit and
search; (2) actively resist visit and search or capture; (3) are armed, i.e., equipped
with weapons or other equipment capable of inflicting serious battle damage on a
warship or aircraft; (4) are incorporated in or assist in any way the enemy's intelli-
gence systems; (5) engage in belligerent acts on behalfofthe enemy; (6) act as a na-
val or military auxiliary; (7) sail under convoy of enemy warships or military
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aircraft; or (8) are integrated into the enemy war-fighting or war-sustaining ef-
fort. (Principles relating to belligerent convoy of neutral merchantmen are ad-
dressed in Part D.) This list followsNWP 9A, published at the end of the Tanker
War, with an addition from theSan Remo Manual and modifications suggested, for
reasons stated below.
The NWP 9A and Manual enumerations differ slightly from customary law,
and they divide on minor points and one major issue. Categories (1), (2), (4), (6)
and (7) are essentially the same inNWP 9A and the Manual and correspond with
customary and treaty norms.
The traditional rule for armed merchant ships, Category (3), has been that they
may have defensive armament, e.g., pistols or rifles for defense against pirates, but
i fin
that armament of a kind to enable the ship to conduct warfare is forbidden.
NWP 9A and the Manual sensibly drop the distinction between defensive and of-
fensive weapons. NWP 9A comments:
In light of modern weapons, it is impossible to determine, if it ever was possible,
whether the armament on merchant ships is to be used offensively or merely
defensively. It is unrealistic to expect enemy forces to be able to make that
determination.
I CO
The Manual is to the same effect. While shoulder-fired missiles and rockets
would likely be considered arming a vessel, equipping an enemy merchantman with
chaffwould not. Although a ship's bow can be an effective ramming weapon, hav-
ing a sharp bow, perhaps reinforced against collisions, does not mean that a merchant
ship is thereby armed. NWP 9A recites that an enemy merchant ship is subject
170
to attack and destruction "Ifarmed." The Manual says an enemy merchantman
is a proper military objective ifit "[is] armed to an extent that [it] could inflict dam-
age to a warship; this excludes light individual weapons for the defence ofperson-
171
nel, e.g., against pirates, and purely deflective systems such as "chaff{.]" . . . Both
definitions must be read with their explanatory comments to determine, forNWP
9A, the limitation on offensive armament; for the Manual, what is meant by "dam-
age to a warship," i.e., it does not include using a bow to ram. Being armed, under
the Manual definition, may not mean the capability to damage another merchant
172
vessel, however. TheManual does not say. IfNWP 9A might seem too broad on
its face, the Manual statement might seem to lack precision in definition. Given
advances in weapons technology, it is almost impossible to describe banned or law-
17?
ful weapons within a definition or to anticipate the future. It is better, asNWP
9A does, to avoid lists or definitions, whether by inclusion or exclusion.
I suggest this as a more workable restatement of the law on this issue:
Enemy merchant ships may be attacked and destroyed if they are armed, i.e.,
equipped with weapons or other equipment capable of inflicting serious battle
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damage on a warship or aircraft. This does not include equipment aboard an enemy
merchant ship for its protection from collision, pirates, or riots; for maintaining
internal order aboard the vessel, e.g., to quell a mutiny; or for deflecting incoming
weapons, e.g. special paint to deceive homing missiles, chaff and like devices to
deceive missiles, or extra shell plating to protect against projectiles or missiles as well
as against collisions, ice or other maritime perils.
"Weapons or other equipment" covers armament, e.g., missiles or naval guns but
also equipment that could damage or destroy sensing systems, e.g., offensive elec-
175
tronic warfare equipment, etc. As a matter of theory, pistol bullets could inflict
some battle damage against close aboard warships, e.g., the Iranian speedboats dur-
I nc
ing the Tanker War, but side arms are not considered arms within the meaning
of the definition. "Battle damage" is common parlance well understood in naval
warfare. Use of the generic word "equipment" would cover not only weapons, but
also devices, e.g., tear gas or high pressure water hoses that might be used to deflect
177
an attempt to rush a ship. Similarly, having heavier than usual shell plating or a
reinforced bow to protect against ice or collision should not qualify a vessel as an
armed merchantman. With good reason,NWP 9A, its successor and the Manual
depart from the traditional law; perhaps their definitions could be refined,
however.
The San Remo Manual adds Category (5), permitting attack on and destruction
ofenemy merchant ships if they "engag[e] in belligerent acts on behalf of the en-
emy, e.g., laying mines, minesweeping, cutting undersea cables and pipelines, en-
gaging in visit and search ofneutral merchant vessels or attacking other merchant
178
vessels[.]" This has no direct counterpart in other sources, e.g.,NWP 9A, but it
is a restatement of the law. There are problems with the statement, however, if
there are no other considerations. Hague VII, reciting conditions for converting
179
merchant ships into warships, lays down customary standards but does not
cover situations where merchantmen engage in belligerent acts. The 1856 Paris
180
Declaration condemns privateering but does not cover a situation when priva-
teers commit belligerent acts from a merchant ship. Category (5), taken from the
Manual, would cover these situations. There are problems with the law of the sea.
The LOS, e.g., condemns and sets standards for jurisdiction over the universal
181 1 8?
crime of piracy. here the conventions' other rules clauses have no impact,
and pirates can be pursued, captured, tried and convicted by belligerents or neu-
trals during armed conflict as in other situations. If it is assumed that pirates and
other LOS violators cannot be assumed to commit belligerent acts when they
engage in LOS-condemned activity, then the Manual definition is a correct state-
ment of the law. The problem is with the clause, "e.g., laying mines, . . . attacking
other merchant vessels." Suppose, for example, a patriotic pirate attacks a mer-
chant ship of the enemy. Is the pirate subject to the LOS rules or those of the
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LONW? Perhaps it would have been better to omit the examples, as stated above in
Category (5).
184
185
Category (7), a residual clause, copies its principles from NWP 9
A
:
. . . [EJnemy merchant vessels may be attacked and destroyed by surface warships,
either with or without prior warning, in any of the following circumstances:
... If integrated into the enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining effort and
compliance with the rules of the 1936 London Protocol would, under the
circumstances of the specific encounter, subject the surface warship to imminent
danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment. 1 *^
The San Remo Manual is more defense-oriented : "The following activities may
render enemy merchant vessels military objectives: . . . otherwise making an effec-
187
tive contribution to military action, e.g., carrying war materials." This was be-
cause the Manual conferees agreed, after considerable discussion, that the NWP
9A descriptive phrase "integration into the enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining
1 88
effort" was too broad to use for a residual category. Three years later, however,
the Helsinki Principles defined contraband as "goods . . . designed for the use ofwar
fighting and other goods useful for the war effort of the enemy." Although con-
190
traband only involves goods shipped to a belligerent port, if the Principles
drafters were willing to accept such a broad definition for goods shipped to a bellig-
erent's port in a neutral-flag merchantmen, then logically they might well have ac-
cepted the NWP view of a residual category of integration into the enemy
war-fighting or war-sustaining effort. Although the issue is close, given worldwide
191
use ofNWP 9A and its successor, Category (7) follows the NWP model. To be
sure, "war-sustaining" is not subject to precise definition, "effort" that indirectly
but effectively supports and sustains a belligerent's warfighting capability is
within the scope of the term. The varying language of the NWPs, the Manual and
the Principles represents distinctions without differences for practice. There is
nothing unusual about this kind of phraseology. Naval targeting is governed by
193
concepts like necessity and proportionality, the LOS recites a due regard
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principle to describe oceans usage sharing. "War-sustaining" is neither more
nor less precise. State practice will determine what constitutes "war-sustaining,"
precisely as State practice has determined and will determine proportionality.
On its face, the London Protocol would require, except for Categories (1) and
(2) (persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or active resistance to visit
and search) that a surface warship or submarine may not sink or render incapable
of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and
ship's papers in a safe place. The Protocol says the vessel's boats are not regarded as
a safe place unless passenger and crew safety are assured under existing sea and
weather conditions by proximity of land or presence of another ship that can take
Law of Armed Conflict 369
them aboard. The Protocol does not mention air attacks, although by 1936,
when the Protocol was negotiated, attacks from the air were part of the experience
of armed conflict. The 1923 Hague Air Rules, however, had restated the general
rule of the military objective, and although the Rules recited this in a context of
197
land targets, this general principle could be said to apply to maritime targets.
The issue is the vitality and scope of these London Protocol requirements, ne-
gotiated in 1936 with World War I experience in mind, in today's law ofnaval war-
198
fare. The law of the sea, and since 1949 the Second Geneva Convention and
Protocol I, restate a customary rule requiring rescue of those in peril on the
sea, and status of these persons, helpless against the elements unless assisted by
others, undoubtedly has played an emotional role even though these principles do
not apply to the Protocol issue. Sinking merchantmen, particularly ships with pas-
sengers aboard, e.g., liners, had been a highly charged issue during the Great
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War, and it was an emotional and legal issue in World War II, particularly dur-
202
ing the early years. Even after the currents ofwar swept liners from the seas, ex-
cept for use as troopships, for which they were (and are) liable to attack and
destruction, losses ofmerchant mariners after attacks was considerable. The
Allies and the Axis did not follow Protocol standards during World War II, ini-
tially on a theory of reprisal and later because merchant ships were armed, con-
voyed, used as intelligence collectors, or otherwise incorporated into the war
effort. Besides attacks from surface ships and submarines, merchantmen were also
205
attacked by enemy aircraft.
The Nuremberg trials ofGerman Admirals Karl Doenitz and Erich Raeder did
not resolve the issue. The admirals, inter alia found guilty of failing to rescue the
shipwrecked, received no sentence on these counts because ofevidence ofwartime
UK and US practice.206
Post-World War II commentator opinion has also divided. Some say the Lon-
207 208don Protocol is ofno effect today or not relevant in modern warfare, some say
209
it has been cast in ambiguous light or is unrealistic, others say it remains in ef-
210
feet, and still others say it applies only to Categories ( 1 ) and (2), i.e., where a mer-
chant ship persistently refuses to stop upon due summons or actively resists visit
21
1
and search, the Protocol's exact language, or does not apply to attacks from the
• 212
air.
Military manuals show similar ambiguity. For example, the 1 900 US Naval War
Code said that prizes could be destroyed under certain conditions, e.g., un-
213
seaworthiness, reflecting the law and times when visit and search, as distin-
guished from diversion, was the typical way to deal with merchantmen. The US
Navy's 1917 Instructions said a prize could be destroyed "in case ofmilitary neces-
sity," but only after visit and search and "persons on board have been placed in
safety and also, ifpracticable, their personal effects." Documents aboard the prize
were to be preserved. A neutral ship engaged in unneutral service "must not be
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destroyed . . . save in . . . the gravest military emergency which would not justify
[the capturing warship] in releasing the vessel or sending it in for adjudication."
World War II US Navy manuals published the Protocol word for word but in a
context of visit and search. They declared that since title to an enemy vessel vested
in a captor through capture, "enemy ships made prizes may in case of military ne-
cessity be destroyed . . . when they cannot be sent or escorted in for adjudication."
In the ordinary case, if a neutral flag prize could not be sent or escorted in for adju-
dication, they should be released. Neutral prizes could also be destroyed, but be-
cause "responsibility ... for destroying a neutral prize is so serious that [a
capturing warship] should never order such destruction without being entirely
satisfied that the military reasons therefor justify it " In cases ofenemy or neu-
tral prizes Protocol provisions for protecting passengers, crew and papers had to be
215
observed.
NWIP 10-2, published and revised by the US Navy as a naval warfare publica-
tion between September 1955 and October 1 974, and declared not to be "a legis-
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lative enactment binding upon courts and tribunals applying the rules ofwar,"
was a major watershed in US naval thinking. The 1955 version, published as an
Appendix to Tucker'sLaw ofWar and Neutrality at Sea, written in 1955 but printed
218
in 1957, represented the thinking of the US Navy when it was the largest naval
219power on Earth. The NWIP 10-2 text continues recitation of Protocol princi-
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pies of safety of passengers, crew and papers as applicable to prize destruction.
In a note to this requirement, however, NWIP 10-2 refers these terms to its list of
merchantmen that could be attacked and destroyed before capture. The note de-
clares in part:
According to the customary and conventional law of naval warfare valid prior to
World War II, a belligerent warship or military aircraft was forbidden to destroy an
enemy merchant vessel or render her incapable of navigation without having first
provided for the safety of passengers and crew; exception being made in the
circumstances of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned or of active
resistance to visit and search (or capture).
After reciting the Protocol rules, the note says: "These rules, deemed declaratory
of customary international law, have been interpreted as applicable to belligerent
military aircraft in their action toward enemy merchant vessels," but that they
have not been considered applicable to nonmilitary enemy aircraft. The note then
recites World War II experience and mentions the Doenitz acquittal without say-
ing how these square with the prior analysis. The final version ofNWIP 10-2
(1974) follows the 1955 edition.222
One reading ofNWIP 10-2 is that it means what it said, i.e., the Protocol recites
customary law and attacking aircraft are bound by them too. Under this analysis,
223
the result is that the NWIP 10-2 drafters at the Naval War College came to a
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different conclusion from Professor Tucker, a Stockton Professor ofInternational
Law at the College (and later a consultant there), author of The Law of War and
Neutrality at Sea, which precedes the 1955 version of NWIP 10-2 in the same
book. A second is that the drafters omitted a final part ofthe note, which would
have concluded the law had changed because of World War II experience, the
Doenitz judgment and perhaps treaty interpretation principles of desuetude, im-
possibility of performance (perhaps the situation of an aircraft which attacks an
enemy merchantman), or fundamental change of circumstances because of the
universal use of merchantmen, often armed and in convoys, lifting goods for the
77ft 771
war effort in a global conflict. This is negated by earlier language in the note
228
and lack ofamendments in six later manual supplements over nearly 20 years. A
third is that the War College drafters intended the World War II experience as a
229
"soft law" coda to the "hard law" ofthe Protocol and a parallel customary norm.
The difficulty with this is that these concepts were not part of international law
analysis in 1955 and were only beginning to appear in 1974, when the lastNWIP
230
10-2 supplement was published. The reason for the difference is thus not clear.
The 1976 US Air Force manual quoted NWIP 10-2, noted trends in practice,
and concluded: "The extent to which this traditional immunity of merchant ves-
sels, still formally recognized, will be observed in practice in future conflicts will
depend upon the nature ofthe conflict, its intensity, the parties to the conflict and
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various geographical, political and military factors."
Ambiguities of the first round of post-World War II military manuals thus
match the differences (and difficulties) among commentators.NWP 9A andNWP
1-14M represent improvement. Besides adoptingNWIP 10-2's category approach
for vessels subject to attack and destruction without warning, they publish the
Protocol text, review World War II practice, note debate over the Protocol's valid-
ity as a current rule of law, and close thus:
. . . [Ejnemy merchant vessels may be attacked and destroyed by surface
warships, . . . with or without prior warning, in any ofthe following circumstances
:
... If integrated into the enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining effort and
compliance with . . . the . . . Protocol would, under the circumstances of the specific
encounter, subject the surface warship to imminent danger or would otherwise
preclude mission accomplishment.
TheNWPs then say that rules for surrender and search for the missing and collec-
tion of the shipwrecked, wounded, sick and the dead also apply to enemy mer-
232
chantmen and civil aircraft that may become subject to attack and destruction.
The NWPs then recite the same rules for submarines, including a statement that
the Protocols apply to submarine attacks, but noting the "impracticality of
imposing on submarines the same targeting constraints as burden surface warships
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[being] reflected in the practice of belligerents ofboth sides during World War II
when submarines regularly attacked and destroyed without warning enemy mer-
chant shipping[,]" justified as reprisal or as "a necessary consequence of the arm-
ing of merchant vessels, ofconvoying, and of the general integration of merchant
shipping into the enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining effort." Like surface ships,
submarines must search for the missing and collect the shipwrecked, sick and
wounded, to the extent military exigencies permit, after an engagement. A third
analysis for aircraft attacks follows the pattern of those for surface warships and
submarines, except that NWP 1-14M adds armed merchantmen to the list, and
places Category (2), active resistance to visit and search, in a footnote that would
not be part of the commander's version of the manual. Moreover, iheNWPs omit
reference to the Protocol for aircraft attacks, a change from the NWIP 10-2 view,
although they require military aircraft to search for the missing and collect the
shipwrecked, wounded and sick, to the extent military exigencies permit.
The San Remo Manual, published in 1995 in between iheNJVPs, discusses the
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"failure" of the London Protocol but adopts its principles as a standard for cap-
tured merchantmen:
. . . [A] captured enemy merchant vessel may, as an exceptional measure, be
destroyed when military circumstances preclude taking or sending such a vessel for
adjudication as an enemy prize, only if the following criteria are met beforehand:
(a) the safety of passengers and crew is provided for; for this purpose, the ship's
boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers
and crew is assured in the prevailing sea and weather conditions by the prox-
imity of land or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take
them on board;
(b) documents and papers relating to the prize are safeguarded; and
(c) if feasible, personal effects of the passengers and crew are saved.
Destruction ofenemy passenger vessels carrying only civilians at sea is prohibited.
For passenger safety, these liners must be diverted to an "appropriate area" or port
to complete capture. Thus except for a prohibition on destruction of passenger
ships carrying only passengers, which must be diverted for completion of capture,
the Manual adopts the Protocol's literal language, which says it applies to destruc-
tion of enemy merchantmen if they persistently refuse to stop upon being duly
summoned or if they actively resist visit and search. The Manual does not state an
alternative for disabling a vessel, mentioned in the Protocol. The Manual applies
its terms to aircraft attacks under these circumstances.
TheManual treats the Protocol rules, like the rules for visit, search and destruc-
737
tion as alternatives to attack. In effect they are indicia of proportionality; the
Manual says that "Indeed, it could be argued that according to the wording of the
[London Protocol] . . . destruction of merchant ships can be considered legal as
long as passengers, crew and ship's papers have been placed in safety." One
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should add that any right to destroy a merchantmen is subject to categories permit-
ting destruction and exemptions, e.g., for hospital ships. In effect, theManual
sees the Protocol principles as indicia of proportionality for particular situations
in naval war.
Given the divergence among individual commentators, the collective effort of
the Manual, and among operational law manuals, what is the status ofthe Protocol
today? While it would appear that its literal language is not binding law, many of
its policies are reflected in rules of law. A perhaps oversimplified analysis might
be:
1. If an enemy-flag merchantman falls within any of the categories listed
above, clearly recognized in international law, it may be attacked and de-
stroyed without warning. 242
2. This principle is subject to an important qualification: Certain classes of
merchantmen may never be attacked if they are operating within excep-
tions granted by law, e.g., hospital ships operating as such. 243
3. As an option to attack, a belligerent's warship may choose to visit and
search, followed by destruction as an alternative to sending in as prize,
with diversion as an option to completing visit and search on the high
seas. As a further alternative to the foregoing, a warship may first order a
merchant ship to divert to an appropriate place where visit and search
may be conducted.244
4. Principles of necessity and proportionality apply to all attacks. 245
5. Preserving crew's and passengers' lives and property, and ship's papers,
are very important proportionality factors if necessity indicates an en-
emy merchantman's destruction is appropriate. The London Protocol
states specific principles of necessity and proportionality. Even here,
however, there are gradations, with passenger and crew effects having a
lower priority than the lives ofcrew and passengers and ship's papers. 246
By the same token, a decisionmaker must take into account possible costs
in his or her force members' lives, and property, if, e.g., visit and search as
opposed to attack without warning is considered. 247 While the LONW
sets a high premium on humanity aboard the target ship through law
flowing from the London Protocol and humanitarian law after destruc-
tion of a ship, where assistance is subject to circumstances after attack,248
humankind aboard a belligerent platform before projected destruction of
the target also has high value. Admiral Service has emphasized the value
of human beings aboard a belligerent platform,249 risk of loss of life
aboard each platform, the attacking platform(s) and the merchant ship,
and the military value of the merchantman, must be thrown into the ne-
cessity and proportionality balance. It might be argued that this point is
new to the LOAC and humanitarian law in particular, i.e., that lives
aboard an attacking ship should not be taken into account in striking the
proportionality balance. This argument does not square with emerging
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basic principles ofhuman rights law, which inter alia declare an "inherent
right to life," which cannot be derogated during public emergency.250
Nor does it square with the possibility that loss of"smart" attacking plat-
forms engaged in rescue may result in more casualties when that belliger-
ent must resort to less sophisticated weaponry that may entail greater loss
of life for both sides. Last, the argument flies in the face of a basic policy
of the law of warfare, that it be conducted by means calculated to engen-
der the least bitterness and hatred, so that a more lasting and just peace
can be more easily achieved at war's end. 251 And while the latter is usu-
ally considered a problem of the defeated State, one might ask whether
the Versailles victors' decisions for the vanquished Central Powers were
partly motivated by the enormous loss of life on the Western Front, and
that these decisions contributed to what many have seen as onerous peace
treaties that led to Adolf Hitler and World War II? Suppose the British
invention of the tank had worked, the German lines had broken with rel-
atively light loss of life, and there had been an armistice at that point?
6. The foregoing apply to all modalities of attack, i.e., by surface warships,
submarines, or aircraft.252 Different principles of proportionality and
necessity may dictate different options for different platforms, indeed
different options for the same platform under different conditions, e.g.,
size of the merchant ship, military value of its cargo, heavy or moderate
seas, cold or temperate weather, relative nearness of enemy forces, etc. It
does not seem logical, e.g., to say that aircraft attacks should not be con-
sidered in the light of London Protocol requirements. To be sure, an at-
tack jet cannot do much about placing crew and passengers in safety
pursuant to strict Protocol standards, but a method of attack {e.g., ship-
disabling fire instead of ship-destroying weapons) might be appropriate,
given the nature and military value of the cargo and ship, so that the crew
could use lifeboats. By the opposite token, a large helicopter might be
able to winch a surviving crewman of a small craft to safety aboard the he-
licopter under some circumstances, and that might be taken into ac-
count. Moreover, if attack will be coordinated among, e.g., three or more
platforms, e.g., aircraft, surface warship and submarine, having different
basic rules for each invites confusion. Operational plans or orders and
ROE can spell out proportionate actions dictated by the situation.
7. Although this Part has discussed attacks on enemy merchant ships in the
LOAC context, the same kinds of necessity and proportionality are at
play in the conditioning factors of necessity and proportionality in the
self-defense253 context. The content ofnecessity and proportionality will
be different; e.g., while a deliberate confrontation with an enemy mer-
chantman might dictate visit and search of e.g., a suspected intelligence-
transmitting merchantman (perhaps to have a look at its equipment be-
fore ordering destruction or other action) with Protocol provision for
crew and passengers, while in a self-defense situation, particularly with
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an immediate problem of anticipatory self-defense, destruction might be
appropriate under self-defense necessity and proportionality principles.
8. In any case, after the merchant vessel has been sunk, the attacking plat-
form^) must search for the missing and collect the shipwrecked, sick,
wounded and dead in accordance with humanitarian law, taking into ac-
count "all possible measures," i.e., risk of hazard to the platform that has
conducted an attack or destruction with the possibility of loss of addi-
tional life if the platform engages in this effort, the capabilities of the
platform, etc. Thus a submarine, having legitimately attacked and sunk a
ship, might not be able to conduct search and rescue because of danger to
it from enemy attack while on the surface, with resultant loss ofmore life,
because of hull configuration, or because of capacity on board to accom-
modate more people, the case of a small submarine. An attack jet might
be able to do no more than report that there are survivors in the water,
while some helicopters, depending on the operational situation and their
size and capabilities, might be able to pick up some or all. A surface war-
ship might be able to pick up all, unless there is the possibility of success-
ful fatal attack on the warship with more resultant casualties or heavy
seas; this occurred after sinking ofthe Bismarck during World War II. On
the other hand, ifdestruction occurs after visit and search, and there is no
possibility ofattack on the visiting platform(s) with resultant loss ofcrew
in perhaps a combined surface ship and helicopter operation, humanitar-
ian law dictates picking up survivors if, e.g., the merchantman's lifeboats
do not operate properly or it appears London Protocol requirements can-
not otherwise be met.254
9. Principles 1-8 are subject to UN Security Council decisions and actions
taken pursuant to them.255
This seems an appropriate way to cut the Gordian Knot ofresponding to mod-
ern warfare's technological realities, London Protocol requirements and Sec-
ond Convention and Protocol I principles for an attack or destruction otherwise
legitimate under the LOAC or self-defense principles.
The foregoing assumes a potentially legitimate target. The LOAC, and human-
itarian law in particular, has declared that certain objects, enemy-flag vessels or en-
emy-flag civil aircraft, are not legitimate objects of capture or attack, if they are
employed in their capacity exempting them from capture or attack, do not commit
acts harmful to an opposing enemy, immediately submit to identification and in-
spection when required, do not hamper combatants' movements, and obey bel-
7S7
ligerents' orders to stop or move out of the way when required. If, e.g., they are
not so employed or do not obey orders to stop for, e.g., visit and search, they may be
subject to other action, e.g., attack and destruction under some circumstances. Ex-
empt vessels include:
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1. Hospital ships;258
2. Small craft used for coastal rescue operations and other medical trans-
ports;259
3. Cartel ships, i.e., vessels belligerents grant safe conduct for transporting
prisoners ofwar, diplomats or other noncombatants, e.g., civilians from a
war zone or repatriated civilians;260
4. Ships engaged in humanitarian missions, including those carrying sup-
plies indispensable to civilian population survival, and ships engaged in
relief or rescue operations, pursuant to the belligerents' agreement; 261
5. Ships transporting cultural property under special protection;262
6. Passenger vessels when engaged only in carrying civilian passengers;263
7. Ships on religious, scientific or philanthropic missions;264
8. Small coastal fishing vessels or small boats in local coastal trade; 265
9. Vessels designed or adapted exclusively for responding to pollution inci-
dents involving the marine environment, perhaps not a customary norm
but introduced by the San Remo Manual; 2^
10. Ships or vessels of any size {e.g., boats) or aircraft that have surren-
dered;267
11. Life rafts and lifeboats; 268 or
12. Vessels a belligerent gives a unilateral safe-conduct or license, perhaps by
proclamation.269
270
There is no customary exemption for ships driven ashore byforce majeure. Mail
ships are not exempt; there seems to be no custom to exempt them, although the is-
271
sue is not free ofdoubt. However, ifa mail ship,e.£., R.M.S. (RoyalMail Ship) Ti-
tanic (lost in 1912) is exempt for another reason, e.g. Titanic, as a passenger liner
carrying only passengers and no military cargo, it normally would not be subject to
272
capture or attack. Enemy merchant vessels in an belligerent's port, unless they
are otherwise exempt, e.g., a hospital ship or a passenger vessel with only civilian
273
passengers aboard, are not exempt from capture or attack.
By the opposite token, if a ship otherwise exempt from attack is used for war ef-
fort, or if it is otherwise used in activity that removes it from exempt status,
77 ft
that ship may be subject to capture or attack, depending on circumstances.
Rules of engagement or operational plans or orders can direct options, e.g., diver-
sion instead of visit and search, limit capture or destruction of vessels not other-
277
wise exempt, etc.
Certain kinds of enemy civil aircraft are also exempt from attack:
1. Medical aircraft;278
2. Aircraft granted safe conduct by belligerents;279 or
3. Civil airliners.280
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As with exempt enemy merchant vessels and exempt ships, enemy aircraft other-
281
wise exempt can lose this status under certain conditions, they are subject to
282 283
self-defense considerations andUN Security Council decisions. Rules of en-
gagement or operation plans or orders can further limit capture or destruction of
284
aircraft not otherwise exempt.
2. Acquiring Enemy Character
Neutral merchantmen may acquire enemy character by acting in various capac-
ities on behalf of belligerents. Part D discusses this.
3. Convoying by Belligerents
Principles applicable to neutral warships' convoying, escorting or accompany-
ing neutral merchantmen that are not carrying goods for a belligerent's war effort
285
have been discussed. When a belligerent's warships or military aircraft convoy,
escort or accompany merchantmen flying its flag, the result is quite different.
These convoys are presumed to be military convoys and, being lawful military ob-
jectives, are subject to attack, with or without warning, and may be defended by
the convoying State, just as independently steaming merchantmen may be pro-
287
tected. The exception is if the convoy, escorted ship or accompanied ship is en-
titled to protected status, i.e., coastal fishing vessels engaged in their trade and not
288
contributing to the enemy war effort. An enemy warship or military aircraft,
unless exempted, e.g., as part of a cartel ship operation, is subject to attack even if
the convoyed, escorted or accompanied vessels are not.
4. Principles ofContraband
The law of contraband in naval warfare only applies to goods inbound to a bel-
289
ligerent. Goods with a neutral destination coming from a belligerent's port can-
290
not be contraband. This is not to say, however, that these goods may not be
classified as aiding the enemy war effort, i.e., warfighting or war-sustaining goods,
and therefore subject to an opponent's options, discussed in Parts C.l - C.2, which
include visit and search, diversion, and in some circumstances, e.g., when under
enemy direction or control, attack and destruction of the vessel. Contraband was
associated with neutral-flag merchantmen during the Tanker War, ifat all, and the
principal discussion is in Part D.
5. The Tanker War
Did Iran and Iraq comply with the principles of attack and destruction of en-
291
emy-flag merchantmen during the Tanker War? Iran conducted visit and search
292
operations on numerous merchant ships during the war, but there is no firm ev-
idence ofattempts to destroy these ships incident to these operations. Iraq^ lacking
much ofa navy or aircraft capable of visit and search, did not use these procedures.
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The question then comes to the legitimacy of Iraqi air attacks on Irani-flag mer-
chantmen, and of Iranian air and surface attacks on Iraqi-flag merchantmen. Un-
fortunately, the record is not clear as to whether these attacks, as distinguished
293from attacks on neutral-flag merchant ships, occurred. Analysis proceeds on an
assumption that these attacks occurred.
The record is fairly clear that these attacks did not involve destruction of ex-
empted vessels or aircraft, e.g., hospital ships or civil airliners. There were no
claims of self-defense attacks on them. There were no Security Council decisions
affecting these aspects ofthe war. All belligerent attacks were conducted under the
law of naval warfare.
Given Iraqi propensity to use long-distance weapons to attack merchantmen of
whatever flag, without discrimination between those carrying war-fighting or
295
war-sustaining goods or otherwise subject to attack without warning and those
with other cargoes, the attacks clearly lacked proportionality, unless in the case of
296 r
cargoes subject to attack Iraq knew, or had reason to know at the time, ofthe na-
ture ofthe cargoes. Attacks on vessels not carrying these goods might be excused if
297
it is assumed that these were cases oflegitimate collateral damage, e.g., where an
attack conducted against a proper target results in a missile's seeking and hitting
another vessel, despite the attacking platform's best efforts. The same can be said
of similar Iranian attacks. Since attack jets conducted these attacks, as a practical
matter ofthis warfare mode (and as a matter oflaw, if it is accepted that the London
298
Protocol does not apply to aircraft attacks ) there was little to no opportunity for
humanitarian law survivor assistance. Perhaps the belligerents notified other ves-
299
sels ofthe survivors; y the record is silent on the point. IfIran and Iraq had reason
to know there were survivors (which cannot be assumed, given the fog ofwar and
the distances from which some attacks were conducted), and did not do what was
feasible under the circumstances, there were humanitarian law violations.
Iranian attacks by surface warships, whether destroyer types or speedboats, and
its helicopter attacks stand on different footing. Here Iran had a much better op-
portunity for other options. In some situations, to be sure, there was a risk of Iraqi
attack on belligerent forces at sea, and under these circumstances, attack in lieu of
other operations was a permissible mode. However, in cases where there was no
possibility of attack, the option of visit and search or diversion should have been
given strong, perhaps imperative, consideration, ifthis option was feasible. Ifvisit
and search had been conducted, and destruction were ordered by a surface combat-
ant, compliance with London Protocol and humanitarian law requirements was
mandatory. Given that attack was a valid option, the issue is whether the attack was
necessary and proportional under circumstances known or which should have
been known at the time. The record on this issue is less than clear, and will
likely be forever enshrouded. The same can be said ofIran's duty to attend to survi-
vors in the water. If it was possible, Iran should have searched for the missing,
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shipwrecked, sick, wounded or dead after an engagement. In many cases, partic-
ularly those involving surface ship attacks, Iran probably had a capability to do so
and did not. If so, Iran was guilty of humanitarian law violations.
Iranian warships and perhaps other platforms {e.g., military helicopters, fixed-
wing aircraft) convoyed tankers carrying petroleum down its coast, using Iranian
302
coastal waters as much as possible. Iranian-flag merchantmen were subject to
Iraqi attack while being convoyed; Iran could defend these ships under the LOAC,
303
like any other Iraqi target. As will be seen, neutral flag merchantmen participat-
ing in these convoys were also subject to attack. These convoys should be distin-
guished from situations where neutral-flag warships convoyed, escorted or
accompanied neutral-flag merchantmen carrying cargoes that were not part ofthe
belligerents' war efforts; these convoys were not subject to belligerent attacks as le-
305
gitimate targets. In either case, however, the humanitarian law or LOS rules for
survivors, etc., applied.
Neutral-flag warships could respond in self-defense to belligerents' air and sur-
face ship attacks on merchant vessels flying the warship's flag, or the flag of an-
other neutral if that neutral requested it, if the merchantmen were not lifting
307
belligerent war-fighting or war-sustaining goods, the merchantmen steamed
308independently, or were convoyed, escorted or accompanied. Neutral warships
and merchantmen they convoyed, escorted or accompanied had obligations to see
309
to the missing, shipwrecked, sick, wounded or dead after each engagement.
Other merchantmen in the area of the engagement but not involved in the attack
310
also had an LOS duty to assist with search and rescue. Duties of ships involved
in the engagement devolved from the LOAC as applied under the law of self-
31
1
defense through the LOS conventions' "other rules" clauses, the customary law
312
ofthe sea, and Article 103 ofthe Charter, other ships in the area but not involved
313
in the engagement only had LOS obligations.
Similarly, neutrals could respond to what were perceived to be air, mine or sur-
face ship attacks on their military aircraft or warships in self-defense, but in
these cases neutrals also had obligations to see to the missing, shipwrecked, sick,
316
wounded or dead after each engagement. In these situations as well, the LOS
did not apply during the engagement; duties to rescue, etc., devolved from the
317LOAC as applied under the law of self-defense through the LOS conventions'
318
other rules clauses, the customary law ofthe sea, and Article 103 ofthe Charter.
Merchantmen in the area but not involved in the engagement were obligated to at-
319
tempt rescue pursuant to the LOS.
Although the record is not clear, perhaps owing to the fog ofwar or incomplete
reporting, there is no indication that neutral military aircraft, warships and mer-
chantmen involved in air or surface attacks on them did not attempt to succor vic-
tims after these attacks by Iran or Iraq, or the occasional erroneous and tragic
380 The Tanker War
attacks by neutral forces on neutral aircraft (e.g. the U.S.S. Vincennes incident) or
370
neutral-flag shipping (e.g., firings on dhows or fishing vessels).
There appear to have been no incidents ofbattles between Iranian and Iraqi na-
val, air or other military forces over the high seas; their territorial seas, continental
shelves, EEZs, or contiguous zones; or neutrals' EEZs or continental shelves. Con-
sequently, the general rule (subject to important qualifications) allowing belliger-
321
ent combat in these areas, as well as belligerents' inland waters and territories,
was not at stake during the Tanker War. Similarly, there was no application of the
322
requirement to recover those lost at sea or the dead. The story was far different
on land and in belligerents' inland waters, but these aspects of the conflict are be-
yond this volume's scope.
Part D. Neutral Flag Merchantmen: Enemy Character;
Reflagging; Contraband
During the Tanker War, neutral flag merchantmen carried much of the trade
323 rbetween the belligerents and the outside world, apart from petroleum Iraq
pumped through pipelines to Turkey, Syria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Iran
325
through pipelines to its southern Gulf ports, and perhaps through pipelines to
326
the USSR. Iran conducted visit and search operations aboard neutral flag mer-
327
chantmen, looking for cargoes destined to benefit the Iraqi war effort; both
belligerents attacked and damaged or destroyed some ofthese ships, sometimes by
328
surface ship or aircraft attacks, but also by mining. Iran published a contraband
329
list late in the war.
This Part examines claims related to these issues, specifically whether and
when neutral flag merchantmen acquired enemy character so as to render them
amenable to attack because they, e.g., lifted warfighting/war-sustaining goods for a
belligerent's war effort; the effect ofreflagging; and the doctrine ofcontraband, in-
cluding the continuous voyage rule. If a neutral merchant ship or aircraft has not
acquired enemy character, it may be subject to approach and visit under the law of
330 331
the sea, or visit and search pursuant to the law ofarmed conflict, but it is oth-
erwise exempt from capture or attack and destruction, and doubly so if it is an
332
exempt vessel or aircraft. Neutral exempt vessels may also acquire enemy
character.
1. Vessels and Aircraft that Have or Acquire Enemy Character
A ship operating under an enemy flag or an aircraft with enemy markings pos-
sesses enemy character. Just because a merchant ship flies a neutral flag or an air-
craft has neutral markings does not necessarily establish neutral character. Any
merchantman or aircraft a belligerent owns or controls has enemy character, re-
333
gardless ofwhether it is operating under a neutral flag or has neutral markings.
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An opposing belligerent may treat ships or aircraft acquiring enemy character as if
they are enemy vessels or aircraft.
Neutral ships and civil aircraft areprimafacie neutral in character ifflying a neu-
335
tral flag or bearing neutral markings. They acquire enemy character, and a bel-
ligerent may treat them as enemy warships or military aircraft if they take direct
part in hostilities on the enemy's side or act in any capacity as a naval or military
auxiliary in enemy armed forces. This unneutral service makes them subject to
capture, attack and destruction as though they were enemy-flag warships.
Neutral merchant ships and civil aircraft acquire enemy character, and a bellig-
erent may treat them as enemy merchantmen or civil aircraft, ifthey are operating
directly under enemy control, orders, charter, employment or direction, including
337
operating in convoys escorted by belligerent aircraft and/or warships. Under
these circumstances they may be subject to visit and search, diversion, capture, at-
tack or destruction, depending on the situation and perhaps whether they are in an
338
exempt category of ship. Neutral merchant ships or civil aircraft that retain
neutral character also may be captured and perhaps destroyed, and may be at-
339
tacked if they resist visit and search or diversion, if they:
1. Avoid attempts to identify them;
2. Resist visit and search;
3. Carry contraband;
4. Break or attempt to break blockade;
5. Present irregular or fraudulent ship's papers, lack necessary ship's pa-
pers, or destroy, conceal or deface ship's papers;
6. Violate rules a belligerent establishes for the immediate area of naval
operations;
7. Carry personnel in the enemy's military or public service; or
8. Communicate information in the enemy's interest, e.g., by communicat-
ing belligerent warship movements on the high seas.340
A neutral platform may be liable to capture if it engages in more than one ofthese,
e.g., by resisting visit and search while carrying an opposing belligerent's military
personnel. Neutral merchantmen are not liable to capture because they carry mili-
tary or public service personnel or for communicating information in the enemy's
interest, at the beginning of a war, if the ship is unaware of the opening of hostili-
ties or, in the case of military, etc., passengers has not been able to disembark them
after learning of the opening of hostilities. A vessel is deemed to know about a war
ifit leaves an enemy port after war begins, or ifit leaves a neutral port after notice of
hostilities has been made in sufficient time to a neutral whose port the merchantman
departs. Because of the ease of worldwide communications today, there is a pre-
sumption that the merchantman knows ofthe outbreak of hostilities. Captured
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vessels are sent in for adjudication as prize; they may be destroyed under certain
342
circumstances.
As in the case ofenemy flag merchantmen, these specific principles are subject
to the general principles of necessity and proportionality, either in the context of
self-defense or the LONW, depending on the circumstances. Under the LOAC
the belligerentwhom these vessels serve may defend them, like any legitimate mil-
itary target. They are also subject to anyUN Security Council decisions on the sit-
344
uation.
If a neutral merchant vessel or civil aircraft has taken direct part in hostilities,
e.g. by operating as a military auxiliary for enemy forces, its officers and crew
may be made prisoners ofwar. On the other hand, officers and crew ofneutral ships
or aircraft that have acquired enemy character by other means, e.g., operating in an
enemy convoy, must be repatriated as soon as circumstances permit. Enemy
nationals who are armed forces members, employed in the enemy's public service
or are suspected of service in the enemy's interests, may be prisoners ofwar. They
may be removed from the neutral vessel or aircraft regardless ofwhether the plat-
form is subject to capture as prize. Other enemy nationals are not subject to capture
348
or detention. ' These humanitarian law principles may be subject to Security
349
Council decisions.
2. The Effect ofReflagging
The law ofthe sea has developed detailed, ifless than clear, provisions for vessel
350
nationality and therefore when a vessel may fly a State's flag. These do not apply
351during armed conflict. During war a merchantman flying an enemy flag is con-
352
clusively presumed to have enemy character. A merchantman flying a neutral
353
flag is prima facie presumed to have neutral character. The question of when
there is a proper transfer of flag from a belligerent to a neutral is less than clear;
prize court decisions go either way on whether the test is nationality or domi-
cile. This issue cannot arise if a neutral-flag vessel validly transfers its flag pur-
suant to the law of the sea to another neutral as long as the nature of the carriage
does not change. These principles are subject to any Security Council decisions on
355
the subject in a particular conflict.
3. Contraband Issues
356
The law ofcontraband deals with cargoes inbound to a belligerent. Outbound
cargoes from a belligerent cannot be classified as contraband under traditional
357
law. However, they may be subject to other principles, e.g., material that con-
358
tributes to a belligerent's warfighting/war-sustaining capability.
Traditionally goods shipped to the enemy have been divided into absolute con-
traband, goods whose character makes it obvious they are destined for use in war;
conditional contraband, goods that can either be used for war or for other
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purposes, e.g., food; "free goods," cargo that is not considered contraband under
359
any circumstances. Belligerents sometimes published contraband lists, which
often varied according to circumstances of the war. Practice during the World
Wars distorted differences between absolute and conditional contraband; nev-
ertheless, in some recent conflicts belligerents have published contraband lists.
Treaties tried to define rules for absolute and conditional contraband and free
goods. For example, the unratified 1909 London Declaration said these might be
treated as absolute contraband without notice to other States:
(1) Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their distinctive
component parts.
(2) Projectiles, charges, and cartridges of all kinds, and their distinctive compo-
nent parts.
(3) Powder and explosives specially prepared for use in war.
(4) Gun-mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military wagons, field forges, and
their distinctive component parts.
(5) Clothing and equipment of a distinctively military character.
(6) All kinds of harness of a distinctively military character.
(7) Saddle, draught, and pack animals suitable for use in war.
(8) Articles of camp equipment, and their distinctive component parts.
(9) Armour plates.
(10) Warships, including boats, and their distinctive component parts of such a
nature that they can only be used on a vessel of war.
(11) Implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture ofmuni-
tions of war, for the manufacture or repair of arms, or war material for use on
land or sea.
Articles used exclusively for war might be added to a list of absolute contraband,
which had to be published. The Declaration had a similar long list for condi-
tional contraband, which could be captured without notice to other States ifused
for war purposes:
(1) Foodstuffs.
(2) Forage and grain, suitable for feeding animals.
(3) Clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes, suitable for use in war.
(4) Gold and silver in coin or bullion; paper money.
(5) Vehicles of all kinds available for use in war, and their component parts.
(6) Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds; floating docks, parts of docks and their
component parts.
(7) Railway material, both fixed and rolling-stock, and material for telegraphs,
wireless telegraphs, and telephones.
(8) Balloons and flying machines and their distinctive component parts, together
with accessories and articles recognizable as intended for use in connection
with balloons and flying machines.
(9) Fuel; lubricants.
(10) Powder and explosives not specially prepared for use in war.
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(11) Barbed wire and implements for fixing and cutting the same.
(12) Horseshoes and shoeing materials.
(13) Harness and saddlery.
(14) Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds ofnautical instruments.
More items could be added to a conditional contraband list by notice to States.
Countries could also publish items for which they had waived status as contra-
band. World War I belligerents soon rejected this list as all-inclusive.
The Declaration also stated that "Articles which are not susceptible of use in
war may not be declared contraband of war," i.e., they would be considered free
goods. It then attempted a comprehensive list of these:
(1) Raw cotton, wool, silk, jute, flax, hemp, and other raw materials of the textile
industries, and yarns of the same.
(2) Oil seeds and nuts; copra.
(3) Rubber, resins, gums, and lacs; hops.
(4) Raw hides and horns, bones, and ivory.
(5) Natural and artificial manures, including nitrates and phosphates for agricul-
tural purposes.
(6) Metallic ores.
(7) Earths, clays, lime, chalk, stone, including marble, bricks, slates, and tiles.
(8) Chinaware and glass.
(9) Paper and paper-making materials.
(10) Soap, paint and colors, including articles exclusively used in their manufac-
ture, and varnish.
(11) Bleaching powder, soda ash, caustic soda, salt cake, ammonia, sulphate of am-
monia, and sulphate of copper.
(12) Agricultural, mining, textile, and printing machinery.
(13) Precious and semi-precious stones, pearls, mother-of-pearl, and coral.
(14) Clocks and watches, other than chronometers.
(15) Fashion and fancy goods.
(16) Feathers of all kinds, hairs, and bristles.
(17) Articles of household furniture and decoration; office furniture and
requisites.
(18) Articles serving exclusively to aid the sick and wounded, which in case of "ur-
gent military necessity" and subject to payment ofcompensation could be req-
uisitioned if not destined for the enemy.
(19) Articles intended for the use of the vessel in which they are found, as well as
those intended for use of her crew and passengers during the voyage. 367
These lists' very length and complexity articulates problems States discovered five
years later when World War I began. As with weapons development and arms con-
trol agreements today, technology had already begun to outrun the lists. Abso-
lute contraband lists began to swell, and there were constant disputes over
369
conditional contraband. The free goods lists shrank. A modern list of free
goods, reflecting recent humanitarian law conventions, includes:
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(a) Religious objects;
(b) Articles intended exclusively for treatment of the wounded and sick and for
disease prevention;
(c) Clothing, bedding, essential foodstuffs, and means of shelter for the civilian
population in general, and women and children in particular, provided there
is not serious reason to believe such goods will be diverted to other purpose, or
that a definite military advantage would not accrue to the enemy by their sub-
stitution for enemy goods that would thereby become available for military
purposes;
(d) Items destined for prisoners of war, including individual parcels and collec-
tive relief shipments containing food, clothing, educational, cultural and rec-
reational articles;
(e) Goods otherwise specifically exempted from capture by international treaty or
by special arrangement between belligerents; and
(f) Other goods not susceptible of use in armed conflict. 370
Modern LONW manuals and other publications have abandoned distinctions
371between absolute and conditional contraband. US Navy World War I and II in-
structions published abbreviated lists ofwhat was contraband, saying that articles
and materials exempted by treaty provisions, e.g., with still-extant bilateral agree-
ments, would not be contraband, and that upon outbreak of or during hostilities
the United States might publish lists of other items. This was followed by other
372
States. There was no free goods list.
Current US naval manuals take the position that if a State wishes to seize ships
and goods for carrying contraband, all that is necessary is a publication of a free
373
goods list. The San Remo Manual takes the opposite view; a belligerent must
publish a contraband list before goods may be seized on this account. The Lon-
don Declaration had required publication of all items not on its absolute or condi-
375
*
tional contraband lists. (The Helsinki Principles take no position on the
issue. ) Now that the Declaration lists are obsolete, is the notice requirement
also obsolete?
Given the uncertainty ofwhat may or may not be contraband, and uncertainty
ofa publication requirement, a more prudent course is for States to publish contra-
377band lists; this likely remains a requirement of international law. They must
378
publish lists of free goods despite treaty lists, must publish notice of war
379 380
zones, must let neutrals know about areas ofnaval operations, and must pub-
381
lish blockade declarations. Proper publication of contraband and free goods
lists would not limit applying a belligerent's other options, e.g., visit and
search, diversion, capture, attack, destruction, etc., of neutral merchantmen
that have acquired enemy character, e.g., by serving as intelligence collectors for
38?
the enemy or sailing in enemy convoy. Published contraband and free goods lists
should begin with a general warning that a belligerent reserves rights to visit and
search, divert, capture, attack, destroy, etc., neutral merchant ships under the law
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of naval warfare, if that is the case. Publishing a contraband list, and labeling
items as absolute contraband, would inform all that these cargoes, and vessels
that carry them, may be subject to condemnation as prize. Similarly, publish-
ing a free goods list, with warnings that these goods, if used for enemy
war-fighting or war-sustaining effort or for other reasons that would subject the
vessel to visit and search, diversion, capture, attack or destruction, would clar-
ify what is considered free goods. An option to the latter would be a general no-
tice, to the effect that the proclaiming belligerent will observe its 1949 Geneva
Conventions obligations and other humanitarian law the belligerent recog-
383
nizes, e.g., Protocol I. Since much of the latter is customary law, a belligerent
would be bound by it regardless ofbeing a treaty party, but even here publication
would clarify the issue. As in the case of cartel ships and similar vessels,
384
belligerents could make special arrangements for the conflict; while this might
be likely for free goods, particularly those ofa humanitarian nature, a special agree-
ment on contraband is much less likely. Publishing contraband lists with warn-
ings ofalternatives the belligerent might pursue, could have a practical effect, from
a proclaiming belligerent's point of view, of deterring shipping from accepting
these cargoes. Such a proclamation could, of course, be a lightning rod for debates
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like those that erupted during World Wars I and II over contraband definitions.
Yet another option is for belligerents to arrange for certificates of noncontra-
band carriage, i.e., navicerts, aircerts and/or clearcerts, a customary practice oftwo
World Wars and as late as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Under this procedure a
belligerent agrees with a neutral State that the belligerent's consular officers may
issue certificates stating that a ship's or aircraft's cargo has been found free ofcon-
traband. Issuance ofthese certificates may minimize visit and search by the issuing
belligerent, although unneutral service of another kind, e.g., serving as an intelli-
gence collector for the enemy, etc., may result in action by that belligerent. Certifi-
cates issued by one belligerent have no effect on visit and search, etc. , rights ofother
belligerents. A neutral vessel's or aircraft's accepting a certificate does not consti-
386
tute unneutral service.
The continuous voyage rule may apply to contraband issues. In 1856 the Paris
Declaration laid down now-customary rules that neutral flags cover enemy goods,
except contraband and that neutral goods except contraband are not liable to cap-
387
ture under an enemy's flag (free ships, free goods).
The London Declaration declared absolute contraband liable to capture if des-
tined to enemy or enemy-occupied territory or to enemy armed forces. "It is imma-
terial whether the carriage of goods is direct or entails transshipment or a
subsequent transport by land." Conditional contraband is liable to capture if des-
tined for enemy armed forces or an enemy government department, unless cir-
cumstances in the latter case show the goods cannot be used for the war in progress,
currency and bullion excepted. Conditional contraband is not liable to capture
Law of Armed Conflict 387
unless found aboard a vessel bound for territory belonging to or occupied by the
enemy, "and when it is not to be discharged in an intervening port." The sole ex-
ception is where the enemy has no seaboard. The continuous voyage rule, as re-
fined by the London Declaration, says that ifgoods declared absolute contraband,
however defined, are bound for an enemy port or for a neutral port with provision
for transshipment to the enemy, or ifgoods declared conditional contraband, how-
ever defined, are bound for an enemy that has no seaboard, those cargoes may be
captured.
Conditional contraband destined for a neutral's port, with provision for trans-
shipment to the enemy, cannot be captured under the continuous voyage rule.
This rule cannot apply to cargoes outbound from enemy or neutral ports, since
contraband principles apply only to inbound traffic. The rule cannot apply ifthere
has been no declaration of contraband. Finally, the rule as stated in the London
Declaration may have become a relic ofthe past, given longstanding trends toward
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blurring distinctions between absolute and conditional contraband, or not de-
claring contraband at all and relying on capture, etc., for neutral merchant ships
carrying goods supporting or sustaining the enemy war effort, or other bases of
390
capture, etc.
391These principles are subject toUN Security Council decisions on the issue.
4. The Tanker War
Neutral vessels carrying war-fighting or war-sustaining cargoes destined directly
to Iraq or Iran, or invoiced to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE or other neutral States
for later transhipment, perhaps overland, to either ofthose belligerent States, were
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subject to visit and search. Some ofthese neutral merchantmen acquired enemy
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character and became subject to possible attack and destruction. Those sailing
in coastal convoys organized, directed and physically protected by Iran were a
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clear example. To the extent that they were convoyed, directed or protected by
Iran, neutral tankers carrying oil from Kharg and other Iranian ports, and there-
fore lifting war-sustaining cargoes, also acquired enemy character and were like-
395
wise subject to attack.
396On the other hand, Iraq, having lost its coast and ports for most of the war,
could not ship oil direct by sea. It could only ship through pipelines to neutrals for
eventual lifting through Gulfand Mediterranean Sea ports, and then only after oil
had been sold to these neutrals and had become neutral property. The last points
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seem to be the factual record. Under these circumstances, as a technical matter
oflaw, ifthese were bonafide sales to neutrals, and the oil thereby became the prop-
erty ofneutral States or their nationals, vessels carrying this oil did not acquire en-
emy character. Any attacks on them were not valid under international law, and
there was nothing invalid for neutrals to convoy, escort or accompany these ships.
(On the other hand, if the sales were shams, or if Iraq retained title until final
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destination, the rule would be the opposite. There is no indication that the transac-
tions were anything but arms-length and that title passed on neutral territory, e.g.,
in Kuwait.)398
Neutrals protested Iran's legitimate right to visit and search neutral flag mer-
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chant ships. Ifthese protests had led to active resistance to visit and search, Iran
could have used forceful means, up to and including destruction, to overcome that
resistance. No Iranian attacks appear to have occurred on this basis.
Reflagging Kuwait-owned tankers to the US ensign, and others to other neu-
trals' flags, comported with the law of the sea. Since the tankers were registered
with a neutral State, and re-registered with another neutral country, LONW rules
on transferring flag from belligerent to neutral did not apply. The reflagging was
valid under the LONW; it was valid under the LOS.
The law ofcontraband had little impact on the Tanker War. First, since its prin-
ciples can only apply to cargo inbound to a belligerent, the law of contraband
was not involved with shipments of oil outbound by the belligerents themselves.
The contiguous voyage rule cannot have applied to shipments through pipeline
connections to neutrals (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey for Iraq, perhaps the
USSR for Iran); these too were outbound shipments, for which contraband law
does not apply.
Only in January 1 988 did Iran appear to publish a contraband list, the Iran Prize
Law, which inter alia declared as prize merchandise and means oftransport belong-
ing to neutral States or their nationals, if the merchandise or means of transport
could contribute effectively to the enemy's combat power, or if the means of trans-
port, either directly or through a neutral intermediary, was an enemy of Iran.
This generalized statement was consonant with recent statements, either of situa-
tions where an opposing belligerent could attack a merchantman that had ac-
quired enemy character because it carried war-fighting or war-sustaining cargo
while under enemy direction or control, or of the definition of contraband it-
self. The Prize Law also appeared to recognize the foregoing principles, i.e.,
contraband rules applied only to inbound traffic, and the continuous voyage
rule. To be sure, perhaps from caution, the United States and other countries
declared their convoy, escort and accompanying operations did not involve con-
traband-carrying neutral merchantmen or goods contributing to belligerents' war
efforts, but there is no indication that these statements applied to more than in-
bound traffic, e.g., tankers in ballast headed for Kuwait. There is nothing in these
statements by neutrals to indicate there had been prior contraband proclamations
by Iran or Iraq. They were merely statements ofconformity with international law,
which permits neutral warship convoy of neutral merchantmen not carrying con-
traband.409
Moreover, if it is accepted that publication ofcontraband lists is a requirement of
international law, any Iranian captures on claims of contraband before January
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1988 were not valid. The same can be said for any Iraqi captures during the conflict,
since apparently Iraq never published a contraband list. The record on these
points is not clear as to whether there were any captures on this basis by either
belligerent.
There is also no record of issues relating to free goods, and particularly items
which should pass to a belligerent by sea under humanitarian law. Nor is there any
indication of employing navicerts or similar procedures. Similarly, there were
no UN Security Council decisions affecting these LONW issues. However, as
analyzed earlier, it seems fairly clear that standards ofnecessity and proportional-
ity were not observed, particularly by Iraq in its long range, fire and forget attacks.
Moreover, the method of Iran's attacks on these merchantmen, even ifwarranted
under the LONW, indicates that necessity and proportionality principles were not
observed in all cases.
Part E. The Law of Blockade and the Tanker War
There were statements early in the war about "blockade" of Iraq's small coast-
line and Iraq's Kharg Island "blockade," mostly by commentators. The theme
of this Part is that neither belligerent could have effectively invoked the law of
blockade during the war.
1. The UN Charter and the Law ofBlockade
The UN Charter, Article 42 declares that the Security Council may take action,
including blockade, to maintain or restore international peace and security. Arti-
cle 42 has never been formally invoked. The Council authorized interdiction of
petroleum bound for Rhodesia in 1 965, but not a blockade, although a commen-
tator says the operation was a form of "pacific blockade," i.e., blockading a coast
during time of peace, probably not allowed as a measure for States under the UN
Charter. It may be argued, however, that Article 42 indirectly supported theUN
forces' North Korea blockade, pursuant to Council decisions to aid South Ko-
rea. Since Council decisions may supersede at least treaty law, the traditional
law may not apply in blockade operations when Council decisions authorize or di-
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rect action.
2. Blockade Under the Law ofNaval Warfare
The traditional law of blockade, recited mostly in custom or commentators'
views, may be stated fairly simply. Unlike issues related to contraband, which is
concerned with traffic inbound to a belligerent, blockade is a belligerent's right
to prevent vessels or aircraft of all countries, enemy and neutral, from entering or
leaving specified ports, airfields or coastal areas under the sovereignty, occupation
or control of the enemy. Belligerent visit and search interdicts the flow of contra-
band goods; belligerent blockade tries to prevent ships and aircraft, regardless of
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cargo, from crossing an established, publicized line separating an enemy from in-
ternational waters and airspace.
A belligerent or a belligerent's blockading force commander acting pursuant to
the commander's government's order must declare a blockade. At a minimum a
declaration must include the date and time a blockade begins, its geographic lim-
its, and a grace period within which neutral ships and aircraft may leave the area to
be blockaded. Vessels whose registry has been changed from enemy to a neutral
flag under the law of naval warfare may be restricted from leaving. If an area
changes, or a blockade ends, these too should be declared. Under the London Dec-
laration, notice should also be given local authorities, although this provision has
been superseded by World War I and II and Korean War practice and realities of
modern warfare. If a blockade is interrupted, e.g., by withdrawing blockading
forces for gunfire support elsewhere, a belligerent retains a right ofvisit and search
for contraband and other modalities of economic warfare, e.g., attack and destruc-
tion of merchantmen serving as intelligence collectors for the enemy. However,
the blockade at this point becomes a "paper blockade," unlawful under the LOAC
since the 1856 Paris Declaration.
If a blockade is interrupted, a blockading belligerent must declare a blockade
again. If an enemy drives offblockading ships, the blockade ends and must be re-
instituted. If a blockading power captures the blockaded port, the blockade ends;
however, ifa blockading power controls territory near a blockaded port or area, but
not the blockaded port or area itself, a blockade remains in force. Temporary inter-
ruption, e.g., by a violent storm, does not end a blockade. A blockading force may
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end a blockade by appropriate notice.
A blockade may continue during an armistice unless there is an agreement to
429
the contrary. Although individuals who violate armistice terms, e.g., by contin-
uing blockade activity after an armistice suspends or ends it, may be punished if
captured, there is no unanimous view on what a State may do in such a case. Some
say it may reopen hostilities; others say it may denounce the armistice, the posi-
tion of the Hague Regulations.
A blockade must also be effective, i.e., forces (air, surface, submarine, or a com-
bination) must maintain it sufficient to render ingress or egress to a blockaded area
dangerous. Effectiveness does not require covering every possible avenue of in-
gress or egress. Although traditional law required a close-in and not a long-
distance blockade, World Wars I and II and Korean War practice; perhaps mili-
tary feasibility before then and developments in weapons systems and platforms,
including submarines, high-speed aircraft, cruise missiles and missiles from the
blockaded shore since; have rendered the close, in-shore blockade difficult if not
impossible and therefore obsolete except perhaps in localized conflicts. In a
backhand way, extension of the territorial sea to 12 miles for most States has also
helped eliminate the truly close blockade; a blockaded belligerent may
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temporarily suspend innocent passage in its territorial sea if a strait is not in-
volved, and this may force more neutral merchantmen to use high seas passage.
Thus a naval force may not have to approach enemy coasts as closely as before to
enforce a blockade.
Hague VIII says belligerents cannot lay mines off belligerents' coasts with the
sole object of intercepting commercial shipping and must notify danger zones
around anchored mines as soon as military exigencies permit; the 1913 Oxford
Manual denounced mining to maintain a blockade. These rules were soon found
impracticable and do not seem to have survived World War I and II practice, al-
though laying anchored mines with a sole object of interrupting commerce by
blockade with no naval forces to enforce a blockade may still violate international
law. In only that narrow context may the prohibition survive. The San Remo
Manual says mining operations in a belligerent's internal waters, territorial sea or
archipelagic waters "should" provide for free egress ofneutral shippingwhen min-
ing is first executed, signaling the rule's total demise.
A blockade must be impartial; it must apply to all States' aircraft and ships. Dis-
criminating against or in favor of some States, including a blockading State's
ships, invalidates a blockade. However, particular aircraft or vessels or classes of
them may be permitted to pass through a blockade, provided no distinction is
made as to flag, either by agreement or unilateral act of a blockading belligerent.
Examples might include cartel ships repatriating prisoners of war or permitting
repatriation of merchant mariners of neutral nationality. Although neutral
warships and neutral military aircraft have no positive right of entry to a block-
aded area, they may be allowed to enter or leave this area as a matter of courtesy,
with length of stay and other conditions in the hands of a blockading force com-
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mander or higher authority.
Humanitarian law imposes limitations on declaring, establishing or maintain-
ing blockades. They cannot be established with a sole goal ofstarving the civil pop-
ulation, as distinguished from enemy armed forces. If the civil population is
inadequately provided with food or materials essential for survival, or if medical
supplies are needed for this population or wounded and sick enemy armed forces
members, a blockading State must provide for passage of food, these materials or
medical supplies. This is subject to a blockading State's right to prescribe techni-
cal arrangements, e.g., visit and search, for blockade passage. A blockading State
may also provide for distributing these supplies under local supervision of a Pro-
tecting Power or a humanitarian organization, e.g., the ICRC, that can offer guar-
antees of impartiality and that food and other materials, as distinguished from
medical supplies, do not support enemy armed forces. This might be accom-
plished by belligerents' agreement or a blockading belligerent's unilateral declara-
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tion.
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Blockades cannot bar ingress to or egress from neutral ports or coasts. Neutrals
keep rights to engage in neutral commerce if it does not involve origin or destina-
tion in blockaded areas. Blockades cannot block international straits passage. A
belligerent may blockade its own coasts if it is enemy-occupied.
Breach of blockade, for which a vessel or aircraft may be subject to attack and
destruction, occurs when a ship or aircraft passes through a blockade without the
blockading belligerent's entry or exit authorization. Attempted breach, for which
a vessel or aircraft may also be subject to attack and destruction, occurs from the
time the platform leaves a port or airfield until the voyage is complete. Knowl-
edge of a blockade's existence is an essential element of breach of blockade or at-
tempt to breach blockade. Knowledge can be presumed once a belligerent declares
a blockade and notice has been provided other governments. Under the contin-
uous voyage rule, even though the vessel or aircraft is bound for neutral terri-
tory at the time of interception, if its ultimate destination is a blockaded area, that
platform is subject to principles governing attempted breach ofblockade. There is
a presumption ofattempt ifa vessel or aircraft is bound for a neutral port or airfield
that is a transit point to a blockaded area. Necessity, i.e., distress, may excuse a
merchantman's actions that would otherwise be breach of blockade.
Besides being subject to UN Charter decisions, blockades are also subject to
general LOAC necessity and proportionality rules.
3. The Tanker War and the Law ofBlockade
Insofar as the record shows, neither belligerent formally declared a blockade. If
one was declared, there is no record ofbeginning times or area parameters, or grace
periods for departure ofneutral vessels and aircraft. Use ofthe term "blockade" ap-
pears only in commentators' and historians' statements. An analogy to a war-
time expression, "loose lips sink ships," might apply here. Loose use of blockade
terminology by commentators, historians, the media or less than knowledgeable
governments can muddy fairly well-established LONW principles, with a result
that belligerents and perhaps neutrals later in the conflict, or these sources them-
selves, may be relied on as practice in future wars. One great problem in re-
searching the Tanker War has been relative availability of sources. In blockade
issues, as in other aspects ofthe conflict, truth may have been the first casualty, and
in many instances the facts are not available or are sealed in government ar-
chives.
If perchance these secondary sources refer to official belligerent declarations,
records of times, areas and grace periods have not surfaced. Without these, any
blockade by the belligerents would have violated international law. Any block-
ade Iraq declared would not have been effective; Iraq had no naval assets, e.g.,
on-station surface warships, to enforce it. Paper blockades have been invalid
since the 1856 Paris Declaration. If speedboats, fixed-wing aircraft and
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helicopters are thrown into the equation along with its larger warships, Iran proba-
bly had enough platforms to enforce a blockade if it had been properly declared.
Iranian acceptance of a proposal (which Iraq declined, citing sovereignty over the
Shatt al-Arab) to allow neutral-flag merchantmen to leave the Shatt at the begin-
ning of the war under a UN or Red Cross flag could be said to be compliance
with a requirement of allowing these ships egress, except those that had switched
from an Iraqi to a neutral flag. Iraq may have also justifiably refused on grounds
of temporarily suspending territorial sea innocent passage, if the LOS applied,
on grounds of controlling its ports and at least its share of Shatt territorial waters
during war, or restrictions on merchant ship movement in the immediate area of
naval operations (albeit in the riverine warfare context), ifsuch was the case.
Iraq's LOS authority to temporarily suspend territorial sea innocent passage, in
terms of time, disappeared not long afterward, and was replaced by the LOAC. By
that time the war's course around Basra port and damage to the ships themselves
undoubtedly made them immobile. Whether there was naval warfare in their vi-
cinity throughout the conflict is not clear from the record. However, the law is
clear that Iraq could not have used this derogation from freedom ofnavigation, if it
applied in the riverine context, to permanently bar access to navigation. That is
certainly the rule for high seas naval operations.
Ifeither belligerent tried to blockade neutral coasts, e.g., Kuwait's or Saudi Ara-
bia's by sowing mines, or use of air or naval forces, that violated international law.
Thus if somehow the law of blockade, as distinguished from LOS rules for entry
into and exit from ports, applied, Iran was equally culpable under the LOAC. The
UN Security Council was fully justified in passing Resolution 552(1 984), although
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its text did not mention blockade but LOS rights to enter and leave port. To the
extent that Iranian naval maneuvers occurred in Saudi territorial waters as a naval
demonstration, that operation violated the Charter's prohibition of threat of
force against a neutral State as well as LOS territorial sea rules and LOAC princi-
ples governing belligerents' conduct toward neutrals. There is no record of a
belligerent's mounting a quarantine operation.
There are no known instances ofattempts to use cartel ships to return prisoners
ofwar, etc., during the Tanker War, nor are there any reports of neutral warships'
attempting to pass through blockades (assuming that lawful blockades existed).
Although Iran accepted a proposal to allow merchant ships trapped in the Shatt in
1980 to depart under a UN or Red Cross flag, Iraq as the "blockaded" State de-
clined. Assuming a proper blockade of Iraq's coast then existed, which is un-
likely, departure ofneutral nationality mariners aboard these vessels could have
been accomplished as a humanitarian law exception to the law of blockade, since
the purported blockading State (Iraq) approved as a matter of discretion.
If it is assumed that either State established a lawful blockade, which is highly
doubtful, many attacks on neutral merchantmen for alleged breaches of the
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blockade were disproportionate, under the same general standards of necessity
and proportionality applicable to attacks on neutrals generally. In no instances
are locations of these attacks relative to whatever blockade areas proclaimed, if
there were any, available; no precise commentary on legitimacy of attacks on this
basis can be made.
The UN Security Council did not address blockade directly; there were no
UN-mandated interdictions. Neither belligerent declared a blockade, as the
LONW requires. However, to the extent that mines belligerents laid ham-
pered access to neutrals' ports and might somehow be considered related to
blockade, Council Resolution 552 (1984) condemning lack of access stands as a
condemnation of the practice.
Part F. Zones: Excluding Shipping, Aircraft from Area of Belligerents'
Naval Operations; High Seas Self-Defense Zones; War Zones;
Air Defense Identification Zones; Ocean Zones Created
for Humanitarian Law Purposes
During the Tanker War, Iran and Iraq declared war zones, advising by
NOTMARs and NOTAMs that any merchantmen in the zones might be attacked.
Iran justified its zone on the basis ofdefending its Gulfcoast and to assure safety of
shipping. After first pledging that the Straits ofHormuz would remain open, Iran
later announced that its Straits areas were a war zone, for which there were neutral
State protests. Iraq said its zone (GulfMaritime Exclusion Zone, or GMEZ) was a
reprisal response to Iran's war zone declaration and that Iraq would attack any
shipping in its zone, saying the zone would help discriminate among shipping in
the Gulf, i.e., any shipping in the zone was presumed a legitimate target. Iran
also conducted visit and search operations throughout much of the Gulf. Iran
announced or conducted naval maneuvers in its territorial waters, on the high
seas, perhaps in the Strait of Hormuz, and in Saudi territorial waters.
Neutrals' armed forces were also heavily involved in the waters of the Gulf and
the Strait ofHormuz and the skies above them. There is some evidence Saudi Ara-
bia may have allowed Iraqi military aircraft access to refueling on its territory.
Midway through the war Saudi Arabia declared an air defense identification zone
(ADIZ) over waters adjacent to its Gulf coast. Two weeks before the ADIZ procla-
mation Saudi Arabia had shot down an Iranian fighter over international wa-
ters. The United States issued NOTMAR and NOTAM warnings to ships and
aircraft about coming within certain distances and altitudes from its maritime
forces on the high seas; these were later amended to omit specific distances, claim-
ing a right to declare what I have characterized (and acronymed) as high seas
self-defense zones (SDZs). The US and other navies conducted naval opera-
4.78
tions, including mine clearance; formation steaming and other air and surface
evolutions; escorting, accompanying or convoying neutral flag merchantmen
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that did not carry contraband; and defense of these ships and their naval
4.81
forces. Saudi Arabia announced a safety corridor throughout its and other Gulf
482
States' territorial seas.
This Part analyzes these issues in the LOAC context and the law of naval war-
fare in particular; Chapter III discussed self-defense issues, and Chapter IV cov-
ered LOS aspects. Parts C,D and E ofthis Chapter considered issues related to visit
and search, contraband and blockade with respect to attacks on and destruction of
enemy and neutral flag merchantmen and aircraft.
1. Excluding Shipping andAircraftfrom ImmediateAreas ofBelligerents'Naval
Operations; High Seas Self-Defense Zones (SDZs)
Although the law allowing exclusion ofneutral merchant shipping and civil air-
craft is fairly straightforward, principles regarding excluding neutral warships and
military aircraft are less than clear. Application ofUN Charter norms adds a fur-
ther difficult dimension to these issues. Claims with respect to high seas defense
zones (SDZs) are relatively new, but they have been implicit in the LOS authority
to conduct peacetime naval operations. How SDZs interface with the LOAC right
of a belligerent to exclude shipping and aircraft from the immediate area of naval
operations presents further difficult questions. One more aspect of the problem
has been, as for blockades, development oflonger range weaponry that can expand
threat zones many miles from a naval force.
a. Excluding Shipping andAircraftfrom ImmediateAreas ofBelligerents'Naval
Operations. Custom allows belligerents to establish special restrictions, including
total exclusion from waters near operations or requiring departure from the area,
on neutral merchantmen and aircraft near an immediate area ofhigh seas naval op-
erations ifhostilities are taking place or will occur in the near future, or where bel-
ligerent forces are operating, e.g., conducting visit and search. These areas can
include flight and submarine operations. A belligerent may not purport to deny
territorial sea innocent passage access to neutral States' coasts or to close an inter-
national strait to transit or innocent passage unless another route of similar con-
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venience is open to neutral traffic. A belligerent may also impose similar
restrictions on neutral merchantmen and aircraft in its territorial sea, an enemy's
territorial sea where the belligerent occupies enemy coasts, or occupies an enemy's
territorial sea but does not occupy the coast, consistent with LOS principles for
temporary suspending innocent passage through the territorial sea and lack of a
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right ofinnocent passage in a belligerent's territorial sea. A belligerent's right to
restrict neutral maritime and air traffic on and over the high seas applies to high
seas fishing zones; neutrals' contiguous zones, continental shelves, EEZs and fish-
• 487ing zones; and in the Area. However, belligerents exercising this high seas right
must pay due regard to neutrals' rights in these areas, including the high seas
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where no contiguous zone, continental shelf, EEZ or fishing zone, or Area law
,. 488
applies.
This customary right ofrestricting neutral activities does not apply to warships,
naval auxiliaries, ships on governmental or noncommercial service or State or mil-
itary aircraft, which continue to have complete immunity as under the law of the
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sea. ' Consistent with LOS principles applying to the territorial sea and the LOS
due regard principle, a belligerent may ask these neutral platforms to leave the
area. Consistent with LOS principles, neutral platforms should give due regard
to the request and a belligerent's right to restrict other neutral traffic in the imme-
diate area ofnaval operations. Neutral military commanders may choose to leave a
belligerent's area of naval operations, or be otherwise guided by rules of engage-
ment, but these are matters of neutral force discretion and not a belligerent's
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right. A belligerent's request should not be lightly denied, absent other consid-
erations, e.g., conducting one's own naval operations.
Policies allowing this "limited and transient" control over neutral merchant
vessels and civil aircraft, which is a derogation from their navigation, overflight
and other freedoms, are based on a belligerent's right to attack and destroy its en-
emy, its right to defend itself without suffering from neutral interference, and its
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right to ensure its forces' security. On the other hand, when neutral warships,
military aircraft, etc., are concerned, these policies must be balanced against those
platforms' navigation, overflight and other freedoms, their immunities, and the
right of these neutral platforms to defend themselves and vessels or aircraft under
their charge (e.g., convoyed neutral flag merchantmen not carrying contraband),
and a right to ensure neutral forces' security, and the security of platforms under
neutral forces' charge.
Consistent with customary blockade principles, a State exercising this high seas
right must give notice appropriate under the circumstances, e.g. a naval com-
mander's flaghoist or radio message but perhaps a commander's government
NOTMAR or NOTAM if a major operation such as a Normandy-size amphibious
landing is underway. The area to be cleared, or the distance to which a neutral plat-
form must depart, should be defined with reasonable precision and should be pro-
portional, i.e., limited to that part ofthe high seas necessary for the evolution. Ifan
operation has not begun, a start time should be given unless this compromises the
belligerent's security. Similarly, and also consistent with not compromising the
belligerent's security, notice of ending an operation should be given. Unlike
blockade areas or war zones, which have definite geographic coordinates, these ex-
clusion areas can be tied to mobile operations, unless the operation involves a rela-
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tively long-term location, e.g., an amphibious landing. The same principles
should apply to military operations in a belligerent's territorial sea or in an en-
emy's territorial sea.
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In connection with this right of belligerent control, a belligerent naval com-
mander may exercise control over communications ofneutral civil aircraft or neu-
tral merchantmen whose presence in the immediate area ofnaval operations might
endanger or jeopardize these operations. A neutral civil aircraft or merchantman
within that area that fails to conform to belligerent directions may thereby assume
enemy character and risk capture or attack. Legitimate distress communications
should be allowed to the extent that the operation's success is not prejudiced. Any
transmission to an opposing belligerent concerning the belligerent's military op-
erations, including the order to depart the area, is inconsistent with neutral duties
of abstention and impartiality and renders the neutral merchantman or civil air-
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craft liable to capture or destruction. Since a neutral warship, naval auxiliary,
government ship on noncommercial service or a military or State aircraft is enti-
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tied to immunity, a belligerent cannot exercise control over those platforms'
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communications and must give due regard for these neutral platforms' rights to
communicate, including their right to transmit distress messages. Due regard for
an area of a belligerent's naval operations and common sense dictate that these
neutral platforms should exercise discretion in what is communicated, on what
frequencies, etc. Transmission to an opposing belligerent risks a self-defense re-
sponse by the belligerent conducting the naval operation. By the opposite to-
ken, if a belligerent force commits a hostile act against or attacks one of these
neutral platforms after it rightly refuses to allow control of its communications,
that belligerent risks a self-defense response.
A belligerent naval force may also exercise its right of self-defense against neu-
tral forces that display hostile intent against or attack the belligerent force while it
exercises a legitimate right to control an immediate area ofnaval operations. Thus
if a neutral merchant ship legitimately ordered out of an immediate area of naval
operations by a belligerent signals to a warship of its nationality requesting assis-
tance, and that neutral warship fires on the belligerent force legitimately control-
ling the immediate area of naval operations that has ordered the merchantman to
depart the area, the belligerent can respond in self-defense. Similarly, if a neutral
warship or military aircraft observes one of its neutral-flag merchantmen legiti-
mately ordered out of an immediate area of belligerent naval operations and fires
on the belligerent naval force, the neutral platform risks self-defense responses by
the belligerent. Ifa neutral military aircraft or warship, being asked to leave an im-
mediate area of belligerent naval operations legitimately declared, displays
hostile intent or attacks the belligerent force, that neutral platform risks the bellig-
erent's self-defense response. Where a belligerent has not legitimately declared
such an area, a risk of self-defense response is also present, and lack of a legitimate
claim of an area of belligerent operations may be a rejoinder to a belligerent's
self-defense claim. In some cases a belligerent's claim of a legitimate area can be
evaluated and decided by higher, perhaps executive level, authority. In other cases
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the on-scene neutral commander may be required to evaluate and decide on the sit-
uation with advice of counsel if available and act, consistent with ROE guidance
and the right of self-defense.
b. High Seas Self-Defense Zones (SDZs). The law of the sea provides that after
due publication of a notice, a State may temporarily suspend, without discrimina-
tion in form or fact among foreign ships, the right of innocent passage for foreign
ships in specified areas of its territorial sea ifsuspension is essential for protecting
its security, including weapons exercises. A State has sovereignty over its territo-
rial sea airspace and may totally exclude foreign aircraft. Transit or innocent pas-
sage through straits cannot be suspended, unless a treaty governing straits passage
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says so. States cannot establish permanent security or military zones, purport-
ing to regulate activities ofother countries' warships and military aircraft, seaward
503from their coasts. However, States may conduct high seas military opera-
tions. For States concerned (e.g., a State conducting a military operation, States
exercising high seas freedoms, e.g., freedom of navigation, fishing or overflight,
States with EEZ or continental shelf operations), the LOS requires each to have
due regard for others' oceans uses. These LOS rules are subject to the inherent
right of self-defense, which gives States authority to declare a high seas defense
507
zone (SDZ), also known as a "cordon sanitaire," on a temporary basis during na-
val forces' transit.
SDZs may be defined as a geographically limited area beyond the territorial sea
including the water column, ocean bottom and airspace associated with it that a
State unilaterally declares as a warning area, around its naval or air assets and
within which other countries are warned of a heightened risk of self-defense re-
sponse, including response in anticipatory self-defense, to attacks or hostile acts
from aircraft, ships or submarines. The SDZ travels with a naval force and is not
tied to geographical coordinates, as with territorial sea innocent passage suspen-
sion areas, blockade areas, war zones, some but not all areas from which a
belligerent would exclude shipping and aircraft while conducting naval opera-
tions during armed conflict, or permanent security zones tied to a country's
coastline and extending beyond the territorial sea, the latter ofwhich violate inter-
si 2
national law. The SDZ may or may not have time parameters, unlike rules for
territorial sea innocent passage suspension areas (requiring publication of start
en
and stop times) or blockade areas (start times must be published, and when a
blockade ends must also be published). However, on a time line an SDZ-cov-
ered area usually will not be encumbered for long, due to a naval force's mobility.
An immediate precedent for mobility aspects ofthe SDZ was theUK "defensive
bubble" employed as the UK task force deployed to the Falklands/Malvinas Is-
lands during the 1982 war. A close analogue is the well-established right of all
States, belligerent or neutral, to conduct naval operations on the high seas, which
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carries with it the right of self-defense. The difference between these areas is
one ofnotice in all cases for the SDZ and a warning to all States, not just a belliger-
ent, ofthe right ofself-defense in the SDZ notice, which a naval force has under the
law ofthe sea in any event. By contrast, some naval operations the LOS permits are
announced through NOTAMs and NOTMARs, e.g., gunfire exercises in desig-
nated areas, while others are not, e.g., flight or antisubmarine warfare exercises. In
still other cases a naval force, perhaps steaming in formation, dispersed, or inde-
pendently as separate units, may exercise high seas freedoms like any merchant-
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man or civil aircraft; these evolutions are almost never published, a major
exception being flight plans for some aviation. Security concerns may dictate that
518
no notice be published for areas where a force will be operating.
The primary sources ofan SDZ claim are the right ofself-defense and the LOS,
519
which is subordinate to the right of self-defense. A right to establish an SDZ is
limited to areas beyond the territorial sea and straits passage for the declaring
520
State. The further problem then arises as to conflicting uses ofthe high seas and
straits navigation. Here LOS principles ofshared high seas use, restated in the LOS
521 522due regard principle, and the rule that straits passage cannot be impeded, come
into play. A State claiming an SDZ cannot operate so as to deny others' high seas
rights, e.g., to navigation or overflight freedoms, a coastal State cannot claim an
SDZ so as to deny others their straits passage rights, and a naval force in straits pas-
sage cannot use an SDZ claim to deny coastal States their rights or other States'
platforms their rights to pass the strait. Similarly, others using the high seas or
straits, or straits coastal States, must have due regard for forces operating under an
SDZ notice.
If an SDZ-publishing State exercises its right of self-defense, that exercise is
governed by necessity and proportionality principles. Under no circumstances
can an SDZ notice be a basis for free-fire attacks or reprisals involving use offorce
523
on neutral shipping or aircraft.
Unless an SDZ notice says otherwise, publishing an SDZ notice does not limit
that State's self-defense responses. For example, although an SDZ notice warns of
a possibility ofa self-defense response ifan aircraft approaches within a stated dis-
tance, that does not bar self-defense responses at greater distances ifthe aircraft has
launched an attack or has displayed hostile intent so as to trigger a self-defense
right. A platform covered by an SDZ notice may respond to attacks or threats not
covered by the notice, e.g., responding to a submarine displaying hostile intent or a
submarine attack when the SDZ notice covers only air or surface ship threats or at-
tacks. A State whose platform is covered by an SDZ notice may respond in
self-defense to threats to or attacks on other ships or aircraft, e.g., a convoying war-
ship covered by an SDZ notice may respond to threats to or attacks on a convoyed
merchantman, a nearby unescorted merchantman ofthe same flag as the warship,
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or a sister warship not involved in the convoy, even though these vessels are not
covered by the SDZ notice.
An SDZ notice, unless it limits it, does not affect rights of collective self-
defense, either by an SDZ notice-covered platform coming to the aid of a platform
covered by a formal or informal self-defense arrangement, or a platform of a State
aligned in a formal or informal self-defense arrangement with an SDZ no-
tice-covered platform.
Thus although use ofSDZ notices seems to have begun with the Tanker War as
a gloss on UK practice during the Falklands/Malvinas War, and earlier during
525Nyon Arrangement operations (1937), their use, subject to the above-stated
limiting principles, is consistent with the UN Charter and the law of the sea. A
State conducting an attack based on unlawful use of an SDZ, e.g., a country using
an SDZ to establish a free-fire zone, risks self-defense responses, nonforce reprisals
or retorsions by a State whose platforms are threatened or attacked under a claim
based on an SDZ, and nonforce reprisals or retorsions for declaring but not using
illegal SDZs.526
As the Falklands/Malvinas War suggests, belligerents may declare SDZs to ad-
vise their self-defense rights relative to non-belligerents, i.e., neutrals. In this situ-
ation the LOAC applies to interactions between belligerents, but the law of
self-defense applies to belligerent-neutral interactions. A belligerent considering
declaring an SDZ to advise of self-defense intentions must weigh the SDZ notice,
which may advise belligerents of its forces' whereabouts, against a factor ofwarn-
ing neutrals (and perhaps belligerents, as a courtesy to allied belligerents and as a
threat to opposing belligerents who may wish to conserve military assets) of risks
incident to coming near its forces. As with neutrals' SDZ declarations, interna-
tional law does not require belligerents to operate under an SDZ. The inherent
right ofself-defense, subject to limitations, ifany, in an SDZ notice applies in this
situation with respect to neutrals. A belligerent does not gain any LOAC or
self-defense rights by publishing an SDZ; e.g., an SDZ declaration cannot give a
belligerent a free-fire area within its geographic parameters.
Rules of engagement have no bearing on an SDZ declaration; ROE are guid-
ance principles for a military force within its own units and personnel. Forces may
or may not operate under ROE whether or not an SDZ has been declared. ROE
should take SDZ standards into account, however. ROE and SDZs are independ-
ent concepts.
c. Other Self-Defense and UN Charter Issues for SDZs. A final set of issues deals
with conflicting self-defense claims. Suppose, hypothetically, a naval force of
527
countryA issues NOTAMs andNOTMARs publishing a legitimate SDZ for its
forces in a high seas area whose waters are a scene of increasing tension. The
NOTMARs and NOTAMs include defending neutral convoys carrying cargoes
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not part ofany State's war-fighting or war-sustaining capability, e.g., medical sup-
528
plies that could be used for civilians or armed forces personnel. Country B at-
tacks country C. Country A declares neutrality. Country C, as a self-defense
measure, begins conducting naval operations and wishes to control a high seas area
529
for these operations. Country A's neutral forces are operating in the area, and to
comply with the country C exclusion order will implicate A's announced self-de-
fense measures. What principles guide this hypothetical situation, where there are
530
conflicting self-defense claims that may have jus cogens status?
Under these circumstances the proper response may lie in a due regard analysis
ofclaims. The relative importance ofeach self-defense claim should be assessed. If,
e.g., country C's claim of control involves visit and search of merchantmen sus-
pected ofcarrying materials for mass destruction weapons destined for its enemy,
that claim should have priority over the country A claim, assuming the convoy is
on a routine voyage to supply a neutral with replenishment material for its hospi-
tals, and there is no urgent need for them. Ifcountry A's medical supply cargo con-
voy is destined for emergency humanitarian relief in country D, at war with
531
country E which has authorized the shipment to country D, and country C's na-
val operation is a routine neutral shipping visit and search, the balance tips in favor
ofthe countryA convoy. Where policies appear equal, the principle offirst in time,
first in right should apply to give the countryA convoy primacy. Country A's SDZ
claim was asserted before country C's self-defense claim based on LOAC princi-
ples for belligerent control of an immediate area of naval operations.
These are the "easy" cases, and real-world situations will be much more com-
plex. States confronted with this situation should try to avoid escalation and in-
struct military commanders accordingly, perhaps through ROE. ROE might give
532
advance guidance, although commanders retain the right to defend their forces.
The more difficult dilemma will be respective military commanders confronted
with these circumstances, particularly where ROE give no guidance. Local com-
munications should help. In the convoy hypothetical, assuming no self-defense
claim from country C's government, the on-scene country C commander must,
under principles governing control of the immediate area of naval operations,
533
communicate with the convoy commander. Similarly, the country A convoy
commander must communicate the nature of the convoy. At this point the re-
spective commanders must use judgment, as they do daily on much more routine
naval matters. Other situations may not be resolved so easily, e.g., where aircraft
are involved, because of relatively short decision time.
Another hypothetical situation might involve interaction between two bellig-
erents in separate wars with different belligerents, and each belligerent wishes to
control the immediate area ofnaval operations in separate evolutions that overlap
535
in terms of ocean areas. Yet another is the situation where two self-defense
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zones overlap, a rarer circumstance given (thus far) the relatively small ocean areas
claimed. The same kinds of analysis should be employed here as well.
If a belligerent proclaims an SDZ, the same rules apply between it and other
countries not party to its war with opposing belligerents. As between allied
belligerents, opposing belligerents and neutrals involved in that war, however, the
LOAC will apply. In the latter situation the SDZ operates as an LOAC zone.
Under the hypotheticals posed in this sub-Part, as in other situations discussed
in sub-Part b, ROE and the SDZ are independent considerations. States may oper-
ate under ROE without proclaiming an SDZ, and vice versa. An SDZ - proclaiming
State should be sure that its ROE and SDZ are congruent, however.
The foregoing assumes no paramount Security Council decision, perhaps com-
ing after the self-defense claim(s); in the latter case the decision prevails. Practice
under the decision should follow these principles insofar as the letter of the deci-
sion does not give directives. If the issue is a belligerent's control ofthe immediate
area ofnaval operations under the law of naval warfare, a Council decision also has
priority. Similarly, practice under the decision should be informed by LOAC prin-
ciples insofar as there is no conflict between them and the decision.
International law does not require notice ofan SDZ. States' naval forces may as-
sume defensive, operational and armed conflict postures without announcement
to anyone on the high seas, except where other principles, e.g., directions to ships
and aircraft to stay outside the immediate area of naval operations during armed
537
conflict, require notice and/or other action. Ifa State publishes an SDZ notice, a
disclaimer analogous to the US Tanker War NOTAMs and NOTMARs, which
warned mariners of the Iranian and Iraqi zones without expressing opinion on
538 o
their legal validity, may be included. Unless the contrary is intended, an SDZ
notice announcing risks or warnings should advise that stated force actions are
only among the options the naval force may exercise.
The foregoing legal analysis expresses no opinion on the strategic or tactical de-
sirability of announcing an SDZ. To proclaim an SDZ declares a force's approxi-
mate location, more so than radio communications intercepts; this may be less
than desirable from an operational perspective. On the other hand, an SDZ an-
nouncement may have advantages, e.g., in psychological operations to warn an ad-
versary of strong naval presence, or comity in advising a co-belligerent of the
proclaiming State's intentions, but these must be balanced against the disclosure
problem. Under international law there is no reason why a State cannot declare a
"selective" SDZ, e.g., announcing movement ofsome forces but not discussing co-
vert operations, e.g., those with submarines. Nor must an SDZ announcement
539
publish a list, inclusive or otherwise, of options a force may employ.
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2. War Zones
During the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) Japan declared the first ofwhat have
come to be known as war zones. Japan declared them before the war; at the war's
outbreak 12 or more of these areas were designated, the boundaries of which ex-
tended from Japan's coast into the high seas by up to seven miles. The United
States designated similar areas after entering World Wars I and II. In both cases
the coastal State claimed a right to exclude merchantmen on the basis of self-de-
fense. Commentators have said establishing these limited zones was legitimate un-
der international law. These defense areas were historical antecedents of later
war zone claims.
During the Spanish Civil War, the 1937 Nyon Arrangement divided much of
the Mediterranean Sea into areas where danger from unknown submarines, or sur-
face ships or aircraft, existed for neutral merchant ships. The UK Admiralty or-
dered that a submarine detected within five miles of a torpedoed merchantman to
be hunted and sunk; i.e., a five-mile war zone existed around an attack datum.
Later ROE allowed attack on a submarine submerged within a specific sea area,
i.e., a war zone coupled with exercise of an anticipatory right of self-defense was
created. Nyon Arrangement orders were, in effect, a forerunner of the moving
"defensive bubble" SDZ. 545
In World War I, and again in World War II, both sides proclaimed war zones
over wide areas, sometimes coupling them with policies ofunrestricted submarine
warfare or starvation blockades, and justifying them as reprisals for prior illegal
acts of the enemy. This species of war zone was also a result of new and different
methods and means ofwarfare, e.g., the submarine and the aircraft. During and af-
ter the wars these zones were condemned as excessive; although this gave zones
a bad name, like using the word reprisal, the concept of a valid zone remained.
States have employed a war zone concept in some conflicts after World War II.
During the Korean War theUN Command proclaimed a Sea Defense Zone (SDZ)
in 1952, rescinding it a year later during armistice negotiations. The UN Com-
mand established the SDZ to "prevent . . . added attacks on the Korean Coast;
secur[e] . . . the Command sea lanes of communication and prevent . . . introduc-
tion ofcontraband or entry ofenemy agents into [the] Republic of [i.e., South] Ko-
rea." A blockade had been proclaimed in 1950 at the beginning of the war
548
around North Korea's coast; the SDZ affected South Korea's coast.
During the Algerian civil war France declared a 20 to 50 kilometer (1 1-28 mile)
customs zone offAlgeria for small craft, seeking to visit and search ships suspected
ofrunning war materials to rebels in Algeria. High seas interceptions occurred off
Algeria but also 45 miles off Casablanca in the Atlantic Ocean and in the English
Channel. France justified her actions on self-defense grounds. Flag States of ves-
sels involved protested vigorously; compensation was paid for some ships wrong-
fully detained. During the 1971 India-Pakistan war the Bengal Chamber of
404 The Tanker War
Commerce advised neutral shipping it would not risk attack in the Bay ofBengal if
it did not approach within 40 miles ofthe coast between dusk and dawn. During
the 1973 Arab-Israel conflict, shipping was warned about entering the region of
conflict, at first with respect to Egyptian and Israeli territorial waters, but later
parts of the Mediterranean Sea and Egyptian, Libyan and Syrian ports were
listed. During the Vietnam War, Operation Market Time patrol areas, origi-
nally part of a 12-mile defensive sea area, eventually extended to over 30 miles off
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the South Vietnamese coast. These areas were not tied to a coast, like North Ko-
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rea's security zone, but were moving zones within which patrol vessels might
operate. The concept of a "cordon sanitaire," i.e., an area around a peacetime naval
force analyzed in Parts F.l.b-F.l.c, also developed at this time.
In 1982's Falklands/Malvinas war Argentina and the United Kingdom pro-
claimed war zones after Argentina invaded South Atlantic islands, the Falklands/
Malvinas group and others over which Britain exercised sovereignty, a claim Ar-
gentina disputed. The first UK proclamation declared that Argentine warships
and naval auxiliaries found in a Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ), a 200-mile ra-
dius of the islands, would be subject to UK attack. Argentina followed with a
200-mile defense zone (DZ) off its coasts and around the islands. The United
Kingdom also proclaimed a Defensive Sea Area, a defensive bubble around its task
force, then underway for the South Atlantic, warning that approaches by Argen-
tine warships or naval auxiliaries, or surveillance by Argentine civil or military air-
craft, would result in "appropriate" UK action. When fighting started in the
islands, theUK changed theMEZ to a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ), purporting to
exclude all vessels and aircraft supplying the Argentine war effort. The TEZ area
was the same as the MEZ; the declaration said any ship or aircraft, military or civil,
found within the zone without UK authority would be regarded as operating to
support the Argentine occupation and would be regarded as hostile. Like earlier
UK announcements, the UK TEZ declaration said it was without prejudice to the
UK's general self-defense rights under the UN Charter.
Two days after the TEZ proclamation, the UK submarine Conqueror sank the
Argentine cruiser General Belgrano with heavy loss of life 30 miles outside the
TEZ; Belgrano, inter alia armed with Exocet surface to surface missiles, had ap-
peared to turn in the direction ofUK forces well over the horizon. TheUK govern-
ment justified the sinking on its MEZ warning that any Argentine ship or aircraft
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threatening the UK force would be dealt with. The UK also boarded and sank
Narwal, an oceangoing Argentine trawler with communications equipment and
an Argentine communications officer aboard that had been shadowing the UK
558
formation. Justified on the basis of the threat language in the TEZ proclama-
tion, the Narwal capture was also lawful under the LOAC.
Argentina then declared all South Atlantic Ocean waters a war zone, threaten-
ing to attack any UK ship therein. Perhaps the only neutral ship Argentina
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attacked in the zone was S.S. Hercules, a Liberian-flag, US interests-owned tanker
in ballast and steaming 600 miles offArgentina and 500 miles from the islands.
The United Kingdom responded to the Argentine proclamation by announcing
that because hostile forces could cover distances involved in resupplying Argen-
tine forces on the islands, particularly at night and in bad weather, UK forces find-
ing any Argentine warship or military aircraft more than 12 miles offthe Argentine
coast would consider it hostile. Because Argentina faces much of the South At-
lantic below Uruguay and Brazil, this meant a substantial overlap ofthe last Argen-
tine-declared area, which presumably extended from the Equator to Africa and
Antarctica.
The war ended two months later, but the United Kingdom continued its TEZ.
Ten days after hostilities ended, however, the United Kingdom lifted its TEZ but
warned Argentina to keep military ships and aircraft away from the islands, declar-
ing a 1 50-mile Protection Zone (PZ) around the islands. Argentina was required to
seek UK agreement before Argentine civil aircraft or merchantmen went into the
PZ. The PZ continued for some time thereafter.
The Argentina-UK war is important for the Tanker War; it occurred in 1982,
just before belligerent attacks on Persian Gulfshipping intensified. It was also the
most recent intensive use of war zones since World War II. Commentators have
analyzed the conflict from the perspective of the zones as proclaimed and em-
ployed; it is therefore appropriate to synthesize principles emerging from this war.
In some cases the belligerents were correct in their actions, sometimes they were
correct for the wrong reasons, and in a few cases there were actual or potential in-
ternational law violations.
To the extent the UKMEZ and TEZ and the Argentine DZ declared opposing
naval forces were subject to attack within the zones, the claims were within ac-
tions international law permits. Attack on or capture of opposing naval forces,
once there is a state ofwar, can occur anywhere except within neutral waters, and
then under special circumstances. The initial declarations were thus no more
than declarations of intent to do what the law allowed. Under either theory, i.e.,
limitation because ofthe MEZ or TEZ or the general law of naval warfare, UK in-
terception ofNarwal was proper. Whether 200 miles was a reasonable distance
is less than clear from facts at hand; later Britain declared the 1 50-mile PZ, but this
was after hostilities ended, and it cannot be said whether 200 miles during the war
was sufficient, any more than it can be said the 150-mile PZ was reasonable at the
end. Argentina also included its territorial sea within its DZ, and the MEZ/TEZ
and the DZ necessarily included these waters of the islands. Argentina could val-
idly declare a DZ for its mainland territorial waters under the law of the sea, but
only for a limited time. It could make a similar claim under the LOAC for terri-
torial seas on the mainland and around the Falklands/Malivinas that were imme-
diate areas ofmilitary operations. Britain, claiming sovereignty over the islands
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(a claim Argentina disputed), could likewise assert LOS exclusion rights for the is-
lands' territorial seas; the United Kingdom could also exclude neutrals from parts
of the territorial seas around the Falklands/Malvinas and Argentina's mainland
territorial sea while conducting military operations. Any Argentine territorial sea
exclusion claim under the LOS for the Falklands would have been invalid, if it is
assumed Britain had sovereignty over the islands. The UK reservation of
self-defense rights was proper but not necessary, except perhaps as a saving clause,
or as a warning to third States. Argentina could have validly asserted the same
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claim. The right to self-defense is paramount. Britain could reserve these rights
as against others, e.g., in hypothetical situations that Argentina might acquire an
ally that mounted an attack against Britain, or if a future decision on the war as
then fought would say that UK attacks on Argentine assets elsewhere were valid
under this theory. The reality is that these assets would have been subject to attack,
not on a self-defense basis, but pursuant to the LOAC.
571The UK defensive bubble was also proper; it had precedent under the Nyon
572Agreement and other declarations, in that it was limited to a certain ocean area.
Like the Nyon Agreement and similar procedures, the bubble was mobile, but that
was no cause for concern; all high seas mariners have radar today, and they could
have observed the task force, undoubtedly steaming in formation, on their screens.
Moreover, the UK task force would have seen neutral ships and aircraft on its sen-
sors and would have warned them if they got too close. A neutral ship blundering
into the formation and aware of the bubble through a NOTMAR would be at risk,
but mutual visual identification and signals were available.
The UK TEZ declaration that any ship or aircraft within the zone would be
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considered hostile could have come close to the line of illegality. Britain could
declare a presumption of hostility, but even here belligerents must observe neces-
sity and proportionality principles as against vessels or aircraft that are not proper
targets. Argentine air and naval assets, including ships and aircraft supplying its
war effort, continued to be proper targets, but the UK blanket declaration meant
that before attacking in the TEZ, Britain had to determine that the target was
proper under the LOAC or under self-defense principles in the case ofnon-Argen-
tine platforms. There is no indication that Britain did not do so. The self-defense
statement analysis is the same as under the MEZ. The Belgrano sinking 40 miles
outside the TEZ was a legitimate act under the law of naval warfare, TEZ or no
TEZ, and whether Belgrano appeared to turn toward the UK task force or not.
There is no indication that Britain had declared it would not attack Argentine mil-
itary forces elsewhere, and certainly no indication it would not attack ships like
Belgrano if they appeared to be moving toward the UK force with ship-killing
575
Exocet missiles aboard.
576
The Argentine war zone declaration covering the entire South Atlantic was
disproportionate; in theory this stretched from the shores ofSouth America below
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Brazil and Uruguay to the continent's southern tip and across to Africa. The Ar-
gentine attack on the neutral tanker Hercules was unlawful because it was an attack
inside a disproportionate war zone; even if the zone had been proportional and
necessary, it is questionable whether Argentina observed proportionality and ne-
cessity in the attack, given the size of the Argentine navy, threats to it, its capacity
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for enforcement in all these waters, and the relative size ofthe conflict. Neutral
ships and aircraft did not lose protections just because they passed through a war
578
zone. The UK declaration came close to saying the same in terms of area, al-
though limited to a presumption of hostility for Argentine flag aircraft and
579
ships. Under these circumstances, all the UK declaration did was to repeat
LOAC standards for dealing with these platforms, wherever found on the high
seas, and the declaration to that extent was lawful.
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Britain could legitimately continue its TEZ after the end of hostilities; the
posture of the conflict being cooled down at that point was the same as when the
conflict was heating up, and theUK task force organized and proceeded toward the
islands. There is no indication the defensive bubble was abandoned; Britain could
continue this proclamation, and indeed can declare a bubble, reasonable in area
and the time it will take a UK force of any size to transit an area, to this day, any-
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where to assert rights of self-defense. As noted above, whether the 150-mile PZ
was reasonable in area under the circumstances can only be determined by opera-
tional considerations, for which the record does not supply information. However,
the UK PZ could continue after hostilities and until final resolution of the con-
frontation; ifvisit and search, blockade or a war zone may be maintained during an
582
armistice or other cease-fire absent belligerents' contrary agreement, a protec-
tion zone after the end of possible hostilities and before restoration of peace can
likewise be continued. Neither a postwarTEZ nor a PZ can purport to operate like
a security zone ofthe high seas, which would exclude all ships and aircraft seeking
583
to exercise high seas rights. Security zones so structured are unlawful.
The final problem of all these zones is relationship between them and LOS-
permitted zones. It was unfortunate that the TEZ and the DZ coincided with the
584
200 miles the law of the sea allows for an EEZ. The two concepts are mutually
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exclusive. It was not necessary, either as an LOS or LOAC matter, that the two
areas overlap geographically, and this is illustrated by the later UK PZ, 150 miles
in breadth. A belligerent's assertion of a war zone cannot bolster an EEZ declara-
tion for the same area, and an EEZ claim cannot bolster a war zone claim for the
same area. Opposing belligerents must take into account EEZ installations, etc., in
necessity and proportionality calculations, however. Although no recent war has
involved contiguous zone, continental shelf, fishing zone, etc., demarcation lines,
the same considerations apply. As to parts ofa war zone in the territorial sea, under
the LOS any State including a belligerent can limit neutrals' innocent passage
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temporarily. The same rule applies during armed conflict, although the time
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during armed conflict near shore may be different, and belligerents may also to-
tally exclude neutral ships and aircraft from immediate areas of naval opera-
587
tions. An opposing belligerent's military forces, including vessels or aircraft
supporting the war effort, may be attacked there.
Argentina could not have closed its Straits of Magellan waters to neutral ship-
ping; the treaties covering the Straits have no provision for it. Under both the LOS
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and the LOAC, these straits had to stay open. If UK forces had transited the
Straits (they did not use them), Argentina could not have attacked them in Chilean
territorial waters in the Straits, nor could either belligerent have purported to close
the strait to neutral navigation, either by sinking the other's assets to block pas-
sage, or to have closed the Straits by declaration of a war zone or an immediate area
of naval operations. A naval engagement, or an exercise of self-defense (which
might have occurred if a third State attacked either belligerent's forces in the
Straits) would have invoked necessity and proportionality principles, which
might have been the same or different for the law of armed conflict or self-
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defense, depending on the circumstances. In either case necessity and propor-
tionality considerations would have required consideration of neutrals' straits
transit rights during war or peace. All of this is theoretical, of course, because no
military actions are reported to have taken place in the Straits during the briefwar.
In summary, then, it appears that the Falklands/Malvinas war zones were law-
ful, except as to the Argentine declaration for the entire South Atlantic and its at-
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tack on Hercules.
A central purpose of these zones has been to avoid committing large forces to a
task of cutting off enemies' seaborne and air commerce, or for a measure of sea
control where a belligerent has only limited forces to bring to bear on controlling
enemy commerce. Undoubtedly they will be used more frequently as navies down-
size in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Midway through the Tanker War,
Fenrick attempted to sum up the developing norm for war zones:
If belligerents use [war] . . . zones, they should publicly declare the existence,
location, and duration ofthe zones, what is excluded from the zone, and the sanctions
likely to be imposed on ships or aircraft entering the zone without permission, and
also provide enough lead time before the zone comes into effect to allow ships [and
one would add, aircraft] to clear the area. As with blockades, "paper" zones are
insufficient. Belligerents declaring zones should deploy sufficient forces to the zone
to make it "effective," that is, to expose ships or aircraft entering the zone to a
significant probability of encountering submarines, ships or aircraft engaged in
enforcing the zone. All militarily practicable efforts should be made to employ
minimum sanctions, such as seizure instead of attack on sight. Similarly, all
militarily practicable measures should be taken to ensure proper target identification
and to ensure that only legitimate military objectives, such as military aircraft,
warships, and ships incorporated into the [opposing] belligerent's] war effort, are
attacked. The emphasis on what is militarily practicable is important. Sometimes the
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minimum practicable sanction will be attack on sight; sometimes ships or aircraft
that are not legitimate military objectives will be attacked because of errors in target
identification. There must be a proportional and demonstrable nexus between the
zone and the self-defence requirements of the state establishing the zone.^92
Moreover, the same body oflaw, i.e., the LOAC with its limitations (e.g., necessity
and proportionality, exemption of some ships, e.g., coastal fishing craft, from at-
tack as long as they do not contribute to the enemy war effort), and the overarching
right ofself-defense under theUN Charter, applies inside and outside the zone.
A zone's extent, location and duration and measures imposed may not exceed what
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is required by necessity and proportionality, and should take into account one
rationale for the zone, promoting safety ofneutral merchant shipping and aircraft
by keeping them a safe distance from areas ofactual or potential hostilities. If it
is no longer necessary that a surface ship be on station to enforce a blockade, the
same rule is true for a war zone. The only requirement is for forces sufficient to en-
force the zone.
The zone's location and extent need not coincide with other zones established
under the LOS or the LOAC. For example, although some Falklands/Malvinas
war zones extended about 200 miles from the South American mainland and the is-
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lands, the same permissible distance the LOS allows for an EEZ, war zone
principles may dictate a zonal width broader, narrower or the same as LOS limits.
The same is true for the law ofnaval warfare; for example, a blockade area might be
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the same as, greater than, or less than, a war zone laid on top ofthe area. National
security planning suggests that a war zone declaration should proclaim a zone dif-
ferent from other zone lines in the area, e.g., those for the EEZ, commensurate with
necessity and proportionality requirements. If a zone line must coincide with an
LOS zone line, a declarant should state in the war zone proclamation that war zone
lines are independent ofany other zones, and that the war zone declaration should
not be taken as an assertion of any other, e.g., rights for an EEZ, and that
declarant's EEZ rights are not affected in any way by the war zone declaration.
This should help avoid other States' protests that the war zone proclamation is, in
effect, claiming rights which when combined with other claims amounts to a secu-
rity zone like North Korea's unlawful claim.
Due regard must be given neutrals' rights to uses ofthe oceans. Necessary
safe passage through the zone for neutral vessels and aircraft must be provided
where the geographic size ofthe zone significantly impedes free and safe access to a
neutral's ports and coasts, and in other cases where normal navigation routes are
affected, except where military requirements do not permit it. A war zone can-
not bar straits passage, access to innocent passage through a neutral's territorial
waters, or access to neutrals' territorial seas. A belligerent is not absolved of its
duties under the LOAC and international humanitarian law by establishing a war
zone. "In short, an otherwise protected platform does not lose that protection by
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crossing an imaginary line drawn in the ocean by a belligerent." Although
belligerents must publish restrictive measures so that neutrals will know what is
expected ofthem, publication ofenforcement measures is not necessary, although
a belligerent may choose to do so. A neutral's complying with a belligerent's or-
ders in the zone cannot be construed as an act harmful to an opposing belliger-
ent. These belligerent measures can include only those essential for passing
through the zone, and do not include complying with a belligerent's order that ef-
fectively converts a neutral into part of a belligerent's war effort.
UN Security Council decisions can override these principles, to the extent a
Council resolution is in point. These considerations apart, and despite some
commentators' and countries' objections, State practice before and after World
War II confirms war zones' lawfulness if properly noticed, properly configured in
duration and area, and properly employed so as to not violate universally-accepted
principles of necessity and proportionality during armed conflict.
3. Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs)
States may bar foreign aircraft or regulate their entry into national airspace,
which includes the territorial sea as part of national sovereignty. Analogous to the
law ofthe sea, the ICAO Convention allows countries to establish prohibited areas
in their territories, over which foreign flag aircraft may not fly. Unlike the LOS,
these prohibitions can be permanent. Aircraft flight through straits cannot be sus-
pended temporarily or permanently. Since this aspect of the territorial sea is
also subject to the LOAC through LOS other rules provisions, a belligerent may
apply the LOAC to its territorial sea airspace. Any State, belligerent or neutral, has
a right of self-defense of this airspace as well as its land territory, territorial waters
and inland waters below the airspace.
Belligerents and neutrals have a customary right to establish air defense identi-
fication zones (ADIZs) in international airspace, anchored to their territorial sea
airspace, to establish reasonable rules of entry into their territory. The legal basis
for an ADIZ is a nation's right to establish reasonable conditions for entry into its
territory. An ADIZ is not analogous to a sort ofcontiguous zone for the air, giv-
ing a coastal State a right to police airspace above that part ofthe high seas outside a
contiguous zone. (Coastal States may, ofcourse, police airspace above a contiguous
zone for activities, e.g., drug smuggling or customs violations, if the LOS permits
such action and that State has laws claiming jurisdiction over such activities.)
An ADIZ cannot be a sovereignty claim over high seas airspace; freedom of navi-
c -I o
gation and overflight are high seas freedoms. An ADIZ does not stand in the
way ofhigh seas freedoms. An ADIZ is a reference area for initiating identifica-
tion procedures for aircraft on a course that will penetrate an ADIZ State's national
airspace. States cannot combine an ADIZ proclamation with other LOS rights,
e.g., contiguous zone, EEZ, fishing zone, continental shelf, etc., claims, to assert
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greater rights over an ocean area, e.g., combining an EEZ claim with an ADIZ
claim to assert sovereignty over a high seas area. Each claim is separate in rights
that can be asserted and cannot be thus lumped together. A proclamation for these
rights may assert some or all of them in the same document, but claims for an
ADIZ and LOS rights must be separately stated.
The ADIZ also differs from aircraft warning zones, which are legitimate and
may be declared incident to military exercises on, under and over the high seas,
which purport to warn but not to exclude, or warnings concerning belligerents'
immediate area ofnaval operations, blockade areas, SDZs or war zones.
An ADIZ can be an incident of self-defense, including anticipatory self-
defense, in that entry presupposes communication with an aircraft that proposes
to enter, by its identifying itself as it proceeds toward the ADIZ State or by a chal-
lenge and response system between an ADIZ State and an approaching aircraft. If
an incoming aircraft displays a threat, i.e., hostile intent, or begins hostile action
amounting to an attack, an ADIZ State may initiate self-defense responses, includ-
ing interception and anticipatory self-defense, subject to principles of necessity
and proportionality and rules against attacking certain aircraft. A belligerent
may use its ADIZ during wartime to identify and intercept incoming enemy mili-
tary aircraft and attack them, observing principles of necessity and proportional-
ity, such that neutral States' aircraft, ships, persons or property that are not proper
objects of attack; or enemy aircraft, ships, persons or property that are not proper
objects of attack; are not endangered. An ADIZ cannot be a justification for
self-defense or belligerent attacks, however, any more than proclaiming, e.g., a war
zone can justify indiscriminate attacks. The ICAO Convention has recently
been amended to prohibit States from using weapons against civil aircraft, and in
the case of civil aircraft interception, action so that lives ofthose on board and the
safety ofthe aircraft cannot be endangered. This does not detract from a State's
inherent right ofself-defense, but it does establish conditions ofnecessity and pro-
portionality ifa civil aircraft is involved. Similarly, the amendment establishes
conditions of necessity and proportionality in LOAC situations.
Thus far the only requirements for a valid ADIZ are notice, claim ofan area of
international airspace for this purpose, and that the zone has been established for
aircraft identification. ADIZs thus far have been relatively permanent in nature,
but if a State modifies or ends an ADIZ, that should be notified as well. In that re-
gard, ADIZ minimum requirements are similar to those for other zones.
Analogous to the law ofthe sea, air law recognizes an exception for aircraft entry
£22
in distress. During peacetime, States must allow entry ofany aircraft in distress.
During war neutrals must allow belligerent aircraft in distress entry, but their
crews and the aircraft must be interned for the duration of the war; civilians must
be allowed to return home. Belligerents' aircraft entering an opponent's terri-
tory in distress maybe captured or destroyed, and the crews made prisoners ofwar,
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except neutral passengers who do not contribute to the war effort, who must be re-
patriated.
4. Ocean Zones Createdfor Humanitarian Law Purposes
Humanitarian law allows establishing special hospital zones and neutralized
zones by the parties' agreement. These zones may be on belligerents' territory and,
"if the need arises," in occupied areas. A belligerent may propose establishing a
neutralized zone to the enemy through a neutral country or a humanitarian orga-
nization, e.g., the ICRC, in combat areas for sheltering wounded and sick and civil-
ians playing no part in hostilities. A zone must be stated in a written agreement,
which must reflect geographic area, zone administration, food supply and zone su-
pervision. Since belligerent territory and occupied areas can include the territo-
rial sea as part ofa belligerent's territory or a belligerent's occupied territory, these
zones can include sea approaches to them, e.g., landing facilities for a shoreside
hospital. (Hospital ships and similar craft, unless they contribute to the war ef-
fort, carry their exemptions with them whether they are on the high seas or else-
where, e.g., at a dock in territorial waters.) Humanitarian law treaties do not
provide for similar zones on the high seas. However, during the Falklands/Malvinas
War, at Britain's suggestion the belligerents agreed on a high seas zone in addition
to a neutralized zone in the center of the city of Stanley in the islands. The high
seas zone, called a "Red Cross Box," was 20 nautical miles in diameter and north of
the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. Argentine and UK hospital ships were stationed
in the Box. Its primary purpose was exchange ofsick and wounded. The Box agree-
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ment was not in writing. Since 1982 no other high seas areas have been so
designated.
The San Remo Manual suggests the possibility of establishing a high seas area
for humanitarian purposes: "[P]arties to the conflict may agree, for humanitarian
purposes, to create a zone in a defined area of the sea in which only activities con-
sistent with those humanitarian purposes are permitted." Perhaps recognizing the
informality of communications at sea, the Manual would not insist on a written
agreement. Once established, the zone does not have to exist indefinitely but for
the time agreed upon. No activity forbidden by the agreement, or inconsistent
with the zone's purpose, should be conducted, e.g., using the zone as a refuge for
combatant vessels like submarines. Military craft, e.g., helicopters, can traverse the
zone to ferry sick and wounded.
The Manual proposal is progressive development, not a customary norm. How-
ever, the idea has merit and should be followed in future wars. Like agreements on
hospital and neutralized zones ashore, the agreement should be in writing if at all
possible and should spell out terms analogous to those for shoreside zones. To-
day, despite the fog of war inevitably accompanying armed conflict, worldwide
communications (e.g., facsimile for signed agreements) are such that belligerents
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should be able to agree in writing, preferably government to government, rather
than relying on naval commanders at sea who will have more pressing matters at
hand. Naval commanders should be consulted, ofcourse. Location ofthe Box or
any similar zone, its duration including whether it will continue during an armi-
stice or other cease-fire, and the agreement's terms including its relationship with
other zones (e.g., war zones or ADIZs, discussed in Parts F.2-F.3), should be pub-
lished, particularly by NOTAM and NOTMAR, also another omission of the
Manual formula. Belligerents might consider language similar to that used in ex-
cluding neutrals from the immediate area ofmilitary operations, permitted as dis-
cussed in Part F.l.a, to encourage other countries' shipping to stay out of the Box
and its vicinity, to avoid complicating situations. The agreement should consider
the due regard principle, discussed in Part A, to assure other high seas users' rights
are not unduly compromised.
Further, there seems no reason why neutrals cannot establish a Box, with
belligerents' agreement, to succor sick, wounded and civilians who do not take
part in the conflict. Given the likelihood of relatively small sea wars like the
Falklands/Malvinas conflict and downsizing among the Earth's navies in the fu-
ture, it is quite possible that many belligerents may not have resources (e.g., hospi-
tal ships) for a Box although they would wish to establish one, and that other
countries may have these assets and a willingness to deploy them to alleviate suf-
fering and dislocations during the war. Military commands might prepare Box
agreements in advance of any conflict, to be sure they are complete and ready for
rapid use if armed conflict and the need for a Box or similar zone arise.
5. The Tanker War
There are no recorded belligerent claims to exclusion ofneutral shipping from
the immediate area of belligerent naval operations.
The United States proclaimed what amounted to SDZs in its NOTAM and
NOTMAR warnings and its reversion to "zone defense" after the 1988 cease-
fire. US NOTAM andNOTMARwarnings referred to a specific area in the Gulf
but did not mention any specific naval units; they warned of dangers incident to
approaching US naval forces. These warnings were lawful, in that they notified
others of special dangers incident to approaching too close to US forces, e.g.,
self-defense responses, much as NOTAMs and NOTMARs notifying high seas
users of naval maneuvers, like those Iran announced during the Tanker War,
which were lawful high seas uses but not lawful in neutrals' territorial seas or in
straits if straits passage would be impeded.
The US SDZ claims for particular areas in the Gulf, at first limited to relatively
small areas around its forces, and later redefined with no specific areas, appear rea-
sonable in the context of the war. To be sure, there were mistaken firings on, e.g.,
dhows and fishermen coming close to US forces and the Airbus, but there is no
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evidence the United States violated necessity and proportionality principles,
given information available at the time, or knowingly attacked ships or aircraft
that were not lawful targets under the LOAC. These were situations of tragic col-
lateral and other damage incident to self-defense responses, for which the United
States paid compensation (without admitting fault, a common practice in tort set-
tlements and releases in the common law) for some and probably all damage
claims. Although there appear to be no published SDZs as such for the war's
neutral convoy, escort or accompanying operations, permitted under interna-
(LAQ
tional law, use ofa published SDZ, whether communicated by diplomatic chan-
nels or perhaps as the need arose for the convoy commander, that was reasonable in
terms and moving area covered, would have been compatible with international
law. International law does not require establishment or notice of SDZs, how-
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ever.
Other neutrals and the belligerents did not proclaim SDZs. Iran could have
published them for its convoy operations and projected naval operations and ma-
neuvers, but apparently chose not to do so. The convoys were subject to Iraqi at-
tack. An SDZ declaration could not have changed that. Iran had a right to
conduct naval maneuvers in its territorial sea, as well as high seas naval maneuvers,
the latter subject to due regard for others' oceans uses, but had no right to conduct
maneuvers in Saudi territorial waters. Publishing SDZs could not alter the le-
gality, or lack thereof, of these operations. Both belligerents' military aircraft
could overfly the Gulfs high seas, subject to due regard for others' high seas rights,
but not neutrals' territorial seas, and an SDZ publication could not change these
rules. Nor could publishing an SDZ justify belligerents' mine or other attacks
on neutrals.
Iran and Iraq published war zones. They roughly corresponded with the gen-
eral geographic area of some but not all military operations. The zones were not
"paper" zones and were legitimate in terms of geographic scope, since Iran and
Iraq had capability for operations over them, except to the extent that Iran
sought to control or restrict Strait ofHormuz transit passage. Iran could publish a
Strait war zone to warn of risks of hostilities, but it could not use the zone procla-
mation to close the Strait or restrict straits passage by neutrals, any more than
North Korea could establish its security zone, purporting to limit high seas free-
doms.657
The principal problem with the belligerent zones was with their misuse. Iran
and Iraq made neutral ships their principal targets with a view to inhibiting oil ex-
ports that financed their opponent's war effort. Iran also attacked neutral shipping
proceeding between neutral ports. These attacks occurred outside the zones as
well. Both belligerents fired on neutrals' military aircraft and warships, both in-
side and outside the zones. There was an obvious disregard of target discrimina-
tion, failure to observe general principles of necessity and proportionality, and a
Law of Armed Conflict 41
5
failure to avoid attacks on shipping that was exempt from capture or destruction.
To that extent both States violated international law in use of otherwise valid
zones. To the extent mining was part ofwar zone operations, the zones were un-
lawful in use because they did not provide safe sea lanes for neutral shipping.
UN Security Council resolutions condemning indiscriminate Tanker War attacks
on neutral shipping support this view.
Saudi Arabia established an ADIZ during the war. Establishing the zone was
consistent with international law; it was noticed. The record does not disclose
the high seas area it covered, but presumably it was that part ofthe high seas offthe
Saudi Gulfcoast, nor does the record say what the ADIZ notice recited in terms of
identification. However, there were no recorded protests, and it must be presumed
that Saudi Arabia acted in accordance with international law on these points.
Two weeks before establishing the zone, Saudi Arabia shot down an Iranian air-
craft over the high seas of the Gulf. The ADIZ would not have given a right to
shoot it down, even though initial information for Iranian flights may have come
through AWACS information procedures. The shootdowns were governed by the
right of self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, as well as principles ofne-
cessity, proportionality and admitting ofno other alternative in the case ofanticipa-
tory self-defense. There is nothing in the record to say the law was not observed.
There are reports Saudi Arabia allowed Iraqi military aircraft to use refueling
facilities on its territory. There is no evidence that these aircraft entered under
distress conditions, and it must be presumed that Saudi Arabia permitted entry,
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which it was allowed to do under the LOS and the law of the air. Whether this
could be claimed as a violation of Saudi obligations as a neutral was a separate is-
sue. Depending on resolving the issue ofwhether a neutral may aid a country that
is victim ofan aggressor, and who was the aggressor in the war, the response could
go either way. Commentators may differ on whether a neutral may aid a country
believed to be a target ofaggression, but the view seems to be that it is proper to as-
sist the target with aid, including military aid. Ifneutral Saudi Arabia could aid
Iraq as a victim of Iranian aggression, then the assistance was proper. If Iraq was
the aggressor, then the aid was improper. The difficulty, of course, is which coun-
try committed aggression. The reported facts may point toward Iran or Iraq; the is-
sue is far from clear.
Perhaps owing to the nature of the conflict, i.e., isolated attacks on shipping or
defense of shipping, or lack of seaborne assets dedicated to humanitarian use, e.g.,
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hospital ships, no equivalent ofa Red Cross Box was established during the con-
flict.
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Part G. Weapons and Weapons Use; Mine Warfare
Unlike the land war, where Iraq used poison gas against Iranian forces in viola-
tion of the law of armed conflict, no nuclear, biological or chemical weapons
were employed in the Tanker War at sea.
Conventional weaponry in the sea war included all sizes ofprojectiles, from bul-
lets sprayed on merchantmen's bridges to medium-size naval guns, surface to sur-
face rockets, belligerent helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft fire and bombing,
intermediate range land-based Silkworm missiles Iran fired against merchantmen
in Kuwaiti port berths, and surface to air missiles and projectiles. Iran fired con-
ventional weapons at Iraqi port facilities, neutrals' port facilities and neutral ship-
ping; these attacks came from Iranian naval units and land-based aircraft. Iraq
conducted aerial attacks on Iranian oil facilities and neutral shipping; the flights
originated on land, because Iraq had no shipboard naval aviation capability. Nei-
ther belligerent bombarded its opponents' shores incident to a seaborne invasion.
After giving occupants ofIranian offshore oil platforms, used for surveillance and
harboring small, offensively armed boats, notice and an opportunity to leave them,
US naval forces shelled these platforms in response to speedboat attacks on neutral
merchantmen. US naval forces also used weapons fired from helicopters and sur-
face ship weapons in self-defense responses against belligerent surface vessels. The
U.S.S. Vincennes mistakenly shot down the Airbus with surface to air missiles.
Other US warships mistakenly fired on dhows and fishing boats. At least one bel-
ligerent's attack jet was downed by a Saudi interceptor.
Both belligerents laid sea mines during the Tanker War. All apparently were of
the contact variety, i.e., actuated by contact of a vessel with the mine. Iran laid
them, probably tethered to the bottom, in approaches to Kuwaiti and other neutral
ports. Iraq laid them in Iranian Gulfport approaches. Both States laid them in in-
ternational shipping lanes, i.e., in high seas areas where traffic generally sailed.
Sometimes these were laid just before a ship was due to pass. Some were drifting
mines, the result of anchored mines' having broken their moorings; others re-
mained tethered. Neutral navies began to report, sweep and destroy or remove
mines, sometimes individually, and in other cases cooperatively among several
States' naval forces. The US Navy captured and later scuttled the Iranian mine-
layer Iran Ajr, and returned surviving crew to Iran. After hostilities ended neutral
navies organized to sweep thousands of mines in the upper Gulf.
Apart from mine warfare discussed in sub-Part 2, this Part concentrates on
methods and means ofbelligerents' attacks on opposing enemy forces, shipping or
facilities in the Tanker War. Analysis of belligerents' attacks on neutral military
forces, neutral shipping or neutral facilities has been discussed in Chapter III and
in Parts A.-F., and that analysis will not be repeated here.
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No Tanker War participant, belligerent or neutral, employed weapons consid-
ered inherently unlawful under the LOAC or in self-defense. The central issue for
the war is whether belligerents, or neutrals acting in self-defense, used conven-
tional weapons consistently with principles of necessity and proportionality and,
for anticipatory self-defense, necessity, proportionality and admitting ofno other
alternative. What might be proportional and necessary under the LOAC between
belligerents might or might not be necessary and proportional in a self-defense
f\7f\
context, and vice versa. Besides these general principles, there were few guide-
posts in treaty or customary law.
1. Conventional Weapons Use, Apartfrom Mine Warfare
Iran bombarded Iraqi shore facilities during the Tanker War, using land-based
air and perhaps naval assets. Iraq bombarded Iranian shuttle convoys carrying oil
that Iran sold to finance its war effort, Iranian vessels on the high seas, and Iranian
port facilities and offshore oil installations. No international agreement specifi-
cally covers the circumstance of attacks on offshore oil platforms, which I would
also characterize as "shore bombardment." Hague IX declares that military instal-
lations and warships in a harbor may be destroyed by bombardment, with consid-
eration for historical, scientific and artistic monuments and hospitals, after
summons to surrender and a reasonable time of waiting. No summons need be
f\T7
given if necessity {i.e., surprise) dictates otherwise. The Hague Air Rules have
similar provisions for attacks from the air but omit requirements for a sum-
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mons.
Whether or which ofthese principles are customary law or are in desuetude is a
debate among commentators. However, at the least these provisions today reflect
customary rules of necessity and proportionality applying to attacks on military
objectives under theLOAC or in self-defense responses. These principles ofneces-
sity and proportionality apply to military objectives within otherwise civilian
areas, e.g., oil platforms within an EEZ (a "civilian area") used for military surveil-
lance or as launching pads for attacks on shipping (a proper military objective).
Bombardment may not be used to terrorize the civil population or to wantonly de-
stroy areas ofconcentration of civil populations. Today the rule seems to be notice
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should be given ofan attack ifthe military situation permits it. Besides histori-
cal and artistic monuments, medical facilities are off limits for attack unless used
for military purposes.
The record ofbelligerents' bombarding opponents' shore facilities as incidents
of the Tanker War is sparse. Whether notice if appropriate was given; whether
Hague IX and Hague Air Rules standards were followed; whether civilian objects
or historical, artistic, scientific or hospital sites were involved; whether bel-
ligerents attacked areas where the civil population was concentrated; whether at-
tacks were designed to and did terrorize the civil population; or whether attacks
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followed LOAC principles ofnecessity and proportionality, is less than clear. If
the War of the Cities and other aspects of the 1980-88 conflict on the land are any
indicator, there is a high likelihood that there were LOAC violations, perhaps of
the general principles of necessity and proportionality and perhaps of specific
rules in Hague IX and the Hague Air Rules. We do not know from the available
historical record of this aspect of attacks on land targets.
2. Mine Warfare
Mine warfare law is a mixture of one treaty dating from 1907, Hague VIII,
and custom developed from it and elsewhere since introduction of sea mines,
once known as torpedoes, over two centuries ago. Although modern mine de-
vices, e.g., CAPTOR, which rises from the seabed to attack submarines by a modi-
fied homing torpedo, have been developed and were used in many wars in this
century, belligerents laid only bottom-moored contact mines during the Tanker
/TOT
War, although some ofthese may have broken loose from their moorings. Anal-
ysis therefore concentrates on legal aspects of this weapon as used in the war.
A State laying mines must notify other States ofthe location ofmines as soon as
f.QQ
military exigencies permit. Belligerents may not lay mines in neutral waters,
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i.e., neutrals' territorial seas. Anchored mines, i.e., moored or tethered mines,
must become harmless when they break their moorings or control over them is
lost. Unanchored mines, i.e., those not fixed to or imbedded in the bottom, must
become harmless after a mine layer loses control of them, e.g., after a vessel drops
them over the side or an aircraft deploys them. As the foregoing indicates, these
principles apply to mines and not to a delivery system; aircraft and submarines are
692bound by them like surface ships.
Minefield locations must be carefully recorded to ensure accurate notification
(and therefore appropriate action by other States, e.g., to avoid them), and to facili-
tate removal and/or deactivation, perhaps after hostilities end. At the end ofhostil-
ities States must remove mines they have laid, except that States must remove
mines in their waters, regardless ofwho laid them. Parties to a conflict may make
other arrangements for removal, including arrangements with other countries for
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mine removal. Neutral States do not commit an unneutral act if they clear
mines laid in violation of international law' unless to do so would violate other
international law principles.
Mines may be used to channel neutral shipping but not to deny straits or
archipelagic sea lanes passage. Mines cannot be laid off an enemy's ports and
coasts with a sole objective of intercepting commercial shipping; however, they
may be otherwise used in strategic blockade of enemy coasts, ports and water-
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ways. States cannot mine areas of indefinite extent in international waters, i.e.,
the high seas. Reasonably limited war zones may be established ifneutral shipping
has an alternate route around or through the zone. Indiscriminate high seas
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mining is unlawful. Minelaying States must have due regard for others' high seas
rights and freedoms.
Belligerents or neutrals may not lay mines in other neutrals' internal waters or
territorial seas; this would violate that State's territorial integrity under the UN
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Charter as well as the LOAC. Mines cannot be laid in international straits so as
to impair or impede neutral passage unless alternate routes ofequal safety and con-
venience are provided.
Neutrals may lay mines in their territorial sea as a self-defense measure, but
they are bound by rules for belligerents, e.g., notice, leaving lanes open for ship-
701 702
ping, not impeding shipping, etc. When a threat ends, the LOS and Hague
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VIII require that such mines be removed or rendered harmless. Unless it is a
case ofself-defense by a neutral or a belligerent expecting or experiencing attack by
a country with which that belligerent is not presently at war, and usually in cir-
cumstances of anticipatory self-defense, armed mines may not be laid on the high
seas, absent an armed conflict situation. Ifmines are placed on the high seas un-
der these circumstances, a minelaying State must give prior warning by analogy to
705Hague VIII; other Hague rules must be applied analogously, e.g., mines must be
70ft
removed expeditiously or rendered harmless once an imminent danger passes.
Controlled mines, i.e., those that cannot be actuated except by signal from a
707
minelaying State's forces, may be laid on the high seas as long as they do not in-
terfere with other high seas uses, or uses involved with parts ofthe seas covered by
708 709
EEZ, etc., regimes. Due regard principles apply here too. Even if controlled
mines are laid that would interfere with high seas freedoms, this may be permissi-
ble if there are published alternate safe and convenient routes for other high seas
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users. Since most countries laying controlled mines would want controlled
mine locations secret until there is a need to actuate them, it is not likely a
minelaying State would notify other countries of their location by notice ofan al-
ternate route or risk entanglement with another high seas user, followed by diplo-
711
matic protest based on the due regard principle.
3. Mine Warfare Principles and the Tanker War
Chapter III analyzed the necessity and proportionality of self-defense re-
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sponses, and that discussion will not be repeated here, nor will the necessity and
proportionality questions incident to LOAC issues, discussed in Parts A-F, be re-
hearsed anew here. In some cases, assuming that an objective was a proper military
target, e.g., neutral merchantmen under belligerent convoy with cargoes support-
713ing an enemy war effort, it is questionable whether the method of attack was
necessary or proportional under the circumstances. Iranian forces in particular
seemed to target merchant ship crews by aiming at personnel areas ofships. The
same can be said for belligerents' indiscriminate mining, resulting in casualties to
71
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merchantmen and warships alike. Failure to publish location of minefields was
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a factor in lack of discrimination, as was belligerents' failure to lay mines that be-
716
came inoperative after losing their tethers.
Besides failing to satisfy general principles ofnecessity and proportionality, in-
cluding target discrimination and minimization of civilian and neutral military
casualties, the belligerents, and Libya ifinvolved in the 1984 Red Sea mining, vio-
lated many specific rules ofmine warfare. Although belligerent ships probably laid
717
most mines, the rules applied to mines laid by aircraft as well. Minefield loca-
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tions were not published. Belligerents laid mines in neutral waters, a Charter vi-
719
olation and a violation of the LOAC. Mines, particularly those Iran laid, failed
720
to become harmless after breaking moorings. Whether the belligerents re-
corded minefields carefully is unknown. What is clear is that an international post-
war effort was required to clear northern Gulf mines, which could infer that
neither belligerent, having laid mines, had the necessary means to retrieve them
721
after hostilities, a Hague VIII requirement. Iran's mines in the Strait ofHormuz
also violated a principle of mine warfare, that international straits passage must
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not be impeded. Iraq may have violated the rule against laying mines off a bel-
ligerent's coast, i.e., the Iranian coast, for the sole purpose ofintercepting commer-
723
cial shipping. Iran deliberately laid mines in international waters, with no
minefield announced and no provision for alternate routing around or through the
mined area, another LOAC violation. The belligerents showed little, ifany, due re-
gard for high seas users' rights. There was no record ofdamage to EEZ facilities
as a result of mines, however, other than the almost certain pollution from holed
ships.
Throughout the Tanker War neutral navies were engaged in mine countermea-
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sures, including sweeping, retrieving and destroying mines. International law
permitted this on the high seas and in neutral territorial waters where the neutral
coastal State allowed entry for this purpose. Even if a neutral had not granted
permission, and there was a mine threat (e.g., a CAPTOR mine) to a third State's
shipping, the third State could enter neutral waters to remove the threat if the
neutral could not or would not do so. For example, Saudi Arabia requested US
assistance (and thereby gave permission) for mine sweeping and clearance of its
727
waters during the 1 984 Red Sea mining episode. ' Ifit is assumed that minelaying
in neutral territorial waters violates the UN Charter in addition to the law ofnaval
warfare, it could be argued that the Saudi-US mine clearance agreement was an in-
728
formal self-defense arrangement to respond to the mine invasion. Another
729 r
self-defense claim related to the US destruction ofIran Ajr, an element ofwhich
was neutrals' customary right to remove mines, and devices involved with them
(i.e., the minelayer), from ocean areas, i.e., the high seas, where mines have been
730
unlawfully laid.
Although the belligerents committed numerous LOAC violations, including
failure to observe necessity and proportionality principles in surface and air
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attacks on neutral shipping (warships and merchantmen alike), their mine war-
fare programs take the prize for wholesale violations of international law. And al-
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though neither State is party to HagueVHP the rules ofthat treaty are grounded
in custom, whose norms both belligerents violated.
Part H. Other Humanitarian Law Issues
Chapter III and Parts A-G have discussed Tanker War humanitarian law issues
in other contexts, e.g., general principles of necessity and proportionality in
self-defense or LOAC situations, including limitations on reprisals and when ne-
cessity and proportionality should be measured and the prohibition against per-
733
fidy; visit and search or diversion, attack on and destruction of enemy vessels
and vessels with enemy character, vessels exempt from attack unless they aid the
enemy war effort, and goods exempt from designation as contraband because of
their humanitarian nature; blockade and exemptions from blockade because a
735
vessel is carrying cargo for a humanitarian purpose; creating various zones dur-
ing war, including a Red Cross Box as a sea area where belligerents' sick and
wounded may be transported for hospital ship treatment on the high seas; bom-
737bardment and mine warfare. Those analyses will not be repeated here. How-
ever, other humanitarian law issues arose during the war and are discussed in more
detail in this Part.
1. Merchant Ship Crews Trapped in the Shattal-Arab at theBeginningofthe War
The fate ofcrews trapped aboard neutral flag merchantmen in the Shatt al-Arab
738
at the beginning ofthe war is not clear. Those ofthe Iraqi merchant marine who
fell into the hands of Iran, and Iranian merchant marine personnel who fell into
the hands of Iraq, were entitled to at least prisoner of war status under the Third
1949 Geneva Convention. The same would be true ofships' crew ifa neutral vessel
739
acquired enemy character. Crew of neutral flag ships that had not acquired en-
emy character, which probably accounted for personnel on most stranded vessels,
were protected persons under the Fourth Convention: "Persons . . . who, at a given
moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case ofa conflict or oc-
cupation, in the hands ofa Party to the conflict or Occupying Power ofwhich they
are not nationals." They should not have been detained and should have been al-
lowed to return home promptly.
Crew entitled to prisoner ofwar status were entitled to treatment as prisoners of
war, including repatriation before the end ofhostilities for those seriously ill or
wounded. In any event these crews should have been repatriated "without delay
after the cessation of hostilities." There is no record ofwhen or if these prison-
ers ofwar were repatriated. However, ifpart ofthose were still in captivity 10 years
after the war, the Detaining Power (Iran or Iraq) may have been guilty of a
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grave breach of humanitarian law. The same can be said for the seriously ill or
wounded who were not returned in accordance with the Third Convention.
Fourth Convention-covered crew also had considerable protections even if in-
748
ternees. Unless interned, these crews were entitled to leave unless their depar-
749
ture was contrary to Detaining Power interests. Internees should have been
released from internment as soon as conditions for internment no longer ex-
750 751
isted, and then as protected persons they were entitled to rapid repatriation.
In no event could internment last longer than the end of hostilities, at which time
any crew internees should have been repatriated as soon as possible unless there
752 • r
were outstanding penal proceedings against them. There is no record ofwhen
Fourth Convention-protected crew were returned. However, if crew considered
protected persons were not interned, they should have been repatriated. Interned
crew should not have been held longer than the end of hostilities before repatria-
tion, unless there were criminal charges against them. If any of these crew mem-
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bers were held longer, the Detaining Power was guilty of a grave breach,
particularly ifthey were among those held over 1 years after the end ofhostilities.
2. Rescue of Those in Peril on the Sea
On at least three occasions neutral armed forces took custody of members of
belligerents' armed forces after attacks on or over the high seas. A US Navy ship
rescued an Iraqi pilot shot down by an Iranian air-to-air missile; the pilot was repa-
triated to Iraq during the war through Saudi Arabian Red Crescent Society aus-
pices. US forces rescued 22 Iranian Iran Ajr crewmen after their minelayer was
captured during a US self-defense response. The 22, and remains of 3 crewmen
that died in the attack, were handed over to Omani Red Crescent officials, who sent
them to Iran. US naval forces also rescued six Iranian Revolutionary Guards boat
crewmen from the water during a US self-defense response; two died aboard a US
Navy ship. The survivors and remains of the dead were turned over to Omani Red
Crescent officials, who sent them to Iran. It is not known whether Iraq consented
to repatriation of the Iranian service members, but it does not appear that Iraq ob-
jected to the procedure. Similarly, it is not known whether Iran consented to the
*7 C A
Iraqi pilot's return or whether Iran objected to this procedure. After the US at-
tack on the Rostum platforms in response to attacks on neutral shipping, and a
subsequent naval battle with Iranian surface combatants, there were heavy casual-
ties. US forces permitted Iranian tugboats to engage in rescue operations without
755impediment.
Undoubtedly there were survivors in the high seas after belligerents' numerous
756
attacks on shipping by mines, aircraft or surface combatants. Undoubtedly neu-
tral naval forces or other merchant ships rescued many ofthem. There is no record
of Iranian naval forces' succoring survivors; Iranian tugs picked up platform crew
757
when US forces attacked them. Since Iraqi fighter aircraft prosecuted high seas
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attacks, these platforms could have not actively participated in rescue operations,
although commensurate with security Iraq could have signaled to other platforms
concerning survivors in the water. If Iraq had helicopters or surface ships in the
area, they could and should have participated. There were apparently no belliger-
ent minelaying units nearby that could have participated in rescue efforts when
mines detonated against shipping.
There is a general obligation, under the law ofthe sea and the law ofarmed con-
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flict, to rescue persons in peril on the sea. Thus whether belligerent forces, neu-
tral warships or aircraft, enemy flag merchantmen or neutral merchantmen, all
had the obligation to rescue shipwrecked mariners. Apart from Iranian tugs' as-
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sisting Iranian nationals, there is no record of belligerent ships or aircraft's
helping to rescue persons in peril on the sea. Consistent with their security needs,
these ships and aircraft should have done their utmost to assure safety ofthese per-
sons, perhaps communicating their observations after reaching a place of safety.
There is no indication as to whether this was done, or ifit could have been done un-
der the circumstances.
Some rescues, £.£., that ofthe Iran Ajr crew, came after self-defense responses. It
could be argued that since these did not occur during armed conflict as between
rescuer forces and rescued persons, the LOS supplied the standard after self-de-
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fense measures ended. Alternatively, it could be argued that these rescues were
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incidental to the right of self-defense; i.e., the LOS did not apply, and these res-
cues became part ofthe developing law ofself-defense. Under this theory, a right of
self-defense carries with it the responsibility ofattempting to save life at sea under
LOS and LOAC standards. Since the United States was a neutral, unless the
76?LOAC in this particular instance applied to it, the LOAC could not have gov-
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erned these rescues. These are distinctions without a difference, as they should
be. Given the obligation's universality, it could be argued that a duty to rescue
those in peril on the sea has achieved;*/* cogens status, required in peace and war,
subject to a rescuer's responsibility of protecting its own crew, passengers and
platform.
3. Neutrals' Repatriation ofBelligerentArmed Forces Members
Sub-Part 2 discussed neutrals' rescue and repatriation of Iranian and Iraqi
armed forces members during the war. Humanitarian law requires that neutrals
into whose territory, including territorial waters, belligerent military personnel
fall must intern them for the war's duration, so that they do not take further part in
the conflict, according to the Second Convention, which is particularly in point for
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this issue. With respect to the Iraqi pilot shot down, rescued by US forces,
turned over to the Saudi Red Crescent and returned to Iraq, this may have techni-
cally violated humanitarian law standards unless Iran consented to the arrange-
ment. The same could be said ofthe IranAjr crew rescued by US forces, turned over
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to the Omani Red Crescent and returned to Iran, ifhumanitarian law applicable to
the LOAC applied unless Iraq consented to premature repatriation. If it is as-
sumed that the United States turned these persons over to Red Crescent represen-
tatives in good faith, the blame for premature repatriation arguably lies elsewhere
than on the United States.
Since these attacks occurred in the context ofUS self-defense responses, it could
be argued that the humanitarian law applicable during armed conflict did not ap-
ply of its own force, but only in the context of necessary and proportionate self-de-
fense. Under this theory, new standards of humanitarian law, not necessarily
the same rules applicable during armed conflict, could apply during and after
self-defense responses. If this is the case, returning Iranian crew and remains be-
fore the end of hostilities was not unlawful; there were no treaty rules to govern re-
patriation, since the Charter and its right ofself-defense trumped the treaty law.
However, it could be argued that the same rules of humanitarian law applicable
•7 /TO
during armed conflict should be applied by analogy in the self-defense context.
A third argument would be that the law of self-defense ceased with the armed re-
sponse, and that other norms, e.g., the LOS and LOAC rescue at sea requirements
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and LOAC nonrepatriation principles then arose to supply the rules. Under the
first or third theories, and arguably what should be the law in the self-defense con-
text, it was not proper to repatriate the rescued crew prior to termination of
hostilies without opposing belligerent consent. However, since there was no pro-
test from opposing belligerents, these States' acquiescence in these actions may be
presumed.
Part I. Deception During Armed Conflict at Sea: Ruses and Perfidy
Stratagems and ruses are allowed in sea warfare within the same general limits
as land warfare; customary and treaty law denounce perfidy ("breaking of faith")
or treachery in land, sea, air or space warfare. Ruses ofwar involve misrepresenta-
tion, deceit or other acts to mislead an enemy under circumstances where there is
no obligation to speak the truth. Perfidy or treachery involves acts inviting an ad-
versary's confidence that the actor is entitled to protection or must accord protec-
770
tion under international law.
1. Legitimate Ruses of War and Actions Constituting Perfidy
Although the LONW follows general rules for ruses of war in other arenas,
there are principles peculiarly applicable to sea warfare and others that have more
frequent application to sea warfare situations.
For example, most commentators say it is lawful for a warship to use a neutral or
enemy flag when chasing an enemy vessel, when trying to escape, or to draw an en-
emy vessel into action. The warship must fly its national ensign immediately be-
fore it attacks, however. It is perfectly proper for warships to assume disguise, i.e..
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adding funnels or masts to simulate a merchantman. Aircraft, including naval avi-
ation, may not use false markings, however. Use by a belligerent of neutral flags,
771
insignia or uniforms during actual armed engagement is forbidden.
Besides the false flag rule for warships, legitimate ruses ofwar for warships and
naval auxiliaries, and vessels convoyed by a belligerent and other ships with en-
emy character, include camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation,
which might include false or misleading communications signals, acoustic or
other emissions, paint except for the markings or pendent number the LOAC re-
quires, and the like. These (but not the false markings rule) also apply to aviation
operating over the oceans. Other lawful ruses include surprises; ambushes; feign-
ing attack, retreat or flight from battle; simulation ofquiet or inactivity; deception
by bogus orders or plans; use ofenemy signals or passwords; communications or
orders to nonexistent units; deceptive supply or military unit movements; decoy-
ing through use ofobsolescent or poorly armed military aircraft or warships to lure
hostile forces into combat; dummy ships or aircraft; altering vessel or other equip-
ment appearance by e.g., adding fake funnels or masts; mock combat among
friendly forces to lure an opponent into combat to aid its forces; flares or fires to
mimic battle damage; smoke to conceal opposing forces' size and power; taking ad-
vantage ofweather (e.g., fog); removing or changing navigational aids; psychologi-
cal methods to incite enemy personnel to rebel, mutiny, desert or surrender; and
772
inciting an enemy population to revolt.
Ruses can be unlawful or unlawful, depending on the situation. Although de-
ceiving the adversary is generally lawful, deception that involves misleading or
luring an adversary into what would otherwise be a treacherous or perfidious act is
an unlawful ruse. For example, luring or misleading an adversary into attacking ci-
vilian objects or the civil population in that adversary's ruse-induced mistaken be-
lief the target is a legitimate military objective is an unlawful ruse that the LOAC
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condemns. While some unlawful ruses are common to all warfare modes, others
have particular emphasis in naval warfare.
Warships and naval auxiliaries may not simulate hospital ships, small coastal
craft or medical transports; vessels on humanitarian missions; passenger ships
carrying civilian passengers; vessels guaranteed safe conduct by parties' prior
agreement, including cartel ships; vessels entitled to be identified by the red cross
or red crescent emblem; or vessels carrying cultural property under special protec-
775 776
tion. Although the San Remo Manual says this list is exhaustive, it does not
reflect the state ofthe law; e.g., a warship may not simulate a vessel that has surren-
dered and is therefore exempt from attack, a perfidious act, as the Manual later rec-
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ognizes. In terms of aviation operating over the high seas, a similar list might
be: medical aircraft; aircraft on humanitarian missions; civil airliners carrying
only civilian passengers; aircraft granted safe conduct by parties' prior agreement;
and aircraft entitled to be identified by the red cross or red crescent emblem;
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aircraft carrying cultural property under special protection. And as in the case
779
ofprohibitions on warships and naval auxiliaries, the list is not exhaustive; e.g.,
780
aircraft cannot display any false markings.
TheManual would also bar belligerents from actively simulating status of a ves-
sel flying theUN flag as part of its "exhaustive' list, noting that "It has not yet been
determined precisely in which circumstances flying [UN] colours would indicate
protected status [I]fUN forces are not taking part in the conflict . .
.
, they are
781
entitled to a form of protected status."
The Manual standard, while perhaps appropriate as a general principle, may be
deficient in several respects. First, in practice, when theUN ensign has been flown
i • -ii i • 782during peacekeeping operations, it has been subject to prior agreement. Second,
any such agreement is subject to Security Council decisions, which could super-
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sede it. Third, the rule does not take into account situations where a belligerent
or neutral State is faced with a UN-flagged force of warships arrayed against it.
While that country may be entirely in the wrong in opposing the force, perhaps op-
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erating under a UN - supported blockade, that State may oppose, attack and de-
stroy these UN flagged forces as it can under the present LOAC or law of
self-defense. On the other hand, if the UN flagged force is used for humanitarian
purposes, e.g., to transport cargo through a blockade for humanitarian pur-
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poses, the Manual principle would apply. The third point, where a UN force is
used for combat purposes, invokes the false flag rule, a legitimate ruse ofwar at sea
for warships as long as the false flag is hauled down before hostilities begin and true
786
colors are flown, which the Manual also recognizes. Under the false flag rule, a
country opposing a UN combatant force could fly the UN flag as a ruse under cir-
cumstances described, and under LONW customary standards the UN flagged
warships would not be entitled to protected status as the Manual suggests if the
State's naval forces hauled down a false flag, hoisted true colors and attacked. Ifthe
UN operation is proceeding under a Council decision, as a technical matter the
LONW rules might not apply of their own force, but in all likelihood the result, as
a matter of international law under the Charter, would and should be the same.
The foregoing analysis suggests, as the Manual also does, that the law of UN
flagging is less than complete. The best procedure in every case would be for States
whose vessels would fly the UN flag to seek agreements with belligerents or be
girded with a Council decision, particularly if a State would oppose the UN -
787
flagged naval force with armed force.
Perfidy includes feigning distress, particularly through misusing an interna-
tionally recognized protective sign, e.g., the Red Cross or Red Crescent; feigning
cease-fire, humanitarian negotiation {e.g., a parley to negotiate removal of dead
and wounded) or other truce; feigning incapacitation by wounds or sickness; or
combatants' feigning civilian noncombatant status.
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Like lawful ruses, perfidy involves simulation, but it aims at falsely creating a
situation in which the adversary, under international law, feels obliged to take action
or abstain from taking action, or because of protection under international law
neglects to take precautions which are otherwise necessary. Perfidy or treachery to
kill, injure or capture has been prohibited in armed conflict under international law . .
.
to strengthen the trust which combatants should have in the international law of
armed conflict .... [PJerfidy tends to destroy the basis for restoring] . . . peace and
causes the conflict to degenerate into savagery.788
In naval warfare these include launching attack while feigning exempt platform
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status; feigning surrender or distress. Air warfare rules allow an aircraft to feign
disablement or other distress to induce an enemy to end its attack. There is no obli-
gation to stop attacking a belligerent military aircraft that appears disabled. How-
ever, if it is known an aircraft is disabled so that it is permanently removed from
790
conflict, attack should end to allow possible crew or passenger evacuation. Sub-
marines have feigned success ofdepth charge or torpedo attacks by releasing oil or
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debris; this practice has never been questioned as perfidious conduct.
2. Ruses and Perfidy During the Tanker War
There are no reported ruses ofwar, lawful or unlawful, adopted by belligerents
during the Tanker War. There are no reports of perfidious conduct.
US naval vessels began painting their combatants' pendent numbers in shades
ofblack and grey, instead ofthe traditional white-on-black familiar to the world, to
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minimize reflective surfaces that might attract a missile. Although there is no
report of it, undoubtedly US and other aircraft may have used nonreflective paint
and nonreflective markings, instead of the usually brilliant aluminum or other
surfaces commonly seen during recent conflicts in which the United States has
793been involved. Perhaps US and other countries' warships also began to use
nonreflective paint. Undoubtedly US platforms, and those ofother countries, em-
ployed emission controls and other devices to minimize detection and therefore to
minimize attacks by belligerents. Toward war's end warships like Vincennes ap-
peared in Gulf waters; these vessels had been designed from the keel up to mini-
mize detection by their configuration and equipment. Neutral navies did not
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actively simulate hospital ships and other platforms the LOAC forbids.
LOAC rules allowing ruses and forbidding perfidy did not apply to US and
other neutrals' warships and military aircraft operating in the Gulf during the
Tanker War. These countries were not belligerents. Ifthese actions are seen as in-
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cidents ofself-defense, and ifthe LOAC rules are analogized to self-defense sit-
uations, these neutral naval forces' actions were legitimate. Apart from displaying
796
a pendent number on ships or proper markings on aircraft, international law
does not require a ship or aircraft to be painted a particular color or with a particu-
lar kind of paint, and the law says nothing about the color of these markings.
428 The Tanker War
Similarly, if emission control and other actions to minimize detection are legiti-
mate ruses for belligerents, neutrals may employ them in self-defense. Warships
like Vincennes or aircraft like Stealth bombers can be designed and built to mini-
mize detection under the LOAC and the law of self-defense.
There were two potential uses of the UN flag during the war. Early in the war
the Organization sought the belligerents' approval for allowing vessels trapped in
the Shatt al-Arab to leave under the UN or ICRC flag. Although Iran approved,
Iraq refused permission, and the vessels remained there for the duration of the
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conflict. No subsequent Security Council decision addressed the issue. If the
belligerents had agreed on terms of departure, that agreement would have gov-
erned. Ifthe Council had issued a decision, that decision would have governed the
798 r n
situation. Use ofthe ICRC flag, withoutUN action on its use, e.g., by Council de-
cision or suggestion ofan agreement in absence ofCouncil action, would have been
subject to the parties' agreement. In the latter case the LOAC would have governed
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as to the ICRC, i.e., Red Cross or Red Crescent, ensign. None of these events oc-
curred, and the scenarios posed are hypothetical, offering considerations for future
wars.
Late in the war the USSR proposed a UN flotilla, perhaps flying the UN colors.
The proposal came to naught, although the United States correctly insisted on a
careful statement of terms. However, this raises the issues of relative sanctity of
the UN flag. If the flotilla had been created by Council decision, that decision
would have determined the flag status. On the other hand, if the decision did not,
and the flotilla engaged in operations against the belligerents, it should have been
subject to the same rules, e.g., false flags principles, that the LONW has devel-
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oped. As in the case of the UN or ICRC flag proposals for merchantmen,
these scenarios are hypothetical but offer thoughts for future wars.
During the Tanker War merchant ships began tailing neutral naval convoys or
803
simulating convoys during night steaming. Some merchant ships appeared in
the Gulf painted grey, like warships.
If these ships were neutral flagged and did not carry goods for belligerents' war
efforts, no perfidy issues arose. Commensurate with safety on the high seas in the
case ofthe convoys, there is no objection under the LOAC for merchantmen to sail
close to neutral convoys, even ifaccompaniment suggests association with the con-
voy. Ifsuch a vessel was not formally part of the convoy, it could not claim convoy
protection and was subject to visit and search as if it steamed alone on the high
seas. It could be defended like any other merchantmen by neutral warships.
The same principles apply to painting vessels grey, perhaps to simulate a warship.
If ships tried to look like neutral warships in color, as long as they did not carry a
807
pendent number required of all warships under the LOS and the LOAC, they
were not subject to attack as a belligerent target if the simulation approximated
such. Ifthe vessel contributed to the opposing belligerent's war effort, and thereby
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acquired enemy character, it was subject to capture and possible destruction on
that account, and not because of its paint. On the other hand, if the simulation ap-
peared to resemble a neutral warship, the belligerents had no justifiable reason to
attack on account of the color simulation. Grey-painted merchantmen invited
risks of mistaken attacks by a belligerent if a belligerent thought the ship was an
809
opposing belligerent's warship, or perhaps neutrals' self-defense responses if
the neutral warship thought the grey-painted vessel was a warship approaching
810
with hostile intent, however.
Part J. General Conclusions and Appraisal; Projections for the Future
Cessation of hostilities in 1988 did not end the war. The belligerents' status
when fighting stops is usually determined at the time of cessation and by terms of
the cessation of hostilities, in this case a cease-fire. It does not dispose of parties'
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claims. This was true for the Tanker War, the 1980-88 conflict's Persian Gulfas-
pects. The belligerents apparently did not settle matters for two more years; Iraq
became involved with the crisis over Kuwait and Coalition war against it in
1990-91. Tardy prisoner of war exchanges a decade after the cease-fire814 may
indicate that matters are not settled yet. There is litigation in the International
81
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Court ofJustice over the US platforms attack, for example; private claims may
be in lawsuits or the espousal process for years. New facts and records may
change conclusions in this volume.
This Part advances general conclusions from the available record for develop-
ments in and projections of the law of armed conflict as it applied to the Tanker
War. I do not propose to repeat full, separate analyses for each topic appearing in
817
this chapter, however.
1. BasicPrinciples: Necessity andProportionality;ROE; the SpatialDimension
The war illustrates the distinction that must be made between necessity and
proportionality in self-defense situations and necessity and proportionality in
LOAC situations. What is or is not proportional in a self-defense response may or
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may not be proportional in the same circumstances when the LOAC applies.
The same analysis must apply to the due regard principle, adapted from the law of
the sea and promoted for LOAC situations where no LOAC rule applies, i.e.,
8?0
belligerents should have due regard for neutrals' LOS rights. Necessity and
proportionality or due regard, like many terms in US and other legal systems, are
"terms ofart" for lawyers that may have different meaning and content depending
on circumstances in which they are used. To cite an example from US law practice,
"jurisdiction" can mean subject-matter jurisdiction, or competency; venue, or the
particular court(s) within a judicial system that can hear a case; authority ofa court
over persons or things, i.e., in personam, in rem, quasi in rem or status jurisdiction, or
more generally "judicial jurisdiction;" standing, or the authorization the
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Constitution or statutes give a particular claimant to bring a suit; etc. The word
"trespass" is another example; it has one set of meanings for lawyers, another to
821
those who are not lawyers, and yet another in the Lord's Prayer.
The LOAC recognizes two ocean areas and the air above them, the high seas and
the territorial sea as defined in the 1958 and 1982 LOS Conventions; special
LOAC rules apply to neutrals' territorial waters. In general, belligerents may wage
war in their territorial seas and on the high seas, subject to limitations, e.g., the law
822
ofblockade, principles of treaty interpretation and application and UN law un-
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der the Charter, and a general principle of due regard for others' oceans rights.
LOS rules for other ocean areas, e.g., EEZs, do not apply of their own force, but
824
belligerents must pay due regard to neutrals' rights in these areas. In general
belligerents may not wage war in neutrals' territorial seas, but here too there are ex-
ceptions, e.g., the rule of necessity permitting a belligerent to attack, using neces-
sity and proportionality qualifying factors, an enemy warship threatening it from
neutral territorial waters when the neutral cannot or will not obtain movement of
the ship from its territorial sea as the law of neutrality requires. As a general rule,
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belligerents may not impair or impede neutrals' straits passage. As in self-de-
826
fense situations, ROE may qualify LOAC responses. A due regard principle,
analogous to the same principle in the LOS, has been advocated for LOAC situa-
tions ifthere is no positive law governing oceans use between belligerents and neu-
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trals. In any case, the LOS other rules clauses, a customary norm, declare that
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this body of law must be read in the LOAC context in appropriate situations.
The Tanker War record is slim on belligerents' recognizing or observing these
principles. As Parts B-G suggest, Iran and Iraq failed to observe necessity and pro-
portionality principles throughout the war, particularly in attacks resulting in
damage to neutral shipping from mines, fire from aircraft and surface vessels, and
missiles. Iran violated, or came close to violating, rules for neutrals' territorial seas
and the straits transit regime.
2. Visit and Search; Capture, Destruction or Diversion
The Tanker War revisited traditional principles of visit and search, as distin-
guished from LOS approach and visit, and rules applicable to neutral warship-
convoyed vessels and belligerents' convoys. As in prior wars, aircraft, particularly
helicopters, played a role in visit and search, and this confirms use of other than
surface combatants for this purpose. Belligerents have a right of visit and search of
merchant shipping to determine if they are carrying goods for an opponent's war
effort. Ifsuch goods are found, the merchant ship maybe captured. Alternatively,
belligerents may divert merchant ships for search in a more convenient and safe
place. The traditional rule ofprima facie validity of a neutral flag flown by a mer-
chantman, and the conclusive presumption rule for merchantmen flying the en-
emy flag, still apply. Warships are never subject to visit and search. While
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belligerents may convoy shipping with military aircraft and warships, those con-
voys are subject to attack. On the other hand, it is legitimate for neutral warships to
convoy neutral-flag merchant shipping; those convoys are not subject to visit and
search, and neutral convoying warship(s) or aircraft may respond in self-defense if
829
a belligerent attacks the convoy.
Iran was within its rights to conduct visit and search of neutral shipping to de-
termine if it carried cargoes helping Iraq's war effort. Iran did not have the right to
attack and destroy these vessels without warning or proofthey carried such goods.
While Iraq might have exercised visit and search by helicopters, it did not do so,
and its indiscriminate attacks on neutral shipping also violated the LOAC. Iraq
was within its rights to attack Iranian convoys shuttling oil down the Iranian coast
for sale to finance Iran's war efforts. On the other hand, Iraq violated international
law when it attacked neutral flag convoys carrying goods that did not contribute to
Iran's war effort that were escorted by neutral flag warships. Neutral flag warships
could legitimately respond in self-defense.
3. Belligerents' Seaborne Commerce; Belligerents' Convoys
Sub-Part J.2 discussed rules for belligerent convoying; these rules apply to mer-
chantmen flying belligerent flags. Flying a belligerent's flag is a conclusive pre-
sumption of enemy character.
In determining whether or not an enemy merchant vessel is a lawful military
objective, and therefore targetable, the US Navy manuals' "war-fighting or war-
sustaining" approach appears to make sense. Protocol I's land warfare approach,
copied for sea warfare in the San Remo Manual "effective contribution to military
action" phrase, is similar but more restrictive. The US Navy and Manual ap-
proaches maybe distinctions without differences; although theManual analysis is
said to be more restrictive, its application in practice may have the same result as
the US Navy standard.
The London Protocol declares that belligerents should not destroy a merchant
ship unless passengers, crew, ship's papers and, if feasible, passenger and crew ef-
fects are first placed in safety. State practice since 1909 appears to confirm that an
absolute rule is impracticable, particularly in air and submarine attacks. The rule
today should be that general LOAC principles of proportionality and necessity
should be observed, and that the safety of passengers, crew, ship's papers and ef-
fects should be observed when at all possible, which should include advising by
communications ofthe location ofthe sinking and oflifeboats. Separate rules, e.g.,
those published in current military manuals, for air, surface and submarine plat-
forms, should be consolidated in view of the reality that merchant ship inter-
dictions may be coordinated among all three kinds ofplatforms. It makes no sense
to have one set of rules for each kind of platform. The same principles, perhaps
with different necessity and proportionality factors, should be observed in
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self-defense situations. I have proposed a nine-point analysis to attempt to clar-
ify the rules. It is clear that belligerents failed to observe even these principles, but
that neutrals, e.g., the United States, attempted to do so in self-defense responses
like the Airbus incident.
Certain enemy vessels and aircraft are exempt from attack unless they contrib-
ute to an opponent's war effort. There were no published instances of belligerent
attacks on these platforms during the Tanker War. Neutrals fired at these vessels,
i.e., fishing craft, during mistaken self-defense responses.
031
4. Neutral Flag Merchantmen; Enemy Character; Re/lagging; Contraband
Neutral merchant ships can acquire enemy character ifthey aid the enemy, e.g.,
by carrying war-fighting or war-sustaining cargo pursuant to enemy diretion or
control or when under enemy convoy, or by supporting the enemy, e.g., by signal-
ing the location ofan opponent's sea forces. Absent these considerations, a neutral
flagged ship carries a prima facie presumption of neutral status. Reflagging during
the Tanker War complied with LOAC standards as well as LOS standards.
Late in the war Iran published a contraband list covering goods inbound to
Iraq. Its effect during the war is less than clear, but it did not apply to Iranian sei-
zures, etc., of neutral shipping before its publication. Contraband lists must be
published before they are effective. Although the list was general, it was a valid list
after its publication. The record ofpost-1945 wars, and indeed since the 1909 Dec-
laration of London, demonstrates the impossibility of compiling and publishing
lists ofabsolute and conditional contraband. Weapons development and commod-
ities supporting a war effort, often locked in intelligence and defense agencies' na-
tional security classifications, are in constant change today as before. Any attempt
to publish up-to-date contraband lists is doomed to failure before the ink is dry.
Naval manuals continue to pay lip service to these concepts; a better approach is
listing items that are not contraband, e.g., humanitarian supplies, and treating the
rest as goods for the war effort.
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5. The Law ofBlockade and the Tanker War
Although there was loose talk, in the media and among some commentators,
about Iran's blockading the Iraqi coast or Iraq's blockading Iran's Kharg Island,
no blockade that the LOAC would recognize occurred during the Tanker War.
Neither belligerent published any notification of a blockade and their sea mine
campaigns could not have counted as a blockade with or without notification. In
any event, it is doubtful ifIraq could have mounted an effective blockade ofthe en-
tire Iranian coast with her air force alone. Iran's naval and air forces could have
blockaded the small Iraqi coast effectively, but there is no evidence they did. Al-
though theUN Security Council might have imposed a blockade under its Charter
834.
authority in Article 41, it did not do so. The significance of blockade for the
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Tanker War are two: (a) using the term, however loosely, is evidence the LOAC
concept is still alive; (b) States wishing to impose a blockade must comply with the
traditional law, even if it means that aircraft will mainly be used.
6. Zones*
35
Although theManual and current military manuals confirm the customary rule
that belligerents may exclude neutrals from properly notified high seas areas that
are an immediate area ofnaval operations which must be proportional in size, this
procedure was not used in the Tanker War.
The United States proclaimed a high seas defense zone (SDZ), also known as a
defensive bubble or cordon sanitaire, around its forces, thereby adding to customary
law for this LOAC-related sea zone receiving modern emphasis in the 1982
Falklands/Malvinas War. The SDZ must be proportional in area. The SDZ need
not be noticed like warnings of belligerents' immediate areas of naval operations.
The SDZ is only an announcement ofa State's intention to apply its inherent right
ofself-defense. Although they did not do so, TankerWar belligerents or other neu-
trals could have published these zones; if they had done so, they would have been
subject to the same principles. An SDZ cannot justify conduct unlawful under the
LOAC or the law of self-defense. Whether an SDZ is a tactically useful device is
questionable; it advertises a naval force's approximate location. On the other hand,
it may serve a useful political purpose in warning about naval presence. Interna-
tional law does not require notice of SDZs; they are grounded in the law of
self-defense, which requires no publication.
Iran and Iraq proclaimed war zones. Modern military manuals and the Manual
recognize high seas war zones as a customary norm, if they are properly notified,
are proportional in area, give time of implementation and duration and allow a
grace period for shipping to leave the zone. Like blockades, they must be effective;
"paper" zones are inadmissible. Declarants must observe LOAC principles, e.g.,
necessity and proportionality, exemption of certain vessels (e.g., hospital ships)
from attack, and enemy character rules for merchantmen. War zone declarations
cannot create a high seas free fire area entitling belligerents to shoot on sight. Al-
though the Tanker War belligerents' war zones were notified, proportional and ef-
fective, use of the zones as free-fire areas, including Iraq's notice to that effect,
meant the zones were unlawful as applied. Belligerents' war zone misuse was
among the most egregious LOAC violations during the Tanker War.
Saudi Arabia proclaimed an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over Per-
sian Gulfhigh seas midway through the war. Ifan ADIZ is properly notified and is
proportional to its purpose, e.g., as an identification device for incoming aircraft,
an ADIZ is permissible under international law. ADIZs are lawful under the LOS
and the LOAC. There is no indication the Saudi ADIZ failed this test.
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During the Falklands/Malvinas War the United Kingdom proposed, and Ar-
gentina accepted, creation of a high seas Red Cross Box north of the Falklands/
Malvinas, where hospital ships could operate and receive sick and wounded. The
Box precedent was the First and Fourth 1949 Geneva Conventions, which allow
belligerents to agree on hospital or neutralized zones for sick and wounded and ci-
vilians. There is no equivalent in the Second Convention on humanitarian law
principles at sea. Despite subsequent lack ofpractice (none was established during
the Tanker War), the concept is useful, if the Box is reasonable in size, other high
seas users' rights are not prejudiced under the due regard principle, and bellig-
erents notice the Box's duration and location. A Box agreement should follow the
1949 Conventions Annex form and be in writing if practicable.
7. Weapons and Weapons Use; Mine Warfare
Whether Iran and Iraq followed necessity and proportionality principles in at-
tacks on convoys, oil platforms and the like is less than clear. If the War of the
Cities record is an indicator, it is highly likely that they did not adhere to these
standards in Tanker War bombardments. As noted in Part J. 5, they did not follow
these rules in high seas attacks on merchantmen; it follows that they also probably
did not do so for shore installations.
The belligerents' automatic submarine contact mine campaigns were among
the most egregious Tanker War LOAC violations. Neither observed necessity and
proportionality principles in mining. Iraq mined high seas areas; many Iraqi
mines became unmoored and did not deactivate. The same appears true for Iranian
mining. Iraq may have laid mines off the enemy coast for the sole purpose ofinter-
cepting commercial shipping. Iran laid mines in the high seas without publishing
location of minefields. Iran may have laid mines in neutral waters, and mines ap-
peared in the Strait of Hormuz, thereby threatening to impede or stop neutral
shipping. Iran and Iraq also failed to show due regard for neutrals' rights to use the
high seas or other ocean areas.
8. Other Humanitarian Law Issues
Besides humanitarian law issues related to attacks on shipping and shore facili-
ties, the Tanker War raised issues of evacuation of merchant ships and crews
trapped in the Shatt al-Arab dividing Iran and Iraq, under aUN or ICRC flag; neu-
trals' repatriation of belligerent crew they rescued on the high seas; and repatriat-
es
ing prisoners of war at war's end.
When Iraq refused, as humanitarian law allowed it to do, egress oftrapped mer-
chantmen under a UN or ICRC ensign, the issue was mooted. These issues may
arise in future wars.
When the United States turned over an Iraqi pilot to a national Red Crescent So-
ciety, and when the United States turned over surviving Iranian IranAjr crewmen to
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another Red Crescent Society, the United States acted in accordance with humani-
tarian law, which says that belligerents' armed forces members must not be returned
to their countries during the war ifa neutral rescues them on the high seas. Whether
the Red Crescent Societies acted properly is another matter. Since opposing
belligerents did not protest, it is presumed they acquiesced in the transactions. On
the other hand, Iran's failure to repatriate prisoners ofwar until 10 years after the
war's end violated humanitarian law, which says they must be repatriated
promptly after hostilities end.
9. Deception DuringArmed Conflict at Sea: Fuses and Perfidy
Although there were no reported belligerent actions amounting to ruses ofwar,
lawful or unlawful, or perfidy, there were actions related to these issues during the
Tanker War.839
Late in the war the USSR proposed a UN flotilla of Gulf naval forces; when all
Gulfnaval interests did not agree with the proposal, the idea mooted. The issue re-
mains for future wars, particularly in the peacekeeping context. The flag issue is
the tip of the iceberg; underneath lie command and control structure issues for
multinational naval operations. During the Tanker War navies cooperated to
greater or lesser degrees, particularly in clearing mines, analogous to a more formal
coalition opposing Iraq, ultimately with Security Council authorization, in the
1990-91 war. The USSR proposal may prove to have been a seed of future opera-
tions concepts.
Neutral warships and military aircraft probably began to adopt protective mea-
sures like non-reflective paint schemes. Warships like U.S.S Vincennes and some
neutral military aircraft were built from the frames up to be less conspicuous on ac-
quisition radars. Neutral shipping tagged along with neutral convoys; some ships
were painted grey like warships, probably to simulate them and thereby deter bel-
ligerent attacks. None of these actions were perfidy or unlawful ruses; they were
actions by neutrals.
10. Summing Up: Projections for Future Conflicts
Although on a worldscale basis the Iran-Iraq war was a small affair, it was a big
war, a total war, for two medium-sized belligerents. It was fought far away from
major neutral naval powers' home ports. It has not been and will not be the last of
its kind. The 1990-91 GulfWar pitted a US - led coalition against one Tanker War
belligerent, Iraq, and there was the potential and reality for a reprise of many
Tanker War LOAC issues. Yugoslavia's disintegration, continuing to this day, be-
gan just after the Tanker War cease-fire. The same kind of issues, e.g., interdicting
high seas merchant traffic, arose in these conflicts.
A critical difference between the Tanker War and these later conflicts was the
Cold War's end and perhaps a beginning of a new UN era, in which Charter law
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issues besides the inherent right of self-defense, a major legal issue during the
Tanker War, will figure. To the extent the later conflicts were governed by
Charter-based law, as a technical matter the LOAC did not apply; in all cases the
LOAC informed the content of Charter-based law. The result thus far has been
close approximation ofLOAC standards under Charter law, but the law need not
always be identical. The difference between necessity and proportionality un-
der the LOAC and necessity and proportionality in self-defense situations, the
Charter recognizing the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense,
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can be great. This was a major but disputed Tanker War issue. To take another
issue related to the War, law governing a Security Council decision directing a
blockade might include a "paper blockade," unlawful under the LOAC since the
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1856 Paris Declaration. For national decisionmakers, the question will be
whether the LOAC should be part of the law governing UN operations; if not,
what should be different? In many cases the old law has worked well; it is a matter
ofunderstanding and applying it. TankerWar examples ofobjections to legitimate
visit and search or use of the term "reprisal" when self-defense should have been
recited are not helpful in developing the law, traditional or otherwise.
The second problem will be interfacing the LOS with the LOAC. Universal ac-
ceptance of the 1982 LOS Convention will cure ambiguities in earlier law, e.g.,
straits passage rules, and will strengthen customary norms already restated in the
1982 and 1958 Conventions. A narrow issue will be whether the customary and
treaty-based rule, that the customary other rules clauses ofthe 1982 and 1958 Con-
ventions, which mean the LOS is subject to the LOAC in appropriate situations,
will be followed in the future. Properly read and applied, Article 88 of the 1982
LOS Convention, declaring the high seas are reserved for peaceful purposes, will
not impede Charter-governed operations, LOAC-governed operations, or peace-
time naval operations, for that matter. A reverse-twist issue is whether the due
regard principle, found in the LOS conventions as a rule for mutual use of, e.g., the
high seas, will apply as an LOAC concept in belligerent-neutral relations for
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oceans use ifthere is no LOAC rule. This is not a firm LOAC principle but only
commentators' proposals; should it become a rule of law?
The third issue is applying traditional rules, or perhaps variants ofthem under a
Charter law regime, to new technologies. The Tanker War was the first where heli-
copters, as distinguished from fixed-wing aircraft, worked with warships in visit
and search or diversion operations. The technique was employed again in the
1990-91 GulfWar and the Yugoslavia crisis. Missiles have been a feature of every
war since the early Arab-Israel conflicts. New sea mines may be deployed; the tech-
nology ofTanker War mines dated back to the early Twentieth Century. New elec-
tronic or other devices may conjure up new ruses ofwar, with a possibility ofclaims
of unlawful ruse or perfidy. How will Internet communications affect traditional
LOAC rules? Will space technology and platforms be a factor? In many ways the
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Iran-Iraq conflict was an old-fashioned war, replete with unrestricted (and unlaw-
ful) attacks on neutral merchantmen and grisly trench warfare on land, complete
with gas attacks reminiscent ofWorld War I. The next wars may not be simple in
terms ofweapons technologies and techniques. How will traditional LOAC rules,
and necessity, proportionality and due regard principles, respond to these issues?
The interdependent world economy is another issue, largely outside the law,
but it may promote problems, whether the law is Charter-based, the LOAC or the
LOS. Besides seafaring nations, some ofwhom have substantial naval assets and
others that do not, other countries' and their citizens' and businesses' interests will
figure in decisionmaking, particularly in UN action, but maybe in individual sov-
ereign State attitudes. The sketch of possible interests in maritime carriage of
goods and passengers is a case in point. Consider how political decisions might
be different, depending on whose and which national interests are involved. These
decisions have translated, and will translate, into the content ofUN and individual
States' actions. The history of support for the Tanker War belligerents in the ab-
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sence ofUN action illustrates the latter point.
One final, new issue is the maritime environment during armed conflict.
Tankers and other oceangoing vessels are larger today than ever before; they are
matched by larger warships, all ofwhich carry more bunkers, or can lift more oil, in
the case ofthe tankers. There was one major reported spill during the Tanker War,
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in 1983, at Iran's Nowruz offshore facility, resulting from Iraqi attacks. Un-
doubtedly high seas self-defense responses or belligerent attacks caused others.
The maritime environment issue is the subject of Chapter VI, to which we now
turn.
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treaties state custom, e.g., Protocol I, arts. 51(2), 51(5); art. 52, except for its art. 52(1) prohibition on reprisals against
civilians; art. 57. See also nn. III.623-25 and accompanying text. Art. 52(2)'s military objective definition might be
considered different in scope from definitions in the Helsinki Principles and US military manuals. Compare Protocol
I, art. 52(2) ("objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage") and San Remo Manual 1M 40, 46, 60(g) with NWP 1-14M Annotated Ml 8.1.1., 8.2.2.2, at
8- 12 (vessel "integrated into the enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining effort"); NWP 9A Annotated Ml 8.1 . 1, 8.2.2.2, at
8-12 (same); Helsiniki Principle 5.2.3 (similar). Although San Remo Manual H 60, cmt. 60.10 rejects the NWP
definition as "too broad," NWP citations to Protocol I, art. 52(2) indicate the United States views Protocol I, art. 52(2)
as customary law. The Manual to the contrary notwithstanding, it would seem that US acceptance of art. 52(2) as
custom means the NWP language is a distinction in wording without real differences for practice.
46. Bowett, Self-Defence 131; see also Alexandrov 102.
47. Cf. Von Clausewitz, n. III.620, 117-21.
48. See nn. III.258-59 and accompanying text.
49. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
50. See NWP 1-14M Annotated, Pre/ace at 2,1111 3.1 1.5.1, 4.3.2.2, 5. 5; NWP9A Annotated 11113.1,3.3.6,3.11-3.1 1.1,
4.1, 4.3.2, 5.5; see also Christopher Craig, Fighting by the Rules, NWC Rev. 23 (May-June 1984) (discussing UK ROE
during Falklands/Malvinas War); n. III.258 and accompanying text. Craig's analysis involved Britain's war ROE, to
which the LOAC applied, as distinguished from peacetime ROE, governed by the law of self-defense. During the
Tanker War US and other neutral navies applied peacetime ROE in connection with self-defense and other responses.
States also have ROE for peacekeeping or peacemaking operations. See generally Hayes, Naval Rules, n. 11.341;
O'Connell, Influenceof Law 169-80; Duncan, n. 11.341 ; Grunawalt, TheJCS, n. 11.341 ; Roach,Rules ofEngagement,
n. 11.341; Shearer, Rules ofEngagment, n. 11.341; Stephen A. Rose, Crafting the Rules ofEngagement for Haiti, Liber
AMICORUMCh. 11.
51. See Pan B.
52. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
53. LOS Convention, art. 110; compare High Seas Convention, art. 22, permitting visit if a merchantman is
suspected of engaging in piracy or the slave trade, or in reality flies the same flag as the warship; see also n. 76 and
accompanying text.
54. E.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. III.952-67, IV.10-25 and
accompanying text.
55. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
56. Chapter IV analyzed LOS issues in the Tanker War context.
57. Colombos § 558; NWIP 10-2 11 430; San Remo Manual H 10; compare Robertson, New LOS 265-72 with id.
272-77. For specific analyses, see Parts B-G and accompanying text, which develop exceptions and interpretations of
this broad statement.
58. LOS Convention, art. 87; High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. IV.68-79 and accompanying text. As Parts
A-G make clear, there are exceptions to this broad statement.
59. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
60. Robertson, New LOS 265-77 also analyzes archipelagic waters and the Area, but there are no archipelagoes or
Area waters in the Persian Gulf. Id. 278-97, citing inter alia NWP 9A Annotated H11 7.3, 7.3.4.2, 7.3.5, 7.3.6, and refuting
arguments in Elmer Rauch, The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions forthe Protection of Victims
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of International Armed Conflictsand the United Nations Convention on the Lawofthe Sea: Repercussions on
the Law of Naval Warfare 34 (1984) and at UNCLOS III for the proposition that coastal States may extend
neutrality to the EEZ and archipelagic waters as declared in the law of the sea.
61. Compare NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 7.3, 7.3.3-7.3.7.1 with NWP 9A Annotated HH 7.3-7.3.7.1; San Remo
Manual HH 14-37.
62. Helsinki Principles 3.1, 4; San Remo Manual 1111 10(b), 10(c), 34, 36-37; Robertson, New LOS 286, 291, 297,
303; Dietrich Schindler, Commentary, in Law of Naval Warfare 211, 220; see also n. 58 and accompanying text.
63. See nn. 32, 41-47 and accompanying text; see also Part I.
64. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 11.459-68, III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
65. See n. 33 and accompanying text.
66. See nn. 11.459-68 and accompanying text.
67. See nn. 11.341-44, 452-53, III.258, 465 and accompanying text.
68. See n. III.258 and accompanying text.
69. See nn. 11.341-44, III. 258 and accompanying text.
70. See nn. 11.104-06, 220, 277, 290, 325, 357, 375, 379-81, 463 and accompanying text.
71. NWP 9A Annotated HI 2.3.3, 7.3.5; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 2.3.3, 7.3.5; San Remo Manual HH 23-33; see
also Part IV. B.5.
72. LOS Convention, arts. 19(2)(a)-19(2)(c), 19(2)(f), 19(2)(/); Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(4); see also nn.
IV.372-75 and accompanying text.
73. Hague XIII, arts. 1, 5; NWP 9A Annotated HH 7.3, 7.3.2, 7.3.4, 7.3.4.2, 7.3.7; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 7.3,
7.3.2, 7.3.4-7.3.5, 7.3.7; 2 Oppenheim HH 318, 325 n.l; San Remo Manual HH 14-18.
74. See n. 73 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., nn. 11.250-59, 309, 401-02, 434 and accompanying text.
75. See,e.g., nn. 11.250, 260, 334-35, 337-39, 362, 373, 393-94, 412, 421, 430-33, 446, 469, 519, V.58 and
accompanying text.
76. LOS Convention, arts. 95-96, 109-10, 236; High Seas Convention, art. 22. Other agreements flesh out LOS
principles, e.g., Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade & Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 LNTS 253;
Protocol, Dec. 7, 1 953, 7 UST 479, 1 82 UNTS 5 1 ; Supplementary Convention on Abolition ofSlavery, the Slave Trade
& Institutions & Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 5, 1956, 18 id. 3201, 266 UNTS 3; Telecommunications
Convention & Optional Protocol, Nov. 6, 1982, TIAS ; Telecommunications Convention & Optional Protocol,
Regulations, Oct. 25, 1973, 28 UST 2495, 1209 UNTS 32 & Radio Regulations, Dec. 6, 1979, TIAS ; European
Agreement for Prevention of Broadcasts Transmitted from Stations Outside National Territories, Jan. 22, 1965, 634
UNTS 239; (illicit radiobroadcasting; see also TIF 450-56); see also The Marianna Flora, 24 US (1 1 Wheat.) 1 (1826);
Brown 294-95, 299-304, 309-10, 314; Brownlie, International Law 237-44; Colombos §§ 156A-56B, 333-37, 457-64,
470-83A; 1 Hyde § 227; McDougal & Burke 887-93; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 3.4-3.8; NWP 9A Annotated HH
3.4-3.8; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 802-03, 814-19; 1 Oppenheim §§ 292-93, 299-305, 429-30; Restatement
(Second) § 34; Restatement(Third) § 522; Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade (1997); Eric Ellen, Contemporary Piracy,
21 Cal. W. Int'L L.J. 123 (1990); Samuel Pyatt Menefee, "Yo Heave Ho!": Updating America's Piracy Laws, id.151
(1990); John N. Petrie, Pirates and Naval Officers, NWC Rev. 15 (May-June 1982); Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The
Suppression ofPirate Broadcasting: A Test Case for Control ofActivities Outside National Territory, 45(1) L. & Contemp.
Probs. 73 (1982); Louis Sohn, Peacetime Use ofForce on the High Seas, in Robertson 38, 39-59; Anna van Zwanenberg,
Interference with Ships on the High Seas, 10 ICLQ 785 (1961).
77. See nn. IV.710-12 and accompanying text; Colombos §§ 151-56. Because the United States abolished National
Prohibition over 60 years ago, US Const., amend. XXI, these treaties may be headed toward desuetude in terms of
their specific function, if that is not already true. See nn. III.930, IV.28 and accompanying text. They may have
lingering vitality for LOS territorial sea issues as discussed nn. IV.710-12 and accompanying text.
78. See Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs & Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, art.
17,—UST
—
, in 28 ILM 493-518 (1989). The United States and other countries have concluded bilateral agreements
on narcotics interdiction too. See, e.g., Agreement to Facilitate Interdiction by the United States of Vessels of the
United Kingdom Suspected of Trafficking in Drugs, Nov. 13, 1981, 33 UST 4224, 1285 UNTS 197. Table of United
States Bilateral Treaties Providing for the Prevention of Smuggling, Doc. 17-7, 6E Benedict lists these and other US
antismuggling bilateral agreements. See also Brown 310-11; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 3.1 1.4.1-3.1 1.6 & Table A3-1:
Maritime CounterdruglAlien Migrant Interdiction Agreements (Sept. 1, 1997), in id. 3-33; Restatement (Third) § 522, cmt.
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d & r.n.4; Phillip A. ]ohnson,ShootingDown Drug Traffickers, Liber Amicorum ch. 4; Sohn, Peacetime Use, n. 76, 59-79.
Smuggling people has been an issue too. See, e.g., Gary W. Palmer, Guarding the Coast: Alien Migrant Operations at Sea,
Liber Amicorum ch. 8.
79. Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10,
1988,—UST— , in 27 ILM 668 (1988); Protocol for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988,—UST—, in id. 685 (1988); see also Brown 304-09; NWP 1-14M
Annotated 11 3.5.2.3 n.30; Malvina Halberstam, The Achille Lauro, Piracy and theIMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82
AJIL 269, 270-71 (1988); Christopher C. Joyner, Offshore Maritime Terrorism: International Implications and the Legal
Response, NWC Rev. 16 (July-Aug. 1983).
80. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also Brown 313 (force used to interdict arms shipments); Colombos § 337; NWP
1-14M Annotated, H 3.11.5.1 (distinguishing force used in drug interdiction and measures taken in inherent
self-defense right); nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. See Parts F.2-F.5 for analysis of
war zones, often claimed in connection with visit and search.
81. LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; Vienna Convention, arts. 60-62; see also nn.
III.952-67, IV. 10-33 and accompanying text.
82. The claim by Brownlie, International Law 243 that the approach and visit regime has been destabilized
because of self-defense and other claims related to approach and visit may indicate lack of appreciation of the law
flowing from UN Charter, art. 51,103, and that the LOS Convention confirms what had been developing trends in the
law; compare 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 801.
83. LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; Vienna Convention, arts. 60-62; see also nn.
III.928-67, IV. 10-33 and accompanying text.
84. See nn. 76-79 and accompanying text.
85. LOS Convention, arts. 95-96, 110(1), 236; High Seas Convention, arts. 8(1), 9; see also Helsinki Principle
5.2.7; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.6; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.6; 2 Oppenheim § 416; Oxford Naval Manual, art. 32;
Stone 591-92; 11 Whiteman 3; n. IV.794 and accompanying text; but see Tucker 335-36.
86. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
87. Bring, Commentary, n. III. 848, 843; Schindler, Commentary, n. 62, 221.
88. Hague XIII, arts. 1 -2, 25; Stockholm Declaration, arts. 9; NWP 1 -14M Annotated 11 7.6; NWP 9A Annotated 11
7.6; San Remo Manual 1111 14-15, 16(d), 118; Bring, Commentary, n. III. 848, 843; Schindler, Commentary, n. 62, 215,
218.
89. LOS Convention, arts. 1(1), 33, 58, 76(1), 78, 135, 137; Continental Shelf Convention, art. 3; Fishery
Convention, arts. 1, 6;Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24; see also Parts IV.B.l and B.2.
90. LOS Convention, arts. 1(1), 136-37; see also Brown 18, 20, ch. 17; Brownlie, International Law 252-57; 2
Nordquist HH 1.1-1.19; 1 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 463-66; 1 Oppenheim § 350; Restatement (Third) § 523.
91. See nn. IV.75, V.58, 62 and accompanying text.
92. LOS Convention, arts. 2, 8; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1, 5; see also nn. IV.267-508 and accompanying
text.
93. See nn. IV.75, V.58, 62 and accompanying text.
94. LOS Convention, art. 25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3); see also nn. IV.337, 349 and accompanying
text.
95. Helsinki Principle 3.3, cmt.; NWIP 10-2 HH 430b & n.23; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.8; NWP 9A Annotated II
7.8; San Remo Manual 11 108; Tucker 300-01; cf Helsinki Principle 3.2. This right of belligerents to close an area of
the sea incident to visit and search should be distinguished from an exclusion zone claim, discussed in Part F, which
may involve larger high seas areas.
96. NWP 1-14M Annotated!! 7.8; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.8; cf. London Declaration, art. 1 ; Paris Declaration 11 4;
San Remo Manual 1111 85, 106.
97. See generally Part IV.B.5 and nn. V.58, 62 and accompanying text. Some treaties have specific provisions, e.g.,
Montreux Convention, n. IV.557, art. 19, 173 LNTS 225 (no visit and search or hostile act in Turkish Straits ifTurkey
not a belligerent); see also NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.3.5, 7-14; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.3.5, 7-20; 1 Oppenheim § 213;
Vignes, n. IV.555, 474.
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98. Hague XIII, art. 1 requires belligerents to respect neutrals' sovereign rights. Belligerents must abstain from
acts in neutral waters which ifknowingly permitted by any State would be an act ofbelligerency; Maritime Neutrality
Convention, art. 3 obliges belligerents "to refrain from performing acts of war in neutral waters or other acts which
may constitute on the part of that State that tolerates them, a violation of neutrality." NWP 1-14M Annotated 1 7.6;
NWP 9A Annotated H 7.6 say the prohibition extends to "international straits overlapped by neutral territorial seas . . .";
San Remo Manual H 15 uses similar language. See also Stockholm Declaration, art. 9(1); Helsinki Principles 1.4, 3.1;
Bruce Harlow, UNCLOS IIIand Conflict Management in Straits, 15 ODIL 197, 205-06 (1985); Schindler, Commentary,
n. 62, 220-2 1 . This would be the situation ofe.g., the Strait ofHormuz ifIran, Oman and theUAE were neutral during a
war involving other States; all are littoral States for the Strait. However, this was not the Tanker War case; Iran was a
belligerent, and Oman and the UAE were officially neutral. Under these circumstances Iran should have been
permitted to conduct visit and search in its territorial waters in the strait, so long as it did not interfere with neutral
shipping transit passage rights. As a matter of theory, this may be the legally correct response, but a practical result of
almost any kind of visit and search in this strait's confines will result in neutral shipping transit passage interference.
On the other hand, in other straits, e.g., those with a considerable high seas belt in the middle, as Hormuz might have
been seen early in the war, cf. nn. IV.533-45, 562-65 and accompanying text, Iran could have conducted visit and
search in the high seas area subject to the LOAC and the due regard principle, nn. 58, 62 and accompanying text, or in
its territorial sea.
99. LOS Convention, arts. 38(1), 44-45; see also nn. IV.567, 582-600 and accompanying text.
1 00. I.e., as a temporary security measure pursuant to LOS Convention, art. 25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, art.
16(3); see also nn. IV.308-09, 337, 349 and accompanying text.
101. NWP 1-14M Annotated 1111 7.6, 7.8; NWP 9A Annotated Ml 7.6, 7.8; cf. Helsinki Principle 5.2.9; London
Declaration, art. 1; Paris Declaration 11 4; San Remo Manual 111 15, 85, 106. See Part F for analysis of exclusion and
similar zones, which implicate wider high seas areas than the immediate area ofnaval operations for visit and search.
102. Although this is the US procedure, it is common practice among navies today. NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.6
(notes omitted); NWP 9A Annotated H 7.6.1 (notes omitted), citing Tucker 338-44. See also Helsinki Principles 5.2.1,
5.2.6; McDougal&Feliciano509-13;1 W.N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade 70-85 (1952); NWIP 10-2 11 631d
n. 22; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.4.2; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.4.2; 2 Oppenheim §§ 418-21; Oxford Naval Manual,
art. 32; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1147-48; San Remo Manual Ml 122-24; Tucker 280-82, 312-15, 322-23; W.
Thomas Mallison, Limited, n. III.316, 389-90; US State Department Press Release, U.S. Acts to Avoid Delays for Ships
Transiting Waters in Vicinity ofCuba, 47 Bulletin 747 (1962), on certificates ofnoncontraband carriage, i.e., World War I
and II navicerts and aircerts; clearcerts, used during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. No aircerts, clearcerts or navicerts
were reported during the Tanker War.
103. San Remo Manual 11 121 & cmt. 121.1. The merchantman may consent to diversion. Id. 11 119 & cmts.
119.1-119.2, citing inter alia Colombos §§ 888-92; Tucker 340; see also 2 Oppenheim §§ 421a-21b; 1 von Heinegg
301-04.
104. NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.6.2; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.6.2; accord, 2 Oppenheim § 415.
105. See nn. 76-79 and accompanying text.
106. Cf. NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.6.2; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.6.2.
107. See generally NWP 1-14M Annotated Ml 7.6.1, 8.2.2.2-8.2.3, 8.3.1, 8.4; NWP 9A Annotated Ml 7.6.1,
8.2.2.2-8.2.3, 8.3.1, 8.4; San Remo Manual Ml 47, 136-37, 139-40, 146, 151.
108. See Parts C.4 and D.3.
109. Lieber Code, arts. 135-37, 141-42; Oxford Naval Manual, art. 92; see also Howard S. Levie, The Nature and
Scope ofthe Armistice Agreement, 50 AJIL 880, 903-06 (1956); Verri, n. IV.71, 337.
110. Cultural Property Convention, art. 14(2), to which the United States is not a party; see also Colombos §§
662-63; Toman 151-72; San Remo Manual Ml 47(d), 136(d), 137, & cmts. 47.30, 136.1, 137.1; Stone 586;
Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n. 11.468, 253; 1 von Heinegg 312; Lyndel V. Prott, Commentary, in Law of Naval Warfare
582, 585; n. V.262 and accompanying text.
111. Second Convention, arts. 22, 24-25, 29-33, 47; Protocol I, art. 22; Bothe et al. 142-45; Colombos §§ 638-55;
Mallison 124-25; NWP 1-14M Annotated Ml 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated Ml 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; 2
O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1119-22; 2 Oppenheim §§ 190, 206; Oxford Naval Manual, arts. 4142, 49; 2 Pictet
154-62, 164-69, 177-89, 252-56; Pilloud, Commentary 254-60; San Remo Manual Ml 13(e), 47(a), 48(b), 136(a) &
cmts. 13.16, 47.1-47.8, 48.10, 136.1; Stone 587; Tucker 97, 117-34; Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n. 11.468, 214-29; P.
Eberlin, Identification ofHospital Ships and Ships Protected by the Geneva Conventions of12 August 1 949, 1 982 Int'l Rev.
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Red Cross 315; Steven L. Oreck, Hospital Ships: The Right ofLimited Self-Defense, Proceedings 62 (Nov. 1988); L.R.
Penna, Commentary, in Law of Naval Warfare 534, 537; Arthur M. Smith, Safeguarding the Hospital Ships,
Proceedings 56 (Nov. 1988); Verri, Commentary, n. IV.71, 334-35; 1 von Heinegg 313. These vessels may lose their
exemption if they contribute to the war effort. See nn. 175, 243, 257-58, 273-76 and accompanying text.
112. "... [P]ostal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, whatever its official or private character may be,
found on the high seas on board a neutral or enemy ship, is inviolable. If the ship is detained, the correspondence is
forwarded by the captor with the least possible delay. The[se] provisions ... do not apply, in case of violation of
blockade, to correspondence destined for or proceeding from a blockaded port .... [IJnviolability of postal
correspondence does not exempt a neutral mail ship from the laws and customs ofmaritime war as to neutral merchant
ships in general. The ship, however, may not be searched except when absolutely necessary, and then only with as
much consideration and expedition as possible." Hague XI, arts. 1-2. Commentators divide on whether mail ships are
among exempt vessels Compare Colombos §§ 665-72 (mail ships not exempt); San Remo Manual 11 136, cmt. 136.2
(same), citing 2 Oppenheim § 191 (same); Stone 589-90 (restrictive interpretation, at best, in practice) with 2
O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1123-24 (mail ships exempted); Oxford Naval Manual, art. 53 (same); LA. Shearer,
Commentary, in Law of Naval Warfare 183, 189 (same); 1 von Heinegg 313 (same); Verri, n. IV.71, 335 (same). Even
the Hague XI correspondence exemption is subject to question and limitation through the practice oftwo world wars,
although neutral diplomatic and consular correspondence and other mails may be exempt under other principles of
international law. See, e.g., Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 27, 23 UST 3227, 3239, 500 UNTS
95, 108; Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 23, 1963, art. 35, 21 id. 77, 99, 596 UNTS 261, 290; Colombos § 673; 2
Oppenheim § 191; Oxford Naval Manual, art. 53; Stone 589-90; CD. Allin, Belligerent Interference with the Mails, 1
Minn. l. rev. 293 (1917); A.P. Higgins, Treatment ofMails in Time of War, 9 BYBIL 31 (1928); Shearer, 183-85; Verri,
Commentary, n. IV.71, 335. The Hague Air Rules adopt the naval warfare rules, whatever they are, for air mail. Hague
Air Rules, art. 56. The Hague Air Rules are considered customary norms and are generally regarded as declaring
customary law, at least for naval warfare. NWIP 1-14 H 7.3.7 n.82. The US Navy applied them during World War II.
AFP 1 10-31 11 4-3c, citing 1941 Tentative Instructions. (AFP 1 10-31 H 5-2c says the Air Rules, arts. 22, 24-26 relating to
air bombardment are not customary law as a total code, however; see also Part G. 1
.) The foregoing does not answer the
question of what the naval warfare rule is; the Air Rules may incorporate nothing by reference when it comes to
neutral mail. If a neutral mail ship exemption exists today, such a ship is subject to enemy character rules and
consequences those entail. Hague XI and the general law of naval warfare make that very clear. See Part D.l. The
"consideration and expedition" language of Hague XI, art. 2, if law today, might be considered an early statement of
necessity and proportionality principles. See Part A. See also nn. 257, 271 and accompanying text.
113. This exemption is grounded in treaty and customary law. Hague XI, art. 3; The Pacquete Habana, 175 US 677
(1900); Colombos §§ 656-59; 1 Levie, Code 186; Mallison 15-16, 126-28; NWP 1-14M Annotated UH 8.2.3, 8.3.2,
8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated 1111 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; 2 O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea 1122-23; 2 Oppenheim § 187; Oxford
Naval Manual, arts. 47, 49; San Remo Manual HH 47(g), 136(f), 137 & cmts. 47.45-47.51; 136.1, 137.1; Stone 586;
Tucker 95-96; Doswald-Beck, n. 11.468, 253-56; L.C. Green, Comments, in Grunawalt 223, 225-26; Shearer,
Commentary, n. 112,185; 1 von Heinegg 312; Walker, State Practice 129-30, 140,146,155, 187. As Hague XI, art. 3 and
commentators emphasize, these vessels lose their exemption if they participate in hostilities. For further analysis of
exempt vessels, see Part C.
1 14. Colombos § 870; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.6; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.6; 2 Oppenheim § 416; Oxford Naval
Manual, art. 32; Stone 591-92; 11 Whiteman 3. Under the law of the sea these ships are also exempt from approach
and visit. See n. 76 and accompanying text. 2 O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea unfortunately uses the same terms, visit and
search, for LOS approach and visit and LOAC visit and search.
115. Colombos § 871-77; Helsinki Principles 5.2.8,6.1; London Declaration, arts. 61-62; NWP 1-14M Annotated
U 7.6; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.6; 2 Oppenheim § 417; Oxford Naval Manual, art. 32; San Remo Manual H 120;
Tucker 334-35; Frits Kalshoven, Commentary, in Law of Naval Warfare 257, 268; Walker, Anticipatory, n. III. 289,
379, 31 Cornell Int'l L.J. 347 (US World War II convoy of UK-bound cargoes while US neutral); Walker, State
Practice 128-29; 170; nn. IV.81 1-19, 826 and accompanying text. UK practice was once to the contrary. 2 Oppenheim §
425. Sweden's warships convoyed iron ore shipments in Sweden-flagged bulk carriers at least part way to Germany in
1915. Paul G. Halpern, A Naval History of World War 1 204 ( 1 994). Germany was dependent on iron ore, but the
questionable nature of what was then absolute contraband clouded the issue of whether Swedish practice violated
London Declaration convoying rules. See also Part D.3.
116. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
117. See nn. 115-16 and accompanying text.
118. See nn. 115-17 and accompanying text.
119. See Part C.l.
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120. Compare Helsinki Principle 1.1; NWIP 10-2 H 501; San Remo Manual 11 113; 1 von Heinegg 292; cf. NWP
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63 l(c)( 1 ), 633(a); NWP 1 -14M Annotated 111 7.4-7.4. 1.1; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.4. 1 . 1 ; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea
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134. See nn. III.568-69 and accompanying text.
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138. 3 Nordquist H 93.7(e).
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141. UN Charter, arts. 25, 48; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying text.
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Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n. 11.468, 225-26; Matheson, Remarks 424.
155. Second Convention, art. 15; see also 2 Pictet 107-12; n. 154 and accompanying text.
156. See Part B.
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Manual 11 135; Tucker 103-04.
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160. 2 Oppenheim § 102b, at 334; DeGuttry, Commentary, nn. 16, 108; Introductory Note, in Schindler& Toman 791.
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O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 1115-16; 2 Oppenheim § 194; San Remo Manual 11 139; Tucker 106-08.
163. San Remo Manual 1111 59, 6\;see also nn. 35-40 and accompanying text.
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cmt. 60.14.
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176. See, e.g., nn. 11.463-64 and accompanying text.
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179. Hague VII, arts. 1-6, restating custom; see also nn. IV.789-90 and accompanying text.
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185. Cf. San Remo Manual H 60, cmt. 60.11.
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187. San Remo Manual 11 60(g).
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8.2.2.2, n.52; see also San Remo Manual H 60, cmt. 60.10; n. 45 and accompanying text.
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Tucker 312-15; Mallison & Mallison, The Naval, n. III.439, 90-91.
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"[References ofnaval historians to the law ofnaval warfare and to the . . . Protocol . . . are less than flattering." Fenrick,
Comments, n. 167, 1 11, citing Theodore Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War II 19(1949);
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208. Service, n. III.439, 238-40; cf O'Connell, International Law, n. III.252, 52.
209. Fenrick, Comments, n. 167, 117; Goldie, n. 11.262, 6, 9.
210. Colombos § 535; 1 Levie, Code 162-63; 2 Oppenheim §§ 194a-94b; L.C. Green, Comments on George K. Walker
Paper, in Grunawalt 223, 226; Janis, Comments, n. 206, 106-08 (London Protocol is "hard" law, the Nuremberg trials
are opposing "soft" law); Levie, Submarine Warfare, n. III.439, 59; A.V. Lowe, Comments on Howards. Levie's Paper, in
Grunawalt 72, 77; Nwogugu, n. III.439, 353; Robertson, U.S. Policy, n. III.439, 352-53; Robertson, Submarine Warfare,
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450 The Tanker War
218. Tucker i, 357-422.
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Convention, arts. 23, 59, 61; Protocol I, arts. 69-70 (relief to pass through blockade in accordance with humanitarian
law); 2 Pictet 212-15; 3 id. 351-74, 664-68; 4 id. 178-84, 319-23; Pilloud, Commentary 816-29; Tucker 263. The
United States is not a Protocol I party but recognizes art. 70 principles as custom. Matheson, Remarks 426.
371. Helsinki Principle 5.2.3, cmt. (although distinction formally retained, has in fact been abolished); NWP
1-14M Annotated H 7.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.4.1; San Remo Manual 11 148; see also 2 Oppenheim §§ 392-93.
372. The US lists included items the London Declaration classified as conditional contraband and did not
distinguish between conditional and absolute contraband. Compare London Declaration, arts. 22-29, with 1917
Instructions 11H 23-25; 1941 Tentative Instructions HH 26-28; 1943 id. 1111 26-28; see also Tucker 266-27.
373. NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.4.1 ("To the extent that international law may
continue to require publication ofcontraband lists, recent practice indicates that the requirement may be satisfied by a
listing of exempt goods.").
374. San Remo Manual 11 149.
375. See nn. 363-64 and accompanying text.
376. See Helsinki Principles 5.2.3, 5.3 & cmts.
377. San Remo Manual, 11 149; Green, Comments, n. 210, 228. 1917 Instructions H 23; 1941 Tentative Instructions H
26; 1943 id. 11 26, declared the United States would publish contraband items beyond those in the Instructions. The
result would be that States, by referring to the unclassified Instructions and reading US notices, would know what was
and what was not contraband throughout a war. If other States practiced this, as Tucker 266-67 implies, the notice
requirement came close to being, if it was not already, a customary norm.
378. NWP 1 -14M Annotated 7.4. 1 .2; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.4. 1.2; see, e.g., Fourth Convention, arts. 23, 59; see also
4 Pictet 178-84, 319-23; n. 373 and accompanying text. San Remo Manual HH 148-49 takes the opposite position;
contraband lists must be published; otherwise goods not on lists may not be captured, and this would include free
goods.
379. Helsinki Principle 3.3 & cmt.; NWP 1-14M AnnotatedH 7.9; San Remo Manual 11 106(e); see also Part F.2.
380. Helsinki Principle 3.3, cmt.; NWP 1-14M Annotated 1111 7.8-7.8.1; NWP 9A Annotated HH 7.8-7.8.1; SanRemo
Manual 11 108; see also Part F.l.a.
381. Helsinki Principle 5.2.10; NWP 1-14M Annotated H11 7.7.2.1-7.7.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated HH 7.7.2.1-7.7.2.2;
San Remo Manual 1111 93-94; see also Part E.2.
382. See Part C.l.
383. While nearly all countries have ratified the First, Second, Third and Fourth Conventions, a few, e.g., the
United States, are not Protocol I parties; many States recognize parts of the Protocol as customary norms. See Table
A5-1, n. III.628.
384. See nn. 260, 269 and accompanying text.
385. See, e.g., Colombos §§ 778-80; NWIP 10-2 H 631b n.18; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated H
7.4.1; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1143-44; Tucker 266-67; see also nn. 361, 372 and accompanying text.
386. See generally 7 Hackworth, Digest 212; Helsinki Principle 5.2.6 & cmt.; McDougal & Feliciano 509-13; 1
Medlicott, n. 192, 94-101; NWIP 10-2 H 631d n.22; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.4.2; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.4.2; 2
O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1147-48; San Remo Manual 1W 122-24; Tucker 280-82, 312-15, 322-23; G.G.
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Fitzmaurice, Some Aspects ofModern Contraband Control and the Law ofPrize, 22 BYBIL 73, 83-84 (1945); Mallison,
Limited, n.JII.316, 389-90.
387. Paris Declaration 1111 2-3; see also 3 Hyde § 816;2 0ppenheim§ 177; San Remo Manual H 147 &cmt.;Fujita,n.
IV.624, 71.
388. London Declaration, arts. 30, 33-36; see also Colombos § § 766-70; Helsinki Principle 5.2.4, cmt.; NWIP 10-2 11
631c (partially accepting London Declaration rules); NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.4.1.1 n.99; NWP 9A Annotated 11
7.4.1.1 n.99; 2 0'Connell,LawoftheSea 1146; 2 Oppenheim §§ 400-03a; Stone 486-87; Tucker, 268 n.9; Fujita, n.
IV.624, 71-72; Kalshoven, Commentary, n. 115, 263-64.
389. In recent wars the doctrine was applied to extensive absolute contraband lists or to lists of contraband of all
kinds. Colombos §§ 771-74; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1146-47; Stone 487; Tucker 267-75; Kalshoven,
Commentary, n. 115, 272.
390. See Part C.l.
391. UN Charter, arts. 25,48, 103; see also San RemoManualII 150,cmt. 150.3;n. IV.57 and accompanying text.
392. See nn. 82-126 and accompanying text.
393. See nn. 333-49 and accompanying text.
394. See nn. 11.103, 280, 306 and accompanying text.
395. Cf. nn. 11.103, 183 and accompanying text.
396. See nn. 11.111-12 and accompanying text.
397. Near the war's end Iran negotiated with the USSR for an oil export pipeline in USSR territory to the north. See
nn. 11.112-14, 182, 473-74 and accompanying text.
398. See nn. IV.668-79, 685-94 for descriptions of typical documentation and sale of goods in ocean commerce.
399. See nn. 11.177, 274-78, 288, 296-99, 306, 366, 420, 447, 491-92 and accompanying text.
400. See nn. 337-44 and accompanying text.
401. See nn. 11.332, IV.825, V.350-55 and accompanying text.
402. See n. 356 and accompanying text.
403. See nn. 387-90 and accompanying text.
404. Iran Prize Law, n. 11.144; but see NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.4.1 n.96. See also nn. 11.422-23 and
accompanying text.
405. NWP 1-14M Annotated H1I 7.5.1, 8.2.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated 1111 7.5.1, 8.2.2.2; compare San Remo Manual 11
60(g); see also Parts C.l, D.l.
406. Cf Helsinki Principle 5.2.3; see also Part D.3.
407. See nn. 356, 387-90 and accompanying text.
408. See nn. 11.350-53 and accompanying text.
409. See generally nn. 114-18 and accompanying text.
410. See nn. 373-85 and accompanying text.
411. See nn. 368-70, 386 and accompanying text.
412. See nn. 344, 355, 391 and accompanying text.
413. See Parts A.l, A.2, A.5.
414. See nn. 11.91, 110, 200 and accompanying text; see also n. 11.236 and accompanying text. The United States
once considered blockading Kharg but did not do so; see n. 11.230 and accompanying text. The United States did not
recognize Iraqi regulations, etc., as law but warned of the danger of the Kharg area through NOTAMs and
NOTMARs; see n. 11.288, 420 and accompanying text. Kharg facilities were a frequent Iraqi target; see, e.g., nn. 11.232,
240, 272, 283. San Remo Manual, Preliminary Remarks, 176-77, notes Manual drafters differed on whether blockade
law continues today or whether it is in desuetude. It says its rules apply "to blockading actions . . . regardless of the
name given to such actions," trying to modernize the Paris and London Declaration rules. Other sources cited in this
Part adhere to interpretations ofthe traditional blockade law as though it was still viable; that is the thrust of this Part,
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although it cites the Manual where it coincides. Helsinki Principle 5.2.10, crat. says the law of blockade is not in
desuetude. For desuetude principles, see nn. III.930, IV.28 and accompanying text.
415. See Goodrich et al. 314-17; Simma 628-36 (using UN Charter, art. 42, has been proposed only once); see also
NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.7.2 n.131; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.7.2 n.129. 2 Openheim § 49 believes art. 42 could be
used for pacific blockade, i.e., a blockade during time of peace. See also id. §§ 44-48, 52b-52e, 52/; nn. 416-21.
416. S.C. Res. 221, UN Doc. S/RES/221 (1965), in 5 ILM 534 (1966); see also Cable 193-94; O'Connell, The
Influence 137-38, 174-75; Walker, State Practice 142-43.
417. 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1157-58, referring to UN Charter, art. 2(4), noting that even under traditional
law a pacific blockade may not have enough practice to be customary law; see also Colombos §§ 484-88B (hinting at
legality of pacific blockade); 2 Oppenheim §§ 44-49, 52b-52e, 52/ (same); NWIP 10-2 H 632a, n.26. A related method,
naval demonstration, i.e., sending warships into neutral coastal waters to threaten a coastal State, violates UN Charter,
art. 2(4), LOS principles governing innocent passage in the territorial sea, and the LOAC regarding belligerent
conduct toward neutrals. LOS Convention, art. 19; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(4); Hague XIII, arts. 1, 5;
Colombos § 489; see also nn. III.47-1 57, IV.337-50, V.73 and accompanying text. Reprisals involving use of force, e.g.,
firing on a neutral coast or other neutral territory to signal a belligerent's displeasure with a neutral's conduct, is
equally invalid under UN Charter, art. 2(4); see also Colombos § 491; nn. 111.47-157 and accompanying text. A
displeased belligerent may undertake nonforce reprisals or retorsions to influence neutral behavior, e.g., embargo in
violation of a trade treaty or withdrawing diplomatic relations, an unfriendly but lawful act. See Colombos §§ 481-83;
nn. III. 396-417, 644-48 and accompanying text. Belligerents may also exclude merchantmen and civil aircraft from
the immediate area of naval operations and may declare exclusion zones in high seas areas off any nation's coast. See
Parts F. 1 -F.2. There is also nothing wrong with a country's using high seas offanother country's coasts for freedom of
navigation and overflight of its warships and military aircraft, or using these high seas areas for naval exercises. LOS
Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. IV.68-79 and accompanying text.
418. Cf. UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying text.
419. The UN Command considered but rejected a blockade of the PRC as well. See generally Walker, State Practice
125-28. The Republic of China on Taiwan had declared a blockade against the PRC. Janis, Neutrality, n. 111.831,149.
See also nn. III.220-23 and accompanying text.
420. UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.7.2.1 n.131; NWP9A Annotated 11 7.7.2.1 n.129;**?
also n. IV.57 and accompanying text.
421. Helsinki Principle 1.2; NWIP 10-2 H 632 n.30; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.7.2 n.131; NWP 9A Annotated 11
7.7.2 n.129.
422. NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.7.5; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.7.5.
423. See n. 356 and accompanying text.
424. Colombos §§ 813, 842, 844; 2 Oppenheim §§ 368, 370, 372; Oxford Naval Manual, art. 30; NWP 1-14M
Annotated!! 7.7.1; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.7.1; 10 Whiteman, Digest 861-64; Clark, n. III.322, 160; Swayze, n.
III. 322, 154. See generally Colombos §§ 814-17; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1150; Tucker 283-87; Clingan,
Submarine Mines, n. III. 840, 353; Goldie, Afarittme War Zones, n. 11.519, 161 -71; for histories ofblockade.^ also n. 417
and accompanying text, discussing legality of pacific blockades, naval demonstrations, reprisals and retorsions as
related means of economic warfare.
425. A US decision to impose a blockade lies with the executive and not with naval force commanders. London
Declaration, arts. 8-9; NWIP 10-2 11 632b & n.30; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.7.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.7.2.1; 2
O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1151; 2 Oppenheim §§ 375-76; San Remo Manual U 93; Tucker 287; Kalshoven,
Commentary, n. 115, 260, 274; Swayze, n. III.322, 154-55.
426. The grace period has ranged from 2 to 10 days; ships were given 3 days to leave Haiphong in 1972 during the
Vietnam War. London Declaration, arts. 8-9, 11-13, 16; Alford, n. IV.638, 345-51; Colombos §§ 824-26; Helsinki
Principle 5.2.10; Charles Cheney Hyde, Blockade 24, 36-37 (1918); NWIP 10-2 11 632c & n.31, 32 (usual to notify
local authorities); NWP 1-14M Annotated 111 7.7.2.1, 7.7.5 (same); NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.7.2.1, 7.7.5 (same); 2
O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1151, 1156 (erroneously reporting Haiphong ships had only three hours to leave); San
Remo Manual H11 93-94, 101 (inter alia stating no requirement to notify local authorities); Tucker 287-92; Harry
Almond, Comments on Hugh Lynch's Paper, in Grunawalt 264, 289; Clark, n. III.322, 172; Goldie, Maritime War Zones,
n. 11.519, 166-71; Kalshoven, Commentary, n. 115, 260, 274; Levie, Submarine Warfare, n. III.439, 33; Swayze, n.
III.322, 154-55. The Korean War aside, there have been no formal blockades ofconsequence since 1945. The Republic
of China declared one against the PRC in 1949, India proclaimed one in 1971, Egypt tried to blockade the
Bab-el-Mandeb Straits in 1973, and Israel imposed one on the Lebanese coast in 1982. 1 Anthony H. Cordesman &
Law of Armed Conflict 459
Abraham R Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War 104-08, 216 (1990); Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement
266-69 (1975); 2 O'Connell 1 154-55; 0'Connell,The Influence 101-02; Janis, n. III.831, 149; Walker, State Practice
137-38, 144. There were naval quarantines during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War. See generally
Howard S. Levie, Mine Warfare at Sea 151-57 (1992); Clingan, Submarine Mines, n. III.840, 353, 358; Goldie,
Maritime War Zones, n. 11.519, 157; Janis 151; Lowe, Commander's Handbook, n. III.318, 128; Mallison & Mallison,
Naval Targeting, n. III.262, 262-68; Walker 141, 145. The tendency has been to proclaim exclusion zones. See Part F.
427. Paris Declaration H 4; Colombos § 818; Helsinki Principle 5.2.10, cmt.; NWIP 10-2 11 632b n.32; 2 Oppenheim
§§ 177, 378; Fujita, n. IV.624, 69. The UN Security Council may proclaim a paper blockade, at least in theory. UN
Charter, arts. 25, 42, 48, 103; see nn. 415-21 and accompanying text.
428. London Declaration, arts. 4, 12; Hyde, n. 426, 41-42; NWIP 10-2 11 632d & n.33; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11
7.7.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated U 7.7.2.3; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1151; 2 Oppenheim §§ 378, 382; Tucker 288-89;
Kalshoven, Commentary, n. 115, 260, 274; see also n. 426 and accompanying text.
429. Lieber Code, arts. 135-37, 141-42; Oxford Naval Manual, art. 92; see also Levie, The Nature, n. 109, 903-06;
Verri, Commentary, n. IV.71, 337.
430. 2 Oppenheim § 239, citing 1899 Hague II, Regulations, art. 40; Hague IV, Regulations, art. 40; Lieber Code,
art. 145; see also Levie, The Nature, n. 109, 901-03.
431. London Declaration, arts. 2-3; Colombos §§ 818-21, 843-43; HYDE,n. 426, 5-6, 12-14; NWIP 10-2 1 632d &
n.33; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.7.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.7.2.3; 2 Oppenheim §§ 379-82; San Remo Manual H11
95-97; Stone 496; Tucker 288-89; Kalshoven, Commentary, n. 1 15, 260, 274; Swayze, n. III.322, 154. The old rule, that
at least one surface warship must be present, has been discarded. Helsinki Principle 5.2.10, cmt.; NWP 1-14M
Annotated H 7.7.5; NWP 9A Annotated U 7.7.5; compare 2 Oppenheim 380a. Paris Declaration H 4 invalidated
Napoleonic era "paper" or constructive blockades that a State imposes by decree but does not have forces to enforce it.
See n. 427 and accompanying text.
432. Paris Declaration 11 4; Colombos §§ 837-41, 845-63; Helsinki Principle 5.2.10; Hyde, n. 426, 13-14; NWIP
10-2 11 632a n.27-28; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.7.5; NWP 9A Annotated U 7.7.5; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea
1151-56; 2 Oppenheim § 177; San Remo Manual H 96 (force maintaining blockade may be stationed at distance
determined by military requirements); Tucker 290, 305-15, 317; Almond, n. 426, 289; Fujita, n. IV.624, 69, 73;
Goldie, Maritime War Zones, n. 11.519, 164-71, 178; Jacobson, n. 166, 233; Kalshoven, Commentary, n. 115, 260, 274;
Levie, Submarine Warfare, n. III.439, 33; n. 173 and accompanying text.
433. LOS Convention, arts. 25(3), 45; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3); see also nn. IV.337, 349 and
accompanying text; Part IV.B.6, analyzing nonsuspendable straits passage.
434. 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1 1 56.
435. Hague VIII, arts. 2-3; Colombos §§ 821, at 720; 837-41, 845-63; Oxford Naval Manual, art. 22; Goldie,
Maritime War Zones, n. 11.519, 166-71; Howard S. Levie, Commentary, in Law of Naval Warfare 140, 143-44; Lowe,
The Commander's, n. III.318, 137-38; Swayze, n. III.322, 163-65; cf. Nwogugu, n. III.439, 333, 340; but see Nicaragua
Case, 1986 ICJ 112, 147-48, involving mining and not wartime blockade issues.
436. Manual commentary suggests the requirement is mandatory, not hortatory, as "should" might indicate. San
Remo Manual 11 85 & cmts.
437. If a blockading force officer acknowledges a distress situation, a neutral-flag ship may be allowed to enter a
blockaded place and leave it, provided the vessel neither discharges nor ships cargo. London Declaration, arts. 5-7;
Helsinki Principle 5.2.10; Colombos §§ 813, 822-23; Hyde, n. 426, 14, 35-36; NWIP 10-2 111 632f& n.35, 632h; NWP
1-14M Annotated Ml 7.4.1.2, 7.7.2.4, 7.7.3; NWP 9A Annotated Ml 7.4.1.2, 7.7.2.4, 7.7.3; 2 O'Connell,Law ofthe Sea
1 151 ; 2 Oppenheim §§ 370; San Remo Manual 11 100; Tucker 291-92; Kalshoven, Commentary, n. 1 15, 260, 274; see also
nn. IV.494-506 and accompanying text.
438. The United States appears to have a view that neutral diplomatic agents are entitled to leave a blockaded place.
Colombos § 813; Hyde, n. 426, 37-39; 7 Moore 854; NWIP 10-2 H 632h(l); Tucker 291; During the Korean War
blockade, foreign warships except North Korea's could enter and leave North Korean ports. Walker, State Practice 1 26,
citing inter alia US Deputy Director of State Department Office of Northeast Asian Affairs U. Alexis Johnson
Memorandum of Conversation, July 8, 1950, 7 FRUS 1950, 332-33. Since imposing a blockade is a US executive
decision, it is likely the executive will also make these decisions. US naval commanders, and force commanders with
like national rules, perhaps stated in rules ofengagement, should consult those rules and refer to higher authority as
directed. See nn. III.258 and accompanying text for ROE analysis.
439. Second Convention, art. 38; Third Convention, arts. 72-75 & Annex III; Fourth Convention, arts. 23, 59, 61
;
Protocol I, arts. 69-70; Helsinki Principle 5.3; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.4.1.2; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.4.1.2; San
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Remo Manual 1W 102(a), 103-04, 150; Tucker 263; Frits Kalshoven, Noncombatant Persons, in Grunawalt 300, 312-13;
see also Bothe et al. 430-37; Hyde, n. 426, 39-41; 2 Pictet 212-15; 3 id. 351-74, 664-68; 4 id. 178-84, 319-23, 325-28;
Pilloud, Commentary 812-29. Protecting Powers, a third, neutral State or an international organization parties to a
conflict appoint to safeguard their interests, including interests of prisoners of war, etc., are discussed and defined in
First Convention, arts. 8-11, 23; Second Convention, arts. 8, 11; Third Convention, arts. 8, 11; Fourth Convention,
arts. 9, 12, 14; Protocol I, arts. 2(c), 5-6, 11, 33, 45, 60, 70; Cultural Property Convention, art. 21. See also Bothe et al..
54-55, 64-84, 110-16, 172-75, 260-62, 387-89, 432-37; Green ch. 13; 1 Pictet 86-131, 206-26; 2 id. 60-65, 79-82; 3 id.
93-103, 123-27; Aid. 81-92, 113-17, 120-28; Pilloud,Commentary 58-59,61-62,76-102, 150-63, 350-63, 544-59, 708-16,
816-29; Toman 222-26; Howard S. Levie, Prisoners of War and the Protecting Power, 55 AJIL 374 (1961). The United
States evacuated civilians from North to South Vietnam in that conflict during offshore interdiction operations.
Wounded and sick French armed forces members were repatriated to France and Morocco. 1 Edwin M. Hoopers al.
.,
The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict ch. 12 (1976); Daniel M. Redmond, Getting Them Out, 116
Proceedings 44 (No. 8, 1990).
440. London Declaration, art. 18; Colombos § 833; Helsinki Principle 5.2.10; NWIP 10-2 H 632e; NWP 1-14M
Annotated U 7.7.2.5; NWP 9A Annotated II 7.7.2.5; 2 Oppenheim § 373a; San Remo Manual 11 99; Tucker 289-90;
Kalshoven, Commentary, n. 115, 260, 274; see also Parts E.2-E.3.
441. Colombos § 844; W.E. Hall, Law of Naval Warfare 205-06 (1921); Helsinki Principle 5.2.10; Hyde, n. 426,
29-33; NWIP 10-2 11 632g(2); NWP 1-14M AnnotatedH 7.7.4; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.7.4; 2 O'Connell, Law ofthe
Sea 1 1 57 (noting this is UK-US policy, and that continental States follow an analogue ofhot pursuit after a ship breaks
a blockade cordon); 2 Oppenheim §§ 385, 389 (noting differences in State practice); San Remo Manual 111 98, 146(f),
153(f); Tucker 292-95. See also LOS Convention, art. Ill; High Seas Convention, art. 23; nn. IV.298, 326 and
accompanying text (hot pursuit under LOS).
442. Declaration of London, arts. 14-15; Colombos §§ 827-28; NWIP 10-2 11 632g & n.36; NWP 1-14M Annotated
U 7.7.4; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.7.4; 2 Oppenheim §§ 383-84; Tucker 292-93.
443. See nn. 387-88 and accompanying text.
444. Declaration of London, arts. 14-15; Hague Air Rules, art. 52, as interpreted by its drafters; Colombos §
835-36, 844; NWIP 10-2 H 632g & n.36; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.7.4; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.7.4; 2 O'Connell,
Law ofthe Sea 11 57; Tucker 292-93, 3 16- 17. See also Declaration ofLondon, arts. 17, 19, considered by NWP 1-14M
Annotated 11 7.7.4 n. 140; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.7.4 n.138, as obsolete in light of State practice; Kalshoven,
Commentary, n. 115, 261-62, 274.
445. 2 Oppenheim § 386; see also nn. IV.494-506, V.437 and accompanying text.
446. UN Charter, arts. 25,42, 48, 103; Helsinki Principle 1 . 2; see also n. III. 58 and accompanying text; Part E. 1.
447. San Remo Manual H 102(b) & cmts. 102.3-102.4; Goldie, Maritime War Zones, n. 11.519, 178 (necessity
behind changes in traditional blockade law); see also Parts A.1-A.2 and accompanying text.
448. See nn. 11.91, 1 10, 200, V.414 and accompanying text.
449. A similar situation arose in the 1990-91 GulfWar; see Walker, Crisis Over Kuwait 36 n.53, commenting on S.C.
Res. 66, UN Doc. S/RES 665 (1990), in 29 ILM 1329, 1330 (1990), authorizing interception ofIraq-bound cargoes, and
the response of Comprehensive Mandatory Sanctions Imposed Against Iraq, 27 UN Chron. 5, 6-7 (No. 4, 1990); Naval
Blockade Endorsed, id. 1 7, characterizing the operation as a blockade. See also Vessels Intercepted, id. 1 5. The UN Security
Council never formally authorized a blockade; Coalition members never instituted one or treated Council
authorizations under, e.g., S.C. Res. 678,UN Doc. No. S/RES/678, in 1 Dispatch 298(1 990), as authority to impose one.
450. See nn. 1.27-33 and accompanying text.
451. See nn. 425-26 and accompanying text.
452. Several Iranian warships, on order in Italy, never left the Mediterranean Sea; the rest of the Iraqi navy was
bottled up in the Shatt al-Arab early in the war. There is no evidence Iraq used helicopters, which could have enforced
a blockade, against Gulf shipping. See nn. 11.130, 236, 322 and accompanying text.
453. Paris Declaration, U 4; see also n. 427 and accompanying text.
454. See nn. 11.153-56 and accompanying text.
455. See n. 426 and accompanying text.
456. Cf. LOS Convention, art. 25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3); see also nn. IV.337, 349 and
accompanying text.
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457. Helsinki Principle 3.3, cmt.; NWP 1-14M Annotated Hit 7.8-7.8.1; NWP 9A Annotated HH 7.8-7.8.1; San
Remo Manual 1 146; see also Part F.l.a.
458. The record is nonexistent on these points.
459. See nn. 11.179, 233, 250-60, 334, 354, 357, 359, 362, 368, 373, 393-94, 412, 420-21, 446, 469, 519 and
accompanying text; see also S.C. Res. 552 (1984), in Wellens 473; Part IV.B.4; n. 440 and accompanying text. While
many attacks Chapter II documents occurred outside neutral territorial waters, the citations are given to illustrate the
frequency of mine and other attacks on neutral shipping, some of which occurred in neutral territorial waters.
460. See nn. 11.365 and accompanying text.
461. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 103; LOS Convention, art. 19; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(4); Hague XIII, arts.
1,5; see also nn. IV.371-73, V.73, 417 and accompanying text.
462. See n. 426 and accompanying text.
463. See nn. 437-38 and accompanying text.
464. See nn. II. 1 53-56 and accompanying text. Neutral-flag ships could have left under another blockade principle,
the right of egress during a grace period upon notice of blockade. See n. 426 and accompanying text.
465. See nn. 451-53 and accompanying text.
466. See Hague XI, arts. 5, 8; Third Convention, art. 4; nn. 11.153-56, V.346-47 and accompanying text.
467. See Parts A. 1-2 and accompanying text.
468. UN Charter, arts. 25, 42, 48; see also Part E.l.
469. See nn. 425-26 and accompanying text.
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Manual 1IH 27-30; Part IV.B.6.
589. For example, to exercise a right ofanticipatory self-defense, there must be no other alternative to self-defense.
See UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, V.22 and accompanying text.
590. Accord, San RemoManual H 106, cmt. 106.2; Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone, n. 11.109, 116, 125; Goldie, Maritime
War Zones, n. 11.519, 174; Leckow, n. 11.147, 635-36 (only UK zones considered); Walker, State Practice 154-55.
591. Tucker 301.
592. Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone, n. 11.109, 124-25; accord, Vaughan Lowe, The Impact oftheLaw ofthe Sea on Naval
Warfare, 14 Syracuse J. Int*l L. & Com. 657, 673 (1988); compare Colombos § 561; Tucker 298, 301. SanRemoManual
H 106(e) requires belligerents to publicly declare and appropriately notify beginning, duration, location and extent of
the zone, as well as restrictions imposed. See also id., cmts. 106.3, 106.6, the latter stating that notification should
include diplomatic channels and appropriate international organizations, in particular ICAO and IMO. Prudent
belligerents should also instruct their UN Permanent Representatives and notify the Security Council, since some
State will undoubtedly notify the Council and perhaps the General Assembly. See UN Charter, arts. 11-12, 14, 25,
31-42, 48, 51, 103; Chapter III; nn. IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
593. Helsinki Principle 3.3 & cmt.; San Remo Manual H 106(a) & cmt. 106.1 ; see also UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see
also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916- 1 8, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. San Remo Manual 1 108 illustrates the point of
continuing LONW applicability in its correct statement that a war zone declaration does not derogate from a
belligerent's customary right to control neutral vessels and aircraft in an immediate vicinity of naval operations. On
this point, see also Tucker 300; Parts A-E.
594. Helsinki Principle 3.3 & cmt.; San Remo Manual, 1 106(b) & cmt. 106.2; Fleck, Comments, n. III.439, 82.
Tucker 301 rightly complained in 1955 of the problem of zones with no duration or statement of area covered.
Jacobson, n. 166, 234 suggests a treaty to establish negotiated rules balancing needs ofprotecting belligerent forces in
an age of long-distance targeting, neutral shipping interests and humanitarian principles. It is a worthy thought but
not practically attainable.
595. NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.9.
596. See Part E.2.
597. See nn. 555-56 and accompanying text.
598. LOS Convention, art. 57; see also nn. IV. 147-57 and accompanying text.
599. Cf Helsinki Principle 3.3 & cmt.; San Remo Manual H 108 & cmt. 108.1 (war zone rules do not affect
belligerent's right to exclude neutrals from immediate area ofnaval operations; in a particular case an immediate area
might be larger than a war zone, or the two might overlap in part); see also Tucker 300; Part E.2.
600. See nn. IV.309, 357-58 and accompanying text.
601. See n. IV.75 and accompanying text. For LOAC due regard analysis, see nn. 58, 62 and accompanying text.
602. Helsinki Principles 3.3, 5.2.9 & cmts.; San Remo Manual H 106(c) & cmts. 106.2, 106.4; see also NWP 1-14M
Annotated H 7.9.
603. Helsinki Principles 3.3, 5.2.9 & cmts.; San Remo Manual 11 106(d) & cmts. 106.3, 106.5; see also NWP 1-14M
Annotated H 7.9.
604. LOS Convention, arts. 25(3), 38, 44-45; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3); Colombos § 561; Helsinki
Principles 3.3, 5.2.9 & cmts.; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.9; San Remo Manual HH 23, 27-32, 106(d); cf. Helsinki
Principle 6.2 & cmt.; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 9.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated 1 9.2.3; San Remo Manual, UU 85, 87-89 &
cmts.; Stone 574 (whatever status of zones are for the high seas, "the right of a belligerent to establish such zones in
neutral territorial waters cannot be seriously contended for"); Tucker 303-04; nn. 586, 588-89 and accompanying text.
To this extent a war zone differs from blockade. A blockading force may bar entry or exit of all ships and aircraft;
neutral warships or military aircraft may pass a blockade with blockading force discretion. See Helsinki Principle
5.2.10 & cmt.; NWP 1-14M Annotated IM 7.7.1, 7.7.3; NWP 9A Annotated 111 7.7.1, 7.7.3; San Remo Manual 11 100 &
cmt. 100.1; Tucker 298; n. 438 and accompanying text. Thus a war zone might be considered "effective," see Fenrick,
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The Exclusion Zone, n. II. 109, 1 24-25, while a blockade of the same area might not be considered "effective" under law
of blockade standards. Tucker 298.
605. Colombos § 561; Helsinki Principles 3.3, 5.2.9 &cmts.; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.9; San Remo Manual 11
105 & cmt. 105.1; Tucker 298 n. 38, 299 n.39.
606. NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.9.
607. Rules ofengagement may give an enforcing belligerent's forces ranges ofoptions and limitations on enforcing
a war zone. Most States do not publish ROE. San RemoManual 11 106, cmt. 106. 1 ; n. III.258 and accompanying text.
608. San Remo Manual H 107 & cmts. 107.1-107.2; this is the same rule applied to navicerts and aircerts. Helsinki
Principle 5.2.6 & cmt.; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.4.2; NWP 9A Annotated H 7.4.2; San Remo Manual H 123 & CMT.
123.1; n. 386 and accompanying text.
609. E.g. San Remo Manual H 107, cmt. 107.2 says a belligerent may not force neutral merchantmen to join a
convoy escorted by that belligerent's warships; this would subject the merchantmen to attack on sight. See n. 337 and
accompanying text. On the other hand, forcing transiting neutrals to use navicert procedures should not be
considered an act harmful to the enemy. San Remo Manual 1111 107, cmt. 107.1; 123 & cmt. 123.1; see also n. 386 and
accompanying text.
610. UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103; see also n. IV. 57 and accompanying text.
611. Rainier Lagoni, Remarks, in Panel, Neutrality, The Rights ofShipping and the Use ofForce in the Persian Gulf War
(Part I), 1988 ASIL PROC. 161, 163 (war zones lawful only if tied to coast of a State establishing it); Mastny, n. 555, 49
(USSR protest of UK zones during Falklands/Malvinas War); Ronzitti, The Crisis 10, 40 (USSR, Latin American
States' protests; war zones enforced against neutrals unlawful even under pre-Charter law). 2 Oppenheim § 319a,
writing in the World War I context but publishing in 1952, seems to be the last major treatise to condemn them, saying
they can only be imposed as reprisal; see also Howard S. Levie, Mine Warfare and International Law, NWC REV. 27, 31
(Apr. 1972).
612. Helsinki Principle 3.3 & cmt.; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 7.9; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1111-12; San
Remo Manual HH 105-08 & cmts.; Fenrick,n. 11.109,94, 113, 121; Goldie,Mantime War Zones, n. 11.519, 194; Walker,
State Practice 155. O'Connell may have changed his view after publishing The Influence 167 (1975) and the
Falklands/Malvinas War. Ronzitti, The Crisis 40-41 cites O'Connell, The Influence for Ronzitti's view that high seas
war zones during limited war, if permitted at all, are allowed only for belligerent operations among belligerents and
not to molest neutrals, inferring the UK TEZ was inadmissible for that purpose. The UK TEZ did not affect neutral
rights more than they would have been without a TEZ. See generally nn. 555-83 and accompanying text. O'Connell,
The Influence 167 wrote in the World War II context; Ronzitti quotes him in the Falklands/Malvinas context to
support his view, Ronzitti, The Crisis 10, that these zones are unlawful. 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1111-12 was
published in 1984, and The Crisis in 1988. O'Connell, InternationalLaw, n. III.252, 54-56, published in 1970, supports a
view that O'Connell saw all postwar zones, properly limited, as lawful; The Influence 167 undoubtedly refers to the
excessive World War II claims.
613. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 2(2), 25(3), 44-45; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 2, 16(3) with ICAO
Convention, arts. 1-3, 8-9, not applicable to military aircraft; see also Brownlie, International Law 119 (who errs in
saying aircraft straits passage requires a treaty); 1 Oppenheim § 220; AFP 1 10-31 1111 2-5a, 2-6a; NWP 1- 14M Annotated
111 2.5.1, 4.4; NWP 9A Annotated HU 2.5.1. 4.4; Parts IV.B.3, V.B.5. Treaties regulate admitting military aircraft. See,
e.g., Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation & Security Regarding Facilities & Areas &
Status ofUS Armed Forces in Japan, June 23, 1960, Japan-US, art. 5, 1 1 UST 1652, 1654, 373 UNTS 248, 252. During
peacetime no military aircraft may enter another State's territorial airspace without specific permission or authority
under a treaty; the same rules apply to neutral airspace. AFP 110-31 HU 2-5a, 2-6c; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 2.5.1,4.4;
NWP 9A Annotated 111 2.5.1, 4.4. Special LOAC principles apply to medical aircraft; these also include notification
and agreement rules. See First Convention, arts. 36-37; Second Convention, arts. 39-40; Fourth Convention, art. 22;
Protocol I, arts. 8(j), 26-27, 29, 31; Bother al. 95-96, 101, 153-56, 159-61, 165-67; 1 Pictet 285-96; 2 Pictet 215-25; 4
Pictet 173-77; Pilloud, Commentary 115-16, 131-32, 288-92, 294-98, 308-13, 326-37. These principles apply to LOS
situations through the LOS other rules clauses. See, e.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see
also nn. III.952-67, IV. 10-25 and accompanying text.
614. E.g., LOS Convention, art. 2(3); Territorial Sea Convention, art. 1(2); see also nn. III.952-67, IV. 10-25 and
accompanying text.
615. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
616. Whether coastal States can apply these regulations to aircraft passing through an ADIZ and not inbound is
not settled. AFP 1 10-31 HH 2-lg; NWIP 10-2 11 422b; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.5.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated 11 2.5.2.3;
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Restatement (Third) § 521, r.n. 2; 4 Whiteman, Digest 496-97; Note, Air Defense Identification Zones: Creeping
Jurisdiction in theAirspace, 18 VJIL 485 (1978). US ADIZ are published in 14 CFR part 99. Cf. ICAO Convention, arts.
3, 8, 11, not applicable to State and military aircraft, requiring piloted and unpiloted aircraft to submit to rules for
entering another State's territory.
617. AFP 110-31 11 2-lf; NWIP 10-2 H 422b; compare LOS Convention, art. 33; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24,
declaring contiguous zones are high seas areas subject to certain coastal State rights to use them for police purposes; see
also 2 Nordquist 1111 II.8, 33.1; Restatement (Third) §§ 511, cmt. k; 521, r.n. 2; nn. IV.296-300, 324-27 and
accompanying text.
618. LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; AFP 110-31, H 2-lg; see also nn. IV.68-79 and
accompanying text.
619. 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 797.
620. AFP 1 10-31 11 2-lg; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.5.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated 11 2.5.2.3.
621. NOTAMs or NOTMARs may announce these. AFP 110-31 11 2-lg & n. 13; see also n. IV.67 and
accompanying text.
622. NOTAMs or NOTMARs may announce these. See Part F.l.a.
623. NOTAMs or NOTMARs may announce these. See Part E.2.
624. NOTAMs or NOTMARs may announce these. See NWP 1-14M Annotated H 2.5.2.3, 2-32, referring to id. 11
2.4.4 n.68; NWP 9A Annotated 11 2.5.2.3, 2-41, referring to id. 11 2.4.4 n.56; Parts F.l.b-F.l.c.
625. NOTAMs or NOTMARs may announce these. See Part F.2.
626. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also ICAO Convention, art. 3(d), requiring States to have due regard for safety of
civil aircraft navigation; id. art. 3 bis, requiring States to refrain from using weapons against civil aircraft, and in cases
of intercepting intruding aircraft, acting so that lives of those on board and safety of the aircraft are not endangered;
First Convention, arts. 36-37 (medical aircraft); Second Convention, arts. 39-40 (same); Fourth Convention, art. 22
(same); Protocol I, arts. 8(j), 24-31, Annex I, arts. 1(2), 3-9 (same); AFP 110-31 H 2-lg; Bother al. 95-96, 101, 150-67,
578-90; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 4.4; 8.2.1; 8.2.3, 8-13, 8-15, 8-16, 8-18; 8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated 1111 4.4; 8.2.1;
8.2.3; 8.2.3, 8-13, 8-20; 8.4.1; 1 Pictet 285-96; 2 id. 215-25; 4 id. 173-77; Pilloud, Commentary 115-16, 279-342,
1137-51, 1159, 1174-1263; San Remo Manual HH 62-66,70-71, 174-83; Gerald F. FitzGerald, The Use ofForce Against
Civil Aircraft: The Aftermath of the KAL Flight 007 Incident, 1984 CYBIL 291; UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn.
III. 1 0, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, V.58, 62 (LOAC due regard analysis) and accompanying text; Parts A.l -A.2. As
in other circumstances necessity and proportionality principles in self-defense situations are different from these
principles in LOAC situations. See n. 22 and accompanying text.
627. See ICAO Convention, art. 3(d), 3 bis; nn. 613, 626 and accompanying text.
628. &*PartF.2.
629. ICAO Convention, art. 3 bis; see also nn. 613, 626 and accompanying text.
630. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, V.613, 626 and accompanying
text.
631. See Parts A.1-A.2; nn. 613, 626 and accompanying text.
632. See generally n. IV.68 (high seas military operations), Part E.2 (blockade areas), Part F.l .a (vacating immediate
area of naval operations), Part F.l.b (SDZs), Part F.2 (war zones).
633. ICAO Convention, art. 25; see also nn. IV.494-506 and accompanying text.
634. Hague V, arts. 11-15; Second Convention, arts. 5, 15; Protocol I, art. 31; Hague Air Rules, arts. 40, 42-43, 46;
see also AFP 1 10-31 H 2-6c; NWP 1-14M Annotated U 7.11; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.10; 2 Oppenheim §§ 337-38, 341a,
348a; 2 Pictet 41-45, 107-12; San Remo Manual H 168; Stone 386, 614; Tucker 251-52; nn. 613, 626 and
accompanying text.
635. Third Convention, art. 4; Fourth Convention, art. 42; Protocol I, art. 75; Hague Air Rules, arts. 32-38; see also
Bother al. 456-66; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 7.10.2, 8.2.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated 111 7.9.2, 8.2.2.1; 3 Pictet 45-73; 4
id. 257-59; Pilloud, Commentary 863-90; San Remo Manual 1111 165-67; Stone 614, 619.
636. First Convention, art. 23; Fourth Convention, arts. 14- 1 5 & Annex I (form draft agreement); see also G. A. Res.
2675 U 6 (1970), in Schindler & Toman 267, 268; AFP 110-31 111 12-2B, 14-3; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 8.5.1.5; NWP
9A Annotated U 8.5.1.5; 2 Oppenheim § 124b; 1 Pictet 206-16; 4 id. 120-33, 627-39; Stone 669-70 (First Convention,
art. 23 an innovation at the time), 689-90. Howard S. Levie, Civilian Sanctuaries: An Impractical Proposal, 1 Israel Y.B.
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Hum. Rights 335 ( 1 97 1 ) criticized civilian sanctuaries or refuges as G.A. Res. 2444 (1968), in Schindler & Toman 263,
proposed, saying existing humanitarian law supplied enough protection. These resolutions are not law but may recite
law or evidence trends in the law. Restatement (Third) §§ 102-03; see also n. III. 10 and accompanying text.
637. See Pan AA.
638. See n. 1 1 1 and accompanying text.
639. Sylvie-Stoyanka Junod, Protection of the Victims of Armed Conflict Falkland-Malvinas Islands (1982)
26, 33-34 (Int'l Comm. Red Cross ed. 1984); NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 8.5.1.5 n.121; NWP 9A Annotated H 8.5.1.5
n.101; San Remo Manual 11 160, cmts. 160.1-160.3.
640. San Remo Manual H 160 & cmts. 160.3-160.4; see also NWP 1-14M Annotated H 8.5.1.5 n.121; NWP 9A
Annotated H 8.5.1.5 n. 101.
641. Compare First Convention, art. 23; Fourth Convention, arts. 14-15 & Annex I with San Remo Manual 11 160&
cmts; see also nn. 636, 640 and accompanying text.
642. Insofar as possible a high seas Box should have the same terms, and be developed the same way, as those
created under First Convention, art. 23; Fourth Convention, arts. 14- 1 5 & Annex I. Suppose, e.g., belligerents wish to
create a Box whose area overlaps a belligerent's territorial sea or an area of territorial sea seaward of an occupied area.
See nn. 636-37 and accompanying text. There should not be one standard for the territorial sea part and another for the
high seas part. Given pervasive claims for a 12-mile territorial sea and its recognition for LOAC purposes {see Part A.4)
and the nature ofvessels available for hospital ships {e.g., US hospital ships are converted oilers) or seaborne transport,
there is more likelihood today than in earlier times {e.g., 1949, when the First and Fourth Conventions were signed)
that belligerents or perhaps neutrals as suggested above might wish to establish a zone including high seas and
territorial sea areas. Hospital ships on the high seas, and limited to operating there because of their draft, might
conduct triage and send patients to shore for further treatment, for example, in a zone that extends from the high seas
to shore.
643. See n. II.4 and accompanying text.
644. See nn. 11.224, 305, 345, 347 and accompanying text.
645. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
646. LOS Convention, arts. 19,38, 45; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(4);seenn. 11.364 (Iran naval maneuvers,
Gulf high seas), 365 (Saudi territorial sea), 379-81 (Gulf of Oman, Iran territorial sea, may have included Strait of
Hormuz), 411 (Iran territorial sea, Gulf high seas), 457 (Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman), IV. 17, 68 and accompanying
text; Parts IV.B.4, IV.B.6.
647. The United States paid for the Airbus claims, and presumably did so for other mistaken attacks, e.g., on
fishing vessels and dhows, where there was loss of life, injury or property damage. See also UN Charter, arts. 5 1 , 1 03; see
also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
648. See nn. 114-16 and accompanying text.
649. See Parts F.l.b-F.Lc.
650. Whether it would have been wise for Iran to do so, and thereby announce presence, is another matter. See nn.
11.103, 280, 306, 364-65, 379-81, 411, 458, V.515, 518, 539 and accompanying text.
651. See Parts C.3,D.l.
652. UN Charter, art. 2(4); LOS Convention, arts. 19, 87(1), 88; High Seas Convention, art. 2; Territorial Sea
Convention, art. 16(4); see also nn. IV.68, 75, 301-13, 337-50 and accompanying text.
653. LOS Convention, arts. 2, 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; Territorial Sea Convention, art. I; see also Parts
IV.B.l, IV.B.4.
654. See nn. 11.89-90, 101 (US NOTAM warning), 102, 109, 176 (US NOTMAR warning), 199-202, 208, 232, 288
(US NOTAM, NOTMAR warning on zones), 301, 420 (US NOTAM, NOTMAR warning of zones) and
accompanying text. This satisfied one requirement. See nn. 592-96 and accompanying text. San Remo Manual 11 106,
cmt. 106.6 says notification should notify international organizations, but this does not appear to be a customary
requirement. There is no record that the belligerents did not notify these organizations. The UN Security Council
certainly knew about them.
655. Walker, State Practice 169; see also nn. 592-96, 61 2 and accompanying text. Yoram Dinsiein, Remorks, in Panel,
n. 11.144, 608, said the zones were disproportionate in terms of naval assets and therefore disproportionate. However,
he did not take into account belligerent air assets, which can be used to enforce a zone without use of surface or other
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forces. The zones were therefore proportionate in area. Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone, n. 11.109, 124-25; Walker 169; see
also nn. 592-96, 612 and accompanying text.
656. See nn. 592-96, 604, 612, 657 and accompanying text.
657. See n. 600 and accompanying text.
658. NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.9; Almond, n. 426, 313-14; Boczek,Lazu of Warfare, n. 11.154, 258; Fenrick, The
Exclusion Zone, n. 11.109, 121-22; Goldie, Maritime War Zones, n. 11.519, 176; Goldie, Targeting, n. 11.262, 16-17;
McNeill, Neutral Rights, n. 11.354, 636; Robertson, U.S. Policy, n. III.439, 344-45; Ronzitti, The Crisis 41; Walker, Stare
Practice 168-69; nn. 605-09, 612 and accompanying text. Leckow, n. 11.147, 639, says Iran's zone was lawful because it
was more "defensive" in nature.
659. NWP 1-14M Annotated U 9.7; NWP 9A Annotated 11 9.7; San Remo Manual ITU 80, 87-89; Clingan, Submarine
Mines, n. III.840, 359-60; Dinstein, Remarks, n. 648, 608; see also Part G.2 and nn. VI.222-30 and accompanying text.
660. S.C. Res. 552, 582, 598, UN Docs. S/RES/552 (1984), S/RES/582 (1986), S/RES/598 (1987), in Wellens 452,
473, 454; see also Ronzitti, The Crisis 41.
661. See nn. 11.261, 292, V.476 and accompanying text.
662. See Part F.3.
663. See nn. 11.261, V.476 and accompanying text.
664. UN Charter, arts. 5 1, 1 03; see also nn. III. 1 0, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, 1V.6-25 and accompanying text; Part F.3.
665. See nn. 11.116, V.476 and accompanying text.
666. See nn. 633-35 and accompanying text.
667. See n. 613 and accompanying text.
668. See Part III.C.
669. See nn. II.81-85 and accompanying text.
670. See nn. Ill and accompanying text.
671. See nn. 645-50 and accompanying text.
672. Iraq also used gas against its own citizens. See generally Geneva Gas Protocol; see also nn. 11.14-15, 84, 300, 375,
486 and accompanying text.
673. The record is not clear on methods or means of some attacks, e.g., Iranian attacks on Iraqi shore facilities,
which probably included aircraft-launched weapons after flights over the Gulf. See generally Chapter II.
674. See nn. II. 1 79, 233, 250, 334, 354, 357, 359, 368-72, 420, 436, 442, 454-56, 493 and accompanying text. Melia, n.
II.6, 116-27, describes mine countermeasures operations from a US Navy perspective, reporting rumor that North
Korean-manufactured influence mines were laid; none were discovered.
675. Cf. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
676. See generally Parts A.1-A.2 and accompanying text.
677. Hague IX, art. 2. Other provisions regulate bombarding unfortified towns and notice to community
authorities and prohibit pillage. Hague IX, arts. 1-7. See also Cultural Property Convention, establishing cultural
property protections during war, to which the United States is not a party; Roerich Pact, a Western Hemisphere treaty
to which the United States is party, also protectioning cultural property; Toman; nn. V.I 10, 262, VI.272-77, 300-52
and accompanying text.
678. Compare Hague Air Rules, arts. 22-26 with Hague IX, arts. 1-7.
679. Colombos §§ 580-87 (inferring customary acceptance despite breaches of Hague IX rules); NWIP 10-2 111
621b, 623 (recitation of treaty law as custom, statement of military objective principle, warning if military situation
permits); NWP 1-14M Annotated UU 8.5.1-8.5.1.3, 8.5.2 (recitation oftreaty law as custom, citing Protocol I, art. 52(2)
by reference, warning if military situation permits, terror bombing forbidden); NWP 9A Annotated UU 8.5.1-8.5.1.3,
8.5.2 (same); 2 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 1 103, 1 139 (same conclusion as Colombos, Hague IX obsolete but restates
military objective principle); 2 Oppenheim § 213 (Hague IX states military objective test); Oxford Naval Manual,
arts. 25-29 (repeating Hague IX rules); San RemoManual U 40 & cmts. (Hague IX not cited; citing inter alia Protocol I,
art. 52); Stone 588 (Hague IX's art. 2 military objective principle); Tucker 143-45 (military objective principle);
O'Connell, International Law, n. III.252, 19; Robertson, Commentary, n. III.930, 166 (Hague IX in desuetude, citing
military objective principle in Hague IX, art. 2; Hague Air Rules, art. 23; Protocol I, art. 52); Russo, Targeting, n.
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III.624, 20 (rejecting Hague IX as custom); Verri, Commentary, n. IV. 71, 333 (Oxford Naval Manual broke new ground
in forbidding bombardment of unfortified undefended ports, etc.); see also First Convention, art. 50; Second
Convention, art. 51; Fourth Convention, art. 147; Protocol I, arts. 51(2), 57(2)(c), 85(2); AFP 110-31 (general
discussion, Hague Air Rules, arts. 22, 24-26 do not represent custom as total code); Bothe el al. 299-301, 320-26,
360-61, 367-68, 511-14; Hague Air Rules, arts. 22-26; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.3.7 n.82 (Hague Air Rules state
custom); 2 Oppenheim §§ 214a-214e; 1 Pictet 370-72; 2 id. 267-70; 4 id. 597-602; Pilloud, Commentary 610, 612,
630-37, 678-79, 686-87, 991-93; San Remo Manual 11H 83, 90, 106(e) (notice required for minefields, exclusion zones);
Maiheson, Remarks 426-27; Parts V.1-A.2; n. 112 and accompanying text. Neither Iran nor Iraq are parties to Hague
IX, although most other GulfWar participants were. The Ottoman Empire, predecessor sovereign to what is now Iraq,
and Persia, now Iran, signed but did not ratify Hague IX. Signatures, Ratifications and Accessions, Schindler & Toman
815, 816; TIF 442. To the extent Hague IX states customary law, all participants were bound by its terms.
680. Hague V, Regulations, art. 27; Hague IX, art. 5; First Convention, arts. 19, 21; Second Convention, art. 34;
Fourth Convention, arts. 18-19; Protocol I, arts. 12(4), 13; Bother al. 118, 121; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 8.5.1.4;
NWP 9A Annotated H 8.5.1.4; 2 Oppenheim §§ 120, 158; 1 Pictet 194-99, 200-02; 2 id. 189-93; 4 id. 141-56; Pilloud,
Commentary 166-69, 174-80; Stone 657-77, 669, 687.
681. This analysis does not consider the land campaigns and air attacks incident to them. See Chapter II; n. 673 and
accompanying text.
682. See nn. 675-79. Incidental terror to civilians is not prohibited; civilians will feel some fear and terror when a
nearby military objective is hit. Bothe et al. 300-01; 1 Levie, Code 217-18; NWP 1-14M Annotated U 8.5.1.2 n.l 12;
NWP 9A Annotated H 8.5.1.2 n.92; see also n. 679 and accompanying text. Thus if Iran or Iraq bombed an otherwise
legitimate target, e.g., an oil pumping facility with resulting fright to civilian population, that attack was lawful.
683. Hague VIII has been described as one ofthe least successful results ofthe 1907 peace conference. Colombos §§
508, 563-67; Levie 52-53; 2 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 1 138 (Hague VIII obsolete, but its principles are not); Stone
584 ("modest" provisions); Tucker 303 ("worthless"); Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 140. Seabed Arms Control Treaty,
art. 24 forbids laying nuclear-armed mines beyond the territorial sea limit; since none of these weapons were involved
in the Tanker War, the Treaty will not enter into the analysis, except in terms ofenvironmental concerns. The treaty
does not affect the law affecting conventional mines. Nor does the treaty prohibit placing nuclear weapons in the water
column above these waters, e.g., nuclear-armed depth charges or torpedoes. Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 426, 135-37;
NWP 1-14M Annotated H 10.2.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated II 10.2.2.1. See also Part IV.B.3; nn. VI. 222-30 and
accompanying text. The Tanker War did not involve Seabed Treaty principles; no nuclear mines were laid. Mine
Protocol, art. 1 says it applies to mines laid on the land, including those laid to interdict beaches or waterway or river
crossings but does not apply to anti-ship mines at sea. See also Levie 137-38; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 9.3. There is no
evidence Tanker War belligerents mined beach approaches as Iraq did in the 1990-91 Gulf War. See Melia, n. II.6,
127-31. Whether belligerents mined river or water crossings, e.g., in the Shatt al-Arab, is an issue beyond this book's
scope.
684. Hague VIII generally remains valid as a restatement of custom applied to all kinds of sea mines. Some States
might dispute applying it to other than automatic contact mines. 2 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 1 138; O'Connell, The
Influence 93 (UK admiralty questioned in 1939 whether it applied to magnetic mines); Stone 584 (acoustic,
magnetic mines literally not within its coverage); Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 146. However, NWIP 10-2 U 61 1 n.3 says
Hague VIII must be extrapolated to include acoustic, magnetic and other new devices to achieve a goal of protecting
peaceful shipping. Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 611, 29 reports that no World War I or II belligerent raised this point.
Whether Hague VIII applies as treaty law to other types of mines, its terms can be used as a general principle along
with other general principles of the LOAC, necessity and proportionality, to achieve the same result. ICJ Statute, art.
38(1); Restatement (Third) §§ 102-03; n. 111.10 and accompanying text; cf NWIP 10-2 H 611 n.3.
685. See generally Melia, n. II.6 for a history of US Navy mine countermeasures operations from the American
Revolution through 1991 and the 1990-91 war in the Gulf. Mines have been proposed for naval warfare since 1585;
belligerents' uncontrolled use of mines during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) led to Hague VIII. Levie, Mine
Warfare, n. 424, 9-23; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 9.2; NWP 9A Annotated 11 9.2.
686. Other modern mines include acoustic influence mines, which detonate upon "hearing" a ship's underwater
noise; mines that can count, i.e., can be preset to detonate after screening ships have passed in order to attack a major
target; pressure influence mines, which detonate with change in water pressure a passing ship causes; magnetic
influence mines, actuated by a ship's magnetic signature; devices that choose between false and real targets;
remote-control mines, a throwback to shore-based mines employed for centuries; and stealth mines, designed to
blend into the underwater environment. Mines can be moored to the bottom; can rise on a cable or, like CAPTOR,
attack like a torpedo; or be free-floating. Moored mines sometimes come loose from their tether and become
free-floating. Mines can either be self-actuating, i.e., once laid, they detonate in accordance with their sensors and
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internal programming, or controlled, i.e., an outside agency, e.g., a shore station or ship, must send the actuation signal
to the mine. Mines can have several characteristics, e.g., an acoustic mine can be programmed to count ships and
detonate below a more desirable target. See generally Levie, MineWarfare, n. 424, 97-133; MELiA,n. II.6, 5,41-66, 1 14,
136; NWP 1-14M Annotated 1111 9.2-9.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated UH 9.2-9.2.1; Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 142. The 1907
conference that produced Hague VIII gave little thought to the possibility of improved technology and development
of new types of mines. Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 611, 29. As in other weapons development areas, it was a case of
technology outrunning treaty law. See n. 173 and accompanying text. 2 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 1101 wrote in 1984
that there had been and would be little future use ofmine warfare; he was not correct. Mines are an inexpensive, easily
developed substitute for other forces (e.g., surface or air assets) that can be laid covertly with a possibility for great
psychological effect. Levie, MineWarfare,^ 426, 173 &n. 146, quoting Charles C. Petersen, Soviet Military Objectives
in the Arctic Theater, NWC Rev. 3, 8-9 (Autumn 1987). Mines can be very indiscriminate in their effect, however.
687. See nn. 11.179, 233, 250, 334, 354, 357, 359, 368-72, 420 and accompanying text. 2 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea
1138 says contact mines are obsolete; this has not proven to be true.
688. Hague VIII, art. 3; Corfu Channel, 1949 ICJ 22; Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 46-48, 1 12, 147-48; NWIP 10-2 H 61
1
(limited to automatic submarine contact mines, but see id. n. 3); Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 426, 44-47; NWP 1-14M
Annotated H 9.2.3 (Hague VIII, art. 3 military exigencies latitude remains the law, criticizing, at n. 25, San Remo
Manual approach); NWP 9A Annotated H 9.2.3 (same); 2 O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea 1 1 38; 2 Oppenheim § 1 82a; San
Remo Manual 11 83 & cmt. 83.3 (omitting military exigencies latitude in Hague VIII, art. 3, felt "not justified in the
light of the general requirement imposed upon belligerents to limit as far as possible the effect of hostilities"; the
Manual provides for this separately); Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 144. San Remo Manual H 83 adds that there is no
need to notify ifdeployed mines can only detonate against military objectives. This is consonant with the Hague VIII,
art. 3 exigencies requirement, and would cover a circumstance, e.g., when a belligerent warship is being chased by
opposing belligerent forces and deploys mines instead of, e.g., firing missiles or guns. Under these circumstances,
however, the notification requirement would arise after the engagement, when exigencies permit, for mines deployed
and not detonated. San Remo Manual H 83, cmt. 83.2 says notification can be accomplished by NOTAM publication
and communication with international organizations, naming IMO. Although Hague VIII deals only with automatic
submarine contact mines, see Levie, Commentary 141-42, Hague VIII's principles have been applied through custom to
other kinds ofmines and are thus employed here for LOAC sea mine principles generally. They have been applied by
analogy for defensive mining. See nn. 705-06 and accompanying text.
689. Hague VIII, arts. 1-2; Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 426, 27-42; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 9.2.3; NWP 9A
Annotated 11 9.2.3; 2 Oppenheim § 182a; San Remo Manual 11 86; Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 142-43. Oxford Naval
Manual, art. 20, would generally forbid laying automatic contact mines, anchored or not, in the "open sea." Post- 1913
State practice exploded any authority art. 20 may have had.
690. Although Hague VIII does not speak to it, conceivably a mine can lose its mooring and still be under
belligerent control. Hague VIII, art. 1(2); Colombos § 563; Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 424, 101-02 (control by acoustic,
electrical signal); NWIP 10-2 H 611 (limited to automatic contact mines, but see id. n. 3); NWP 1-14M Annotated U
9.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated 11 9.2.3; 2 Oppenheim § 182a; Oxford Naval Manual, art. 21(2); San Remo Manual 11 81;
Stone 584; Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 142-43.
691. Hague VIII, art. 1(1), declaring they must become harmless after an hour, the hour rule being superseded by
practice; Colombos § 563; Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 424, 27-31 ;NWIP 10-2 U 611 (limited to automatic submarine
contact mines, but see id. n. 3); NWP 1-14M Annotated H 9.2.3, 9-8 (US mines have self-neutralizing devices); NWP 9A
Annotated 11 9.2.3, 9-7 (same); 2 Oppenheim § 182a; Oxford Naval Manual, art. 21(1); San Remo Manual 11 82
(adding that mines must be directed toward a military objective, a truism for any weapons deployment); Stone 584;
Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 142-43; see also Parts A.1-A.2.
692. Contra, Stone 585 ("Nor can any restriction on aerial as distinct from naval mine sowing be spelled out of
treaties or practice.") Many commentators would disagree; e.g., Helsinki Principles; Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 424;
NWP 1 -14M Annotated; NWP 9A Annotated; San RemoManual make no distinction among minelaying platforms.
693. Hague VIII, art. $; see also Bother al. 172-75; Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 426, 49-51; NWP 1-14M Annotated H
9.2.3, 9-8; NWP 9A Annotated H 9.2.3, 9-23; Oxford Naval Manual, art. 24; 3 Pictet 541-53; Pilloud, Commentary
350-63; San RemoManual HIT 84,90-91 & cm ts. (citing inter alia Third Convention, art. 118; Protocol I, art. 33); Stone
584; Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 144-45; see also n. 715 and accompanying text.
694. NWP 1 -14M Annotated H 9.2.3 n.29 (citing the right of self-defense); NWP 9A Annotated H 9.2.3 n.23 (same);
San Remo Manual 11 92 (declaratory of customary law); see also Helsinki Principle 6.2; UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see
also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
695. E.g., a naval force may not enter a neutral coastal State's territorial sea to clear mines without that State's
permission. Cf. LOS Convention, art. 19; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(4); see generally Part IV.B.3. An exception
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to this in the mines context might be a CAPTOR-like mine laid in a coastal State's territorial sea, n. 686, that could
actuate and attack the force, thereby triggering a right ofself-defense for a neutral force or a right ofnecessity under the
LOAC for a belligerent's force, if a coastal State is powerless to remove the CAPTOR or like device. Under these
circumstances the force could enter a coastal State's territorial sea specifically and solely to deactivate or remove the
CAPTOR as a self-defense measure. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; Helsinki Principle 2.1 & cmt.; NWP 1-14M Annotated
11 7.3.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.3.4.2; San Remo Manual 11 22; UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10,47-630,
916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, V.694 and accompanying text.
696. NWP 1-14M Annotated H 9.2.3, 9-9; NWP 9A Annotated 11 9.2.3, 9-9; 2 Oppenheim § 182a (commenting on
contrary German World War I practice, Allied reprisals); cf. San Remo Manual 1! 87; see also Part IV.B.5. The 1907
diplomatic conference considered but did not adopt a provision to ban straits mining. See Levie, Mine Warfare, n.
424, 42-44.
697. Paris Declaration 11 4; Hague VIII, art. 2; London Declaration, arts. 1,4-5; Colombos § § 563, 821 (Hague VIII,
art. 2 useless on this point); NWIP 10-2 11 611 (limited to automatic submarine contact mines, but see id. n. 3); Levie,
Mine Warfare, n. 424, 32-34; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 9.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated 11 9.2.3; 2 Oppenheim §§ 182a
(commenting on contrary German World War I practice, Allied reprisals), 380a; San Remo Manual H 88; Tucker 303;
Fujita, n. IV.624, 70; cf. Oxford Naval Manual, art. 22; see also Levie 144-47, 153-55 (Haiphong harbor mine
blockade); Swayze, n. III.322, 163 (same); Parts IV.B.3-IV.B.4.
698. LOS Convention, art. 87(2); High Seas Convention, art. 2; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 9.2.3; NWP 9A
Annotated 11 9.2.3; 2 Oppenheim § 182a (commenting on contrary German World War I practice, Allied reprisals); San
Remo Manual H 80 & cmt. 80. 1; Tucker 303; fcuf 5ee Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 426, 34-42; Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 611,
31-32; see also nn. IV.75 (LOS due regard), V.58, 62 (LOAC due regard) and accompanying text; Part F.2. The Seabed
Arms Control Treaty does not apply to conventional mines. See n. 683. Stone 584 says Hague VIII does not forbid
high seas mining, but this may lead to "exhortation. "
699. UN Charter, art. 2(4); Hague VIII, arts. 1-2; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 9.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated H 9.2.2; San
Remo Manual 11 85; Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 142-43; see also LOS Convention, arts. 2, 8 (territorial sea, inland
waters part of coastal State sovereign territory); Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1, 5 (same); Parts IV.B.3-IV.B.4.
700. The 1907 conference that produced Hague VIII considered but did not adopt a prohibition on straits mining.
See n. 696 and accompanying text.
701. Hague VIII, art. 4 (notice for mines laid off neutrals' coasts, does not require notification for inland waters
mining). There is no customary requirement, except necessity and proportionality principles applicable to
self-defense, for notice. Other treaties might apply. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; Hague VIII, art. 4; Colombos § 568;
Levie,Mine Warfare^. 426, 47-49; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 9.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated 11 9.2.2; 2 Oppenheim § 363a;
Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 144; see also Stockholm Declaration, art. 2(2) (denial of warship access to mined areas,
Nordic inner waters; wording varies); Bring, Commentary, n. III.848, 842; nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25
and accompanying text; Parts IV.B.4-IV.B.5.
702. LOS Convention, art. 25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3); see also Parts IV.B.4-IV.B.5.
703. Hague VIII, arts. 4-5; Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 426, 47-51; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 9.2.2; NWP 9A
Annotated U 9.2.2; San Remo Manual H 86, cmt. 86.2.
704. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 9.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated 11 9.2.2; Clingan, Submarine
Mines, n. III.840, 356; A.G.Y. Thorpe, Mine Warfare atSea—Some LegalAspects ofthe Future, 18 ODIL 255,267 (1987);
but see Levie,Mine Warfare, n. 611, 31-32; UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10,47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25,
V.696 and accompanying text. One necessity and proportionality factor is availability of and providing of alternate
safe, convenient routes for neutral shipping. Cf. San Remo Manual HH 88-89.
705. Cf. Hague VIII, art. 3; see also n. 688 and accompanying text.
706. Cf. Hague VIII, art. 5; Corfu Channel, 1949 ICJ 22; Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 46-48, 1 12, 147-48; see n. 693 and
accompanying text.
707. See nn. 685-96 and accompanying text.
708. NWP 1-14M Annotated H 9.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated U 9.2.2; see also Parts IV.B.1-V.B.2.
709. E.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(2); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. IV.75 (LOS due regard analysis,
V.58, 62 (LOAC due regard analysis) and accompanying text. The Seabed Arms Control Treaty does not apply to
conventional mines or nuclear mines in a high seas water column. See n. 683.
710. Cf. San Remo Manual HH 88-89; see also n. 698 and accompanying text.
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711. E.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(2); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. IV.75 (LOS due regard analysis),
V.58, 62 (LOAC due regard analysis), 709 and accompanying text. Oxford Naval Manual, art. 20, would forbid
automatic contact mines "in the open sea." State practice and the authority ofUN Charter, art. 51, 103 supersede this
general aspiration. See also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
712. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
713. See generally Parts B-D.
714. See, e.g., nn. 11.260, 361, 373, 393-94, 412, 421, 446, 469, 519 and accompanying text.
715. See, e.g., nn. 11.179, 233, 250, 334, 354, 357, 359, 368, 420 and accompanying text.
716. Cf. Hague VIII, arts. 1,3; see also nn. 688, 690-92 and accompanying text.
717. See n. 692 and accompanying text.
718. Hague VIII, arts. 3, 5; nn. 688, 693 and accompanying text.
719. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 103; Hague VIII, arts. 1-2;NWP 1-14M Annotated HI 9.2.2 n. 23, 9.2.3 n. 26; n. 699 and
accompanying text.
720. Hague VIII, art. 1(2); NWP 1-14M Annotated H 9.2.3 n. 27; n. 690 and accompanying text.
721. There may have been agreements between belligerents and mine removal forces, but there is no published
record. Cf. Hague VIII, art. 5; Levie, The Nature, n. 109, 903-06; nn. 109, 688 and accompanying text. Levie, Mine
Warfare, n. 424, 88 notes that as a practical matter parties who must remove mines may not be able to do so because of
lack of resources or internal political conditions. Undoubtedly that was the case with the Tanker War belligerents.
722. See n. 700 and accompanying text; see also Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 426, 168-69.
723. Hague VIII, art. 2; see also n. 697 and accompanying text.
724. Hague VIII, art. 3; LOS Convention, art. 87(2); High Seas Convention, art. 2; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 9.2.3
n. 34; see also Levie,MineWarfare,^ 426, 168-69; nn. IV.75 (LOS due regard), V.58, 62 (LOAC due regard analysis),
698, 709, 711 and accompanying text.
725. See, e.g., nn. 11.436, 442, 454-56, 493 and accompanying text.
726. There were apparently no such threats during the Tanker War. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10,
47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, V.694-95 and accompanying text.
727. See nn. 11.264, 384 and accompanying text.
728. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 51, 103; Hague VIII, arts. 1-2; see also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and
accompanying text.
729. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 11.368-72, UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18,
968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
730. See nn. 693-98 and accompanying text.
731. See generally Parts A-G. 1
.
732. The Ottoman Empire, predecessor sovereign ofthe area that is now Iraq, and Persia, now Iran, signed Hague
VIII but never ratified it. Most Tanker War participants were parties. See Signatures, Ratifications and Accessions,
Schindler & Toman 807, 808; TIF 441-42.
733. See nn. III.485-630 and accompanying text (necessity, proportionality in self-defense context); Part A
(necessity, proportionality in LOAC context). Standards and criteria for necessity and proportionality are different,
depending on whether the situation is a self-defense response or an attack during war. See nn. 21-22 and
accompanying text.
734. See Parts B-D.
735. See Part E.
736. See Part F.
737. See Part G.
738. See nn. 11.153-56 and accompanying text.
739. Hague XIII, arts. 5, 8; Third Convention, art. 4A(5); see also n. 347 and accompanying text; these mariners did
not have Second Convention protections because their ships were not at sea. See Second Convention, arts. 12-21; 2
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Pictet 84-153; see also NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.10.2, 11.3-11.4, 11.7; NWP 9A Annotated HI 7.10.2, 11.3-11.4,
1 1.7; San Remo Manual Ml 161, 165-66; Stone 566-67, 674-75; cf. NWP 1- 14M Annotated 11 1 1 .4, at 1 1 -5. For analysis,
see nn. 740-41 and accompanying text.
740. Fourth Convention, art. 4; Protocol I, arts. 50 (presumption for civilian status), 75 (fundamental guarantees);
see also Bothe et al., 293-96, 456-66; NWP 1-14M Annotated 1 11.3; NWP 9A Annotated 1 11.3; 4 Pictet 45-51;
Pilloud, Commentary 610-12, 863-90; San Remo Manual 11 166(c), 167; Stone 704-05.
741. See generally Fourth Convention, arts. 7, 12-108; Protocol I, arts. 44-45; see also Bothe et al, 243-58, 260-62;
NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 11.4-11.5, 11.7-11.7.4; NWP 9A Annotated 1 11.4-11.7.4; 4 Pictet 65-72, 113-455;
Pilloud, Commentary 520-42, 544-59; Stone 446, 686-88, 695-706.
742. Third Convention, arts. 109-10; see also 3 Pictet 508-20; Stone 660-62; n. 746 and accompanying text.
743. Third Convention, art. 118; see also 3 Pictet 541-53; Stone 662-65.
744. See nn. 11.489-90 and accompanying text.
745. A Detaining Power is the country that has responsibility for a prisoner of war. Third Convention, art. 12; see
also 3 Pictet 128-39; Green 196-201; Stone 655-56, 666.
746. A Detaining Power wilfully causing great suffering or inhuman treatment of prisoners of war is guilty of a
grave breach of the Third Convention; wilful unjustifiable delay in repatriating prisoners ofwar or civilians is a grave
breach of Protocol I. Third Convention, art. 130; Protocol I, art. 85(4)(b); see also Bothe et al. 511-13,517-18; NWP
1-14M Annotated 1 6.2.5 n.58; NWP 9A Annotated 1 6.2.5 n.51; 3 Pictet 626-28; Pilloud, Commentary 991-92,
999-1001. Keeping prisoners of war 10 years after a war ends without a legitimate reason for doing so can be
characterized as wilful action causing great suffering or inhuman treatment to persons so detained. The record is not
clear whether Detaining Power actions were wilful and unjustifiable in not repatriating these persons, but 10 years'
confinement under the circumstances comes very close to being aperse violation.
747. See nn. 739, 741 and accompanying text.
748. Fourth Convention, arts. 8, 13-34, 47-131; Protocol I, arts. 72-76; see also Bothe et al. 441-73; NWP 1-14M
Annotatedl 11.8; NWP9A Annotated 1 11.8; 4Pictet73-80, 118-231, 273-510; Pilloud,Commentary 841-96; Stone
446, 686-89, 695, 700-06.
749. Fourth Convention, arts. 35-36; see also 4 Pictet 234-42; Green 196-201; Stone 688-90; n. 745 and
accompanying text.
750. Fourth Convention, art. 132; see also NWP 1-14M Annotated 1 11.8; NWP 9A Annotated 1 11.8; 4 Pictet
510-14.
751. See nn. 742-47 and accompanying text.
752. Fourth Convention, arts. 133-34; 4 Pictet 514-17.
753. Protocol I, art. 85(4)(b); see also nn. 745-46, 749 and accompanying text.
754. See nn. 11.358, 368-72 and accompanying text.
755. See nn. 11.431-33 and accompanying text; see also Levie, The Status, 31 VJIL, n. 11.410, 611-12.
756. See nn. 11.179 (mines), 233 (mines) 250 (mines), 260, 334 (mines), 354 (mines), 357 (mines), 359 (mines), 362,
368 (mines), 373, 393-94, 412, 420 (mines), 421, 446, 469, 519 and accompanying text.
757. See n. 755 and accompanying text.
758. Second Convention, art.12; Protocol I, art. 33; LOS Convention, art. 98; High Seas Convention, art.12; see
also nn. IV.816, V. 198-200 and accompanying text.
759. See nn. 755, 757 and accompanying text.
760. LOS Convention, art. 98; High Seas Convention, art. 12; see also n. IV.816, V.758 and accompanying text.
761. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
762. Second Convention, art. 12; Protocol I, art. 33; see also nn. IV.816, V. 198-200, 758 and accompanying text.
763. If this is the proper analysis, the LOAC applied through the LOS other rules principle. See, e.g., LOS
Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. 111.952-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying text.
764. See n. III. 10 and accompanying text.
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765. Hague V, art. 1 1 ; Hague XIII, arts. 3, 21 , 24; Second Convention, art. 1 5 ; Convention on Maritime Neutrality,
arts. 6, 17, Hague Air Rules, arts. 42-43; see also 2 Pictet 107-12; Stone 675; Schindler, Commentary, n. 62, 218-19.
766. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103, the latter stating that Charter law is supreme over all international agreements,
including Hague V, Hague XIII and Second Convention. See also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, V.760-63
and accompanying text, the last citation advancing a similar view in the context of rescuing these personnel on the
high seas.
767. See nn. 760-63, 766 and accompanying text.
768. Corfu Channel (UK v. Alb.), 1949 ICJ 22; Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 46-48, 1 12, 147-48; see also ICJ Statute, art.
38(1), Restatement (Third) §§ 102-03, n. 9 and accompanying text.
769. Second Convention, art. 12; Protocol I, art. 33; LOS Convention, art. 98; High Seas Convention, art. 12; see
also nn. IV.816, V.198-200, 758, 760 and accompanying text.
770. Hague IV, Regulations, arts. 22-24; AFP 110-31 HH 8-3a, 8-3b; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 12.1; NWP 9A
Annotated H 12.1; 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 1140; 2 Oppenheim § 211; San Remo Manual HH 109-11.
771. A different rule for aircraft as distinguished from warships has been explained that aircraft once flying
generally cannot change markings before attack as a warship can. Aircraft approach speed compared with ship speed
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Chapter VI
THE TANKER WAR AND THE MARITIME
ENVIRONMENT
Persian Gulf armed conflicts during 1980-88 (the Tanker War) and 1990-91
(the GulfWar between Iraq and the Coalition after Iraq's invasion and occu-
pation of Kuwait) resulted in environmental degradations of Gulf waters and the
land and airspace over States party to the conflicts. Perhaps the worst of these was
what a Time writer called a "Man-Made Hell on Earth" when Iraq dynamited over
550 of 684 producing Kuwaiti oil wells in early 1991 during the Gulf War.
This Chapter does not address the oil well destruction and other environmental
issues related to land warfare and conflict in the skies over the lands of countries
involved during either conflict, nor does it analyze the 1990-91 Gulf War's mari-
time aspects. Rather, this Chapter explores conflict at sea during the 1980-88
Iran-Iraq conflict, the Tanker War, in its environmental contexts. In some in-
stances the same issues arose in both conflicts, but the facts may point to different
analyses for the overland air and land battles ofboth wars or the 1 990-91 sea war.
In 1983 Iraqi rocket attacks hit Iran's Nowruz offshore drilling facilities, caus-
ing a 20-million barrel oil spill into the Gulf. Although early reports that the slick
had equalled the size of Belgium and had caused permanent ecological damage
were later discounted, it was big enough to threaten Bahraini, Qatari and Saudi de-
salination plants before strong winds blew it offshore and partially dispersed it.
Fish imports into the UAE were stopped because of oil contamination in fishing
grounds. Iraq rejected Iran's request for a partial truce so that oil cappers could try
to stop the2000-5000 barrels per day flow. The result was that the leakage lasted for
nine months. US diplomacy may have been behind eventual capping of the flow.
The Nowruz attack may have been in response to Iran's attack on Iraqi oil termi-
nals and ports early in the war, which resulted in their closure. There are no reports
of significant pollution of the Gulf resulting from these attacks. In 1986 Iraq
bombed Iran's Sirri, Lavan and Larak oil terminals, and Iran attacked the neutral
UAE's Abu al-Bakoush oil installations. There were also reports of attacks on Ku-
waiti territory. There were no reports of significant spillage into the Gulf in any of
these cases. Nor was there any report of oil slicks resulting from the 1984 Red Sea
mining episode. In 1987 US naval forces attacked Iranian offshore oil rigs used as
an Iranian gunboat base in response to Iran's Silkworm missile strike on a
reflagged tanker, S.S. Sea Isle City, in Kuwaiti waters. There is no report of petro-
leum spillage on the high seas resulting from these responses.
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Tanker War shipping losses from attacks by both belligerents were another
source ofmarine pollution during that conflict. Although most tankers traveled in
ballast to the Gulf, they and incoming cargo vessels had bunkers aboard. All out-
bound ships had bunkers aboard, and nearly all tankers leaving the Gulf departed
with a full load. These vessels as well as inbound and outbound cargo ships were at-
tacked by the belligerents. Iraq and Iran laid mines, either initially set adrift or
which came loose from moorings. Several merchantmen, some of them neutral
flagged, were mined. Iraq attacked tankers escorted by Iranian warships, and both
countries conducted land-based air attacks on neutral-flag merchant ships, pri-
marily tankers, some ofwhich were convoyed by neutral warships. Iran's navy at-
tacked these vessels as well. Iran saw its attacks as justified because of aid afforded
Iraq. The UN Security Council twice condemned the attacks and the result on the
environment. An Iraqi aircraft mistakenly launched two missiles at and seriously
damaged another US warship, the frigate U.S.S. Stark. An Iranian-laid mine seri-
ously damaged U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts, also a US frigate. Another marine pollu-
tion source came from losses of naval vessels, principally Iran's, hit as self-defense
measures following attacks on US naval vessels or after being caught laying mines,
e.g. the Iran Ajr. Iran saw the US attacks as aggression. Undoubtedly there was con-
tamination of the Gulf from petroleum cargoes and bunkers, although there is no
report ofsuch. The conflict was a major war, not a small one, particularly when the
commitments ofIran and Iraq were measured. For the only time since World War
II, deliberate, sustained operations were carried out against merchant ships. Iran
and Iraq attacked more than 400 merchantmen, sinking 31 with 50 more declared
total losses. Write-off losses stood at nearly half the World War II tonnage sunk.
Q
Over 200 merchant mariners died. (World War II lasted for just under six years
for all combatants except the United States and other States entering the war in
1941 or later, e.g., the USSR, and China, which had been Japan's object of aggres-
sion before 1939. The Iran-Iraq war ground on eight years. The reason for the dis-
parity between the relatively small number ofships lost and huge tonnage losses is
merchant vessels' relatively larger displacement in the Eighties.) The possible re-
sult when a tanker was attacked during 1980-88 was the risk of a considerably
larger oil spill for each ship attacked than during World War II. There were also
aircraft losses over the Gulf, notably the Airbus tragedy; however, there are no
reports of aviation fuel pollution.
Ifthe belligerents who initiated tactics resulting in environmental degradation
hoped to improve their fortunes by these tactics, they were mistaken. The Iran-
Iraq war wore on for five more years after the 1 983 Nowruz attack before ending in
mid-1988. The Iraqi attack on Nowruz was not a war-stopper; leakage from
stricken merchantmen did not even receive media attention, except what viewers
could observe in occasional videos of burning vessels.
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This survey does not include oil sent overboard in deballasting or from
land-based sources not connected with armed conflict in the Gulf. Worldwide fig-
ures for this pollution rose from about a million metric tons annually in the 1960s
to nearly 7 million tons in 1973, with over halffrom land-based sources and 35 per-
cent from ships. Two-thirds ofthe latter have been said to be from "routine tanker
operations."
Part A. Not a New Phenomenon
Environmental degradation during war, or international armed conflict as the
use of force by one State against another is commonly styled today, is not a new
phenomenon. Pollution of the sea on a measurable scale during war at sea has
largely been an aspect of Twentieth Century conflicts, particularly after oil re-
placed coal as a primary source of energy for steam-powered ships, and the world
began to consume petroleum as a primary fuel for transportation, a major source
for heating and an ingredient for plastics and other products. The Persian Gulfhas
been a particularly busy highway for transporting petroleum; a high percentage of
the Earth's proven reserves are within States bordering the Gulf. The ocean pollu-
12 f r
tion problem is not new or confined to the Gulf, however; the Tanker War
merely underscored issues that have arisen on a world-scale basis, usually in the
context ofaccidents through tanker collisions or groundings. These accidents, like
loss ofR.M.S. Titanic in 1912 and the resulting 1914 Convention for Safety of Life
at Sea, have been catalysts for treaties or other action to prevent recurrences.
The world little noted warnings ofthe potential for environmental degradation
ofthe seas before, during and after the Tanker War. After the 1990-91 GulfWar,
when the world focused attention on Iraqi actions that many claimed violated
international environmental norms, there were calls for action in the United Na-
tions and other quarters for more treaties, e.g., a Fifth or "Green" Geneva Conven-
1 n
tion to protect the environment during armed conflict. These efforts largely
came to naught, primarily because most participants concluded no new agree-
18
ments were necessary ifexisting ones were enforced. The question ofbelligerent
culpability for environmental damage during international armed conflict at sea
remains as a possible source of rhetoric, if not law, in future wars. Publication of
the International Committee of the Red Cross Guidelines (1994), the San Remo
Manual (1995) and TVtt^P 1-14M (1997) demonstrates that the issue remains alive
20
within governments and in commentators' minds.
This Chapter limits its coverage to the LOS, the oceans environment and how
these sometimes overlapping bodies oflaw relate to the LOAC and self-defense at
sea. Except as concepts spill over physically or legally, land-based aspects of envi-
ronmental issues (e.g., transborder air pollution), problems related exclusively to
land warfare or war in the air or space above the land, are not discussed. Thus the
air war from the sea, i.e., air strikes from land-based Iranian or Iraqi aircraft flown
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over the sea, or from neutrals' warships in the Gulf, are analyzed, but principles of
air-to-air combat over land or attacks on land targets from the land without flight
over the Gulf are outside the parameters.
Part B. 1 attempts to place the law ofthe maritime environment in the context of
the UN Charter; the law of the Charter was analyzed in more depth in Chapter III,
to which reference will be made. Part B.2 reviews the LOS, particularly the 1982
LOS Convention and its and other conventions' relationship with the law of the
maritime environment and the LOAC; this was explored in more depth in Chapter
IV, to which reference will be made. Part B.3 discusses the LOAC, discussed in the
general context of the war in Chapter V, as it relates to Tanker War environmental
issues. Part B.4, drawing on current thinking in the Restatement (Third), Foreign
RelationsLaw ofthe United States, US conflict oflaws and recent publications on the
LOAC appearing since the Tanker War, offers an analytical method for the com-
plex relationship among these bodies of law.
Part B. Charter Law, the Law of the Sea, the Law of the Maritime
Environment, and the Law of Armed Conflict
There is an enormous volume oflaw related to the maritime environment, most
of it in treaties appearing since the 1958 LOS conventions. If international agree-
21 • 22
ments related to marine resources conservation or maritime safety are con-
sidered, insofar as observing these standards would promote a better oceans
environment, there were scattered efforts at protection of the oceans well before
1958. The same is true with respect to the LOAC, where treaties negotiated to regu-
late aspects ofwarfare or humanitarian principles to be observed during war deri-
vatively benefit the environment. Agreements of this nature include the 1907
Hague Conventions dealing with shore bombardment and mine warfare; the
1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, whose prohibitions on gas and bacteriological warfare
affect human and nonhuman inhabitants of the environment; the 1935 Roerich
25
Pact protecting monuments, etc., ashore; parts of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions; and the 1954 Cultural Property Convention, which provides inter alia for
safe sealift of protected objects during war. More recently the ENMOD Conven-
tion and Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions have included provisions that
are protective of the environment.
The 1996 International Court of Justice Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear
Weapons advisory opinion ruled 8-7 that threat or use ofnuclear weapons would be
contrary to international law except in self-defense situations where a State's sur-
28
vival is at stake. In so deciding the Court said environmental considerations are
29
an element to be taken into account in implementing the LOAC and considered
the impact of some of the foregoing international agreements in the nuclear war-
r 30
tare context.
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There is thus as deep a legacy ofwhat today are called environmental concerns
in the law ofarmed conflict as those agreements dealing with pollution or species
protection, which today might be lumped under the same rubric.
/. The UN Charter and the Environment
Not surprisingly, given the era when it was drafted, negotiated and signed, the
UN Charter has no direct reference to protection of the environment. Environ-
mental protection might be subsumed under Articles 1(3)-1(4) and 55-56, particu-
larly if the environment is considered a human right or if protection of health is
involved. Article 55 has been the linchpin for theUN Environmental Programme,
established through UN General Assembly Resolution 2994 (1972). Like all
General Assembly resolutions, Resolution 2994 as a recommendation is not law-
making in and ofitself, although it can restate existing law and thereby strengthen
32
it, or contribute to development ofcustom. However, ifthe UN Security Council
resolution is a decision, that resolution binds UN Members; if the Council passes
other resolutions, e.g., recommendations, those are not binding on Members. The
latter resolutions may also contribute to development of law, like General Assem-
33
bly resolutions.
During the Tanker War no Security Council resolution directly addressed en-
vironmental issues. The Council did pass resolutions, nonbinding like decisions,
calling on the belligerents to observe international humanitarian law and con-
demning gas warfare, the latter a feature ofthe land campaigns. As will be noted
in the LOAC analysis, implementing these resolutions would have promoted a
35
better environment. Council Resolution 552 (1984), condemning attacks on
ships exercising freedom ofnavigation and reaffirming the right offree navigation
in international waters and shipping lanes en route to and from States not party to
the conflict, likewise could have promoted a better environment. The resolution
did decide to revisit the problem, but no further Council action on the freedom of
navigation issue was taken. If belligerents' attacks on ships had ceased, there
would not have been the oil pollution problem associated with leakage after
attacks.
37
The inherent right to self-defense and the respect due States' territorial integ-
38
nty was also implicated in TankerWar environmental issues. Neutrals exercised
the right to self-defense of their warships and aircraft in responding to belligerent
attacks by sea (e.g., mines, speedboat attacks) and the air (e.g., missiles, aircraft at-
tacks), including belligerent attacks on neutral convoys. Articles 2(4) and 5 1 ofthe
Charter, like the rest of the Charter, do not speak to environmental protection in
affirming the entitlement ofStates to respect for their territorial integrity or the in-
r 39
herent right to self-defense. However, parties are obliged, under general princi-
ples of necessity and proportionality and admitting of no other alternative in the
context of anticipatory self-defense, to have due regard for the potential for
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environmental degradation in self-defense responses. Observance ofStates' enti-
tlement to their territorial integrity necessarily involves respect for what is on that
territory, i.e., its environment.
Iran's attack on neutrals' coastal facilities was an Article 2(4) violation, unless it
was somehow excused, e.g., by mistake as in the case of the Airbus tragedy.
Whether States observed due regard for the maritime environment in self-defense
responses is less than clear from the war's history, which has no record of spills in-
cident to these situations. However, in the absence ofbinding Charter law, i.e., Se-
curity Council decisions, States responding in self-defense should have had due
regard for the environment in those decisions, such due regard being conditioned
on information available at the time of decision.
2. The 1982 LOS Convention and Environmental Protection
The 1982 LOS Convention is the first worldwide multilateral agreement at-
tempting to deal comprehensively with maritime environmental problems. For
those countries that are or become parties, the 1982 LOS Convention will replace
the 1958 LOS conventions. With respect to countries involved in the Tanker
War, Bahrain and Iraq ratified it in 1985, and Kuwait in 1986; others, e.g., France
and the UAE, were signatories. However, other countries with prominent roles in
the war were not signatories or parties, e.g., the United Kingdom and the United
States. Thus some States were obligated not to defeat the Convention's object
and purpose during the war; others were bound by custom the Convention re-
stated.
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The LOS Convention has different provisions dealing with the welter of cus-
tom and treaties affecting the maritime environment; it continues 1958 conven-
tion provisions stating the relationship between the LOS and the LOAC and its
component, the law of naval warfare. Part B.2.a analyzes the relationship among
the 1982 Convention, other LOS conventions and other treaties related to protect-
ing the maritime environment. Part B.2.b discusses exceptions to applying the
Convention during armed conflict. Part B.2.c analyzes the Convention's provi-
sions governing environmental protection. Part B.2.d offers general comments on
these relationships.
a. The Relationship Between the 1982LOS Convention and Other Environmen-
tal Treaties. The LOS Convention will be an effective if mild trumping device
much as UN Charter, Article 103 declares that the Charter supersedes other trea-
ties, for agreements related to environmental protection, whether already in
force or to come into force, which may have special terms but which "should be
carried out in a manner consistent with the general principles and objectives of
48
[the] Convention." This is slightly different from art. 31 1(2), the Convention's
^eneral supersession provision, which declares it does not alter existing rights
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"which arise from other agreements compatible with this Convention" and which
do not affect enjoyment of other parties' rights or performance of their obliga-
tions. The upshot is that all agreements in place or to be negotiated, if related to
Convention environmental norms, must conform generally to these norms.
Reading of Part XII of the LOS Convention, as well as environmental stan-
52
dards scattered elsewhere throughout the Convention, demonstrates that specif-
ics are more often found in other agreements, perhaps bilateral but frequently
regional in recent years. The latter have been often sponsored by theUN Environ-
ment Programme (UNEP), which developed after the Stockholm 1972 UN Con-
53
ference on the Human Environment. Examples ofthese include two particularly
relevant to this analysis, the Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol (1978)
and the Red Sea Convention and Protocol (1982). (Although the Persian Gulf
was the theater of maritime military operations during the Tanker War, Libyan
mines were discovered in the Red Sea in 1984. US and other States cooperated in
removing them. ) In many instances administrative bodies established by the
57
treaties develop detailed regulations. The LOS Convention contemplates this
procedure.
There is the possibility that a parallel but contradictory custom or other source
59
of law may develop alongside Convention-based norms. The developing cus-
tomary norm might be the same as, and thereby strengthen, the Convention
norm. If in opposition, the custom will weaken the treaty norm. However, no
treaty, and probably no custom, can supersede the UN Charter, mandatory norms
developed under it, orjus cogens norms.
b. "Other Rules" Clauses in the Conventions. The 1958 and 1982 LOS Conven-
tions include clauses, sometimes overlooked in analysis or commentary, stating
that rights under these agreements are subject to "other rules ofinternational law"
as well as terms in the particular convention. For example, LOS Convention, ar-
ticle 87(1), declaring high seas freedoms, also says that "Freedom ofthe high seas is
exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of
international law." Four conclusions can be stated.
First, the overwhelming majority ofcommentators including the International
Law Commission (ILC), a UN General Assembly agency of international law ex-
perts, have said the "other rules" clauses in the 1958 and 1982 LOS Conventions
refer to the LOAC, a component ofwhich is the law ofnaval warfare. Therefore,
provisions such as 1982 Convention Article 88 state a truism, i.e., the high seas are
reserved for peaceful purposes, but high seas usage can be subject to the law ofna-
val warfare when Article 87(1 )'s other rules clause is read with Article 88. As in the
case of the 1958 conventions,
That provision does not preclude . . . use of the high seas by naval forces. Their use for
aggressive purposes, which would . . . violat[e] . . . Article 2(4) ofthe [UN] Charter . .
.
,
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is forbidden as well by Article 88 [ofthe LOS Convention]. See also LOS Convention,
Article 301, requiring parties, in exercising their rights and p[er]forming their duties
under the Convention, to refrain from any threat or use of force in violation of the
Charter.68
This analysis is buttressed by the Charter's trumping clause; no treaty can super-
sede the Charter. Thus the peaceful purposes language in Article 88 and other
70LOS Convention provisions cannot override Charter norms, e.g., those in Arti-
cle 2(4), but also those in Article 5 1, i.e., the inherent right ofindividual and collec-
71
tive self-defense. Naval forces of neutral and belligerent States may use the high
seas for military purposes (e.g., for formation steaming) as part of the freedom of
the seas, although these forces may be restricted in other maritime zones, e.g., the
territorial sea. Belligerents may also restrict high seas usage in the immediate vi-
cinity ofnaval operations and establish other kinds ofzones, e.g., war zones, on and
72
over the high seas. The other rules clauses come into force for States engaged in
armed conflict.
Second, there is no indication that the LOS Convention drafters thought that
the other rules clauses referred to anything else, and particularly to a customary
law of the environment. International environmental law was a gleam in academ-
ics' and futurists' eyes when the 1958 LOS Conventions were signed, with only a
73
patchwork of treaties on the subject, and there is no indication the International
Law Commission considered the environment issue. By contrast, there was estab-
lished law dealing with armed conflict situations, including naval warfare, at the
time.
Third, other agreements dealing with protecting the maritime environment in-
clude clauses exempting, or partially exempting, their application during armed
conflict or similar situations. Some speak of war, others armed conflict or the
75
need to protect vital national interests. This includes the North Atlantic Free
Trade Agreement. This tends to confirm the view ofapplying the LOAC as a sep-
arate body oflaw in appropriate situations. To the extent that treaties dealing with
77
the maritime environment do not have such clauses, such agreements must be
read in the light of the LOS conventions, which include such provisions. To the
extent the 1958 LOS conventions today recite customary norms, e.g., the High
78
Seas Convention, applying the LOAC as a separate body oflaw in appropriate sit-
uations as a customary norm must also be considered with LOAC treaties and
79
other sources when analyzing environmental issues in this context.
80
Fourth, principles of the law of treaties
,
e.g., impossibility of performance;
Ol
fundamental change of circumstances; desuetude, or lack of use of a treaty for a
8? • 83
considerable time; or war, the last applying only to parties to a conflict; may
suspend operation of international agreements during a conflict or other emer-
gency situation, or may terminate them. Armed conflict does not suspend or ter-
minate humanitarian law conventions or treaties governing conduct ofhostilities,
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including rules for neutrals. The other side of the coin ispacta sunt servanda, i.e.,
85
treaties should be observed; manifestation ofthis principle is that States signing
treaties should not behave so as to defeat their object and purpose. The of-
87
ten-amorphous law of treaty succession must be considered, particularly for
older agreements, including those stating the LOAC, to the extent that such trea-
ties are not customary law today. If treaties restate custom, and are subject to suc-
88
cession principles as to a particular country, that State is doubly bound.
The conclusion is inescapable that the 1958 Conventions' other rules clauses,
conventions carried forward into the 1982 LOS Convention, mean that these trea-
ties' terms are subject to the LOAC, of which the law of naval warfare is a part.
89
Since the High Seas Convention is generally regarded as restating custom, its
other rules clause is part of the customary norms governing oceans law during
armed conflict.
c. The LOS Convention and Provisions Governing the Maritime Environment.
Although the LOS Convention is prolix on the subject of the environment, the
90
changes it proposes are neither great nor radical; it takes a holistic approach. The
core ofmarine environmental standards are in Part XII, which establishes for the
first time a comprehensive legal framework for protecting and preserving the ma-
91
rine environment under the law ofthe sea. Part II.B.3.c.i summarizes these rules.
92
Other parts of the Convention state environmental principles for ocean areas;
Part II.B.3.c.ii discusses these. Part II.B.3.c.iii explores the relationship among
two regional treaties, the Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol and the Red
Sea Convention and Protocol, the 1982 Convention and the LOAC. Part II.B.3.c.iv
gives general observations, and Part II.B.3.c.v discusses the Tanker War and the
environment.
i. Part XII ofthe Convention. Part XII begins by declaring that "States have the
93
obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment." The Convention
does not define "marine environment," but the drafters generally understood that
94
the atmosphere is included where relevant. It also includes living resources, ma-
95
rine ecosystems and sea water quality. The Convention defines "pollution ofthe
marine environment;" it
. .
.
means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy
into the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result
in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to
human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate
uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of
amenities.96
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The Convention also declares that States' "sovereign right to exploit their natural
resources" pursuant to national environmental policies in, e.g., the EEZ, is subject
97 9R
to a "duty to preserve and protect the marine environment" against significant
damage.
States must act individually and jointly to prevent, reduce and control pollu-
tion ofthe marine environment from any source, using the best practicable means
at their disposal, in accordance with their capabilities. They must harmonize na-
99
tional policies, i.e., national laws, with this requirement. In doing so, they must
ensure that they do not damage other States or their environment by pollution, or
that pollution does not spread beyond their areas of sovereignty or control, e.g.,
the EEZ or the territorial sea. Required measures include those designed to
minimize to the greatest possible extent releasing toxic, harmful or noxious sub-
stances, especially those that are persistent, from land-based sources, from or
102
through the atmosphere or by dumping; pollution from vessels, including ac-
cident prevention measures, dealing with emergencies, safety at sea, preventing
discharges, and regulating the design, construction, equipping, operating and
crewing ofvessels; pollution from installations for exploring or exploiting natural
resources of the seabed and subsoil; and pollution from other installations operat-
103 ring in the marine environment. In so acting States must refrain from unjusti-
fiable interference with other States' exercising their Convention rights and
duties. Measures taken must include those necessary to protect and preserve
rare or fragile ecosystems and habitats of depleted, threatened or endangered spe-
cies and other marine life. In combatting pollution, States must not act to trans-
fer damage or hazards from one area to another, or to transfer one type ofpollution
into another. Technologies that alter or harm the environment, or introduce
new or alien species that would significantly harm the environment must be
107 r
avoided. There are two distinct duties: avoiding use of harmful technologies,
and "maintaining] the natural state of the marine environment," the latter an in-
108
novation in international law.
The Convention requires environmental cooperation on global and regional
109
bases. Other provisions require cooperation in scientific research and in estab-
lishing scientific criteria for rules for pollution prevention, reduction and con-
trol. States also must monitor, publish and assess the marine environment and
provide scientific and technical assistance, with preference for developing States.
A State must notify other countries and competent international organizations
112
(e.g., IMO) of actual or imminent pollution damage to the environment. Notifi-
113
cation is a rule ofcustomary international law. Notice "also envisages that a no-
tified State may wish to take preventive action to avert damage to itself . . . ."
States must jointly develop and promote contingency plans to combat pollution,
cooperating with international organizations within limits oftheir capabilities.
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The Convention establishes standards for international rules and national laws
to combat pollution. States must adopt measures at least as effective as inter-
national rules and standards to prevent, reduce and control pollution from
land-based sources; seabed activities, artificial islands and installations subject to
117
"national jurisdiction;" the Area; and vessels of their registry or flag. The
phrase "national jurisdiction" includes internal waters, the territorial sea, the
118
EEZ, the continental shelf and archipelagic waters.
119
Similar principles govern ocean dumping. Dumping in another State's terri-
torial sea, EEZ or continental shelfwaters requires the coastal State's express prior
approval; it may regulate such dumping after consulting with other affected coun-
tries.
120
Although some drafters thought that emergency fuel discharge from aircraft
might not be an exception to prohibitions on ocean dumping without prior express
approval, eventually the drafters concluded that general international law allows
such on force majeure or distress theories as an exception to Convention compli-
121
ance. What is true for aircraft is also true for ships; distress andforce majeure the-
ories are recognized for innocent passage and straits transit passage regimes.
Distress and force majeure can be valid claims during armed conflict situations,
with different rules applying in relationships among States not party to a conflict,
relationships between belligerents and States not party to a conflict, and relation-
122
ships between belligerents.
States must harmonize national policies at regional levels and must work at
the global level to establish rules, standards and recommended practices and pro-
cedures.
ii. Controlling Pollution and Protecting the Ocean Environment in Specific
Areas. The 1982 Convention, Part XII, recites standards related to specific ocean
areas, e.g., the territorial sea. In some instances, e.g., the contiguous zone, there is
no reference in Part XII.
The Convention has special rules for controlling pollution from vessels in the
territorial sea. States may publish rules for foreign-flag ships' entry into port or in-
ternal waters after due notice. These can be cooperative arrangements. States may
adopt rules for foreign-flag vessels in their territorial sea, including ships in inno-
1 2^
cent passage. No rule can hamper innocent passage.
These provisions are consistent with the Convention's navigational articles,
which declare that passage is considered prejudicial to the coastal State's peace,
good order or security ifa foreign-flag ship "engages in . . . any act ofwilful and seri-
ous pollution contrary to [the] Convention [,]" and which allows the coastal State
to adopt regulations, "in conformity with . . . this Convention and other rules ofin-
ternational law, relating to innocent passage ... in respect of. . . conservation ofthe
living resources ofthe sea [and] . . . preservation of the environment of the coastal
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State and the prevention, reduction and control ofpollution thereof. . . " with due
notice of the rules. Foreign ships must comply with these rules. Tankers, nu-
clear-powered ships and vessels carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or
noxious substances or materials may be required to confine their passage to sea
lanes established by the littoral State. These ships must also observe special pre-
127
cautions stated in international agreements. As in other circumstances, coastal
States cannot hamper innocent passage except pursuant to the Convention; in ap-
plying regulations adopted in accordance with it, the practical effect cannot be to
deny or impair innocent passage. There can be no discrimination in form or fact
against any State's ships or against vessels carrying cargo to, from or for any
128
State. However, coastal States may act to prevent breach ofconditions attached
to port calls or passage to internal waters, and some countries already have
129
anti-pollution regulations. Moreover, States may temporarily suspend inno-
cent passage in specific areas of their territorial sea if essential for protecting their
1 30
security after duly published notice of a suspension. While this might arguably
allow suspension for "environmental security" reasons, such is not the case. Repe-
131
tition from the Territorial Sea Convention and the LOS Convention drafting
1 32
history point to a different view. The right of temporary suspension balances
between a coastal State's right to protect its territorial integrity through legitimate
133
self-defense measures and rights of navigation, etc., under the territorial sea in-
nocent passage regime. How protecting a coastal State's environment fits into the
analysis is a different issue.
The same territorial sea rules for criminal and civil jurisdiction, and for immu-
nity of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial pur-
poses, also apply to environment-related claims. For example, warships not
complying with valid coastal State environmental regulations can only be asked to
leave the territorial sea immediately. Flag States are responsible under international
law for loss or damage caused by their warships or other noncommercial vessels.
The Convention innocent passage rules, insofar as they concern environmental
protection, are also subject to "other rules of international law," i.e., the law ofna-
135
val warfare.
Straits passage or innocent passage through straits is nonsuspendable. Al-
though coastal States may take appropriate enforcement measures against vessels
"causing or threatening major damage" to the straits environment because they
have violated navigational safety, maritime traffic or environmental laws while in
transit passage (the regime for most straits), this does not apply to warships or
1 27
other vessels entitled to sovereign immunity. "Heavily used sea lines of ap-
proach, such as the Straits ofHormuz or the Malacca Straits are likely candidates
1 38
for onerous environmental restrictions." However onerous these restrictions
may be, they are subject to LOS Convention rules on nonsuspendable transit or
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innocent passage, sovereign immunity and other rules ofinternational law, i.e., the
LOAC, and the inherent right of self-defense.
Convention Article 33, permitting a contiguous zone, does not mention envi-
ronmental protection. It allows declaring a contiguous zone, which, ifno EEZ has
been claimed, is a high seas area contiguous to a territorial sea but no wider than 24
miles from territorial sea baselines. A coastal State may exercise control in the zone
to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary (i.e., health
or quarantine) laws and to punish violations committed within the territorial
sea. Environmental protection claims might be made in connection with health
law enforcement, but this has not been a traditional view ofthe zone's purpose.
Article 33 is tied to Article 303, which sets standards for archeological and his-
torical objects found at sea. "Found at sea" seems to have a more comprehensive
scope than "found in the marine environment." Another problem with Article 303
is that there is no agreed definition of the terms "archaeological" and "histori-
cal." Article 303 says that its terms are also "without prejudice to other interna-
tional agreements and rules of international law regarding the protection of ob-
jects of an archaeological and historical nature," a variant on the other rules
clauses that make the Convention subject to the LOAC in appropriate situa-
tions. In internal waters, the territorial sea and archipelagic waters, coastal State
law governs for artifacts found there; beyond, out to the Area, Article 303 con-
trols but does not accord sovereign rights. Objects found in the Area must be
preserved or disposed of for humankind's benefit, with "particular regard" for a
149
State oforigin, if it can be determined. As noted above, the latter principle does
not apply to the Persian Gulf, which because of its depth has no Area.
As in the case ofthe territorial sea, coastal States may adopt special laws for their
EEZs; this is consistent with the LOS Convention's navigational articles. l
Although there is no explicit cross-reference to Convention continental shelfprin-
ciples in this Part XII provision, a coastal State has the same environmental rights
and responsibilities for its continental shelf activities where shelf sovereignty has
153been declared but there is no EEZ claim. States often declare common EEZ and
continental shelfboundaries; there can be a continental shelfwithout an EEZ, but
there can be no EEZ without a corresponding continental shelf. However, for
the EEZ and the continental shelf, coastal States must have due regard for other
oceans users' high seas rights, including navigation and overflight. Both are
subject to sovereign immunity exceptions for, e.g., warships and the other rules
principle in connection with environmental regulation.
Provisions allowing coastal State regulation ofpollution from vessels in the ter-
ritorial sea, the EEZ and above the continental shelf are considered "innovative]
for the general law ofthe sea," which usually has looked to flag or registry States to
157
control pollution from ships. Whether considered established law or progres-
sive development, these provisions are subject to qualifications. There must be a
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balance of due regard for others' high seas rights, e.g., freedoms of navigation or
overflight; warships and other noncommercial vessels retain sovereign immunity;
and any attempt at environmental regulation of these areas is subject to LOAC
principles in appropriate situations through other rules clauses.
The 1982 Convention also provides for enforcing environmental standards.
Countries must adopt laws implementing international norms for land-based pol-
lution, pollution from seabed activities, ocean dumping and pollution through or
158 159from the atmosphere. A pollution hazard must be significant.
States in whose port a ship suspected ofpolluting that State's internal or territo-
rial waters or EEZ in violation of international standards may investigate, detain
or begin enforcement against that ship. These rights are subject to, e.g., notice to a
flag or registry State, nondiscriminatory enforcement and enforcement only
through State vessels, e.g., warships or vessels on authorized government ser-
vice. Enforcing States may not endanger navigational safety, create a hazard to
an accused ship, bring it to an unsafe port or anchorage, or expose the marine envi-
ronment to "unreasonable risk." A detaining State is liable for unlawful en-
forcement measures, excessive "in the light of available information" at the
time. LOS Convention Article 221 also provides:
1. Nothing . . . prejudice^] the right of States, pursuant to international law, both
customary and conventional, to take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea
proportionate to the actual or threatened damage to protect their coastline or related
interests, including fishing, from pollution or threat of pollution following upon a
maritime casualty or acts relating to such a casualty, which may reasonably be
expected to result in major harmful consequences.
2. . . . "[Mjaritime casualty" means a collision of vessels, stranding or other
incident ofnavigation, or other occurrence on board a vessel or external to it resulting
in material damage or imminent threat of material damage to a vessel or cargo.
Measures that may be taken under Art. 221(1) include destruction of the vessel.
These provisions, also in other widely-accepted pollution prevention conven-
tions, may be close to acceptance as customary international law, if such is not
already so. Such an intervention right would have justified Gulf countries' act-
ing to prevent oil pollution damage from attacks on oil terminal facilities or vessels
during the Tanker War, ifthere was a threat within the LOS Convention defini-
tion and leakage resulting from the attacks was a "casualty" within Article 221(2)'s
meaning, i.e., an "occurrence on board a vessel or external to it resulting in, or im-
minent threat of, material damage to a vessel or cargo." The provisions may not
have applied to Iran and Iraq in 1980-88 because of the LOS conventions' other
rules clauses, applicable at least as customary law, but as between Gulf States not
party to the conflict and either belligerent, or as among other neutral States and the
belligerents, the LOS applied in this context. Neutrals would have been justified
in using LOS intervention standards to deal with vessel spillages and, if"maritime
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casualty" is construed to include the platforms, action to deal with situations like
Nowruz.
In the context of the Convention's enforcement provisions, here too warships,
naval auxiliaries and other vessels or aircraft on government noncommercial ser-
vice may not be detained. They have sovereign immunity; this is qualified by re-
quiring flag States to ensure, by adopting "appropriate measures" not impairing
operations or operational capabilities of such ships or aircraft, that they operate
consistently, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with the Convention. This pol-
icy repeats other Convention immunity rules except for the "appropriate mea-
I en
sures" qualification. It
. . . acknowledges that military vessels and aircraft are unique platforms not always
adaptable to conventional environmental technologies and equipment because of
weight and space limitations, harsh operating conditions, the requirements of
long-term sustainability, or other security considerations. . . . [S]ecurity needs may
limit compliance with disclosure requirements. 1^
Some regional environmental protection agreements either omit a declaration
of the customary immunity rule or do not append LOS Convention limitations
and requirements for appropriate measures. The Kuwait and Red Sea Conven-
170
tions are examples ofthe latter. To the extent the Convention binds parties in a
171
given context, those treaties must be considered modified to that extent. Since
the LOS Convention's navigational articles restate custom, the longstanding cus-
1 To
tomary rule ofwarship and naval auxiliary immunity is a powerful factor for its
application in these contexts as well.
Other LOS Convention divisions providing for environmental protection in-
dependently of Part XII include those dealing with vessel accidents on the high
seas, high seas fishing, and the Area, also a part ofthe high seas, and marine scien-
tific research. The Convention's high seas fishing provisions follow in part the
1 95 8 conventions, but Area rules are unique to the 1982 Convention. Because there
has been little technology capable ofexploiting that part ofthe ocean, and because
the Convention has only recently come into force, these provisions are largely the-
oretical in nature. Nevertheless, they may have impact in the 21st Century; many
restate concepts in other ocean areas the LOS Convention regulates.
The LOS Convention requires more of flag States as to ships under their regis-
try and operating on the high seas. Flag States must ensure "that the master, offi-
cers and, to the extent appropriate, the crew are fully conversant with and required
to observe the applicable international regulations concerning . . . prevention, re-
173
duction and control of marine pollution . . .." The Convention also requires
States to "cause an inquiry to be held . . . into every marine casualty or incident of
navigation on the high seas involving a ship flying its flag and causing [inter
alia] . . . serious damage ... to the marine environment. The flag State and the other
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State shall co-operate in the conduct ofany inquiry . . . into any such marine casu-
alty or incident of navigation."
States bordering semi-enclosed areas^ i.e., a gulf or other body surrounded by
two or more States and connected to another sea or ocean by a narrow outlet, e.g.,
the Persian Gulfand the Strait ofHormuz, must coordinate managing, conserving,
exploring and exploiting oceanic living resources and coordinate implementing
their rights and duties for protecting and preserving the marine environment.
The 1982 LOS Convention recognizes marine scientific research as a high seas
1 nc
right; these operations must comply with relevant regulations adopted in con-
formity with the Convention, including those protecting and preserving the ma-
177
nne environment.
Although high seas fisherfolk retain the traditional freedom to seek their
178
catch, the LOS Convention seines in that right to a certain extent, as it has been
179
under earlier treaties and practice. It has never been an unfettered right. The
LOS Convention subjects high seas fishing rights to treaties limiting the right,
and to cooperation in achieving agreements, as well as rules it sets for certain fish
180
stocks and conserving high seas living resources. To the extent these treaties
impose environmental controls, the high seas freedom to fish is curtailed. The
same is true for conservation measures coastal States or agreements impose.
The LOS Convention declares the Area, the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil be-
181yond national jurisdictional limits, and its resources are declared the common
182
heritage of humankind. There is no Area in the Persian Gulf as stated in the
183
Convention; its waters are relatively shallow. Area environmental issues are
therefore nonexistent for Tanker War analysis.
iii. Regional Treaties, the LOS Convention and the LOAC. The Kuwait Re-
gional Convention, to which all Gulf countries are party including Iran and Iraq,
covers the entire Gulf except bordering State internal waters. Similarly, the Red
Sea Convention's geographic sweep includes the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden,
185 r-
again excepting bordering State internal waters. Both define "marine pollu-
tion" in nearly identical terms:
introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine
environment resulting or likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living
resources, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities including fishing,
impairment of [the] quality ofuse for use of [the] sea and reduction ofamenities[.]^^
Parties pledge cooperation to prevent, abate and combat pollution of the marine
environment in the Gulf or the Red Sea, whether caused by ships, dumping from
ships or aircraft, from exploring and exploiting the territorial sea and its subsoil
187
and the continental shelf, or land reclamation activities. ' The Convention
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Protocols amplify this pledge. The latter broadly define "marine emergency" to
trigger application; it means
. . . any casualty, incident, occurrence or situation, however caused, resulting in
substantial pollution or imminent threat of substantial pollution to the marine
environment by oil or other harmful substances and includes, inter alia, collisions,
strandings and other incidents involving ships, including tankers, blow-outs arising
from petroleum drilling and production activities, and the presence of oil or other
harmful substances arising from the failure of industrial installations^] 1^
These Conventions and Protocols do not provide for anticipatory self-defense
190
against imminent pollution threats, as the LOS Convention does. The Proto-
cols appear to contemplate such by allowing "every appropriate measure to combat
pollution and/or to rectify the situation," provided that other countries are
notified of emergency responses, defined as "any activity intended to prevent,
mitigate or eliminate pollution by oil or other harmful substances or threat ofsuch
192
pollution resulting from marine emergencies." This broad authority must be
193
tempered by the limitations of proportionality, etc., in the LOS Convention.
This Convention language further justifies, subject to notice and proportionality
principles, anticipatory reaction to imminent threat. And if this be so, might this
194
support anticipatory self-defense in the Charter context?
These regional treaties applied during the Tanker War. The Red Sea Conven-
tion and Protocol did not apply to the 1980-88 war, except to support common
principles in the Kuwait Convention and Protocol, which did pertain, geographi-
195
cally, to the Persian Gulf. It had direct application to the 1984 Red Sea mining
incident, in which Libya laid mines. The Conventions and LOS Convention
principles, which are common with the Intervention Convention and Protocol,
were justification for actions coastal States, perhaps in cooperation with other neu-
trals, took to clear mines from the Gulfand the Red Sea if they threatened coastal
EEZs or States' shores. They supported self-defense actions States took to rid the
1 07
Gulf of ships that laid mines, e.g., Iran Ajr.
There were two belligerents in the Tanker War, Iran and Iraq. The Kuwait
Convention and its Protocol may not have applied as between them, either because
1 98
of the LOS other rules principles, or because of law of treaties principles, e.g.,
impossibility of performance, fundamental change of circumstances or armed
conflict between them, may have been grounds for suspending international
agreements. These treaty rules did apply ifthe treaties were part ofcustomary law,
199
however. Except as these grounds applied as between belligerents and other Gulf
States party to the Convention and its Protocol, their pledges to prevent, abate and
combat pollution of the marine environment remained in force. Undoubtedly it
was in this context that Iran claimed that the 1983 Nowruz attack violated the Con-
201
vention. To the extent that the agreements' terms restated customary norms,
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these too remained in force. Iraq's claim that the Convention and its Protocol did
202
not apply during the war may have been correct as to Iran, but it was not the case
as to other States party.
Given drafting of the LOS Convention with its clauses paramount and terms
virtually identical with the Kuwait Convention and Protocol, together with terms
ofother treaties around the world virtually identical with the Convention and the
Protocol by 1983, there was at least a developing customary norm, and perhaps a
customary rule, alongside treaty principles stated in the Kuwait Convention and
203
its Protocol, by 1 983. If this is so, the belligerents were obliged not to act so as to
pollute, or act to cause an imminent threat, to other Gulf States' interests, and to
interests ofcountries using Gulfwaters for freedom ofnavigation, through actions
such as attacks on the Nowruz and other terminal facilities when the result at the
time of decision was likely to be a substantial spill. Under the Kuwait Conven-
tion Iran was arguably within its rights to ask for an opportunity to stop the out-
205
flow. For the same reasons, there may have been Convention and Protocol
violations with respect to spillage resulting from Iraqi and Iranian attacks on ship-
ping during the war, if such could have been foreseen to have resulted in substan-
tial risk to other States' environmental interests, and such risks occurred. The
record is less than clear on this point.
iv. The LOS Convention and the Law of the Maritime Environment. This
summary of Convention terms for protecting the marine environment demon-
strates that Part XII and those in other parts of the treaty are indeed prolix and
comprehensive; there is little that is new law or unanticipated. Indeed, provisions
related to the environment often repeat principles seen in other contexts: the due
regard concept where there are two or more oceans uses at stake; confirming sover-
eign immunity of warships, naval auxiliaries and other government vessels on
non-commercial service and State aircraft; confirming application ofthe LOAC in
the context ofenvironmental protection through the other rules clauses, which do
207
not include customary law ofthe environment as part of"other rules;'" the same
208
"peaceful purposes" language for the Area as on the high seas generally. Ap-
proval ofthe use ofanticipatory self-defense against an environmental threat, pre-
viously stated in earlier treaties, is some precedent for applying anticipatory
self-defense in the context of the inherent right to self-defense mentioned in the
Charter.
209
v. The Tanker War and the Environment. Other Gulf States might have as-
serted EEZ or continental shelf claims during the Tanker War if belligerents' at-
tacks on Gulfshipping caused slicks that threatened their interests, or ifattacks on
210
oil terminals, including that on Nowruz in 1 983, raised the same threat. A simi-
21
1
lar analysis obtains for the Kuwait Convention and Protocol. Similarly, neutrals
Maritime Environment 499
could have raised these claims in connection with other neutrals' self-defense re-
sponses, and the belligerents could have raised the issue with the responding neutral
as well. No environmental deprivation claims appear to have been raised in con-
nection with self-defense responses; if they had, the law of self-defense and its ne-
cessity and proportionality standards, or the law of anticipatory self-defense with
212
its similar qualifying factors, and not LOAC necessity and proportionality
213
principles, would have been at issue. Any issues relating to neutrals' conduct to-
ward other neutrals, not covered by the law of self-defense or the LOAC, would
have been resolved under the LOS.
As more States ratify the LOS Convention, or it is accepted as custom, these
claims may be raised in the future, particularly if the Convention is buttressed by
similar terms in regional and bilateral agreements, although LOS Convention
norms trump any to the contrary in these treaties. To the extent LOS Conven-
tion rules are customary norms, however, the customary rules will apply without
the encumbrance oftreaty interpretation principles. Custom, however, has its own
215
set of derogation principles, e.g., the persistent objector rule.
This review ofa complex body oflaw raises the two issues ofthe relationship be-
tween the law ofthe maritime environment and the general LOS, perhaps under a
"due regard" analysis, and the relationship between the law of the environment
and the LOAC, perhaps also on a "due regard" basis. (The Convention carries for-
ward and solves a third side ofthe problem by incorporating the other rules clauses
ofthe 1958 LOS conventions. ) The response to the two remaining issues is com-
plicated by the Convention's publishing some environmental norms in Part XII,
217
the general standards, and sprinkling others throughout the treaty. How do
these bodies oflaw, the law ofthe maritime environment, the LOS and the LOAC,
interrelate? The LOS Convention gives no clear answer.
d. General Conclusions on the Law ofthe Sea, the Law of the Marine Environ-
ment, and the Law ofNaval Warfare. If the LOS Convention is a "constitution"
for the LOS where the LOAC is not involved, its provisions for protecting the ma-
rine environment could be said to be a seagoing "bill of rights" for the environ-
ment. Treaties varying from Convention environmental protection provisions are
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subject to its terms for States party to it. Custom may compete with the Conven-
tion in the future, andjus cogens and UN Charter norms may supersede part of it as
well.
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Customary norms, first codified in the 1958 LOS conventions, confirming sov-
ereign immunity for warships, naval auxiliaries and other vessels on government
non-commercial service and State aircraft, are affirmed in the LOS Convention
and have been repeated in regional agreements. Similarly, recognition of the
LOAC and its component, the law of naval warfare, as applicable in certain situa-
tions, is confirmed in the Convention's navigational articles and its
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environmental provisions. The due regard principle for competing oceans uses,
particularly on the high seas, has been carried forward into the LOS Convention.
What is new is a complex, prolix protection for the maritime environment. The
fundamental issue has become the relationship of this relatively new body of law
with the general law of the sea and the law of armed conflict.
3. Environmental Standards During Armed Conflict at Sea
Although the 1990-91 Gulf War raised media attention and advocacy for pro-
tecting the oceans environment, the LOAC has dealt with aspects of the problem
for years. Treaties first stated these norms, and they have become customary law, if
they were not already thus, in many instances. Decolonization, countries' breakup
220during the Charter era, and the resultant effect of the law of treaty succession,
may bind many new States. Analysis begins with the 1 907 Hague Conventions and
runs through the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 ENMOD Convention and
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, to more recent treaties. Lately theUN Secu-
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rity Council, with its authority to make binding decisions, has been active. Re-
cent compilations of the LOAC may be influential in the future.
a. The Law ofNaval Warfare as Part of the LOAC; Protection of the Environ-
ment. Earlier treaties (e.g., the 1899 Hague Conventions) dealt with environ-
ment-related issues; the 1907 Hague and other conventions have superseded
them. This sub-Part examines the 1907 Conventions, later treaties and customary
norms surrounding them, in the Tanker War context.
i. The Hague Conventions of 1907 and the Oxford Naval Manual. Two among
the 1907 Hague Conventions deal with environmental problems in the maritime
context; others arguably have rules that could raise these issues in particular
situations.
(I) Hague VIII and Mine Warfare. Hague Convention VIII (1907) on automatic
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contact mines reflects customary law and could affect environmental quality, in
that mines improperly laid under the treaty might have implications for the oceans
environment. Mines cannot discriminate between ships and the environment
when they explode, although "smart" mines can differentiate among types and se-
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quences ofvessels. Countries laying mines can try to determine the effect on the
environment, however. If a State publishes where it has placed mines as re-
22S
quired by international law, other States are on notice of their location, etc., and
may therefore be obliged to undertake protecting the environment by rerouting,
etc.
Iran, Iraq and some States involved in the Tanker War were not parties to
Hague VIII. Its terms applied as custom and under principles ofthe law oftreaty
Maritime Environment 501
227
succession for some States. Iran and Iraq used moored mines that broke from
their moorings, drifted down the Persian Gulf, and damaged neutral shipping
when they detonated during the 1980-88 war, and Iraq deployed them and bottom
mines, with the same result in 1990. In some cases Iraq may have deliberately set
some mines adrift to damage Coalition ships or to disrupt naval operations. Some
228
mines laid during the Tanker War also may have been set adrift. Drifting
mines, unless deactivated within an hour ofloss ofcontrol over them, and moored
mines that do not deactivate when theybecome unmoored, violate the Convention
and customary law. If Iran and Iraq laid automatic mines off enemy coasts with a
sole object ofintercepting commercial shipping, or extensively mined high seas ar-
eas and thereby interrupted freedom of navigation, there were Convention and
229
customary law violations.
Although Iran and Iraq deployed many mines during the war, there were no ac-
cusations ofenvironmental damage attributable to them, even though there must
have been spillage from mined vessels; there is no record ofenvironmental damage
claims from this source. The same is true for the 1984 Libyan mining of the Red
Sea. This is not to say that environmental damage did not occur; no reports seem to
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have surfaced. However, as Levie has perceptively observed, there is always the
possibility of damage, maybe significant damage, given modern tankers' size and
their huge cargoes, or the size of ships and their large bunker capacity.
(II) HagueIXandBombardment. Although Hague IX, stating rules for naval bom-
bardment ofundefended shoreside ports and facilities, does not recite environ-
mental protection principles as such, ifConvention rules cover sensitive areas, the
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treaty will contribute indirectly to preserving the environment. Among other
things, Hague IX says:
... In bombardments . . . necessary measures must be taken by the commander to
spare as far as possible sacred edifices, buildings used for artistic, scientific, or
charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and
wounded are collected, on the understanding that they are not used at the same time
for military purposes.2^
The naval commander must "do his utmost" to warn local authorities of the area
before beginning bombardment if the military situation permits. In no case may a
town or place be pillaged, even if taken by storm. Thus if shore parties or ma-
rines follow up on a naval bombardment, they are subject to the same rules on pil-
IK
lage as forces approaching from the land. The 1 946 Nuremberg Judgment held
Hague IV, dealing with pillage during land warfare, had become customary
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norms. Where Hague IX's provisions parallel Hague IV's, they can be consid-
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ered customary law also on this account. Most importantly, Hague IX articu-
738
lates general principles of military objective, necessity and proportionality,
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which when observed should take into account the environment in which bom-
bardment occurs.
Iran, Iraq and some neutrals in the Tanker War were not Hague IX parties;
the treaty bound all in both wars as custom or perhaps through treaty succession
principles. Iran and Iraq did not conduct shore bombardments from naval ves-
sels during the Tanker War. However, Iraq struck Iranian coastal oil facilities
from the air, notably Nowruz, and Iran bombed neutrals' coastal facilities. Apart
from attacks on Nowruz, there is little evidence of environmental damage. How-
ever, given the Nowruz spill's magnitude, Iraq did not take into account propor-
tionality and necessity that would have afforded protection to the environment.
Iranian attacks on neutral facilities violated those States' territorial integrity; Ira-
nian observance of Charter norms would have protected the environment.
(Ill) Exempted Vessels and Cargoes. The Paris Declaration (1856), Hague XI and
rules stated in the 1909 London Declaration also offer the potential for incidental
environmental protection. If an environmentally valuable object sent in postal
correspondence as Hague XI provides is within contraband exemptions stated
in the 1909 London Declaration or other agreements, e.g., the Paris Declaration or
practice governing contraband, or is in a neutral ship's hold in a neutral warship
convoy as provided in the London Declaration, they would have been pro-
tected. Coastal fishing boats and their catch, and coastal traders, are exempt from
capture ifpursuing those occupations and not contributing to an enemy war effort
under Hague XI; there is no protection for offshore areas where they fish. If
environmental study vessels could be characterized as ships on scientific or phil-
anthropic missions under Hague XI, they too would be exempt from capture un-
less collecting data of military application. (The San Remo Manual proposes that
protection be extended to environmental cleanup vessels when engaged in pollu-
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tion control.) The Manual and current military manuals list other ships, e.g.,
hospital ships, exempt from capture or possible destruction as long as they do not
contribute to the enemy war effort.
Iran, Iraq and some other countries involved in the Tanker War were not par-
ties to the Paris Declaration or Hague XI; they were bound, insofar as these treaties
state customary norms, by custom developed independently of treaties, and per-
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haps by the law oftreaty succession. Claims arising during the Tanker War con-
cerned Iraq's declaration ofcontraband; mining ofneutral flag vessels while under
neutral flag warship convoy; destruction ofIran Ajr, an Iranian ship laying mines
on the high seas, a vessel that might be characterized as a coastal trader but which
was not engaged in its usual occupation; and occasional mistaken attacks on fish-
ing vessels. Although there was some oil and perhaps other pollution from ships
damaged during the Tanker War, no environmental deprivation claims have been
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reported. However, to the extent these rules, whether as treaty or customary
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norms, would have been observed, observance would have benefited the maritime
environment through minimization of oil spillage from attacked ships or loss of
environmentally valuable objects.
(IV) Hague IV and Other Protections for the Environment. Besides rules common
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with the law ofnaval warfare on bombardment and pillage, the law ofland war-
fare in Hague IV offers protections for an enemy State's occupied territory; these
have an environmental component today. The right ofbelligerents to adopt means
of land warfare is not unlimited. Private property except for transportation sys-
tems cannot be destroyed or confiscated, pillage is forbidden, and the occupying
State is regarded as only administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real
estate, forests and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, if "situated in
the occupied country." An occupier must "safeguard the capital of these proper-
ties, and administer them [under] the rules ofusufruct." Properties ofmunicipali-
ties; religious, charitable and educational institutions; and institutions of the arts
and science, even if State property, must be treated as private property. "Seizure of,
and destruction [of], or intentional damage done to[,] such institutions, to histori-
253
cal monuments, works ofart or science, is prohibited[.]" Some Hague IV provi-
sions, e.g., those exempting monuments, are directly related to environmental
protection; attacks on a country's cultural heritage are forbidden, unless they are
used for military purposes. Others, such as the rules on private property or
usufruct, may give incidental protection to the environment if these properties
would be considered environmentally sensitive.
There were no Hague IV issues on these points, insofar as maritime warfare is
concerned, during the Tanker War, although Hague IV's provisions on protecting
cultural, etc., monuments would have supported the sea warfare rules on the same
subject if that issue had arisen during 1980-88.
(V) Martens Clauses; Other Possible Rulesfor Environmental Protection. The conven-
tions' Martens clauses, i.e., for cases not covered by the treaties, parties consider
themselves bound by international law principles resulting from usages estab-
lished among civilized nations, from the laws ofhumanity and from the dictates of
the public conscience, can operate to carry forward customary norms related to en-
vironmental protection during war. A commentator has suggested that humanity
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and the public conscience could include environmental concerns. There is no
suggestion of claims under these clauses related to environmental protection dur-
ing the Tanker War, however.
(VI) The Oxford Naval Manual (1913). Besides restating rules, mostly those in
Hague IX, that can afford environmental protection if they are observed, the Ox-
ford Naval Manual would apply this rule to naval warfare:
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Occupation of maritime territory, that is of gulfs, bays, roadsteads, ports and
territorial waters, exists only when there is at the same time an occupation of a
continental territory, by either a naval or a military force. The occupation, in that
case, is subject to the laws and usages of war on land. 2^6
Verri says that this applies Hague land warfare rules to a hostile coastal waters area
only if there is simultaneous occupation of adjacent land territory; he cites no au-
257
thority on whether this is a customary norm. If a customary norm, the result is
that protections for occupied land territory, e.g., apply to coastal waters such as the
territorial sea.
The Manual did not restate a customary rule for that era. The 1 899 and 1 907 ne-
gotiators were careful to separate principles applicable to land and sea warfare into
different treaties in most cases. " Land warfare rules for occupied territories care-
fully specify naval warfare rules where they intersect with the law of land war-
fare. Moreover, the status of the territorial sea during peacetime as part of a
coastal State's sovereign territory was not certain when the Hague Conventions
were negotiated, being finally resolved, according to some, only by the 1958 LOS
Conventions. Ifsuch was the situation during peacetime, such a requirement is
also illogical for armed conflict. These treaties went into force decades after the
Hague Conventions, and thus Hague law could not applyper se to these waters, un-
less a contrary custom could be argued, and that may be the case today for this
Manual provision, at least in terms ofgeneral protections, e.g., for cultural objects.
Although Iran and Iraq occupied their opponents' land territory and perforce
territorial sea areas adjacent to it during 1980-88, there is no record ofenvironmen-
tal deprivation claims related to this Manual provision.
(VII) Conclusions. The record ofclaims ofenvironmental deprivations during the
Tanker War is scanty, the Nowruz attack being the only exception. However,
Hague norms, and those recited in customary law flowing from other sources, e.g.,
the London Declaration and the Oxford Naval Manual, show that observance of
these rules, and general principles of the military objective, necessity and propor-
tionality, would have enhanced protection of the maritime environment. Invoca-
tion ofthese principles in future wars should afford protection to the environment.
ii. Between the Wars. After World War I and before World War II's outbreak, re-
flecting the Great War experience, commentators prepared draft rules, and treaties
were negotiated, that have direct or tangential impact on protecting the maritime
environment during war.
(I) RulesforAerial Warfare. Rules for air warfare, reflecting Hague principles (now
also customary law) for bombardment from land and sea, were published in
7fO 7fvK
1923. Whether these rules articulate customary law today is debatable. States
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have, however, declared that some of the Rules will be followed in practice. •
Thus, the Rules are analogous to the London Declaration; some restate custom,
particularly if they parallel Hague provisions, and others may not. Perhaps it is
time to give the Rules a decent burial and rely on general LOAC principles, i.e.,
military objective, necessity and proportionality, as Robertson recommended for
Hague IX.266
Neither Iran nor Iraq had the capability to launch air attacks from the sea; they
attacked land targets after overflying the Gulf, including Iran's attack on UAE in-
stallations. There is no record ofenvironmental damage from these attacks, except
for the Nowruz facility. Since the applicable Air Rules restate general principles of
necessity and proportionality incident to any modality ofattack, the same result in
terms oflegal analysis, whether from a general LOAC perspective or environmen-
tal law, applies here. Iran's attack on facilities in neutral territory raised the issue of
a UN Charter, Article 2(4) violation.267
(II) The Geneva Gas Protocol; the Roerich Pact. Two treaties ofthe interwar era have
implications for the maritime environment.
The 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, while banning gas and bacteriological war-
fare affecting humans, has environmental implications. Anthrax, for example,
kills other mammals besides humans. The same is true for some gases; gases lethal
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to the environment can afflict humans. The Protocol has no territorial limita-
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tions. While Iraq used gas during the land campaigns of the 1980-88 war and
271
was condemned for it by the Security Council, there was no apparent use ofgas
or bacteriological weapons during the sea war. Wanton use ofgas in the land cam-
paigns, and a possibility of use of these outlawed indiscriminate weapons in new
forms, suggests the Protocol may be invoked in naval warfare in the future. Any
use of toxic gas may degrade the maritime environment as well.
The Western Hemisphere Roerich Pact, which includes the United States
among its parties, declares protections for historic monuments, museums and sci-
entific, artistic, educational and cultural institutions and their personnel. The
Pact's "neutrality" for these facilities must be recognized "in the entire expanse of
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the territories of parties." The Pact might be implicated in inshore operations
involving naval bombardment or air operations if such sites are close to the coast.
However, because of the territorial sea's uncertain status in 1935, it is not clear
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whether the Pact covers objects in it. Unless contrary custom obtains, its princi-
ples could not apply to archipelagic waters, the continental shelf or EEZs, whose
delimitations came with the 1958 and 1982 LOS Conventions, concluded years af-
ter the Pact. The Pact is effective in peace and war, and therefore applies in
military operations other than war.
As a regional agreement among Western Hemisphere countries, the Pact could
not apply of its own force to the 1980-88 war except to reinforce treaty and
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customary norms in conventions of worldwide application, e.g., Hague IX or the
later Cultural Property Convention. As analyzed under Hague IX bombard-
ment principles, there do not appear to have been any issues related to destruction
277
of cultural objects or sites during the Tanker War.
iii. The 1949 Geneva Conventions; Cultural Property Convention; Other Cul-
tural Property Conventions. After World War II treaty negotiators sought to pro-
scribe excesses of that conflict through four new humanitarian law treaties, the
Geneva Conventions of 1949; the nearly contemporaneous Genocide Convention,
278
which did not present any issues during the Tanker War; and the 1 954 Cultural
Property Convention. The 1972 World Cultural and Natural Heritage Conven-
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tion may also raise issues related to environmental protection during war.
(I) The Geneva Conventions of1949. The 1949 Geneva Conventions, although pri-
marily directed toward humanitarian law, have provisions protecting the environ-
ment directly or indirectly. The Conventions were in force for all States during the
Tanker War.280
The Fourth Convention, supplementing the 1899 Hague II and 1907 Hague IV
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Conventions, restates other customary rules and declares new standards in
some cases, enlarging protections for civilians and property in occupied territory
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or an occupied country. "Territory" or "country" is not defined. To the extent
that it would include the territorial sea, which by 1 949 was moving toward recogni-
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tion under the LOS as subject to coastal State sovereignty, there is a strong pos-
sibility the Convention applies to naval warfare in the territorial sea. On the other
hand, since continental shelf sovereignty rights were in a state of flux in 1949 and
not resolved until the 1958 LOS Conventions, and EEZ law was not established
284
until the 1982 LOS Convention and thereafter, the Fourth Convention could
not apply to those sea areas except through custom; there is no record of such a
claim. States cannot derogate from humanitarian treaties during armed conflict,
285
but questions of territorial application of such law may arise.
To the extent that Fourth Convention hospital and safety zones and localities
for protecting the wounded, sick, aged, children, expectant mothers and mothers
ofyoung children or other noncombatants, coincide with areas suitable for en-
vironmental protection, the Fourth Convention will contribute to saving the qual-
ity of the environment during armed conflict. While protected areas might be
inland, some could be located in coastal areas subject to naval bombardment, many
more might be within the range for air attack, and still others might be aboard ves-
287
sels in territorial or inland waters. Similarly, a Convention-protected hospital
part of, e.g., a park, might support protecting a surrounding area by its presence. A
similar principle protects sick and wounded armed forces in hospitals or hospital
288
ships in territorial or inland waters in previously-agreed neutralized zones.
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These buildings or vessels might be located near areas or objects otherwise deserv-
ing environmental protection. When wounded and sick armed forces members are
convoyed through environmentally sensitive water areas pursuant to the Second
289
Convention, similar considerations apply. These provisions restate customary
law.
290
The Fourth Convention, Article 53, also prohibits:
. . . destruction by the Occupying Power of . . . property belonging ... to private
persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative
organizations . .
.
, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by
military operations.
Article 147 declares that extensive destruction and appropriation of property is a
291
grave breach of the Convention. To the extent that such property is within the
scope of naval operations and is environmentally sensitive, Articles 53 and 147
would have a collateral effect of protecting the environment. The prohibition is
292broader than in earlier conventions. Many of those provisions are customary
293
law and therefore were binding on belligerents in the Tanker War as custom as
well as by treaty law. There is no evidence regarding application in this context,
294
however. The story was different in the 1990-91 Gulf War.
The Convention also gives limited protection to civil defense (CD) personnel
295
during occupation. Unless performing hostile acts, they are entitled to protec-
296
tion. The corollary to this is that if such personnel are known to operate from
certain facilities, and these are environmentally sensitive areas, the environment
may thus be protected collaterally. No TankerWar incidents invoked these princi-
ples for naval warfare at sea or bombardment from the sea.
The Falklands/Malvinas War Red Cross Box innovation, not grounded in
297 r
treaty or customary law and First and Fourth Convention rules for hospital and
298
similar zones, suggests belligerents might agree on "Green Boxes" during war,
i.e., for environmentally sensitive areas not protected by existing law or areas not
readily recognizable through intelligence or other sources. Areas or buildings fly-
ing prescribed warning flags or emblems may not be discernible from afar; it
would be small comfort to protest destruction later, even though adequate warn-
ing, disproportionality, etc., claims might succeed. These agreements should be in
writing, definite in area, description and duration and adequately noticed, follow-
299ing Red Cross Box and 1949 Convention standards.
(II) The Cultural Property Convention. The Cultural Property Convention (1954)
was drafted with war at sea in mind and supplements 1 899 Hague II, Hague IV,
Hague IX and the Roerich Pact on coverage, substituting its protective symbols for
emblems in the earlier treaties. Unlike them, the Convention has no Martens
301
clause. It applies to declared wars or other armed conflicts between two or more
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parties, even ifa state ofwar is not recognized by one or more parties. It also applies
to partial or total occupation of a party's territory, even if there is no armed resis-
tance. Like the 1949 Geneva Conventions, if a party to a conflict is not a Conven-
tion party, it remains in force for Convention parties; if a nonparty accepts
302
Convention terms, the acceptance binds Convention parties.
Cultural property is defined broadly; it includes movable and immovable prop-
erty, refuges for movables, and buildings or building complexes housing it. Pro-
tection of Convention-covered property also includes safeguarding of and respect
for it.
304
Convention parties undertake to prepare for safeguarding cultural property
against foreseeable effects of armed conflict by taking appropriate measures.
Refuges, "limited [in] number," for movable property and centers containing
monuments, "and other immovable cultural property of very great importance,"
may be designated. However, refuges must be "at an adequate distance" from large
industrial centers or "any important military objective constituting a vulnerable
point, [e.g.,] ... a port . . . of relative importance— " Refuges for movable property
can be established anywhere ifbuilt to withstand bombing. Cultural property near
an important military objective may be put under special protection if the State
asking protection undertakes not to use the objective during armed conflict. For
ports and other transportation hubs, this would mean diverting traffic from them.
Centers containing monuments are deemed used for military purposes if used for
moving military personnel or materiel, even if they are in transit. Use for military
purposes includes activities directly connected with military operations, station-
ing personnel, or producing war goods, within the center. There are procedures
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for designated improvised refuges during war by filing with UNESCO.
The Convention provides for transporting cultural property to third States and
from occupied territories. Transported property and the carrying vessel or other
platform, e.g., aircraft, is immune from seizure, being adjudicated a prize or cap-
308 /-<
ture. The Convention preserves a right of visit and search. Although the Con-
vention is silent on the point, customary law permits diversion instead of visit and
search; aircraft, ships and cargo involved in transporting goods that are not cul-
tural property within the Convention's meaning are subject to the law ofprize after
visit and search or diversion. In appropriate situations these ships or aircraft
309
would also be liable to capture and perhaps destruction. If cultural property is
transported on a vessel devoted to scientific or philanthropic missions that does
not contribute to an enemy's war effort, that vessel has the same protections as
310
other ships engaged in scientific or philanthropic expeditions.
The Convention also provides for a UNESCO-maintained International Regis-
ter of Cultural Property Under Special Protection. Although States where prop-
erty is located usually register it, occupying powers can do so. There is a procedure
for parties' objections that an item is not Convention-protected cultural property
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or that property does not comply with Convention conditions. Registrations can
be cancelled if a State where the property is requests it, or where objection to the
property's nature as cultural property or for Convention noncompliance is con-
31
1
firmed. During war parties must appoint cultural property representatives, in-
eluding ones for occupied territory, who will work with Protecting Powers and
21 2
a Commissioner-General for cultural property to administer protection.
Convention parties agree to respect cultural property within their territories
and in other parties' territory by refraining from using property and its immediate
surroundings or its protective appliances protection for purposes likely to expose
it to destruction or damage during war. Parties agree to refrain from hostile acts
against the property, particularly that registered under the Convention, unless
315
"military necessity imperatively requires" it. Parties agree to prohibit, prevent
and stop thefts, pillage or misappropriation of and vandalism against cultural
21
f.
property. Reprisals against cultural property are forbidden. Parties assume
these obligations even though another State does not take protective measures be-
317
fore war. States occupying another party's territory must support authorities in
occupied territory in safeguarding and preserving cultural property. If these au-
thorities cannot act to preserve it, an occupying power must cooperate closely with
V 210
them to take "the most necessary measures of preservation.'
If cultural property is considered part ofthe human environment, the Conven-
tion applies of its own force; given the broad definition ofcultural property, which
includes scientific collections and buildings or centers to house them as well as
property of great importance to people's cultural heritage, sometimes this may be
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the case. Ifthe environment is considered not to include cultural property, wan-
ton destruction of the environment also risks violating the Convention. Al-
though most Convention issues involve land warfare, the Convention is a factor in
cases of cultural property close to a shoreline and therefore susceptible to naval
bombardment or missile or air attack. Provisions requiring location of cultural
property away from transportation hubs such as ports could involve naval plan-
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ners. Rules for transporting movable cultural property, which might include
sealift or ocean overflight, also implicate naval warfare planning. Because the Con-
vention predates the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, which settled the issue of
territorial sea sovereignty, there may be an issue as to whether Cultural Property
Convention coverage extends to territorial sea areas where it does not declare ap-
2TT
plicability, for those States that did not claim territorial sea sovereignty then.
The same problem may arise for coverage for the continental shelf, but not as to an
EEZ; the 1982 LOS Convention resolved those issues well after 1954. 323 As with
humanitarian law generally, there can be no derogation from the 1954 Convention
because of war.
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Iran, Iraq and many countries involved in the Tanker War were parties to the
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Convention and Protocol. Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States and
other States that were not parties observed it in practice.
There is no evidence ofclaims related to destruction ofor moving cultural prop-
erty during the Tanker War.
If cultural property is considered part of the environment, the Green Box con-
cept suggested earlier might be considered in conflicts where countries, e.g., the
United States, are not party to the Convention. Even ifcultural property as defined
in the Convention is not considered part ofthe environment, defining a Box to in-
327
elude nearby cultural sites and property could be considered.
(Ill) Other Cultural Property Conventions. UNESCO has sponsored two more cul-
328
tural property conventions that may have ramifications for environmental pro-
tection if a broad definition of the environment, to include creations of
humankind and esthetics, is accepted.
In 1970 the Convention on Means ofProhibiting and Preventing Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property was opened for signa-
329
ture. Iran and Iraq were parties in 1980, and Australia, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, Syria and the United States, among other countries involved in the Tanker
War, had ratified it. 330
331
Primarily designed to operate during peacetime, the Convention seeks to
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prevent illicit import, export and transfer ofcultural property. The Convention
cultural property definition is broader than the Cultural Property Convention, Ar-
ticle 1. Each 1970 Convention State may designate what it considers as cultural
333
property. The Cultural Property Convention requires property to be registered
with UNESCO according to its criteria. Article 1 1 of the 1970 Convention can
apply to armed conflict: "[E]xport and transfer of ownership of cultural property
under compulsion arising directly or indirectly from the occupation of a country
by a foreign power shall be regarded as illicit." The Cultural Property Convention
335
applies only to armed conflict and covers only export ofproperty. Toman claims
that because the 1970 Convention defines illicitness in relation to national legisla-
tion for transfers, etc., in situations other than armed conflict, "Article 1 1 defines
the illictness arising from occupation without linking it with or referring to na-
336
tional law." This is one possible reading; the other is that Article 1 1 illicitness is
the same as Article 3 illicitness, i.e., that only that which is defined as cultural prop-
erty under the Convention, Article 1, by States is subject to Article 11. Besides the
obvious application during war as to States not party to the conflict, i.e., their re-
sponsibility under the Convention to refuse to accept import or transfer of Article
1 1 property from belligerents, the Convention would also seem to require refusal
to accept import or transfer of this property from third States who wrongfully or
perhaps unknowingly accept it.
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Do obligations to "undertake ... to participate in a concerted international ef-
fort to determine and to carry out the necessary concrete measures, including the
control of exports and imports and international commerce in the specific [cul-
337
tural patrimony affected by potential pillage]" include use of force? Is use of
force contemplated in the Convention obligation "to restrict by . . . vigilance,
movement ofcultural property illegally removed from any State Party to this Con-
338
vention . . ."? Recent analysis does not interpret the Convention to include this
option in either case, but in an extreme situation, might use of force, e.g., on the
high seas to interdict Article 1 1 or other property shipments, be considered a Con-
vention obligation?
There is no report ofremoval ofConvention-covered propertyby sea during the
Tanker War. The Convention is a treaty obligation ofmajor maritime powers and
339
may be invoked for seaborne shipments in future wars, however.
The 1972 World Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention also has possible
ramifications for the LOAC. Although also designed to operate only in peace-
time, it has been advocated for application during war as well. The Conven-
tion provides that States must protect sites considered as cultural or natural heri-
tage, and designated by them as such, within their territories. "Territory"
presumably includes the territorial sea and inland waters. The Convention
broadly defines "cultural heritage" and "natural heritage." Objects properly desig-
nated by States are considered "world heritage for whose protection it is the duty of
the international community . . .to cooperate." Parties undertake "not to take any
deliberate measures which might damage directly or indirectly the cultural and
natural heritage," as defined in the Convention, "on the territory of other . . .
Parties .... "344
While the Cultural Property Convention primarily protects cultural property
with perhaps peripheral coverage for the natural environment, the 1972 Con-
vention goal is to protect the natural environment in areas States designate as the
Convention provides. Some have urged this for protecting these areas during
war. The Convention's World Heritage Committee has adopted an emblem,
348
reminiscent of those required for Cultural Property Convention sites; this may
be prophetic for the future.
Perhaps because no designated sites were involved, there appear to have been no
349
claims concerning the Convention in either Gulf conflict. Iran, Iraq and nearly
350
all States involved in the Tanker War were party to it by 1988; by 1998, 148
351
countries were party, pushing its terms close to recognition as customary
352
norms. Planners must take the Convention into account, particularly if the
Convention is deemed to apply to armed conflict situations. If so, war in the terri-
torial sea may implicate it; shore bombardment and air operations will also be
affected.
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iv. Environmental Modification (ENMOD) Convention; Protocol I. The
ENMOD Convention and Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, signed in
1977, have direct and indirect implications for the LOAC and the maritime
environment.
(I) The 1977 Environmental Modification Convention. The ENMOD Convention is
primarily a disarmament treaty but has environmental implications insofar as it
353
limits risks of intentional environmental damage. The Convention, Article 1,
perhaps ratified with Kuwait's no first use reservation, prohibits "military or
any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having wide-
spread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury
355
to any other State Party." The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,
which prepared the Convention at the UN General Assembly's request, appended
an understanding for Article 1
:
. . . [F]or the purposes of this Convention, the terms "widespread"; "long-lasting"
and "severe" shall be interpreted . . . :
(a) "widespread": encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred
square kilometres;
(b) "long-lasting": lasting for a period ofmonths, or approximately a season;
(c) "severe": involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human
life, natural and economic resources or other assets.
. . . [T]he interpretation . . . above is intended exclusively for this Convention and
is not intended to prejudice the interpretation of the same or similar terms ifused in
connexion with any other international agreement.^
Article 2 defines "Environmental modification techniques" as "any technique for
changing—through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes—the dy-
namics, composition or structure ofthe earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hy-
357
drosphere, and atmosphere, or of outer space." The Committee appended an
understanding to Article 2:
. . . [These] examples . . . [illustrate] . . . phenomena that could be caused by the use
of environmental modification techniques as defined in article II: earthquakes;
tsunamis; an upset in the ecological balance of a region; changes in weather patterns
(clouds, precipitation, cyclones of various types and tornadic storms); changes in
climate patterns; changes in ocean currents; changes in the state of the ozone layer;
and changes in the state of the ionosphere.
. . . [P]henomena listed above, when produced by military or any other hostile use
of environmental modification techniques, would result, or could reasonably be
expected to result, in widespread, longlasting or severe destruction, damage or injury.
Thus, military or any other hostile use ofenvironmental modification techniques as
defined in Article II, so as to cause those phenomena as a means of destruction,
damage or injury to another State Party, would be prohibited.
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. . . [T]he . . . examples set out above [are] not exhaustive. Other phenomena, which
could result from the use of environmental modification techniques as defined in
Article II could also be appropriately included. The absence ofsuch phenomena from
the list does not . . . imply that . . . Article I would not [apply] ... to those phenomena,
provided the criteria ... in that article were met.^8
The Convention allows using these techniques for peaceful purposes, subject to
359
"generally recognized rules ofinternational law concerning such use." Among
' 360
these recognized rules is the overriding principle of self-defense.
The Convention has worldwide application but is subject to limitations. First,
insofar as there are no first use reservations, the Convention will not be in force as
among reserving countries and those States not accepting the reservations. Sec-
-if.")
ond, it applies only as a treaty among treaty partners; Iran and Iraq, e.g., were
not parties. Therefore the Convention could not apply as treaty law for the
Tanker War. However, both countries signed the Convention and were bound to
do nothing to defeat its object and purpose. And if it restates customary law, as
some argue, its norms applied to the Gulf conflicts.
The most critical issue is the third: Whether ENMOD, whether stated as con-
ventional or customary law, could have applied to the Tanker War.
ENMOD standards are triggered when there is a "deliberate manipulation of
natural resources" by a State, according to Article 2; simple negligence is not
enough, but gross negligence or wanton conduct might establish a potential for lia-
bility. Examples ofdeliberate manipulation are in the Article 2 understanding; the
367
list is illustrative, not all-inclusive. Article 1 says there must be resulting "wide-
spread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means ofdestruction, damage or injury"
to a State. ENMOD intends that there be nine alternatives for results because of
the double disjunctive in Article 1, ranging from widespread destruction through
severe injury. However, the understanding to the Article says that "widespread"
means an area of several hundred kilometers; "long-lasting" means an effect last-
ing months, or about a season ofthree months; and "severe" means "serious or sig-
nificant disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources or other
369
assets." Thus Article 1 as amplified by the understanding means that a result of
a deliberate attack must extend over a considerable area, must last at least three
months, but maybe harmful to humans, the natural environment, or "other assets."
Commentators have said the environmental modification, not the technique, must
370
cause the damage. Convention parties have expressed a different view, however,
stating that an environmental modification technique is any technique having as
371
its direct object modification of the environment. Moreover, a State must be
372damaged. However, Article 2's general language, speaking of the Earth and
373
outer space, the latter then and now part of the common heritage of human-
kind, indicates a broader view, particularly because ofthe Article 2 understand-
375
ing, which illustrates with examples of phenomena having no boundaries.
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Ifa narrow view is taken, no ENMOD violation could occur on the high seas be-
yond a State's sovereignty, unless high seas freedoms, e.g., freedoms of navigation,
376
overflight, fishing, etc., are within the meaning of"economic resources or other
377
assets" in the Article 1 understanding. The postulated view, that no ENMOD
claim can arise because of impact beyond a State's sovereignty, is too narrow.
There is a financial cost for being deprived of rights to shipping lanes, air traffic
rights, or established fishing grounds, including deprivation offish that must be
thrown back, because of pollution. Similarly, navies have a right to conduct exer-
378
cises on the high seas whether in belligerent status or otherwise; these opera-
tions are not without cost. High seas pollution resulting in ending, changing or
suspending them can trigger an ENMOD violation claim. Finally, since the un-
derstanding also defines "severe" as "involving serious or significant disruption or
379harm to . . . natural . . . resources,"" regardless ofeconomic factors, high seas pol-
lution where ocean quality is diminished might also support anENMOD violation
claim. In each situation other ENMOD criteria must be satisfied. If ENMOD
claims can include high seas deprivations, damage to continental shelf, fishing
380
zone, EEZ waters, contiguous zone and territorial sea rights through pollution
381
otherwise covered by Convention criteria will also support an ENMOD claim.
To the extent that an ENMOD claim involves damage to areas over which sover-
eignty or jurisdiction obtains under the LOS conventions, e.g., the territorial sea,
382
the continental shelf or the EEZ, ENMOD clearly applies without resort to the
foregoing analysis. To different extents under the LOS, these areas are considered
part of sovereign territory as much as the land.
Although Kuwait and many States involved in the Tanker War were ENMOD
parties, Iran and Iraq were not; as signatories they were committed not to defeat
383
the Convention's object and purpose. Therefore, liability for maritime pollu-
tion must be grounded primarily in custom parallelling the Convention. If
384ENMOD restates custom, and evidence points to that; ifthe Convention covers
385
techniques as well as environmental modifications; ' and if States were damaged
(e.g., threatened with damage because ofconcern over closing desalination plants,
or by not being able to exercise high seas navigation or other rights, e.g., fish-
ing), then the Nowruz oil spill during the Tanker War resulted in widespread or
severe damage, i.e., serious or significant disruption or harm, under the Conven-
387
tion. If the slick lasted nine months as a commentator claimed, this ENMOD
388
requirement was also met; nine months is longer than a season. On the other
hand, if the pollution did not last three months, failure to meet the "long-lasting"
criterion is not critical, since Article 1 speaks in the disjunctive; the Nowruz
389bombing met ENMOD Article 1 standards. However, Article 2 requires intent
to manipulate the environment, or perhaps gross or wanton conduct; mere negli-
gence does not support an ENMOD claim. Iraq probably attacked Nowruz with
a goal ofdepriving Iran ofuse ofthe facility for transshipping petroleum to support
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its war effort. If there was no deliberate attempt to harm the maritime environ-
ment, or if Iraq's action was not gross negligence or wanton conduct, the Article 2
standard was not met. For the Nowruz operation, the verdict must be "not proven"
as to Iraq's liability, unless it is argued that Iraq, as a major oil-producing State
with similar terminals, knew or should have known that indiscriminate attack on
Nowruz had a high probability ofproducing a major spill. Ifthis amounted to wan-
ton or grossly negligent conduct, there was an ENMOD violation. There is no evi-
dence of the extent, duration or effect of attacks on other terminals, or the intent
behind them.391
Although there was spillage from Iranian and Iraqi attacks on vessels during the
392
Tanker War, there does not appear to have been widespread, long-lasting or se-
vere damage to any State (except perhaps shipping losses, which were big, but
393
these were largely covered by insurance) or the environment generally; thus
394
the Article 1 threshold was not met. There is no evidence either State deliber-
395
ately sought to manipulate the environment, the Article 2 trigger. On the other
hand, it could be argued that both were wanton or grossly negligent in attacks on
shipping, by mines or other methods, and that the Article 2 criterion was thus sat-
isfied. However, since there is no evidence of Article 1 durational requirements'
having been met, there was no Convention violation as to belligerents' attacks on
shipping. There were LOAC violations as to neutral merchant shipping not carry-
ing war-fighting or war-sustaining cargo or contraband for either belligerent or
396
not taking active part on behalf of a belligerent, however. Belligerents' observ-
ing these principles would have contributed to a cleaner Gulf environment.
There is no record of widespread, longlasting or severe effects on the environ-
ment, or an attempt to deliberately manipulate natural processes when Libya
397
sowed mines in the Red Sea in 1984. However, Libya's conduct was wanton in
nature, and but for the requirement that both criteria be met (Article 1 and Article
398
2 standards), there would have been an ENMOD violation.
Tanker War neutrals acted pursuant to rights of self-defense, and this Char-
ter-stated norm superseded treaty or customary norms, e.g., those in the Conven-
399
tion, in defending neutral shipping or in responding to belligerents' attacks
that employed mines, aircraft or surface combatants. If the Convention could be
said to supply customary norms for self-defense, there is no evidence that neutrals'
conduct resulted in liability under ENMOD standards. There is no evidence that
oil slicks resulting from self-defense responses resulted in "widespread, long-
lasting or severe effects," or that neutrals deliberately manipulated natural pro-
cesses, or acted wantonly or with gross negligence, in responding in
self-defense. States cooperating in removing the Red Sea mine threat also satisfied
these standards.
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(II) ProtocolI to the 1 949 Geneva Conventions. Protocols I and II to the Geneva Con-
ventions were also signed in 1977. Many States involved in the Tanker War were
not then Protocol I parties, e.g., France, Iran, Iraq, the United Kingdom and the
United States. Protocol I did apply if it restated customary law. Although
Protocol I does not generally apply to naval warfare, and Protocol II governs
only non-international conflicts, e.g., civil wars, some principles in these agree-
ments apply to war at sea; others restate customary norms. Some Protocol I princi-
ples might be adopted by analogy. Other Protocol I provisions, ifapplicable to a
conflict, offer indirect protection to the environment. There are thus several
overtones for application of Protocol I principles to sea warfare. If parts of Pro-
tocol II use the same language as in Protocol I, they should have similar interpreta-
don.408
(A) Protocol I and Customary Law. Some Protocol I provisions declare environ-
mental protection standards; others restate principles for all armed conflict, and
these may protect the environment when applied.
Article 35(1) declares the customary rule that "the right of the Parties to the
conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited." This restates a
general principle for all modes of warfare. Article 35(1) could be invoked sepa-
rately from Article 35(3)'s terms and thereby offer protection to the environment
through its general principle. For example, ifa State uses projectiles causing super-
fluous injury or unnecessary suffering, Article 35(2)'s principle would be in-
voked, along with Article 35(1). Ifuse of this weapon would also damage the en-
vironment, its protection would be enhanced by observance of Articles 35(1) and
35(2) without reference to Article 35(3) necessarily.
(1) Protocol I Environmental Protections. Protocol I, Articles 35(3) and 55, speak
directly to the problem ofenvironmental degradation during international armed
conflict.
Article 35(3) "prohibit[s] . . . methods or means ofwarfare . . . intended, or may
be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural envi-
ronment." Article 35(3)'s preparatory works reveal definitions for these re-
quirements, which must be satisfied conjunctively, and which are therefore
different from those in the ENMOD Convention, which has similar but disjunc-
tively-stated requirements in its Article 1(1). To come within Article 35(3), all
three factors, widespread, long-term and severe as the Protocol defines them, must
be present.
Unlike ENMOD, Protocol Fs geographic definition, "widespread," can mean
an area less than several hundred kilometers. "Long-term" has been defined as a
time ofa decade or more, and "severe" means damage prejudicing over a long term
(i.e.,10 or more years) continued survival of a civil population or risking causing it
major health problems. The Article 35(3) standard, as its preparatory works de-
fine it, is relatively high.
414
"The two texts [ENMOD, Article 1(1) and Protocol I,
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Article 35(3)] should not be seen as redundant, but rather as distinct and comple-
mentary, since one [ENMOD] deals with geophysical warfare, and the other [Pro-
tocol I] with environmental warfare." Despite the difference in the two treaties'
purpose, a State could wage environmental warfare that is geophysical in na-
ture, for which ENMOD would be invoked, and could mount a geophysical attack
degrading the environment and violate Protocol I, thus calling into question ap-
plying both treaties for the same situation.
Article 35(3) may or may not restate a customary norm. The contemporane-
ously-completed ENMOD Convention states the same three criteria, widespread,
long-lasting, severe, but disjunctively. Even if ENMOD declares a customary
418 419
norm, Protocol Fs lumping them together conjunctively may not. IfENMOD
does not restate custom, as some argue, the debate remains as to whether Protocol
Fs Article 35(3) does, as some believe. However, in a given context, com-
monly-accepted definitions of Article 35(3)'s terms may exclude a given armed
conflict scenario from its coverage.
Article 55 ofProtocol I seems to repeat Article 35(3); however, Article 35(3) re-
fers to methods and means of warfare, while Article 55, dealing mainly with land
warfare, is part of the Protocol declarations for protection of civilians:
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against
widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of
the use ofmethods or means ofwarfare . . . intended or may be expected to cause such
damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of
the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way ofreprisals are prohibited.423
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom filed declarations to Article 55, stating
that "military commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding upon or
executing attacks necessarily have to reach decisions on the basis of their assess-
ment ofthe information from all sources . . . available to them at the time," these
interpretations meaning that hindsight review of decisions covered by Article
55 is not admissible. Presumably the same interpretations of "widespread, long-
term and severe" apply to Article 55(1) as to Article 35(3).
Although it has been argued that Article 55(1) applies generally to naval war-
A T7 A ") O
fare, most commentators, and the Protocol's terms, refute this. Protocol I,
Article 49 provides:
... 1. "Attacks" mean acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or
in defence.
2. The provisions of this Protocol with respect to attacks apply to all attacks in
whatever territory conducted, including the national territory belonging to a Party to
the conflict but under the control of an adverse party.
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3. The provisions of this Section [i.e., Articles 48-67] apply to any land, air or sea
warfare which may affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian
objects on land. They further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air against
objectives on land but do not otherwise affect the rules ofinternational law applicable
in armed conflict at sea or in the air.
4. The provisions of this section [i.e.. Articles 48-67] are additional to the rules
concerning humanitarian protection ... in the Fourth Convention, particularly in
Part II [i.e., Arts. 13-26] thereof, and in other international agreements binding . .
.
Parties, as well as to other rules of international law relating to the protection of
civilians and civilian objects on land, at sea or in the air against the effect of
hostilities.429
"Territory" and "national territory" in Article 49(2) are not defined, but this could
mean the territorial sea as well as inland waters are covered, particularly be-
cause Article 49(3) declares that Articles 48-67 of the Protocol "further" apply to
"attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on land but do not otherwise
affect . . . armed conflict at sea or in the air." If attacks from the sea against the land
are included within the Protocol, it is consistent that territorial seas bordering
land attacked are also covered; they are part of the area subject to States' sover-
eignty. On the other hand, the EEZ, continental shelf, etc., are not part of a State's
sovereign territory. Beyond this, Article 55(1) does not apply to the law ofnaval
warfare.
The question remains as to whether either Article 35(3) or Article 55(1) stan-
dards, if applied as customary norms and however erroneously with respect to na-
val warfare in the case of Article 55(1), were violated during the Tanker War.
Both provisions require environmental degradation to be intended and wide-
spread, long-term and severe, in the conjunctive. Both define "widespread" as
an effect covering several hundred square kilometers, "long-term" as 10 years or
more, and "severe" as damage likely to prejudice, over a long term, a civil popula-
tion's continued survival or risking causing major health problems.
As to the 1983 Nowruz spill, there is no question that the effect was widespread
and would have been severe ifthe slick had fouled the desalination plants or would
have destroyed aquatic life upon which the Arabian peninsula depended. The re-
cord on results from other attacks on oil terminals during the Tanker War is not
clear as to size, duration, severity or intent. But did Iraq intend to destroy the
environment? As noted in the ENMOD analysis, more likely than not this was a
military operation against a permissible target, petroleum production facilities,
that resulted in the potential for environmental degradation. Resolution ofthe in-
tent issue is not easy, since most hard evidence is undoubtedly in classified files.
Even if intent is proven, the slick did not last a decade or more, the interpretation
of "long-term." Thus the Nowruz attack will not support a claim under a custom-
ary standard applying Articles 35(3) or 55(1), assuming the latter applies to naval
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warfare, nor could other attacks on terminals raise Article 35(3) or Article 55(1)
issues.
Leakage from damaged merchantmen or warships Iran or Iraq attacked during
the Tanker War would not support Article 35(3) or 55(1) claims. Like the Nowruz
spill, undoubtedly these attacks were military operations against shipping, in
some cases unlawful under the LOAC, and may not have been intended to degrade
the environment. There is also no evidence that pollution was widespread,
long-term and severe within the Protocol's meaning.
Neutrals' self-defense responses involve different law. There is no evidence
that oil slicks from these responses, on oil platforms, aircraft downed at sea, or sur-
face ships damaged or sunk at sea, was intended to degrade the environment or
caused pollution that was widespread, long-term and severe within the Protocol's
meaning, ifthat standard would be assimilated to the law of self-defense, which
governed these situations.
(2) OtherProtocolIProvisions Whose StandardsMay Protect the Maritime Environ-
ment. Many Protocol I provisions, if observed, may protect the maritime environ-
ment through application, even though most of the Protocol is concerned with
land warfare, a major exception being air and missile attacks from the sea. Often
they restate custom common to all warfare.
(a) ProtocolIProvisionsApplicableA s CustomaryLaw toA 11Modes of Warfare. Ar-
ticle 35(2) prohibits weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare
causing superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. This principle, derived from
the Hague Regulations, is customary law applying to all warfare. Weapons legiti-
mate in one context have a potential for being used unlawfully in another. Al-
though this principle normally applies as between combatants, it could affect
environmental quality, just as specific application of it, like specific prohibitions
on certain weapons, e.g., gas and bacteriological weapons and warfare, which can
affect animals and plants as well as humans, has environmental implications. If
a belligerent fires at an area with dum-dum projectiles intending to injure the en-
emy, this violates Article 35(2) and customary rules. The projectiles would not
discriminate among combatants, civilians, animals and plants in the fire zone, and
culpability would lie for the attack on humans. The deterrence value of denying
use of these weapons will accrue to civilians and the environment.
There is no indication that weapons used in the 1983 Nowruz or other terminal
attacks caused superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. Wildlife, i.e., fish,
may have experienced superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, but Protocol
I's purpose is to protect combatants, civilians or victims of international armed
conflict and not wildlife. However, since the Nowruz attack threatened water
supply from neutrals' desalination plants, a claim ofa potential for unnecessary
suffering to humans could be made. As to risk ofinjury to civilians through loss of
water supply, however, Article 35(2)'s history is that it applies only to
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combatants. Although there was a risk to neutral civilian water supplies, there
could be no claim under Article 35(2).
With respect to merchant ship attacks during the Tanker War, Article 35(2)
principles applied to attacks on vessels that were legitimate targets (and many were
not), if there was deliberate firing at a crew when an attack's purpose was to stop a
ship. There were reports, e.g., of deliberate firing into crew areas when a ship could
have been stopped by other well-placed shots. However, the record is not clear
as to whether these attacks, including mine attacks, caused unnecessary suffering
among combatants.
Charter law governed neutrals' self-defense responses, i.e., neutrals' firing on
oil platforms, warships and military aircraft. The same is true for belligerents' at-
tacks on neutrals' petroleum facilities, which were subject to Charter princi-
ples. IfArticle 35(2) principles would be incorporated by reference into Charter
law analysis, there are no reports ofunnecessary suffering in these situations under
Article 35(2) standards.
(b) Other Protocol Terms, Applicable to Land Warfare As Restated Custom, OrAsa
Restatement ofNorms Applicable to AllModes of Warfare. Other Protocol I provisions
besides Articles 35(1) and 35(2) recite customary rules ofgeneral application; like
other Protocol I provisions, they have force as custom for two reasons: (1) for par-
ties bound by the Protocol as a treaty, they apply only in respect ofland warfare and
attacks from the sea; and (2) because many countries, including the
belligerents, were not Protocol I parties during the Tanker War, and the Protocol
could only apply as custom among those States, including the belligerents, in-
volved in the Tanker War. However, to the extent these principles repeat gen-
eral customary rules for naval warfare, Tanker War participants were obliged to
observe them.
(i) Protocol I, Article 48: Basic Rule of Distinction. Article 48 states a "basic
rule" of distinction
:
. . . [T]o ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall . . . distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives
and . . . shall direct . . . operations only against military objectives.
t-i_ • 457This restates custom.
Tanker War attacks on neutral merchantmen, or ships otherwise entitled to
protection from attack, offer examples of the customary norm Article 48 restates
for naval warfare. If Iran and Iraq had observed this principle as to legitimate ob-
458
jects for attack, protected vessels would not have been hit, and the environment
would have been that much cleaner from less oil leakage into the Gulf from
stricken or sunken ships. The Nowruz and other Iranian terminals were legitimate
targets, but one might ask whether collateral damage, in terms of impaired
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high seas navigation rights, fishing, and risk to desalination plants after the
Nowruz attack, was not excessive given the advantage expected at the time by
the attack. Nor was proportionality observed in Iranian and Iraqi use of drifting
mines during the Tanker War.
Article 48 could not apply as a LOAC customary rule for belligerent attacks on
neutrals' oil facilities, or for neutrals' self-defense responses to belligerents' attacks
on neutral shipping. Charter law governed, and there is no indication that neu-
trals' self-defense responses were other than proportional under the Charter. On
the other hand, belligerents' attacks on oil facilities in neutral territories was a vio-
lation of the Charter.
Other Protocol provisions following Article 48 protect specific objects ofattack.
Depending on how the environment is defined, some or all of these objects might
be said to be part of the environment. Even if not considered part of the environ-
ment, their proximity to environmentally sensitive objects may result in deriva-
tive protection, as has been seen in analysis ofHague and Geneva Conventions law,
other treaties, custom and general principles.
(ii) Protocol I, Articles 51, 52, 57: Protectionfor Civilians and Civilian Objects. Arti-
cles 51-52 and 57 of Protocol I state protections for the civilian population, indi-
viduals, and civilian objects. Articles 51-52 and 57 in part restate custom, some ofit
longstanding and applicable to all armed conflict, including naval warfare; States
and commentators differ on whether other provisions restate custom.
Article 5 1 declares that the civilian population and individual civilians, un-
less they take direct part in hostilities, cannot be objects ofattack. Acts or threats of
violence, primarily intended to terrorize the civilian population, are prohibited.
Indiscriminate attacks, i.e., those not directed at a specific military objective,
which employ methods or means of combat that cannot be directed at a specific
military objective, or which employ methods or means of combat whose effects
cannot be limited as the Protocol requires and thus are likely to strike military ob-
jectives, civilians or civilian objects without distinction, are prohibited. Indis-
criminate attacks include bombardment treating as a single military objective
clearly separated, distinct military objectives where civilians or civilian objects are
concentrated, e.g., in cities. They include attacks that may be expected to cause in-
cidental loss oflife or injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
of such, excessive relative to a concrete, definite military advantage anticipated.
Reprisal attacks against civilians are prohibited, as are use of civilians as human
shields for military operations or military objectives.
Four countries filed declarations to Article 5 1 , stating understandings that mil-
itary commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding upon or execut-
ing attacks necessarily must reach decisions on the basis of their assessment of
information from sources available to them at the relevant time, i.e., a judgment
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cannot go against planners, etc., based on hindsight. Three defined "military
advantage" as advantage gained from an attack as a whole.
Article 52 is a general rule for protecting civilian objects:
1
.
Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or reprisals. Civilian objects are
all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2.
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature,
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at
the time, offers a definite military advantage.
3. In case of doubt whether an object . . . normally dedicated to civilian purposes,
such as a house . .
.
, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action,
it shall be presumed not to be so used.468
As in the case ofArticle 5 1 , four States interpreted Article 52 to mean that a planner
or commander of an attack is responsible only for information from all sources
available to the planner or commander at the relevant time; i.e., hindsight infor-
mation does not apply. Three States interpreted Article 52 to allow attack on a spe-
cific area of land as a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons
specified in Article 52, its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization of-
fers definite military advantage, in circumstances ruling at the time.
Article 57 requires constant care to be taken to spare the civilian population, ci-
vilians and civilian objects in conducting military operations. Those planning
or deciding on attacks must
(i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither
civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are
military objectives within the meaning ofparagraph 2 of Article 52 and that it
is not prohibited by . . . this Protocol to attack them;
(ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice ofmeans and methods of attack with
a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects;
(iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause in-
cidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
military advantage anticipated[.] 472
Attacks must be canceled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is
not a military one or is subject to special protection, or that the attack may be ex-
pected to cause incidental loss ofcivilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination ofthese, excessive relative to the concrete and direct mil-
itary advantage expected. Effective advance warning must be given for attacks that
may affect the civilian population, "unless circumstances do not permit." If there
is a choice among several military objectives to attain a similar military advantage,
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commanders must select the one that will cause the least danger to civilian lives
and objects. In naval or air operations parties to a conflict must, consistent with
their rights and duties under international law applicable during armed conflict,
take reasonable precautions to avoid loss of civilian life and damage to civilian
473
property.
Six States filed reservations or declarations to Article 57. Austria's reservation
said, "Article 57(2) ofProtocol I shall available a military commander to reach any
decision is determinant [sic]," which may have lost meaning in translation but
seems to imply that the commander's determination is binding, which seems to be
close to the Swiss declaration, that Article 57(2) obligations can only be imposed
on commanders at battalion or group levels, and those of higher rank. Four
other countries added understandings identical with theirs for Articles 51 and 52,
i.e., commanders must decide on the basis ofinformation from sources available to
them at time of decision, and that "military advantage" refers to advantage
expected from the totality of the attack and not just part of it, in assessing
proportionality.
Article 51(2) and 51(5) prohibitions on attacks on civilians, absent exceptions,
e.g., thosewho take up arms, restate customary law. Civilians may not be used as
human shields, nor may they be a subject ofattacks intended to terrorize them, al-
though otherwise legitimate attacks that happen to terrorize them are permissible.
The specific intent to terrorize civilians gives rise to culpability. Article 52
states a general customary norm, except the prohibition on reprisals against civil-
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ian objects in Article 52(1), for which there is a division of view. The dis-
tinction, necessity and proportionality principles, with the concomitant risk of
collateral damage inherent in any attack that are stated in Articles 51 and 57, gen-
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erally restate customary norms. These do not protect the environment by their
terms, but observing protections for civilians and civilian objects can result in pro-
tection of environmentally sensitive objects and areas around them.
During the Tanker War neither belligerent observed distinction principles for
attacks on neutral and other protected vessels. The collateral result was increased
leakage of petroleum, bunkers and cargo, into the Gulf with higher potential for
environmental damage. A clear example oflack ofdistinction was the Iraqi mis-
sile attack on U.S.S. Stark in 1987. The same is true about indiscriminate mining
of U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts and merchant tankers. The Nowruz facility was a le-
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gitimate military target, but query whether Iraq observed proportionality prin-
ciples, in terms of loss offreedom ofnavigation rights, fishing catches, and threats
to desalination plants. The record is not clear as to belligerents' attacks on other
terminals. However, Iran's attack on neutrals' shore facilities, ifIran was otherwise
seeking a proper target, totally lacked discrimination.
Neutrals' self-defense responses were governed by Charter law, not the LOAC.
There was no reported significant spillage from US naval responses to Iran's
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Silkworm missile attack on a US reflagged tanker, on oil rigs serving as bases for
Iranian gunboats. The US operation was proportional and necessary, in that the
485
source of attacks on neutral shipping was removed. Similarly, US proportional
self-defense responses to the Roberts mining, the Iran Ajr minelaying, and to at-
tacking Iranian naval units were justified. There was no reported major pollution
of the Gulf resulting from these operations either, although there necessarily had
to have been loss of bunkers.
(in) Protocol I, Article 53: Protection of Cultural Property. Article 53 declares,
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without prejudice to the Cultural Property Convention and "other relevant in-
488
ternational instruments," e.g., the Roerich Pact, that belligerents may not
(a) ... commit any acts of hostility against the historic monuments, works of art or
places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples;
(b) ... use such objects in support of the military effort;
(c) ... make such objects the object of reprisals.^9
Although Article 53 applies in some situations to the law of naval warfare, e.g., in
shore bombardment, it restates a general customary norm applicable to all war-
fare, subject to the exception that such objects lose protection if they support en-
491
emy military effort. Cultural Property Convention parties may also claim
492imperative military necessity, since Article 53 is subject to it. According to
Toman, "States which are not parties to the [Hague} Convention do not have the
right of recourse to military necessity and must apply Article ... 53 ... in all cir-
493
cumstances." Granted this interpretation, which assumes that a customary
norm ofmilitary necessity could not apply, it would appear that Article 53 must be
read in the context ofArticle 52, the general rule for protection of civilian objects,
and that since, e.g., a house ofworship may be attacked if it is a legitimate military
objective under Article 52(3), the same house ofworship if a cultural object under
Article 53(a) could likewise be attacked.
These rules have little relevance for high seas operations, except for oceanic
transport of cultural objects. There may be considerable application for inshore
495
operations.
Although cultural property issues abounded in the 1990-91 war, there appear to
have been none connected with the Tanker War, the naval warfare aspects of the
1980-88 conflict.
(iv) Protocol I, Article 54: Sustenance of the Civilian Population. If the environ-
ment includes sustenance of human beings, Protocol I, Article 54 applies:
1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs,
agricultural areas for [producing] . . . foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water
installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying
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them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party,
whatever the motive, whether to . . . starve out civilians, to cause them to move away,
or for any other motive.
3. The prohibitions in ... 2 shall not apply to such ofthe objects covered by it as are
used by an adverse Party:
(a) as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or
(b) if not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action, pro-
vided, however, that in no event shall actions against these objects be
taken which may be expected to leave the civilian population with
such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its
movement.
4. These objects shall not be made the object of reprisals.
5. In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to the conflict in the
defence ofits national territory against invasion, derogation from the prohibitions . .
.
in ... 2 may be made by a Party to the conflict within such territory under its own
control where required by imperative military necessity.496
Article 54 applies in a limited way per se to naval warfare, e.g., to shore bombard-
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ment, although inshore operations might involve all of it. The law of block-
ade, a high seas operation during armed conflict, could contribute to conditions
covered by Article 54, but is another example of the law of naval warfare not cov-
eredper se by Protocol I, although some of its provisions, e.g., relief convoys, may,
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in the future, be invoked by analogy. Some countries and commentators say Ar-
ticle 54(1) does not restate custom; they also disagree as to whether Article 54(2) re-
states custom. All agree that Articles 54(3)-54(5) articulate customary norms.
These might be cited if belligerents attack fisheries or aquaculture areas in the
territorial sea where the catch or product is essential to the civilian population's
survival and other Article 54 criteria are met. This may have been at stake in Iraq's
1983 Nowruz attack, if fishing grounds necessary to sustain populations were de-
stroyed, and in other attacks on Iranian oil facilities. The record is not clear on
this point, and it is therefore unlikely that Iraq violated custom stated in Article 54.
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Attacks on neutral facilities were Charter violations; Article 54 could not apply
except perhaps to supply a standard in considering the situations.
(v) Protocol I, Article 56: Attacks Resulting in Releasing Dangerous Forces. Article
56(1) is perhaps the most controversial provision in this part ofProtocol I. It states
rules for attacks on works or installations containing dangerous forces:
. . . Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and
nuclear generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these
objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous
forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Other military
objectives located at or in the vicinity ofthese works or installations shall not be made
the object of attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces from the
works or installations and consequent severe losses among the civilian
population.*^
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These protections end if installations are used for other than normal functions, to
support military operations, i.e., impounded water behind a dam or power station
acting as a moat between belligerents, and if attack is the only feasible way to end
support of a belligerent. Nuclear power stations may be attacked if they supply
power in regular, significant and direct support of military operations, and if at-
tack is the only feasible way to end it. Other military objectives located at or near
such installations may be attacked ifthey regularly, significantly and directly sup-
port military operations and ifsuch attack is the only feasible way to end such sup-
port. These installations cannot be an object ofreprisals. Four countries filed
declarations interpreting Article 56 to say that a decision on whether to attack can
only be based on assessment of information from all sources available to the
507decisionmaker at the relevant time; hindsight judgments are not admissible in
considering whether Article 56 is violated.
Article 56 does not apply to wartime defensive measures, e.g., to deliberate
508
flooding of a State's own territory to deny access to its advancing enemy, nor by
509
the majority view does it state customary norms. However, for those States that
do not ratify Protocol I or accept it as a customary norm, proportionality and ne-
cessity principles apply to attacks on these installations.
Article 56 has slight relevance to the law ofnaval warfare, except for air or other
attacks from the sea on shore installations. It might be invoked for floating
plants powered by nuclear fuel or tidal dams to generate electricity and located in
512
the territorial sea, since the Protocol appears to apply in territorial waters. Ne-
cessity and proportionality, which must be observed in all warfighting, apply to at-
513
tacks on these installations too. Article 56 does not apply to oil refineries and
presumably other petroleum production facilities; these are natural military ob-
514jectives.
Article 56 could not have applied to Iraq's Nowruz attack with a resulting
threat to the desalination plants, during the Tanker War. First, Article 56 does not
state a customary norm. Second, even if it did, by its terms it did not apply, unless
there was a risk of explosion or similar reaction to oil being sucked into intakes.
Third, and most importantly, the risk of damage was to neutrals, not Iran; it was
neutral facilities that were at risk. Any threat to neutral facilities was covered by
Charter law; Article 56 might have supplied the criteria for determining liability,
but Article 56 could not apply of its own force.
(vi) Protocol I, Articles 59, 60, 62, 65: Undefended Localities,DMZs, CDFacil-
517
ities. Ifundefended localities, demilitarized zones (DMZs) and CD facilities
coincide with environmentally sensitive areas, Articles 59, 60 and 62 will pro-
tect these areas. Such localities, DMZs and CD facilities lose protection if they
commit or are used to commit acts harmful to the enemy, outside their proper
usage. Conversely, ifan area loses, e.g., its Article 59 protection, it retains other
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Protocol I or custom-based protections it may have. Undefended localities
and DMZs must fulfil these conditions:
(a) all combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military equipment must
have been evacuated;
(b) no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations or establishments;
(c) no acts ofhostility shall be committed by the authorities or by the population; and
(d) no activities in support of military operations shall be undertaken.
For DMZs, military activity linked to the military effort must have ceased, and
parties to a conflict must agree on interpretation to be given this requirement and
those persons to be admitted to the DMZ. Acts not considered harmful to the en-
emy in the case ofCD facilities include:
(a) ... civil defense tasks are carried out under the direction or control of military
authorities;
(b) . . . civilian civil defense personnel cooperate with military personnel in the
performance of civil defense tasks, or . . . some military personnel are attached to
civilian civil defense organizations;
(c) ... performance of civil defense tasks may incidentally benefit military victims,
particularly those . . . hors de combat.
519CD personnel may carry light weapons. The Fourth Convention also gives
520
some protection to these persons.
521
Protocol I clarifies Hague rules against bombarding undefended localities;
522
it is a customary norm today. Cities or towns behind enemy lines are not consid-
52?
ered undefended; military objectives within them may be attacked. Immunity
ofagreed-upon DMZs from attack is a customary rule. Customary law also pro-
tectsCD personnel and facilities so long as they do not engage in activity hostile to-
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ward the enemy. Absent Protocol I protections for these areas and activities,
they are covered by customary norms, some longstanding. And as with hospital or
526
previously-agreed neutralized zones under the 1949 Conventions, environmen-
tally-sensitive areas or objects within or near these facilities, zones or areas pro-
tects them for another reason. Protocol I principles for DMZs were used by
analogy during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War when the belligerents agreed on
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a "Red Cross box" on the high seas for transfer of sick and wounded.
During the Tanker War none ofthese areas were involved in the conflict at sea.
However, as suggested previously, the Red Cross Box concept for sick and
wounded at sea might be considered for establishing Green Boxes to protect envi-
528
ronmentally sensitive areas.
(B) Summary: Were ProtocolIProtections Related to Protecting the Environment, or
Related to theLaw ofNaval Warfare and Peripherally Related to Environmental Protec-
tion, Violated During the Tanker War? The response to the first issue is clearly No,
528 The Tanker War
since the Protocol did not apply to this conflict as a treaty. During the Tanker War
Iran and Iraq and many Tanker War neutrals were not parties to it. To the extent
529
Protocol I restated custom, they were bound by these principles.
Assuming that Article 35(3)'s prohibitions against attacks involving damage to
the environment restate customary norms, it was not violated during the Tanker
War. To be sure, the environmental damage of the 1983 Nowruz attack was wide-
spread and severe within the meaning of Article 35(3), but did it have a "long-
term" effect? Moreover, did Iraq intend to disrupt the environment? Could Iraq
have anticipated, at the time, that its attacks would produce the spill? If the effect
was not long-term within the meaning of Article 35(3), then the conjunctive state-
ment of requirements (widespread, long-term and severe) defeats its application.
Even if that hurdle is cleared, the question of Iraqi intent at the time arises. If in-
tent is the same under each article, then application of Article 35(3) as a customary
norm fails, unless wanton or grossly negligent conduct suffices to trigger liability.
Here too the record is less than clear. As an alternative to intent, Article 35(3)
would predicate liability on Iraqi conduct at the time of decision that "may be ex-
pected" to cause environmental harm. Here too the record is less than clear, with
part of the answer lying with documents and witnesses that are not available.
As to attacks on merchant shipping, including bulk petroleum carriers, the re-
sponse is clearer. There is no evidence that the spills caused severe environmental
degradation, were long-term, or were widespread, or that there was an intent to
damage the environment, or that belligerents could have expected the environ-
ment would be damaged when decisions were taken. Thus there was probably no
Article 35(3) violation during the Tanker War.
Similarly, there was no Article 55(1) violation, for the same reasons, but also be-
cause Article 55(1), and any customary norm flowing from it, does not apply to
maritime warfare.
Belligerents' attacks on neutral petroleum facilities, e.g., Iran's attacks on Ku-
waiti and UAE installations were governed by UN Charter law, where there were
violations of the prohibition on threats to or attacks on the territorial integrity of
530
States, and Protocol I standards might be used in determining liability in those
situations. Similarly, US and other neutrals' self-defense responses were governed
by Charter law; any claims ofdamage covered by Protocol I must be considered
in that context. There are no known environment-related claims related to these
responses.
It might be argued that Iraq's Nowruz attacks, which might have disrupted neu-
trals' desalination plants, violated Article 54, as several have argued with respect to
Iraq's attempt to disrupt the desalination plants by flooding the Gulfwith oil dur-
ing the 1990-91 war, in that fouling the plants would deprive the civilian popula-
tion of an adequate water supply. There are two difficulties with this claim.
First, neither Article 54 in its entirety, nor Article 54(2), which deals with
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materials essential to the civilian population's survival, restate customary law. Sec-
ond, even ifArticle 54 does recite applicable custom, these norms apply only to the
533LOAC; Charter law governs attacks on neutrals; Article 54 could apply only as a
standard for possibly informing the content of Charter law.
Could Article 56's terms, dealing with assaults on nuclear power generating sta-
tions, be invoked to condemn these seaborne attacks? The response is threefold.
First, most commentators say Article 56 does not now state customary norms. Sec-
ond, as in the case ofArticle 54 and most ofProtocol I, its terms do not apply to at-
tacks on neutrals; this is governed by the Charter. Third, unless an explosion of
the plants could have released radioactive material or otherwise have triggered Ar-
ticle 56's standards, Article 56 could not apply under its own terms.
On the other hand, Article 48, 51-52 and 57 standards, which restate general
principles ofthe military objective, target distinction, and proportionality were vi-
olated by both States in their indiscriminate mine and surface ship attacks on mer-
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chant shipping. Charter law governed neutrals' self-defense responses, and
there is nothing in the record to indicate that these responses were not necessary
and proportional under the customary law of self-defense.
With Protocol Fs continuing acceptance as treaty law, albeit with reservations
and declarations and applicable as it is mainly to land warfare or air and missile at-
tacks from the sea, the Protocol may come closer to restating custom for aspects of
the LOAC except for persistent objectors. Perhaps further in the future, or along-
side this development, theLONW as a separate component ofthe LOAC may feel
Protocol Fs influence, if not its displacement of traditional LONW standards in
some instances.
v. Other Applicable Law. Since 1977 other treaties related to the LOAC have
been ratified; these present the same kind of issues as Protocol I. The other devel-
opment has been revitalization of the Security Council as a law-making institu-
tion, especially since the USSR's collapse.
(I) The 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention and Its Protocols. Arguments for ap-
plying the Conventional Weapons Convention, with its preamble language, "re-
calling that it is prohibited to employ methods or means ofwarfare . . . intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment," and its land mines and incendiary weapons protocols in particu-
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lar, as customary law governing naval warfare, may be advanced in future wars.
Iran, Iraq and most States involved in the TankerWar were not parties to the Con-
537
vention or its Protocols at that time.
The United States ratified the 1980 Convention and 1980 Protocols I and II
with four reservations or understandings in early 1995, and a condition rejecting
538
applicability ofthe preamble language, which tracks Protocol I, art. 35(3). Many
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US allies have also ratified the Convention and its Protocols. Moreover, a poten-
tial for review conferences means that the law of naval warfare may be implicated
in the future.
The Convention governs all modes ofwarfare, but most Protocol provisions
state norms for land warfare or the law ofbombardment and not armed conflict at
coo 5^2sea.
The Mine Protocol to the Conventional Weapons Convention applies only to,
inter alia, "mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings, but does not apply
to the use of anti-ship mines at sea or in inland waterways." By its terms this
Protocol has little or no application for oceans warfare, except insofar as a com-
mander might consider a mine-infested beach for amphibious landing, perhaps a
factor leading to the faked shore landings during the Gulf War. The Protocol
would affect those operations and arguably could embrace mines, including those
aircraft launched, laid at low tide ashore and covered by higher tides that push
coastal waters over the "ground or surface area" where mines are laid.
The Protocol's statement ofprinciples ofproportionality, the illegality ofindis-
criminate weapons, and reasonable warnings under the circumstances, is reminis-
cent of customary norms recited in the Hague Conventions and Protocol I:
... It is prohibited in all circumstances to direct weapons to which this Article [3]
applies in offence, defence or by . . . reprisals, against the civilian population as such
or against individual civilians.
. . . [Indiscriminate use ofweapons to which this Article [3] applies is prohibited.
Indiscriminate use is any placement of such weapons:
(a) which is not on, or directed against, a military objective; or
(b) which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed
at a specific military objective; or
(c) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advan-
tage anticipated.
. . . All feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from the effects of
weapons to which this Article [3] applies. Feasible precautions are those precautions
which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances
ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.
... It is prohibited to use weapons to which this Article [4] applies in any city,
town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians in which
combat between ground forces is not taking place or does not appear to be imminent,
unless either:
(a) they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective or under
the control of an adverse party; or
(b) measures are taken to protect civilians from their effects, [e.g.,] .
.
. post-
ing ofwarning signs, the posting of sentries, the issue of warnings or the
provision of fences.
Maritime Environment 531
The Protocol defines "military objective" as
. . . any object which by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage.
"Civilian objects" are objects not defined as military objects in the Protocol.
The Amended Mine Protocol has similar provisions, adding with respect to the
military objective a presumption, from Protocol I, that in case of doubt an object
normally dedicated to civilian purposes is not being used for effective contribution
548
to military action.
There are no provisions on mine warfare's environmental impact. However, the
Protocol's statement of military objective, indiscriminate weapons, proportional-
ity, military necessity, and notice principles reinforce those rules in other con-
texts. These principles, if observed, indirectly protect the environment as in the
case ofProtocol I standards and customary law defining the military objective and
proportionality.
Although the Incendiary Weapons Protocol applies to war at sea in the context
of attacks on civilians, incendiary weapons, remain, in the US view, a legiti-
mate means of warfare against combatants at sea. However, these weapons are
rarely seen in naval warfare. The Protocol repeats, in slightly different lan-
guage, principles of military objective, civilian objects, necessity and proportion-
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ality found in Protocol I but has no warning requirements.
The Protocol also prohibits "mak[ing] forests or other . . . plant cover the object
ofattack by incendiary weapons except when such . . . are used to cover, conceal, or
camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military ob-
553jectives." This has been characterized as not imposing a severe restriction on le-
gitimate military use of incendiaries. It applies to shore bombardment or air or
missile attack from the sea. While such plant cover is a feature of traditional land-
ward forests, tropical or subtropical shores have mangroves or other trees extend-
ing into otherwise navigable territorial waters, particularly during high tides.
The Protocol's approach, banning attack on a specific part of the environment,
forests, unless used for military purposes or if the forest itself is a military objec-
tive, might be compared with the general standard ofProtocol Fs controversial Ar-
ticle 56, forbidding attack on dams, dikes and nuclear power generating stations
unless they are used for military purposes or are military objectives. These
might be contrasted with Protocol I, Article 35(3)'s banning methods or means of
warfare causing "widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment,"
or the ENMOD Convention prohibition on "military or any other hostile use of
environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe
effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any . . . Party." The
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generalized approach is better. During the 1990-91 Gulf War commentators at-
tempted to analogize Protocol I provisions, of doubtful standing as custom, to
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cover situations its drafters did not contemplate. Will this be the fate of Incen-
diary Weapons Protocol Article 2(4), the forests provision? What is a forest?
Would claimants try to extend it to grasslands which have occasional coppices or
trees along water courses? Does Article 2(4) protect a considerable acreage of
young saplings, on the way to becoming a forest, on land formerly farmed but now
reverting to woodland? These kinds of definitional problems may make Article
2(4) unworkable in practice.
The Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols are a restatement of,
and therefore an enhancement for, customary definitions ofprinciples of military
objective, necessity and proportionality, and the prohibition on indiscriminate
weapons, applying to all warfare. This is their principal value. In some respects
they do not state customary norms, and for these provisions they must await ratifi-
cation by major military powers.
Iran, Iraq, the United States and many other countries involved in the Tanker
War were not parties to the Convention and its Protocols; by 1987, twenty-eight
559 r
States had ratified them. Therefore; they could have applied only as customary
law for the Tanker War.
Insofar as the Tanker War is concerned, the Mine Protocol did not apply, by its
own terms; there is no record of amphibious landings to which it might have ap-
plied. It did not apply to sea mine attacks. The Incendiary Weapons Protocol
might have applied to attacks on shore installations, but there is no record ofuse of
incendiary weapons in this context. There is also no record of weapons meeting
Fragments Protocol criteria. The technical terms of the Convention and its Proto-
cols did not apply to martime aspects to the extent they stated customary law.
However, insofar as the Convention and its Protocols' recitation of customary
norms of the military objective, discrimination, necessity and proportionality
strengthened those principles for war at sea; belligerents observed or violated
them to the same extent they would be said to have violated the identical terms in
Protocol I, to the extent that those terms reflect customary law. The result is that
customary norms restated in Protocol I have been strengthened.
Since the Convention and its Protocols are in effect a supplement to the 1949
Geneva Conventions and Protocol I and therefore govern LOAC situations,
they could not have applied to self-defense scenarios during the Tanker War.
Charter law governed these, although the general customary law of necessity
and proportionality might have informed the content of these Charter norms. In
any event, as noted in the Protocol I and earlier analyses, the record indicates neu-
trals did not violate these standards in the self-defense context.
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(II) Developments in the Law ofArmed Conflict Under the UN Charter. Before the
GulfWar, UN interest in the relationship between war and environmental protec-
tion had resulted in treaties, e.g., the Cultural Property Convention, ENMOD
Convention, Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols, and the LOS
Convention, among others. Action within UN principal organs was largely
through non-binding General Assembly resolutions, e.g., the Assembly's endors-
ing theUN Environment Programme after the 1972 Stockholm Conference and itsto
Principles, which found their way into later treaties, the 1982 World Charter for
Nature, and the 1992 Earth Summit. UNEP has promoted many regional
agreements subject to the LOS conventions and their other rules clauses, includ-
ing the Kuwait and Red Sea Conventions.
The Security Council, and later the Assembly during the Soviet veto era, voted
resolutions dealing with actual or potential armed conflict situations. However,
there was little direct linkage with environmental protection in particular con-
flicts. For example, during the Tanker War, Council Resolution 598 called for a
cease-fire, "deplor[ed] . . . attacks on neutral shipping . .
.
," the violation ofinterna-
tional humanitarian law and other laws of armed conflict, and demanded that
belligerents "discontinue all military actions on land, at sea and in air." Prior Res-
olutions 540 (1983) and 552 (1984) had been in similar vein; 540 specifically called
upon belligerents "to refrain from any action that may endanger . . . marine life in
the region of the Gulf." If obeyed, these resolutions would have helped protect
the environment, in that if no further shipping attacks occurred, Gulf waters
would have been cleaner. To the extent that Resolutions 540, 552 and 598
incorporated by reference parts of the LOAC applying to belligerent naval opera-
tions in the Gulf that had ramifications for environmental quality, e.g., attacks on
oil terminals such as Nowruz, they would have declared environmental protections
if heeded.
Coincident with the USSR's demise, the Council began to assume a more active
role in world affairs. During the Kuwait crisis and GulfWar, it passed resolutions
with direct or indirect ramifications for the environment during war. These are be-
S70
yond the scope of this book. Two deserve particular attention, however.
Resolution 678, a Council decision authorizing the Coalition "to use all neces-
sary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) [demanding Iraqi
withdrawal from Kuwait] and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore
international peace and security in the area[,]" incorporated earlier resolutions
S71
such as 664-67, 670, and 674 into its binding mandate. When these resolutions'
content is examined, it is clear that the Council meant to include the law ofarmed
conflict in treaties and custom, and the Fourth Convention specifically, and there-
fore direct and indirect environmental protection principles in this law. This
inclusion was subject to the resolution's "all necessary means" and "relevant reso-
lutions" clauses. Participating governments considered that Resolution 678
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incorporated by reference all the relevant LOAC applicable to the war. This was
consistent with the language, ambiguous as it was, ofResolution 678. However, the
point remains, as noted with respect to the prewar resolutions, that the Council
might decide on action to incorporate or supersede all or part of the established
LOAC.
This is not the case with Resolution 687, where the Council directly addressed
environmental degradation during armed conflict; it reaffirmed "that Iraq ... is li-
able under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental
damage and the depletion of natural resources, ... as a result of Iraq's unlawful in-
vasion and occupation of Kuwait[.]" It also invited Iraq to reaffirm its obligations
573
under the Geneva Gas Protocol. As in prior Resolutions incorporating the
LOAC and international agreements, the Council appears to have done nothing
more than incorporate conventional and customary norms into Charter law, with-
575
out creating new liability, which may have been the case with other resolutions.
The Council properly reaffirmed its position; Resolution 687 had declared that
prior resolutions continued in full force and effect, and demanded that Iraq "Ac-
cept in principle its liability under international law for any loss, damage, or injury
arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations,
as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait" and "Immediately be-
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gin to return all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq . .
.
,"" thereby affirming cultural
property conventions' policies, which arguably are protective of the total human
577
environment.
Resolution 687 continued the theme ofCouncil resolutions with indirect effect
on environmental quality during war through inviting Iraq to renew its Geneva
Gas Protocol pledges. The same was true for Resolution 686's affirming prior reso-
lutions that, if complied with, would have afforded environmental protection
through observance of treaties and other international law incorporated by refer-
ence. Resolution 686's requiring Iraqi acceptance of liability under international
law for loss, damage or injury to Kuwait, other countries and their nationals can be
read as supporting liability for environmental damage as stated in international
law.
These resolutions did not decide ultimate liability; there are still issues ofproof
and damages in individual cases. They do, however, powerfully affirm a potential
for international liability for environmental damage during war.
The resolutions also demonstrate that belligerents risk a Council decision go-
ing beyond customary and conventional law ifthere is environmental damage dur-
ing armed conflict. Moreover, the strength and quality of the law may be greater
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than the factorial approach common to international law analysis. If a Council
resolution governing environmental norms is part ofa decision, it bindsUN Mem-
579
bers. There is also a possibility that these resolutions, intrinsically binding or
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not, may approach or be declared jus cogens, trumping treaties and custom.
582
Resolutions may restate treaty or customary norms, thereby strengthening them.
Future wars may find the Council more vigorous, and at the least States can ex-
pect more activity from it and the General Assembly.
b. Final Thoughts. Conclusions to the foregoing subparts demonstrate that there
apparently were few LOAC violations, in terms ofnorms specifically addressed to
environmental protection, or where existing law if observed would give collateral
protection to the environment. However, part ofthe reason for this is the relatively
meager record on environmental degradation during the Tanker War compared
with the 1990-91 GulfWar, where world media attention focused on environmen-
583
tal outrages Iraq committed. Is there a need for a specific treaty, i.e., sl "Fifth"
Geneva Convention or a "Green" Convention, as some urged after the Gulf
War?584
For now, the response is No. As the long foregoing analysis demonstrates, there
are general terms in two treaties, ENMOD and Protocol I, as well as many other
agreements, many ofwhose terms are now also customary norms, that, ifobserved,
will protect the environment through compliance with them: the 1907 Hague
Conventions, the Geneva Gas Protocol (condemning gas and bacteriological war-
fare), the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the cultural property conventions, and the
Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols. These treaties, and custom-
ary norms paralleling them in many cases, recite general terms (i.e., notice in some
cases, discrimination, necessity and proportionality), limit or prohibit attacks on a
wide range of specific objects, or limit or prohibit methods ofwarfare, all ofwhich
have the important tangential effect of safeguarding the environment. Moreover,
the General Assembly and the Security Council have been active in promoting
these norms through resolutions for general standards or specific issues. Although
until recently most resolutions have been nonbinding unless they restated cus-
tomary or treaty norms, this action has had the effect ofstrengthening these prin-
ciples at the least. With the end of Cold War vetoes and revival of the Council so
that it can function as the Charter drafters intended, there is the prospect of its
passing situation-specific resolutions, including binding decisions, in future
conflicts.
585
It seems unnecessary to add yet another international agreement now. Gen-
eral standards in place should suffice until time has had its opportunity to settle
out customary observance, perhaps with widespread acceptance ofENMOD and
Protocol I. This is particularly true in the context of the LOS, since the 1982 LOS
Convention, the first major agreement to include norms to govern the oceans envi-
ronment, is now gaining wide acceptance as treaty law. If a new "Green" treaty
would recite technical rules, similar to administrative regulations accompanying
US environmental legislation, there is the risk of their becoming outmoded before
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the ink would be dry. Developing custom will allow the flexibility that is help-
588
ful in a relatively new area of law. ' The 20 new States that have appeared in the
last five years may not have had time to assess policy positions with respect to
589
treaty succession, let alone a complex new agreement. The sheer number ofpar-
ties to a new multilateral agreement on a controversial body of law may promote
delay in negotiations, reservations or understandings that can cloud the treaty's
590
meaning, and engender delays in ratification.
There are counter arguments. Developing custom through State practice for
wartime rules is an awfully expensive way to write law. Treaties are favored by
591
many new States, carry with them thepacta sunt servanda principle, and can par-
592
allel and thereby augment custom as a source. Treaties can publish black-letter
593 i • • r
rules in the public domain, whereas custom remains in classified private foreign
594
ministry files and can be elusive to research.
On balance, however, the time is not right for a general multilateral agreement,
like the Geneva Conventions, on environmental protection during armed conflict.
c. The San Remo Manual; OtherAnalyses ofthe Place ofthe EnvironmentDur-
ing War. The San Remo Manual (1995) may be influential in its attempt to
recompile the law ofnaval warfare on the order ofthe 1913 Oxford Manual; it is not
a draft treaty like the London Declaration, although it could serve as a basis for fu-
595
ture diplomatic conferences. The Manual refers to environmental protection
during armed conflict in several contexts. The ICRC developed Guidelines for
protecting the environment during armed conflict, and these have had their influ-
ence. The 1997NWP 1-14M, successor loNWP 9A for the US Navy, Marine Corps
and Coast Guard, also refers to the need for environmental protection during
armed conflict.
i. A "Due Regard" Formula for Interfacing the LOAC and the LOS. TheMan-
ual appears to endorse Robertson's view that the relation of States not party to a
conflict and belligerents should be in terms of"due regard" that belligerents must
597pay those States' LOS rights and obligations in, e.g., the EEZ. There may be a
critical difference; Robertson would apply a due regard formula, which he ex-
598
tracted from similar principles in the LOS Conventions, subject to preexisting
rules of international law, e.g., prohibitions on certain weapons or means of war-
fare, targeting, treatment of civilian persons or objects, while the Manual is not
as clear on the point in all cases, i.e., whether due regard should be applied where
there are no preexisting LOAC rules, or whether it is a separate consideration
along with the rules. In those situations where the Manual does not qualify its due
regard formula, the context of other Manual provisions would appear to make it
clear that its drafters meant that due regard would be subject to other LOAC rules.
The Manual takes no position on how a due regard formula would factor into
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situations Charter law governs, e.g., the right of self-defense. Part B. 1 proposes
that an analogous due regard formula be applied in these situations.
This sub-Part discusses the Manual provisions and comments on whether due
regard should be applied in the absence ofpreexisting LOAC rules, which is Rob-
ertson's view, or whether due regard is a factor to be considered alongside the pre-
existing rules.
ii. Due Regard Formula for Interfacing Law of Naval Warfare and Environ-
mental Claims. The Manual uses a due regard formula to describe the duty
belligerents owe for protecting the marine environment, except for sensitive ar-
eas of special importance. For the latter, the Manual provides:
[P]arties to the conflict are encouraged to agree that no hostile actions will be
conducted in marine areas containing:
(a) rare or fragile ecosystems, or
(b) the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species or other forms of
marine life.603
This provision is hortatory, not mandatory, and reflects LOS Convention lan-
604
guage.
The environmental due regard formula must be integrated into the basic rules
ofmethods and means ofwarfare, i.e., general LOAC principles of military objec-
tive, necessity and proportionality, and that weapons cannot be indiscriminate or
cause unnecessary suffering to humans, to the extent specific rules are not
stated in custom or treaties, e.g., hospital ships employed in their normal role or
rules against gas and bacteriological weapons. The specific example ofhomoge-
nizing environmental protection with a method of naval warfare is the relation-
ship of belligerent minelaying and neutral EEZ and continental shelf rights and
duties
608
The Manual, recognizing "the growing number of treaty rules, international
resolutions and constitutional provisions laying down the obligation of the State
to protect the environment," declares that "at the very least . . . there is a general
recognition of a need to protect the marine environment, and a duty upon every
State to protect and preserve the marine environment." However, proliferation
ofsources, and the generality ofthose most in point, led theManual drafters to rely
on a due regard formula in most cases.
iii. Limitations ofand Omissions in the SanRemoManual; Its Strengths. The
Manual is not as specific as it might be for sea areas the LOS Convention recog-
nizes. Part ofthe reason is that the traditional law ofnaval warfare recognizes only
two divisions ofthe seas : high seas and coastal waters, i.e., the territorial sea, the
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situation in 1907 when the Hague Conventions and later LONW treaties were
signed. The result since then has been customary practice built around these trea-
ties and independently of binding agreements, the circumstance of, e.g., the 1909
London Declaration. Thus there is no specific consideration ofthe relationship of
the law of naval warfare with environmental concerns, including conservation, in
the Area, high seas fishing areas, offshore fishing operations where the coastal
State has not declared an EEZ, the EEZ, the continental shelf, the contiguous
f\] 7
zone, or the territorial sea. To be sure, some of these ocean zones, but not the
Area, a separate governance under the Convention, are covered by the Manual's
high seas provision, but the relationship of the Convention's subtleties as to
them in terms ofthe environment and the law of naval warfare recited in the Man-
ual is not discussed.
Another limitation was the drafters' decision not to include warfare related to
the land, e.g., shore bombardment from the sea or the air, except as these rules are
part of LOAC general principles. There is no statement of the relationship of
the due regard formula generally applicable to environmental concerns in shore-
ward projection situations.
On the positive side and somewhat apart from environmental issues, the Man-
ual charts new courses by including material on the ;ws ad helium, i.e., the law of
ft] 7
self-defense and situations where the UN Security Council has acted; recogniz-
ing without approving the possibility of nonbelligerency status between belliger-
ency and neutrality; introducing the military objective concept into the law of
naval warfare; rules applicable to exclusion zones;
l
clarification of whether
671
naval operations can be undertaken in certain sea areas under the law ofthe sea;
and principles of air war at sea. All could interface with environmental protec-
tion claims.
iv. Conclusions with Respect to "Due Regard"; Problems with Analysis. In
general, both positions ofthe Manual, i.e., using a due regard formula for interfaces
between the LOS and the law of naval warfare, and between the law of naval war-
fare and environmental concerns, are correct. There are three caveats.
First, any general due regard standard should be subject to specific customary,
treaty or general principles norms. TheManual recognizes this in several contexts,
e.g., custom or general principles based rules of proportionality, etc., and in citing
treaties like theENMOD Convention and its prohibition on military or other hos-
tile use ofenvironmental modification techniques having "widespread, long-last-
ing or severe effects" as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other
Convention party. Such standards must be subject to law under the UN Char-
ter; this is implied but not specifically stated.
Second, theManual does not indicate the content ofeither due regard standard;
it declares a standard of due regard for the relationship between the LOS and the
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LOAC and its law of naval warfare component, and a second due regard standard
for the relationship between the LOAC and environmental norms. It does not dis-
cuss the content of due regard.
Third, theManual does not say whether the two standards, or a due regard stan-
ds
dard to be applied in situations governed by the Charter, should be considered
together as part of a general due regard principle, or whether they should be con-
sidered sequentially, i.e., applying due regard in the LOS -LOAC context first, and
then applying environmental norms against the result ofthis analysis, or the other
way around, i.e., applying due regard in analyzing the LOS and environmental
norms, and then factoring this result into analysis with the LOAC.
d. The ICRC Guidelines for Military Manuals. In 1994 the ICRC published
guidelines for military manuals and instructions on protection ofthe environment
during armed conflict.626
The Guidelines publish a list of international agreements, many of which re-
fleet custom, observance ofwhich would assist in protecting the environment.
Besides specific rules, the general principles of international law applying to
armed conflict, e.g., distinction and proportionality, also provide protection for
the environment. "In particular, only military objectives may be attacked[,] and
no methods or means ofwarfare which cause excessive damage shall be employed.
Precautions shall be taken in military operations as required by international
law." International environmental treaties "and relevant rules ofcustomary law
may continue to be applicable" during armed conflict,
to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the applicable law ofarmed conflict.
Obligations relating to the protection ofthe environment towards States not party to
an armed conflict (e.g., neighboring States) and in relation to areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction (e.g., the High Seas) are not affected by the existence of the
armed conflict to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the applicable law of
armed conflict.629
In cases not covered by treaty rules, "the environment remains under the protec-
tion and authority of the principles of international law derived from established
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public con-
science."
The ICRC appears to recognize that some international agreements, but not all
of them, related to environmental protection, may apply during war. This is con-
sistent with the general law applying to suspension or termination of treaties during
armed conflict, which delares that some treaties, e.g. humanitarian law conven-
tions, continue to apply during war. This also appears consistent with the other
rules principle of the LOS conventions, which say that the LOS, now including
many provisions protective of the peacetime maritime environment in the LOS
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Convention, may apply during armed conflict. In terms of the maritime envi-
ronment, the LOS Convention declares that all treaties related to the LOS must be
generally consistent with it, and particularly those related to environmental pro-
tection. Ifthese factors are taken into account, the ICRC Guidelines appear con-
sistent with the general LOS-LOAC relationship contemplated by the LOS
conventions and the general principles of international law. The Guidelines do
not explicitly adopt a due regard formula like that the San Remo Manual drafters
developed almost contemporaneously, but they do seem to say that the environ-
ment shall be a factor to be taken into account for applying general principles ofthe
LOAC and specific rules. The Guidelines do not recommend principles for the^ws
ad helium, i.e., Charter law, which includes the right to self-defense.
e. NWP 1-14M and Environmental Protection During Armed Conflict. NWP
1-14M, published nearly a decade after the Tanker War, has a slightly different ap-
proach to environmental protection during armed conflict:
It is not unlawful to cause collateral damage to the natural environment during an
an attack on a legitimate military objective. However, the commander has an
affirmative obligation to avoid unnecessary damage to the environment to the
extent . . . practicable to do so consistent with mission accomplishment. To that end,
and as far as military requirements permit, methods or means of warfare should be
employed with due regard to the protection and preservation of the natural
environment. Destruction of the natural environment not necessitated by mission
accomplishment and carried out wantonly is prohibited. . . . [A] commander should
consider the environmental damage which will result from an attack on a legitimate
military objective as one of the factors during targeting analysis.
This reflects, to a certain extent, the ICRC Guidelines approach. Like the San
Remo Manual, NWP 1-14M appears to implicitly require compliance with a posi-
tive norm, a lawful military objective, but would qualify lawfulness ofthe objective
by the environmental factor, along with other factors, during target assessment.
NWP 1-14M does not appear to address the issue ofdue regard in the LOS-LOAC
context, nor does it consider the environmental factor in the context ofCharter law
issues, e.g., the right of self-defense.
4. The Tanker War; Proposed Resolution of Issues Raised by the San Remo
Manual, the ICRC Guidelines andNWP 1-14M
The Tanker War ended in 1988. The ICRC published its Guidelines in 1994;
the San Remo Manual, developed contemporaneously with them to deal with envi-
ronmental and many other issues in naval warfare, appeared in 1995 ;NWP 1-14M,
also dealing with a broad spectrum (LOS, UN Charter issues, LOAC in all con-
texts) was published in 1997. Chapters II and VI demonstrate that there was little
reportage of, or concern with, environmental issues during the Tanker War, the
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Nowruz spill being a conspicuous exception. The 1990-91 Gulf War raised these
problems to international attention, and the Guidelines, Manual andNWP 1-14M
were among the reponses. Nevertheless, Tanker War scenarios can supply analysis
to help resolve issues these sources appear to raise. This subPart attempts to re-
solve those issues.
Any general due regard policy must give way to a specific norm from the Char-
ter, e.g., the inherent right of self-defense or other binding Charter-based
norms, e.g., Security Council decisions, and jus cogens principles, as well as
treaties or other primary sources, e.g., established custom. Examples ofestablished
norms include those under Hague IX relating to shore bombardment and general
principles ofproportionality and distinction, and the Geneva Gas Protocol and its
no first use reservations, both of which are considered to state custom.
There should be one, general due regard analysis, throwing both LOS due re-
gard concerns, e.g., those for an EEZ of a State not party to a conflict, and environ-
mental concerns, into common analysis with other factors, ifthere are no binding
LOAC rules, or there is no binding Charter law, governing a situation. There
should be no seriatim analysis of the relationship of LOS standards and environ-
mental concerns under a due regard rubric, followed by a second, similar analysis
of the relationship of environmental concerns and the LOAC, or the other way
around. A similar analysis should apply in Charter law-governed situations. This
is so for five reasons:
(1) Some environmental principles are stated in treaties or custom whose geo-
graphic parameters may overlap but not coincide with LOS geographic coverage,
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention for example. If such a
treaty applies during war, it would be legally ludicrous to say that protected spe-
cies in the territorial sea would be subject to a double due regard standard, once
under a LOS-environmental law analysis and a second time under a LOAC-
environmental law analysis, while these species' neighbors would not be analyzed
under LOS principles because they were on dry land or beyond LOS ken.
(2) The degree of conflict between marine environmental protection treaties
and the LOS Convention has not been sorted out through practice under the lat-
ter. The LOS Convention is not yet treaty law for some countries, including the
United States. How analysis would proceed between the LOS Convention as
custom and the environmental conventions, whether stating treaty norms or per-
haps restating customary norms, is even more problematical.
(3) There are environmental standards in the LOS Convention's navigational
provisions, for which the Manual apparently states a separate due regard re-
„,„,„,, 647quirement.
(4) There is a huge volume of recent bilateral and regional treaties with a
myriad ofenvironmental norms. A double level due regard standard would further
complicate analysis.
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(5) Applying a single due regard formula can be more easily accomplished as
part of the military planning process, even as rules of engagement (ROE)
may be customized for particular military operations or scenarios.
a. The Specifics oftheProposedAnalysis. The Restatement (Third) ofForeign Rela-
tions Law ofthe United States factorial analysis, combined with an earlier, similar
approach in the Restatement (Second)
•,
Conflict ofLaws, offers a method for deter-
mining what law to apply where claims for applying the LOS, the LOAC, and in-
ternational environmental law intersect. The Restatement (Third) approach to
prescriptive jurisdiction, i.e., a State's authority to apply its law to persons or activ-
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ities outside its territory, is particularly appropriate.
To be sure, the Restatement (Third) analysis in a transnational context has its de-
tractors. Some US courts and academic critics have rejected the Restatement
(Second), Conflicts. Nevertheless, many US federal courts have adopted a Re-
statement (Third) -style analysis for transnational litigation involving federal law;
these courts use analyses similar to the Restatement (Second), Conflicts or the Re-
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statement (Third) for admiralty and maritime cases. Many US state courts use a
variant of the factorial approach, if they do not accept verbatim the Restatement
658
(Second), Conflicts. Commentators and courts outside the United States have
been less hospitable to US courts' extraterritorial reach under formulas like theRe-
statements, but there has been a trend toward recognizing the effects doctrine in
all but name.660
However that may be, the Restatement analysis proffered here is submitted in a
different context, i.e., conflict of different countries' public international law in-
terests, the interests of international organizations in some situations, and the
interests of three different bodies of public international law, the LOS, environ-
mental law and the LOAC. Moreover, as distinguished from the courtroom
context and its necessarily after-the-fact interest analysis that has generated oppo-
sition in some quarters to the Restatements' factorial approaches, this kind of
66?
analysis can be a valuable planning tool before military operations and may, if
thoroughly and neutrally applied, be useful justification for the operation ifclaims
arise during or after execution. In this regard the proposed methodology as a plan-
ning device is more akin to US NEPA requirements or its Antitrust Guide-
lines. The latter note participation of other countries in multilateral and bilat-
eral negotiation processes to avoid friction; this supports a view that this type of
planning has justification in international law. There is indication that facto-
rial analysis may be gaining acceptance, claims and commentators to the contrary
f.f.'j 668
in other contexts notwithstanding, particularly in the LOS context.
b. Method ofAnalysis. Rather than proceeding directly to a factorial analysis to
determine the due regard formula in a given context, as might seem to be
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recommended by the Restatement (Third), the first inquiry should be, by analogy to
Restatement (Second), Conflicts, whether positive norms govern the situation. If
so, those norms should control.
670 671
The first step is to determine whetherUN Charter orjus cogens norms ap-
ply; if so, they should apply without regard to customary, treaty or general princi-
67?
pies norms. An example is the inherent right of self-defense. If Charter or jus
cogens based principles apply, they trump any due regard analysis unless, ofcourse,
the due regard principle is considered part of Charter law or jus cogens in a given
context.
Second, if a state of armed conflict does not exist as between contending
673
States, a balance must be struck between competing international law norms,
i.e., the LOS and the law of the maritime environment. Ifpositive principles gov-
ern this interface, e.g., a coastal State's right to regulate innocent passage through
its territorial sea or perhaps a regional or global agreement to protect part ofthe
67S
marine environment that lays down rules or standards, those norms, including
those recognized in custom or general principles, would govern without recourse
to a due regard formula. The analyst would employ the traditional factorial ap-
proach generally used for public international law issues to balance among these
676
primary and secondary or evidentiary sources. If the applicable law, usually in
treaty format, prescribes due regard for the marine environment, then the pro-
posed due regard formula, or one like it, would be taken into account. Charter and
677
jus cogens norms would prevail over the balancing process. The only time that a
due regard formula would be employed in the absence of incorporation by either
the LOS or the law ofthe maritime environment would be where the two bodies of
law collide, and resolution cannot be had without a balancing process.
Ifan armed conflict situation exists, the same principles apply. IfLOAC princi-
ples explicitly take into account environmental claims during war, those princi-
ples must be applied. The LOS, as stated in the LOS conventions, declares that it is
subject to "other rules ofinternational law," i.e., the LOAC and its LONW compo-
678
nent. A traditional factorial analysis would be applied to sources of the LOAC
679
bearing on the issue. This would include sources protecting the maritime envi-
680
ronment during armed conflict, e.g., theENMOD Convention. Applying a due
regard formula would have no place unless incorporated as part of the analysis of
681
stated sources of law. As with peacetime situations at sea, Charter andjus cogens
68?
norms will trump principles based on traditional sources. As in the LOS-law of
marine environment context, due regard analysis would only be applied, absent
incorporation of due regard by positive law, where the LOAC and the law of the
marine environment directly conflict, and there can be no resolution without a
balancing process.
Belligerents must pay due regard to LOS rights of States not party to the con-
flict and have due regard for those States' marine environment rights and for the
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maritime environment. States not party to the conflict, i.e., neutrals and
nonbelligerents (ifthis status in international law exists) must pay due regard to
LOS rights of States not party to the conflict, and to such States' marine environ-
ment rights, and for the maritime environment, except insofar as the LOAC might
apply as between them and belligerents' claims. These States must do the same
with respect to belligerents' LOS and environmental rights, and the maritime en-
vironment. However, as stated for other scenarios, no due regard analysis would
be necessary ifpositive principles of law, e.g., the LOS, the law of the marine envi-
ronment or the LOAC, require it, or if comparing these bodies of law produces a
conflict, and a more refined analysis must resolve the issue. Charter orjus cogens
/TOO
norms will trump traditional sources and due regard analysis.
The reality ofmuch ofthe foregoing is that, apart from Charter principles deal-
689
ing with territorial integrity ofStates and the right ofself-defense, little Charter
law will impact States' actions regarding environmentally-related issues unless the
Security Council issues a decision. Jus cogens is an amorphous concept at best
and perhaps small in scope. Apart from the LOS conventions' due regard for-
692 r
mulas, no declarations ofthat sort in positive law have been found in the LOAC
or, more specifically, the law of naval warfare; the law of the maritime environ-
ment apart from the LOS conventions; or the law of the marine environment dur-
ing war. The only other major source is the San Remo Manual, itselfa secondary or
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evidentiary source although purporting to recite established law most of the
time. There is a relatively wide potential for applying due regard (or reasonable-
ness) principles in LOS-law of the marine environment interfaces, between
belligerents in a naval warfare context, or in relationships among States not party
to a conflict and belligerents.
c. The Content ofDue Regard; Factors to be Considered. The final issue is the
content of due regard, not discussed in the San Remo Manual. Factors for the
content of due regard, or reasonableness, a nonexclusive enumeration might in-
clude these, based on Restatement (Third) § 403(2):
(a) Linkage ofa belligerent's activity to the jurisdiction or sovereignty ofa
State not party to a conflict, i.e., the extent to which belligerent activity takes
place within that State's jurisdiction or sovereignty, or is perceived at the
time to have substantial, direct and foreseeable effect on sovereign or juris-
dictional interests of a State not party to a conflict;
(b) Connections, e.g., flag State ofvessels or aircraft, nationality ofpersons
involved on e.g., offshore oil platforms or on vessels, or economic activity at
the time between a belligerent and a State not party to a conflict;
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(c) Character of the activity of a State not party to the conflict to be cur-
tailed, regulated or eliminated; importance of that activity to that State; the
extent to which other States have curtailed, regulated or eliminated that ac-
tivity in the past; and the degree to which desirability of such curtailment,
regulation or elimination is generally accepted by other States at the time;
(d) The extent of justified expectations, by States not party to a conflict
and other interests, e.g., shipping interests and their insurors, that might be
protected or affected by a belligerent's actions at the time;
(e) The importance at the time of a belligerent's action or interests of a
State not party to the conflict, to the international political, legal and/or eco-
nomic systems;
(f) The extent to which a belligerent's action, or the response ofa State not
party to the conflict, is consistent at the time with traditions of the interna-
tional system;
(g) The interest to which other States, or international governmental or
nongovernmental organizations, may have in acting in the situation at the
time;
(h) The likelihood of conflict with action by another State or an interna-
tional governmental or nongovernmental organization at the time;
(i) The impact, from what is apparent at the time, that action by States,
whether belligerent or not party to a conflict, will have on other States' duties
or obligations with respect to the environment; and
(j) The impact, from what is apparent at the time, that action by States,
whether belligerent or not party to the conflict, will have on the environment
irrespective of any State's duties or obligations with respect to the environ-
™~«* 696ment.
This proposed enumeration contemplates an armed conflict situation involving a
State as a belligerent and therefore the LOS, the LOAC and its component the
LONW, and the law ofthe marine environment, are involved. However, the same
kind of analysis could be employed where contending States base claims solely on
the LOS and its interface with the law ofthe marine environment. Similarity ofin-
terests and factors considered for the latter situation becomes apparent when the
scenario ofactive intervention on the high seas to minimize pollution from a leak-
ing tanker, whether after a grounding or following attack during armed conflict, is
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considered. Assuming identical spillage in either case, the result for the environ-
ment will be the same unless action is taken, including anticipatory action.
The factorial list has a two-State analysis in mind. Given a possibility ofself-de-
698
fense alliances, interactions of States not party to a conflict through regional or-
ganizations, e.g., those dealing with environmental problems, or more informal
arrangements, e.g., the GulfWar Coalition, probably many more than two States
will be involved in armed conflict situations, where LOS and law ofthe marine en-
vironment issues mix with law of naval warfare problems, or scenarios involving
the LOS and the law ofthe marine environment. For these circumstances, the law
of treaty reservations might be consulted for analogous analysis.
One critical refinement is inclusion of the phrase "at the time" in the analy-
sis. Taken from declarations to Protocol I, two Conventional Weapons Con-
vention protocols and the Second Protocol to the Cultural Property Conven-
702 703
tion, and the San Remo Manual for naval warfare, the phrase would limit cul-
pability to what is reasonably known to participants when decisions involving the
environment or others' LOS rights or responsibilities, and the LOAC if applica-
ble, are taken. The same qualification should apply in self-defense situations;
planners or actors should be held accountable for what they knew or should have
known at the time ofdecision. Although the foregoing sources and the proposed
factorial analysis contemplate a war scenario, planners should not be liable for
more than they know, or with reasonable investigation should know, when only
the LOS and the law of the maritime environment apply.
d. Testing the Proposed Analysis. The Tanker War offers examples of how the
suggested factorial analysis might apply in future conflicts. With one exception,
the Iraqi attack on Iran's Nowruz facilities, situations taken from the Tanker War
are largely hypothetical because of the incomplete factual record related to envi-
ronmental issues in other instances. Analysis follows the same nonexclusive list
proposed above. Three scenarios have been selected to illustrate how analysis
might proceed: (1) Charter law, i.e., self-defense, was involved in US responses to
attacks on its warships and other platforms, and attacks on US-flagged merchant
ships. (2) Belligerents' attacks on neutral shipping involved application of the
LOAC in an LOS context. (3) Iraq attacked Iran's Nowruz facilities, resulting in a
massive oil spill threatening fishing grounds, neutrals' desalination plants, and
possibly high seas navigation; the LOS, including LOS-based treaty law, and the
LOAC were involved in this situation as well.
i. US Self-Defense Responses Against Iranian Warships. If due regard for the
environment is part ofthe self-defense norm, the record seems fairly clear that US
responses against Iranian platforms involved no significant oil spillage. There
necessarily was spillage in connection with sinking or disabling attacking Iranian
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warships. Because the Charter, Articles 51 and 103, have no criteria beyond state-
ments of the inherent right of self-defense and superiority of Charter law at least
70^ ~ 10ft
over treaties, the nonexclusive indicia listed above are considered, along
with other self-defense criteria, necessity and proportionality and, for anticipatory
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self-defense, action that admits of no other alternative:
(a) There was definite linkage ofIranian activity to a State not party to the
conflict (the United States) when Iran began offensive naval operations
against US warships. Threatening to fire, or firing, weapons against another
country's men of war had a substantial, direct, foreseeable effect on that
country's (i.e., US) sovereign interests. Factor (a) clearly points to validity of
the US response. Since the attack occurred on the high seas, there were no en-
vironmental interests ofother States to consider, except insofar as the result-
ing slick from damaged or sunken ships might have impeded high seas
freedoms or have fouled their shores. There is no record of such, and in any
event Iran's action demanded immediate US response in anticipatory
self-defense.
(b) Connections to the flag were strong as to both actors: warships were in-
volved, and this factor is evenly balanced.
(c) As to character and importance of the activity of a State not party to a
conflict, the United States had an inherent right of unit self-defense; US
high seas freedom of navigation under the LOS was also at issue. Factor (c)
strongly supports the US action.
(d) Given Iran's record of attacking neutral merchantmen carrying car-
goes not destined for Iraq, clear violations of international law, and the near
certainty that these attacks would continue in the future, the balance of this
factor tips heavily in favor ofthe US action. Although leakage from damaged
warships could be expected to pollute the maritime environment, this could
be expected to be relatively slight compared with what could be expected if
Iran hit just one fully-loaded large tanker.
(e) It was vitally important that the United States assert the right ofcoun-
tries not party to the conflict to high seas freedom of navigation; it was im-
portant that the right ofself-defense be vindicated. It was also important that
economic interests ofocean carriers, their consignees and insurers, which lie
behind the freedom ofthe seas, be protected. Factor (e) weighs strongly in fa-
vor of the US action.
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(f) Iran's action was not, and the US response was, consistent with tradi-
tions of the international system.
(g) Other States, and international governmental organizations, had ex-
pressed their policies by that time; the Security Council had passed resolu-
tions deploring these attacks, and other countries' navies were engaged in
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actions to protect shipping.
(h) There was no likelihood of conflict with other States or international
organizations' actions; if anything, the US action was in line with what Iran
might have expected if attacks on other countries' warships had occurred.
(i) The impact ofUS self-defense measures on other States' duties or obli-
gations to the environment is not clear. The Iran-Iraq conflict ended soon af-
terward. This factor is neutral in application.
(j) The same is true with respect to what impact the US measures would
have on the environment irrespective ofother States' duties or obligations to
the environment.
When these 10 nonexclusive factors are considered, it is relatively clear that envi-
ronmental deprivation claims based on pollution from sunken or damaged Iranian
warships would have been countered with strong policy arguments under the
Charter and the LOS to justify US action and for finding that the United States ob-
served due regard for other States' environmental interests and for the environ-
ment in its responses. If attacking Iranian warships had included a deep-draft
naval auxiliary tanker with potential for a large slick if damaged or sunk, naval
thinking and planning might have dictated different actions so long as US war-
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ships' fundamental security was assured. For example, if the tanker were not in
an immediate area ofconfrontation and was in the rear to replenish the Iranian de-
stroyers, and it was otherwise militarily advantageous to remove the tanker from
further participation as part of self-defense measures, disabling fire as distin-
guished from destruction might have been ordered. Towing the disabled tanker
back to port might have had a salutory political-military side effect of"delivering a
message" besides encouraging better law compliance.
ii. Belligerents' Attacks on Neutral Shipping. A second analysis from the
Tanker War may illuminate issues where there are no self-defense norms or other
Charter-based principles at stake. The record is not clear as to the extent ofmarine
pollution that accompanied Iranian and Iraqi attacks on neutral shipping. If it had
been considerable, and no treaty, e.g., the Kuwait Regional Convention and
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Protocol or other customary standards were directly involved, either with
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respect to individual attacks or attacks taken as a whole, the 10-factor analysis
might proceed thus:
(a) Belligerents' activities had clear and devastating effect on other coun-
tries' sovereign or jurisdictional interests. In the case ofwarship, e.g., U.S.S.
Stark and U.S.S. SamuelB. Roberts as noted in the first hypothetical, the only
States involved were the belligerents and the United States. In the case of
merchantmen, the issue is more complicated. To be sure, the law of the flag
711from the law ofnaval warfare applied to the ships, but there were other sig-
nificant interests involved, e.g., nationality of beneficial owners of vessels,
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charterers, crew members, cargo owners, cargo consignees and insurers.
Moreover, there were seafaring States' interests using the Gulf for naviga-
tion, fishing and other high seas rights and freedoms; and coastal States'
rights and jurisdiction in the EEZ, continental shelf, fishing zones, and ter-
ritorial sea; and coastal States' interests in protecting desalination plants and
their coastal environment in general.
(b) The same sort ofconnections were at stake with respect to these States'
associations or economic activity. This is an example of the overlap of
factors.
(c) Freedom ofnavigation and high seas fishing without concern for envi-
ronmental factors such as polluted seas that would force curtailment ofnaval
operations, diversion from regular shipping lanes or from some fishing
grounds; the right ofseafarers to pursue occupations in a clean environment;
the right of coastal States and their peoples to potable drinking water and a
clean environment; were all important interests.
(d) The interests in Factor (c) were justified in expectations for a clean en-
vironment, and these were affected by belligerent actions.
(e) The apparent justification of the attacks was to curtail shipment of
goods to finance opponents' war efforts and to intimidate other Persian Gulf
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users. On the other hand, interests of States not party to the conflict were
strong, based on the LOS.
(f) Iran and Iraq did not act consistently with traditions of the interna-
tional system, including Charter principles such as those in Article 2(4), nor
did they behave consistently with well-established LOS rights offreedom of
navigation and fishing, or equally well-established LOAC principles. On the
other hand, States not party to the conflict were within their Charter rights
(e.g., the Article 51 inherent right of self-defense), the LOS, and the LOAC.
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This weighs strongly against the belligerents in terms ofsignificant environ-
mental deprivations incident to their actions against Gulf shipping.
(g) Other States' interests, whether individually or in groups, in acting
has been described. In addition, Council Resolutions 552 and 598 con-
715demned these attacks in 1984 and 1987. Although these actions, individ-
ual and collective, by other States did not state environmental concerns, this
strong manifestation of interest would be weighed against belligerents for
any ensuing environmental damage.
(h) Based on the record summarized in Factor (g), there was little if any
conflict with actions by other States or international organizations at the
time.
(i) There was some potential for serious impact on coastal States' duties or
obligations with respect to the natural environment, e.g., obligations to pro-
tect their coastal areas or their obligation to provide potable water for their
peoples, livestock and plants.
(j) Finally, it may have been apparent, at the time, that these attacks, indi-
vidually or taken as a whole, would have deleterious effects on the
environment.
In summary, ifsignificant environmental degradations occurred in belligerent at-
tacks on Gulf shipping during the Tanker War, and no norms based on treaties
such as the Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol had applied, evaluation un-
der an expanded due regard analysis would have found the belligerents guilty of
not having given due regard to environmental considerations for this aspect ofthe
conflict. The factors would have weighed strongly against them.
iii. The Iraqi Attack on Iran's Nowniz Facilities. Analysis for the massive spill
in the wake of Iraqi attacks on Iran's Nowruz facilities was different in three re-
spects: there was a definite threat to the high seas environment and to neutrals'
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fishing grounds and desalination plants, the Security Council did not act, and
the Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol, treaties governing offshore pollu-
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tion, were involved with respect to neutrals; they may have been suspended or
71
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terminated between Iran and Iraq, and perhaps as to neutrals. Ifthe Convention
and Protocol did not apply because oftreaty termination or suspension factors, any
719
custom, perhaps based on the treaty or the general LOS, continued to apply.
The 10-factor due regard analysis might proceed thus:
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(a) Although Nowruz was an Iranian facility and subject to Iranian sover-
eignty, the Iraqi attacks had clear linkage to States not party to the conflict
through threats to their fishing interests, desalination plants and high seas
freedom of navigation and other LOS rights. Whether Iraq could have
known at the time that its attacks would result in substantial, direct and fore-
seeable effects is not known, but there is almost a conclusive presumption
that Iraq as a major oil-producing country knew, or should have known at the
time, that its attacks would likely have some or all ofthese effects. This factor
weighs heavily against Iraq.
(b) There was a connection between Iraq and neutrals, i.e., at least the cus-
tomary LOS and perhaps the Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol if it
continued to apply. This cuts against Iraq.
(c) As in the case ofhigh seas attacks on neutral shipping, there were very
important interests ofneutrals involved, including interests in having pota-
ble water and a source offood (fish), laying aside the additional right ofneu-
trals to trade with Iran at the terminal. Although the Security Council did
not act, the record indicates that neutrals, e.g., the United States, expressed
concern and may have tried to help curtail the spill. This factor weighs
against Iraq.
(d) Neutrals' justified expectations were as high at the time ofthe Nowruz
attacks as when their merchantmen were attacked on the high seas. This fac-
tor weighs against Iraq.
(e) As in the second scenario, neutrals' interests were high in being able to
exercise freedom of navigation, to feed their peoples, and to have sufficient
drinking water. On the other hand, depriving Iran of Nowruz, a legitimate
target under the LOAC, was very important to Iraq. Without having the full
facts for Iraq's or neutrals' positions, this factor is even in strength of
policies.
(f) Iraq's actions, and neutrals' reactions, were both consistent at the time
with traditions of the international system. In terms of factorial analysis,
Iraqi sovereign interests in prosecuting its war effort was very strong; it was a
total war for the belligerents.
(g) Other States had interests in acting in the situation at the time. Besides
loss of an opportunity for legitimate trade at Nowruz, neutrals had interests
in freedom of navigation in the Gulf, feeding their peoples, and preserving
their water supplies, all threatened by the result of Iraqi attacks. There was
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no official IGO or NGO action with respect to the attack. Nevertheless, this
factor inclines toward the neutrals.
(h) Apart from Iran's attempts to defend Nowruz, at the time ofthe attack
there seemed to be little likelihood of conflict with actions taken by another
State or an international organization, although the Security Council or
other international organization could have reacted to the attacks. This fac-
tor favors Iraq.
(i) Iraq's action had strong impact on other States' duties or obligations
with respect to the environment, particularly those States' coastal environ-
ment. This factor cuts against Iraq.
(j) There was no impact, apparent at the time, of other States' action that
would have involved the environment.
Thus under the 10-factor analysis two factors favor Iraq (f, h), six would oppose the
Iraqi action (a, b, c, d, g, i), and two (e, j) were neutral. A nose-count vote would say
that Iraqi action was unlawful under a due regard standard. However, as noted in
the first two scenarios, the relative strengths of each policy must be considered.
Here too the interest in a clean, safe Gulfenvironment outweighs the perceived ad-
vantages Iraq had in successfully attacking Nowruz. Seen as a proportionality
analysis under the LOAC, the attack was not proportionate when environmental
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factors are taken into account.
e. Conclusions. The foregoing analysis is quite tentative; the Restatement-based
factors are not exclusive in enumeration and are submitted as a first brief to assist
in solving issues made more knotty by confluence offour bodies of law: oceans law
as stated in the LOS Convention with its major contribution ofguiding principles
with respect to the martime environment; international environmental law, rela-
tively in its infancy and incorporated in part in the Convention; the LOAC and
particularly the law of naval warfare, most ofwhich is customary and which is in-
corporated in the LOS Convention, its predecessors and parallel customary
norms, through the other rules clauses; charter law. Further thinking might apply
this methodology to other events of the Tanker War or to other armed conflict sit-
uations, particularly when concrete facts related to environmental conditions are
available. In any event, multifactor analysis, already a feature of modern military
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planning, should take environmental concerns into account.
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Part C. General Conclusions and Projections for the Future
Ocean pollution is not a new phenomenon, nor has been the attempt to prevent
it through international agreements and customary law. Oil largely replaced sail
and coal as the propellant ofchoice for oceangoing vessels, and navies also became
dependent on it early in this century. The motor vehicle and aircraft became the
transportation of choice on land, and transoceanic flights were harbingers of the
future. The world's largest oil reserves were discovered in the Middle East. During
World War II the lifeblood ofthe combatants was petroleum, not only to fire ships'
boilers but to propel aircraft and increasingly mobile armies and to lubricate the
sinews of mechanized armed forces.
Since World War II, however, a veritable explosion in use ofpetroleum has oc-
curred. Although nuclear power has replaced oil for some warships, petroleum re-
mains the primary fuel for most navies, including countries with nuclear-powered
warships, e.g., China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Motor vehicle use and numbers have grown exponentially worldwide. Airlines
have absorbed much of overland mass transit demands and have largely replaced
ocean liners, except for the cruise line industry, for transoceanic travel. To satisfy
this demand, steamship companies have built ever larger tankers, not necessarily
more ofthem, to transport oil more cheaply in bulk. Although pipelines frequently
carry oil across national borders, they must stop at the water's edge or perhaps off-
shore terminals built to accommodate huge tankers. Other types ofmerchant ships
have also grown larger in tonnage, and the cargoes they carry sometimes include
consignments as toxic to the environment as before the Second World War but are
greater in relative size. The result is that each accident, incident ofnegligent navi-
gation or attack by belligerents can result in more massive pollution than before
the War, when typical tankers ranged between 5,000 and 10,000 tons displace-
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ment. The same is true to a lesser extent for warships, which have also grown in
size and therefore voracity and capacity for fuel, and the supply trains accompany-
ing mobile task forces also include larger supply tankers. The result, as in the case
ofnegligent navigation or accidents that befall merchant tankers, is a potential for
larger slicks from damaged or sunken ships of war.
The law applicable to the ocean environment has also grown in size and com-
plexity. While agreements concluded early in this century occasionally attempted
to regulate oil pollution at sea, more often than not treaties tried to deal with prin-
ciples, e.g., SOLAS or COLREGS, which, ifobserved, would contribute to a cleaner
environment. Since ratification of the Charter in 1945, however, there has been a
sea change in environmental regulation. The old themes, represented by newer
SOLAS and COLREGS versions, continued, but multilateral treaty responses to
maritime disasters as they occurred, e.g., losses ofAmoco Cadiz and Torrey Canyon,
began to promote environmental controls. The 1958 LOS conventions
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represented a parallel development, restating in international agreements major
components of the law of the sea, until then largely customary in format. The UN
General Assembly began promoting a cleaner environment through nonbinding
resolutions, particularly those resulting from the 1972 Stockholm Conference, and
since then the UN Environmental Programme has promoted negotiation and rati-
fication ofmany regional agreements for protection ofthe maritime environment.
The 1958 conventions and regional environmental treaties preserved longstand-
ing customary norms in most cases, e.g., immunity of warships, naval auxiliaries,
State vessels on noncommercial service, and State aircraft, or crystallized new cus-
tomary norms, e.g., the continental shelf. The 1958 conventions' other rules
clauses declared that these treaties were subject to the LOAC and its law of naval
warfare component in appropriate situations. The Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties recognized traditional grounds for treaty suspension or termination,
impossibility or fundamental change of circumstances but did not include rules
for suspension or termination during armed conflict, the latter being left to cus-
723tomary norms.
A major watershed came in 1982 with the LOS Convention, which went into
force in 1994, and which has found increasing acceptance by ratifications and ac-
cessions since. Besides consolidating terms of the 1958 LOS conventions, much of
which had become customary law by then, the 1982 LOS Convention recognized
and regularized rules for innocent passage, straits passage, the EEZ (now a custom-
ary norm), the continental shelf and archipelagic waters while expanding the per-
missible reach of a territorial sea to 12, and a contiguous zone to 24, miles. The
Convention's major innovations were rules for the deep seabed through terms es-
tablishing and governing the Area, and many provisions, including Part XII, to
regulate the maritime environment. Countries such as the United States that have
not ratified the Convention have recognized the customary nature of its naviga-
tional articles and therefore many provisions affecting the maritime environment
encased within these terms. Much of Part XII of the Convention, the principal re-
pository of environmental principles, repeats custom and is not innovative. The
same is true of other Convention provisions; the principle of immunity for war-
ships, naval auxiliaries, government ships on noncommercial service, and State
aircraft is repeated, as is the other rules concept.
The LOAC as it relates to the environment has followed a similar pattern. The
1907 Hague Conventions, and before them the 1899 conventions, provided for
protecting historic monuments, universities, etc., not connected with conflict,
thereby codifying custom in some cases. Today many more Hague principles are
customary norms binding all States. These agreements did not articulate environ-
mental concerns any more than the first treaties governing navigation or safety at
sea, but their effect, if observed, protects the environment. This trend continued
through the mid-Twentieth Century with development of customary norms and
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agreements, some of which limited or forbade means of warfare, observance of
which promotes environmental protection {e.g., the Geneva Gas Protocol); or fur-
ther protected areas, objects or classes of persons {e.g., the Roerich Pact, Hague
Cultural Property Convention, Genocide Convention, and 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions, particularly the Fourth Convention), which also contribute to environmen-
tal protection ifobserved during war. Most ofthese treaties affected land warfare or
aerial bombardment, perhaps from the sea. For the most part, the law ofnaval war-
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fare has remained customary in nature.
Several developments late in the Twentieth Century pointed toward direct in-
terest in regulating naval warfare as it relates to the environment, however. Proto-
col I includes provisions related to environmental protection, stated generally and
perhaps not yet customary in nature, and the ENMOD Convention, probably ac-
cepted as custom today, relates directly to the oceans environment. Protocol I and
the Conventional Weapons Convention and its protocols restate customary princi-
ples applying to all warfare: discrimination, proportionality and necessity, and
Navies began revising their operational law manuals to reflect these LOAC devel-
opments as well as the LOS, chiefamong them NWP 9, and its successor, NWP
1-14M. In 1995 the San Remo Manual, the first compilation of rules of naval war-
fare since the 1913 OxfordNavalManual, included environmental protections dur-
ing war at sea and advanced a concept of requiring belligerents to have due regard
for the environment and due regard for obligations and rights of States not party to
the conflict with respect to the law ofthe sea. These ideas were taken from the LOS
conventions' due regard principles. The ICRC Guidelines (1994) andNWP 1-14M
(1997) also publish principles for environmental protection during war.
The Manual did not expand on the due regard principle. A principal focus of
this Chapter has been to advocate that due regard principles governing relation-
ships between the LOS and the LOAC, and the LOAC and the law of the marine
environment, should be considered together and not seriatim or separately. Due re-
gard should be defined through a factorial approach similar to those used in the
American Law Institute's Conflict of Laws {Second) and Foreign Relations Law
(Third) Restatements, unless there are positive rules of law from the Charter, jus
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cogens or sources such as treaties or custom establishing a standard.
The UN Charter, and development oflaw under it, has been another phenome-
non of the second half of this century. This can have major implications for the
LOS and the law ofthe marine environment, and the LOAC. After a Cold War hia-
tus since 1950, use of Security Council decisions binding UN Members under Ar-
ticles 25 and 48 has been revived, particularly with respect to the 1990-91 Gulf
War. Council and General Assembly resolutions may also be non-binding in na-
ture, i.e., as calls for action or recommendations, but they can restate and therefore
strengthen other sources oflaw, e.g., custom or treaties. This process was used dur-
ing the Tanker War when Council resolutions condemned attacks on merchant
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shipping. Council resolutions also superseded the traditional law. The Gulf War
also marked the first time that the Council specifically condemned a country, Iraq,
for environmental pollution and held it liable for damages. Other recent crises and
conflicts, e.g., the 1990-91 GulfWar and crises in the former Yugoslavia and
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Haiti have also been influenced by Council resolutions, some binding and some
hortatory. The Assembly has a long and strong record of activity related to envi-
ronmental protection and the LOAC, the 1972 Stockholm Conference being a wa-
tershed. Assembly resolutions are nonbindingper se, but they can restate custom or
treaty norms or influence later primary sources. This has been apparent in, e.g. y the
1982 LOS Convention and treaties stating rules for armed conflict.
Besides the Council and Assembly, UN specialized agencies, such as IMO,
which sponsors environment-protective treaties for oceans travel and safety, and
nongovernmental agencies, e.g., the ICRC, sponsor of the Geneva Conventions
and their Protocols, have contributed significantly to the legal milieu.
Yet another phenomenon since the end of World War II has been a worldwide
communications and media revolution, particularly the use of television, and in-
creased attention of national and worldwide publics on the environment. There is
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also near real-time coverage of wars. Worldwide use of the Internet promises
even more intense public interest in environmental affairs and armed conflict.
The US Congress passed NEPA in 1972, and there has been a flood ofmore special-
ized national environmental legislation since then, much of it related to the condi-
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tion of the oceans. " As this practice becomes more worldwide, these national
statutes can also contribute to customary standards. Media war coverage has
grown too, beginning with the Viet Nam conflict. As yet technical capacity and
shipboard space and security have limited media reporting of ongoing environ-
mental casualties at sea, especially during armed conflict, which is usually a matter
of minutes, not days, as in the case of land warfare. There is little room aboard
smaller naval vessels, e.g., for media passengers, and during the Tanker War stan-
dard US NOTAMs and NOTMARs warned away vessels and aircraft (which
might have been hired by media looking for a story) because of the risk of suicide
attacks on US warships. One result has been lack ofpublic sources to assess the na-
ture of environmental disasters at sea; often these are locked in classified govern-
ment files or reports, other unpublished sources, e.g., arbitrations or otherwise
unreported litigation results because of lawyer-client privilege related to pri-
vate-party litigation or the national security exception to evidence disclosure, or in
private company files. Moreover, in earlier instances massive pollution might oc-
cur, but media focus was on other aspects of the tragedy, a recent example being
merchant ships attacked during the Tanker War. There were print reports and oc-
casional television sound bites of flaming ships and dying merchant sailors, but
there was no statement of the extent of pollution. Even the Nowruz oil spill re-
ceived only scant attention. Whether this will change in the future is a matter of
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technology, national security, the rules ofevidence and interest ofreaders, viewers
or Internet users.
If the impact ofmedia coverage and public interest in pollution at sea, whether
from merchant ship accidents or negligent navigation, oil pumping blowouts, or
the result ofconflict, is conjectural, there are other factors that must be considered
for the future.
1. The Proliferation ofPlayers
Although planners have been aware ofthe possible impact ofCouncil decisions
and the influence ofother Council resolutions or those ofthe Assembly, and ofthe
ICRC promotion of the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, there is also a
wide range of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations
that are or would be connected with the law of the sea, the international law of the
environment, and the law ofarmed conflict. These range from IMO, aUN special-
ized agency; regional organizations of countries such as those party to the Kuwait
Regional Convention and its Protocol; theUN Environment Programme, sponsor
ofsuch agreements; Greenpeace, an environmental advocacy group that has urged
a fifth Geneva Convention to protect the environment; to the International Insti-
tute ofHumanitarian Law, which sponsored the San Remo Manual. Some ofthese,
e.g., IMO, can develop rules binding on member countries like the United States.
All can produce policy documents and rules that may influence development of
custom or treaties in the fluid legal environment. There are comparable groups
within countries, such as the Maritime Law Association within the United States,
analogous to the American Bar Association, composed ofmaritime lawyers, judges
and academics and linked to the Comite Maritime Internationale in Brussels, Bel-
gium, which sponsors treaties related to maritime law, or the Sierra Club, a
US-based environmental advocacy group.
A recent phenomenon has been another spurt in newly independent States, pri-
marily in Europe, matching the post-World War II decolonization movement.
This may promote controversy because of the amorphous law of treaty succes-
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sion. Moreover, to the extent these countries have coastlines and navies and
therefore interests in the LOS, the law ofthe maritime environment and the law of
naval warfare, there is a potential for further uncertainty in these subjects because
they may not have sorted out policies on these complex matters. This is one reason
why the time is not ripe for a treaty on the environment during war.
The sheer number of States today (there are over 180 UN Members, ranging
from tiny Andorra, Liechtenstein and San Marino to powerful giants like China,
Russia and the United States), when coupled with the development of regional
agreements and perhaps varied custom around the world, raises the further prob-
lem ofunanimity within the context of a particular military operation. For exam-
ple, during the 1990-91 Gulf War, some States were parties to Protocol I; others,
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e.g., the United States, were not. This meant that Protocol standards could be ap-
plied only as custom. While that issue seems to have been resolved for that short
conflict, the problem of different national or regional views and practices as to
three intertwined bodies of law, the LOS, environmental law, and the LOAC, re-
mains. Even ifthe law is the same on paper, how it is interpreted or practiced in the
multinational context may provoke questions. Military planners must consider
these factors in drafting clear, workable ROE for each operation.
2. The Right to a Clean Environment as a Human Right
Although not mentioned specifically in worldwide or regional human
rights conventions as such, commentators have urged recognizing a decent environ-
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ment as a human rights norm. " That trend is in its infancy; how it will develop,
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perhaps as customary law, is not clear. International Labor Organization con-
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ventions concerned with a safe, healthful workplace arguably could be seen as
requiring a safe, healthful labor environment, even as European Union law, whose
general policy has been creating a common labor market, has been held to require
equal pay for women.
If this trend becomes law, the next issue is the relationship of human rights
norms to the LOAC. Humanitarian law, whether grounded in treaties or other
sources, applies during armed conflict. Its requirements may differ signifi-
cantly from those of human rights law. Some human rights conventions,^., the
Civil and Political Rights Covenant, include derogation clauses limiting their
scope to core rights during "time of public emergency." Others may not.
While all human rights conventions are subject to Charter law,jws cogens norms
and principles of the law of treaties, e.g., impossibility, fundamental change of cir-
cumstances and armed conflict, there is the problem of a human right seen as ajus
cogens norm balanced against Charter norms such as Article 51's right of self-de-
fense, perhaps also recognized as a jus cogens norm. If a convention-based human
rights norm ascends tojus cogens status, treaty suspension rules cannot apply. This
could have important ramifications for applying humanitarian law and the law of
naval warfare, whether in treaty or customary format, during armed conflict.
Some countries, e.g., the United States, may not be party to as many human
rights agreements as other nations, some ofwhich may have incorporated human
rights norms into their national constitutions, thereby binding them to these stan-
dards in practice. There maybe issues ofconflicting norms among regional treaties,
a problem mostly eliminated for environmental law because of terms' commonal-
ity in UNEP-sponsored treaties for the most part.
In any event, planners must be aware of a potential for human rights violation
claims by opponents, or conditioning of responses by allies or coalition partners
due to national human rights commitments. If a right to a safe, healthful
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environment becomes a human right, another factor must be added to a decision
matrix for conducting naval operations and naval warfare.
3. The Carryover ofLand Warfare Concepts, Particularlyfrom Protocol I
Some provisions of Protocol I and the Conventional Weapons Convention and
its Protocols, restate custom applying to all modalities ofwarfare, e.g., discrimina-
tion, necessity and proportionality, although there maybe disputes as to definition
or scope of custom. However, there has been a trend, rejected by some commenta-
tors, to incorporate more of these treaties' norms into the law of naval warfare.
There is always a possibility of a reversal of direction.
4. A New Treaty to Protect the Environment DuringArmed Conflict?
During and after the GulfWar, there were calls from commentators and within
the United Nations for a new international agreement directed toward protecting
the environment during armed conflict. The ICRC advocated rejection of such a
move, stating that the problem was not so much lack oflaw, but lack ofobservation
and enforcement. Ultimately the United Nations took no action. The ICRC was
correct, as this Chapter demonstrates with respect to the law ofthe sea and the law
ofnaval warfare as related to environmental protection. However, ifthere are wars
in the future with significant environmental damage, whether covered by existing
law or not, there may be further calls for another treaty if there is no enforcement
against perpetrators of military or other actions degrading the environment. A
principal factor here is availability ofa veto-free Security Council as one vehicle for
meaningful action.
5. Final Thoughts
This Chapter demonstrates that the environmental protection factor is a real is-
sue for those who plan naval operations in peace and in war today and in the fore-
seeable future. While there are few bright navigational beacons to guide the way in
terms ofapplicable law during armed conflict at sea, there is also a real opportunity
to develop workable norms to assure maximum permissible use of the Earth's
oceans, protect the maritime environment, and security to countries through law-
ful use of force at sea. Perhaps the factorial approach this Chapter suggests for ac-
cording due regard to environmental concerns is a step in that direction.
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68. Restatement (Third) § 521, cmt. b, citing UN Charter, art. 2(4); LOS Convention, arts. 88, 301; referring to
Restatement (Third) § 905, cmt. g; see also nn. III.958, IV.16 and accompanying text.
69. UN Charter, art. 103; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying text; Part B.l.
70. See nn. III.957-60, IV.15-18 and accompanying text.
71. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 51, 103; see also S. Doc. 103-39, n. IV. 3, 51. There is a debate on whether anticipatory
self-defense, as opposed to "reactive" self-defense, where an aggressor strikes the first blow, is permitted in the Charter
era. The US view, supported by many commentators, is that anticipatory self-defense is permissible in the Charter era.
Iran and the USSR had the opposite view. See generally Chapter III and Part B.l.
72. See nn. IV.16, 67 and accompanying text; Part V.F.
73. Cf. nn. 12-14, 21-22 and accompanying text.
74. E.g., 1969 Civil Liability Convention, art. 3(1). ICAO Convention, art. 89 says it does not affect parties'
freedom of action during war and for a state of emergency if the country declaring the emergency notifies ICAO. See
also n. IV.20 and accompanying text.
75. E.g., 1954 Oil Pollution Convention, art. 19; Treaty ofRome, n. III.819, arts. 223-26, 298 UNTS 88-89; see also
n. IV.21 and accompanying text.
76. NAFTA, n. III.949, art. 2204, in 32 ILM 702 (1993). NAFTA has many environmental protection provisions.
NAFTA, arts. 104, 709-24, 901-15, 1101, 1114, 2005, 2014-15, 2101, id. 297-98, 377-83, 386-92, 639, 642, 694-97, 699,
analyzed in Daniel Magraw, NAFTA & the Environment: Substance and Process ch. 1 (1995); Stewart A. Baker,
After the NAFTA, 27 Int'L Law. 765, 769 (1993); Jack I. Garvey, Trade Law and Quality ofLife— Dispute Resolution
Under theNAFTA SideAccords on Labor and the Environment, 89 AJIL 439 (1995); Raymond B. Ludwiszewski, "Green"
Language in the NAFTA: Reconciling Free Trade and Environmental Protection, 27 Int'L Law. 691 (1993); Richard B.
Stewart, The NAFTA: Trade, Competition, Environmental Protection, id. 751 (1993). NAFTA has a national security
exception, stating inter alia that nothing in NAFTA may be construed to prevent a party from taking actions it
considers necessary to protect its "essential security interests," during war or other emergency in international
relations, or to prevent a party from acting pursuant to its Charter obligations for maintaining international peace and
security. NAFTA, arts. 2102(l)(b)-2102(c), 32 ILM 699-700. See also nn. 111.949, IV.22 and accompanying text.
77. E.g., Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol, n. 11.63; Red Sea Convention and Protocol, n. 55.
78. High Seas Convention, preamble; see also nn. III.962, IV.24 and accompanying text. The LOS Convention's
navigational articles also reflect custom. See nn. III.963 and accompanying text; Chapter IV.
79. ICJ Statute, arts. 38, 59; Restatement (Third) §§ 102-03; see also n. III. 10 and accompanying text.
80. Vienna Convention, art. 61; see also nn. III.928, IV.26 and accompanying text.
81. Vienna Convention, art. 62, see also nn. III.929, IV.27 and accompanying text.
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82. See nn. III.930, IV.28 and accompanying text.
83. See nn. 111.938-51, IV.29 and accompanying text.
84. See nn. III.948, IV.30 and accompanying text.
85. UN Charter, art. 2(2); Vienna Convention, art. 26; see also nn. III.934, IV.31 and accompanying text.
86. Vienna Convention, art. 18; see also n. IV.32, 60, VI.45 and accompanying text.
87. See Symposium, State Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.
88. ICJ Statute, arts. 38, 59; Restatement (Third) §§ 102-03; see also n. III. 10 and accompanying text.
89. High Seas Convention, preamble. The LOS Convention navigational articles are also said to reflect custom;
these have numerous other rules clauses. See n. 78 and accompanying text.
90. "In at least one respect [its terms] are more restrictive than customary international law, namely in the case of
the territorial sea." 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea 994; see also Charney, The Marine Environment, n. IV.49, 887.
91. S. Doc. 103-39, n.IV.3, 19.
92. E.g., LOS Convention, arts. 1(1)(4)-1(1)(5), 21, 23, 39, 41, 43, 54, 56(l)(b)(iii), 60(3), 63, 66-67, 94(7), 116,
123(b), 145-47, 155(2), 162, 165.
93. LOS Convention, art. 192; compare Stockholm Declaration, n. 53, Principle 7, 1 1 ILM 1418 (1972); see also 4
Nordquist 36-43. The US Department of Defense and the US Navy view Convention art. 236 and Part XII "as a
mandate to ensure responsibility for environmentally sound practices." William J. Schachte, Jr., The Value ofthe 1982
UN Convention on the Law ofthe Sea: Preserving Our Freedoms and Protecting the Environment, 23 ODIL 55, 61 (1992). See
also NWP 1-14M AnnotatedH 8.5.1; nn. 19-20 and accompanying text; Part B.2.
94. See generally 2 Nordquist H 1.23, arguing for an evolving conceptual definition; 4 id. H 192.11(a); Daniel
Tolbert, Defining the Environment, in Environmental Protection, n. 2, 259.
95. S. Doc. 103-29, n.IV.3, 19.
96. LOS Convention, art. 1(1)(4); 2 Nordquist Ml 1.1-1.15, 1.22-1.24, 1.26-1.31. The LOS Convention definition
means the environment is human and nature centered. See Tolbert, n. 94, 259.
97. LOS Convention, art. 193; compare Stockholm Declaration, n. 53, Principle 12,11 ILM 1419 (1972); see also 4
Nordquist 45-49. Jose Luis Vallarta, Protection and Preservation ofthe Marine Environment and Marine Scientific Research
at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in Symposium, The Law of the Sea: Where Now, 46 L. &
Contemp. Probs. 146, 149 (1983) said the duty to preserve and protect the environment is ajus cogens norm. See also nn.
III. 10, VI.63 and accompanying text.
98. This part of the LOS Convention does not state "significant" as part of the duty, but other LOS Convention
provisions, regional agreements, and commentators have added terms like "major," "serious," "significant" or
"substantial." E.g., LOS Convention, arts. 94(7), 233; Kuwait Protocol, n. 11.63, art. 1(2), 1140 UNTS 201; Red Sea
Protocol, n. 55, art. 1(2), 2 Wallace 2294; Restatement (Third) §§ 601(l)(b)-601(3), 603(l)(a), 603(2); Low &
Hodgkinson, n. 2, 422-23. Such sources, combined, can evidence custom. Brownlie, International Law 5; 1
Oppenheim § 10, 28; Restatement (Third) § 102(3).
99. LOS Convention, art. 194(1); see also Restatement (Third) § 603(2). The "prevention" theme was partly
derived from High Seas Convention, arts. 24-25, and limitation to "capabilities" from Stockholm Declaration, n. 53,
Principle 7, 11 ILM 1418 (1972). 4 Nordquist 11H 194.1, 194.10(b). Diligent prevention and control are probably
binding norms. Cf Birnie & Boyle 95.
100. LOS Convention, art. 194(2); Restatement (Third) §§ 601(l)(b), 601(2), 603(l)(a), 603(2).
101. 4 Nordquist H 194.10(e); see also Parts IV.B.2-IV.B.3.
102. LOS Convention, art. 1(1)(5) defines dumping; see also 2 Nordquist Ml 1.1-1.15, 1.24, 1.26-1.31.
103. LOS Convention, art. 194(3); compare MARPOL 73/78, art. 2(2), Annex II, defining "harmful substance," not
explained in the LOS Convention. 4 Nordquist 11 194.10(j). Art. 194(3) sweeps more broadly than MARPOL 73/78.
Language in MARPOL 73/78, Annex II, art. 2(2) defining pollution is the same as LOS Convention, art. 1(1)(4).
MARPOL 73/78 parties represent 92 percent of world merchant tonnage. Bowman & Harris 293 (11th Cum. Supp.
1995). It is fair to assume that its terms represent custom; similar terms used in similar circumstances in the LOS
Convention also restate custom. Brownlie, International Law 5; 1 Oppenheim § 10, 28; Restatement (Third) §
102(3). The injury must be significant, however. See n. 98 and accompanying text. Act to Prevent Pollution from
Ships, 33 USC §§ 1901-08, implements MARPOL 73/78 for the United States, imposing greater environmental
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obligations on warships than do the treaties. William H. Wright, Naval Warfare and the Environment, in Protection of
the Environment 35, 38.
104. LOS Convention, art. 194(4), restating custom. 4 Nordquist HI 94. 10(n); Restatement (Third) § 601 &cmt.a,
r.n.l, citing inter alia Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 19(3)(d), Report ofthe InternationalLaw Commission,
2(2) YB Int'L L. Comm-n 96, 31 UN GAOR, Supp. No. 10, 226 (1976).
105. LOS Convention, art. 194(5). Ice-covered areas, governed by id., art. 234, are an example of a sensitive
environment. 4 Nordquist H 194.10(o), noting International Law Commission, Report on the Work ofthe 42d Session, ch.
IV, H 312, § C, item 2, art. 22, Commentary, 11 (2), 45 UN GAOR, Supp. No. 10 (1990), in 2(2) YB Int-l L. Comm-n 57
(1990) defines "ecosystem" as "an ecological unit . . . ofliving and non-living components that are interdependent and
function as a community." The LOS Convention does not define the term.
106. LOS Convention, art. 195; see also 4 Nordquist 11H 195.2, 195.6.
107. LOS Convention, art. 196.
108. 4 Nordquist Ml 196.1, 196.7(a).
109. LOS Convention, art. 197, partly based on Stockholm Declaration, n. 53, Recomm. 92, 1 1 ILM 1456-57; 1972
Dumping Convention. 4 Nordquist 11 197.3.
110. LOS Convention, arts. 200-01; see also 4 Nordquist Ml 200.1-200.6, 201.1-201.7; Restatement (Third) §
603(2). High seas freedoms include a right to conduct scientific research, subject to high seas users' rights, coastal
State continental shelfand other rights, under other LOS provisions and the due regard principle. LOS Convention,
art. 87; see also Part IV.B.l. High seas oceans research is generally accepted as a customary right. 1 Brown 429. It is
subject to the LOS other rules principle, however. See, e.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2;
see also nn. 111.952-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying text; Part B.2.b.
111. LOS Convention, arts. 202-06, based in part on Stockholm Declaration, n. 53, Principles 16, 21, 11 ILM
1419-20; National Environmental Policy Act, 42 USC § 4332 (NEPA). 4 Nordquist Ml 201.1 -202.6(b), 203.1 -203.5(c),
204.1-204.8(d), 205.1 -205.6(c), 206.1 -206.6(c). At the time of the Tanker War NEPA was not applied extraterritorially
except in Antarctica. Bruce A. Harlow & Michael E. McGregor, International EnvironmentalLaw Considerations During
Military Operations Other than War, in Protection of the Environment 315, 326, citing Environmental Defense Fund
v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Exec. Order No. 12,1 14, 3 CFR 356 (1979) requires environmental impact
analysis for certain federal actions affecting the environment ofthe global commons or offoreign nations. DeMarco &
Quinn, n. 2, 88-89; Harlow & McGregor 326.
112. LOS Convention, art. 198. "IMO is as important in its particular fields of interest—maritime safety and
protection of the marine environment—as is the UNEP at global level." Birnie & Boyle 53.
113. 4 Nordquist 11 198.1; see also Restatement (Third) § 601, cmt. e & r.n.4, citing inter alia Memorandum of
Intent Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution, Aug. 5, 1980, Can.-US, 32 UST 2521, 1274 UNTS 235.
114. This "to some extent anticipates" LOS Convention, art. 221. 4 Nordquist 1 198.1.
115. LOS Convention, art. 1 99; see also 4 Nordquist H 199.1, noting that High Seas Convention, art. 25(2), requires
States to cooperate with competent international organizations to prevent radioactive materials contamination of the
seas or airspace over them. The LOS Convention covers a wider spectrum of required cooperation.
116. This "to some extent anticipates" LOS Convention, art. 221. 4 Nordquist H 198.1.
117. LOS Convention, arts. 207(1 )-207(2), 208(1-208(3), 209(2), 211(2); see also 4 Nordquist Ml 207.7(a)-207.7(b),
208.10(a)-208.10(d), 209.10(a), 211.15(f); Restatement (Third) § 603(l)(a). As id. r.n.7 shows, the United States like
many nations has marine pollution legislation that may need amendment to align with LOS Convention standards. If
enacted worldwide, such laws can evidence custom. Brownlie, International Law 5; 1 Oppenheim § 10, 26.
118. 4 Nordquist 11 208.10(a). NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 1.4; NWP 9A Annotated H 1.4 define "national waters" as
internal waters, territorial seas and archipelagic waters, and "international waters" as contiguous zones, EEZ waters
and the high seas.
119. LOS Convention, arts. 210(1)-210(3), 210(6); see also 4 Nordquist U 210.11(b); Restatement (Third) § 603.
National laws, e.g., those in id. r.n.7, ifsimilar around the world, can evidence custom. Brownlie, International Law
5; 1 Oppenheim § 10, 26.
120. LOS Convention, art. 210(5); see also 4 Nordquist 111 210.1 l(c)-210. 1 1(g), noting 1972 Dumping Convention,
art. 4 requires prior approval.
121. 4 Nordquist H 210.11(g) & n.14, citing inter alia International Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its
Thirty-First Session: Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 32, UN Doc. A/34/194 (1979), in 18 ILM 1557, 1568, 1576
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(1979), saying these are not defenses if an offending country contributes to a situation of material responsibility. See
also Commentary to Draft Articles on State Responsibility in International Law Commission, Report on the Work ofIts
Thirty-First Session, UN Doc. A/34/10 & Corr. 1 (1979), in 2(2) YB Intl L. Comm-n 122-36 (1979). Practical experience
is that air-jettisoned fuel dissipates quickly and does not present an emergency. 4 Nordquist 1 210.11(g) & n.14.
Restatement (Third) § 603 cmt. g & r.n.8 discuss aircraft noxious and noise emissions.
122. LOS Convention, arts. 18(2), 39(l)(c); see also Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(3). As NWP 9A Annotated
and NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 1.4.1, 2.3.1, 3.2, 3.2.2, 7.3.2, 7.3.7, demonstrate, this customary LOS norm follows
different principles during war. See also Hague VI, art. 2; Hague XIII, art. 2 1 ; Convention on Maritime Neutrality, art.
17; Nyon Arrangement, art. 5; Stockholm Declaration, arts. 4, 7, 11 ILM 1418; Oxford Naval Manual, arts. 31,34,
37; San Remo Manual IH 21 (Hague XIII rule); 136, cmt. 136.2 (Hague VI considered to be in desuetude); 168, cmt.
168.6 (Hague XIII rule); Schindler, Commentary, n. V.87, 22 1 (Hague XIII restates custom with minor exceptions); see
also nn. IV.494-506, V.16, 20 and accompanying text. This is an example of the other rules principle in operation. Cf.
LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. III.952-67, IV.10-25, V.2-3 and accompanying
text; Part B.2.b.
123. LOS Convention, arts. 207(3) (land-based pollution), 207(4) (seabed activities subject to national
jurisdiction).
124. LOS Convention, arts. 207(4), 208(5), 209(1), 210(4), 21 1(1), 212(3).
125. Id., arts. 211(3)-211(4); see also Restatement (Third) § 604(3). LOS Convention negotiating history
demonstrates that coastal States cannot require warships to give notice or get prior consent before entering the
territorial sea on innocent passage. For this and other innocent passage principles, applying equally to merchantmen
and warships, except that submarines must navigate on the surface and show their flag, see LOS Convention, arts.
17-26, 45, 52(2); Part IV.C.3. Ports & Waterways Safety Act, 33 USC §§ 1221-36 regulates safety and environmental
measures enforcement in the US territorial sea. A worldwide pattern of these laws can evidence customary standards.
Brownlie, International Law 5; 1 Oppenheim § 10, 26.
126. These rules cannot apply to foreign ship design, construction, manning or equipment unless they effectuate
generally accepted international rules or standards. LOS Convention, arts. 19(2)(h), 21; see also 2 Nordquist 1111
19.1-19.11, 21.1-21.12, noting some States' continued opposition to warships' right of innocent passage and linkage
between LOS Convention, art. 21(l)(f), and id., art. 192, analyzed nn. 93-94 and accompanying text. The art. 19(2) list
is exclusive, although id., art. 19(2)(1) ("any other activity not having a direct bearing on practice") could be read
expansively. See 2 Nordquist H 1 9. 11, citing Joint Interpretation,^ IV.341, art. 3, in 28 ILM 1446 (1989), noting Russia
has accepted this statement; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 2.3.2.1; nn. IV.337-50 and accompanying text. Aside from a
special rule for fishing craft, Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 4-5, uses a general reasonableness rule to define
innocent passage. See also nn. IV. 301-13 and accompanying text. For other rules clause analysis, see nn. 111.952-67,
IV.10-25, V.2-3 and accompanying text; Part B.2.b.
127. These ships must carry special documentation. LOS Convention, arts. 22(2), 23; see also 4 Nordquist 111
22.1-22.9, 23.1-23.9, noting link with LOS Convention, arts. 24(l)(b), 25(3), 227; Restatement (Third) § 513(2)(b) &
cmt. d. Joint Interpretation, n. IV.341, arts. 5, 20, 28 ILM 1446 (1989), clarify LOS Convention, art. 22's Russian text;
coastal States may designate sea lanes and traffic separation schemes "where necessary to protect the safety of
navigation." 2 Nordquist 11 22.9.
128. LOS Convention, art. 24; see also 2 Nordquist 111 24.1-24.8, noting parallel language ("form or fact") in LOS
Convention, arts. 25(3), 42(2), 52(2), 227; see also nn. IV.337-50 and accompanying text.
129. Wright, n. 103, 38.
130. LOS Convention, art. 25; see also 2 Nordquist 111 25.1-25.9, noting that Joint Interpretation, n. IV.341, applies
to art. 25, taken directly from Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 16(1)- 16(3); Restatement (Third) § 513(2)(a) & cmt. c,
which say there should be no discrimination among different countries' vessels during temporary suspension; it
should apply to ships of all flags; see also nn. IV.337, 439 and accompanying text.
131. 2 Nordquist II 25.1, citing Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3).
132. See generally 2 Nordquist 111 25.1-25.9; Restatement (Third) §§ 513, cmt. c.
133. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, V.21, VI.38-40 and
accompanying text.
134. LOS Convention, arts. 27-18, 30-32; see also Restatement (Third) §§ 457, r.n.7; 461, cmt. e; 513(2)(b) & cmt.
c, e, h & r.n.2.
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135. LOS Convention, art. 2(3); see also Territorial Sea Convention, art. 1(2); nn. III.952-67, IV.10-25 and
accompanying text; Part B.2.b.
136. LOS Convention, arts. 38(1), 45(l)(b), 52-54; id., art. 54 incorporates by reference id., arts. 39-40, 42, 44. LOS
Convention nonsuspendable straits passage rules reflect custom. See generally Part IV.B.6.
137. LOS Convention, art. 233, incorporating by reference id., arts. 42(l)(a)-41(l)(b), 236, would appear to apply,
strictly speaking, to straits transit passage regimes because of references to art. 42; the straits innocent passage regime
and provisions governing territorial sea innocent passage have no similar intervention provisions, although such
might be inferred from coastal State authority to enact environmental laws that might include authority to intervene.
Warships, naval auxiliaries,^., have sovereign immunity as in the case of transit passage. See generally id., arts. 17-32,
45, 236; S. Doc. 103-39, n. IV.3, 11-15, 23, saying that by extension these principles apply to straits passage. The US
Navy has the position that a straits passage regime also applies to approaches to straits. This view, that warships
operating in their normal mode (i.e., submarines traversing these straits), may employ formation steaming and
conduct air operations as incidental to normal navigation practices, so long as there is no threat to the coastal State(s),
is consistent with the transit passage regime. Alexander, n. IV. 523, 92; Clove, n. IV.597, 105; Schachte, International
Straits, n. IV.558, 184-86; n. IV.585 and accompanying text; but see Lowe, The Commander's, n. III. 318 on naval
operations in transit straits. If this is accepted as practice, an environmental protection regime appurtenant to straits
passage applies to this area too. The issue of straits passage for belligerents illustrates the LOS-LOAC interface
preserved by the LOS conventions' other rules clauses. See generally NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 2.3.3-2.3.3.2, 2.5.1.1;
NWP 9A Annotated 111 2.3.2-2.3.3.2, 2.5.1; San Remo Manual HH 23-33; Akira Mayama, The Influence of the Straits
Transit Regime on theLaw ofNeutrality at Sea, 26 ODIL 1 (1995); nn. III.952-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying text; Part
B.2.b.and accompanying text.
138. Wright, n. 103, 38.
139. See nn. 136-37 and accompanying text.
140. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, V.21, VI.38-40 and
accompanying text.
141. LOS Convention, art. 33; compare Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24, providing for a 12-mile zone. The
contiguous zone outer limit means States asserting a territorial sea less than the extent the LOS Convention allows, 12
miles, or under custom for 1958 Convention parties, may declare a contiguous zone up to limits permitted by the
convention in force for them. See also nn. IV.296-300, 324-27 and accompanying text.
142. See generally 2 Nordquist 111 33.1-33.8(1).
143. LOS Convention, arts. 303(l)-303(2) provide:
1. States have the duty to protect objects of an archeological and historical nature found at sea and shall
co-operate for this purpose.
2 [T]o control traffic in such objects, the coastal State may, in applying article 33 [ofthe LOS Convention,
permitting a 24-mile contiguous zone, n. 141 and accompanying text], presume that their removal in the
contiguous zone . . . without its approval would result in an infringement within its territory or territorial sea
of the laws and regulations referred to in that article.
144. See generally 5 Nordquist Ml 303.1-303.10.
145. Art. 303 also does not affect identifiable owners' rights, salvage law or other admiralty rules, or cultural
exchange laws and practices. LOS Convention, arts. 303(3)-03(4). Under admiralty law shipwrecks and objects found
at sea are finders' property, unless their national law or the law of the salvor provides otherwise. See generally
Restatement (Third) § 52 1 , r.n.6; Schoenbaum ch. 14; S. Doc. 103-39, n. IV.3, 5 1 , citing US legislation that may alter
these rules. Warship or government aircraft title is never lost until a flag State officially abandons or relinquishes it. If
an aircraft or ship is captured, title vests in the captor State. See nn. IV.793-96 and accompanying text; see also
Agreement Concerning Wreck of CSS Alabama, Oct. 3, 1989, Fr.-US, TIAS No. 11687.
146. See nn. 136-37 and accompanying text. For analysis of treaties protecting cultural property during armed
conflict in the environmental context, see, e.g., nn. 272-77 and accompanying text; Part B.3.a(III)(B).
147. LOS Convention, arts. 136-37 define the Area as the abyss beyond the continental slope; it is declared the
common heritage of humankind. There is no Area in the Persian Gulf because of its shallow depth. See also nn.
11.66-69, IV.240 and accompanying text.
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148. 5 Nordquist 11 303.10.
149. LOS Convention, art. 149.
150. See n. 147.
151. LOS Convention, art. 21 1(5). A qualification to this rule is id., art. 234: Coastal States may adopt and enforce
nondiscriminatory laws for preventing, reducing and controlling pollution from ships in ice-covered areas to their
EEZ limits where particularly severe climatic conditions and ice create obstructions or exceptional navigational
hazards, "and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the
ecological balance." Such laws must have "due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine
environment . . . . " Antarctic Treaty, n. III.957, art. 4, 12 UST 796, 402 UNTS 74 froze territorial and territorial sea
claims for Antarctica. Until the next Ice Age, art. 234 only applies to Arctic Sea States, e.g., the United States. States
concerned, Canada, the former USSR and the United States, negotiated art. 234 to provide a basis for implementing
provisions for commercial and private vessels in the 1970 Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act
consistent with art. 234 and other LOS Convention provisions while protecting "fundamental U.S. security interests"
in Arctic navigational rights and freedoms. S. Doc. 102-39, n. IV. 3, 24. See also 2 O'ConnellXawoftheSea 1022-25.
152. LOS Convention, arts. 55, 56(l)(a), 56(l)(b)(iii)-56(c), 57-58 (defining the EEZ as extending 200 nautical
miles from territorial sea baselines, providing that coastal States have "sovereign rights for . . . conserving and
managing their natural resources, . . . living or non-living, of the waters subjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and
its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, [e.g.,]. . .
production ofenergy from the water, currents and winds; [and] . . . jurisdiction as provided for in . . . this Convention
[for] . . . protection and preservation of the marine environment; [and] other rights and duties provided for in this
Convention"). See also id., art. 60 (coastal State exclusive rights and jurisdiction over artificial islands, other EEZ
installations), arts. 61-72 (standards for conserving, use of living resources; stocks occurring within two or more
countries' EEZs; various kinds of sea life; landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States' rights), art. 73
(standards for enforcing coastal State EEZ laws). See also 2 Nordquist 1111 55.1-55.1 1(d), 56.1-56.1 1(e), 57. 1-57. 8(b),
58.1-58.10(f), 60.1-60.15(m), 61.1-61.12(k), 62.1-62.16(1), 63.1-63.12(f), 64.1-64.9(0, 65.1-65.16(1), 66.1-66.9(g),
67.1-67. 8(e), 68.1-68.5(b), 69.1-69.17(h), 70.1-70.11(d), 71.1-71.9(c), 71. 1-71. 10(b), 73.1-73.10(h); S. Doc. 103-39, n.
IV.3, 25-27. As of 1992 86 States had EEZs; 20 more claimed fishing zones. The EEZ "is now widely considered to be a
part of general international law." 2 Nordquist U V.33; Restatement (Third), § 514, cmt. a. While id. § 514(1)
generally follows Convention criteria as to EEZ sovereignty and jurisdiction, id., Source Note says "authority" is used
instead of "jurisdiction," because the Restatement characterizes jurisdiction differently in other contexts; see, e.g.,
Part V.C. Id. § 514, cmt. b's declaration, the Convention "does not explicitly designate the [EEZ] as part of the high
seas." Note, however, that LOS Convention arts. 55,58, specifically referring to id., arts. 87-115, declare inter alia that
high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply in the EEZ. Some countries would prohibit naval operations in
their EEZs, but other LOS Convention terms allow these maneuvers. Wartime operations are permitted under the
Convention's "other rules" principle. States therefore cannot exclude warships on environmental grounds from their
EEZs. Stephen A. Rose, Naval Activity in the EEZ—Troubled Waters Ahead?, Nav. L. Rev. 67, 73-76 (1990); nn.
IV. 147-57 and accompanying text.
153. See n. 152 and accompanying text. See also LOS Convention, arts. 76-78, 80, (shelf can extend outward the
same distance, 200 nautical miles, as the EEZ, along the ocean bottom, or to the edge of the continental margin,
whichever is greater, but not over 350 miles); 2 Nordquist HH 76.1-76.18(m), 77.1-77.7(d), 78.1-78.8(d), 80.1-80.9
(adaptation of Continental Shelf Convention, arts. 2-5); Restatement (Third) § 515; see also Part IV.B.2.
154. 2 Nordquist 11 57.8(b), citing Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 ICJ 13, 33; Delimitation of Maritime
Boundary in GulfofMaine Area (Can. v. US), 1984 ICJ 245, 294; Delimitation ofMaritime Areas Between Canada and
France (Can. v. Fr.), 31 ILM 1145, 1163 (Arb. 1992). E.g., the United States claimed continental shelf rights,
Proclamation No. 2667, 3 CFR 67 (1943-48) in 1945, before asserting fishery management rights in what eventually
became its EEZ through the FCMA n. IV. 143, or claiming full EEZ rights, n. IV.3. The United States had claimed
some offshore fishing rights in 1945 along with the continental shelf. See nn. IV. 143, 193-94 and accompanying text.
155. LOS Convention, arts. 55, 56(l)(b)(iii), 56(2), 58(3), 60(3), 60(7), 78-80, also stating a "must not infringe -
unjustifiable interference" formula for shelfand high seas rights interfaces and a "reasonable exploration" - "may not
impede" rule for interfacing shelf and submarine cable and pipeline rights. See also 2 Nordquist H11 56.11(e)-56.11(0,
58.10-58.10(0, 60.15(0, 60.15(j), 66.9(d), 78.8(c), 79.8(e), 80.9; Restatement (Third) §§ 514, cmt. e; 515(2). "Due
regard" or similar phrases also appear elsewhere in the LOS Convention, e.g., art. 87(2) (due regard for others' high
seas rights and freedoms, Area activities); Continental ShelfConvention, arts. 4-5 ("reasonable measures . .
.
, may not
impede"; no "unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing," etc.); High Seas Convention, arts. 2, 26(2)
("reasonable regard" for others' high seas freedoms); Territorial Sea Convention, art. 19(4) (balancing navigation
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interests with right of arrest for crimes committed in territorial sea). See also Bernard H. Oxman & Anatoly L.
Kolodkin, Stability in the Law ofthe Sea, in Beyond Confrontation, n. III.358, 165, 175-76, 181-82.
156. LOS Convention, arts. 58(l)-58(2), 78, referring to id., arts. 86-115; High Seas Convention, arts. 2, 8; see also
nn. 111.953-67, IV. 10-25, 794 and accompanying text; Part B.2.b.
157. 4 Nordquist H 21 1.15(b); see also Oxman & Kolodkin, n. 155, 176-79.
158. LOS Convention, arts. 213-14, 216, 222; see also 4 Nordquist HH 213.1-213.7(1), 214.1-214.7(c),216.1-216.7(d),
222.1-222.8.
159. Restatement (Third) § 603; see also n. 98 and accompanying text.
160. LOS Convention, arts. 217-20, 223-24, 226-31, expanding on rules in the navigational articles, id., arts.
21(1X0, 28(2), 56(l)(b)(iii), 56(3), 60(1), 80; see also 4 Nordquist HI 217.1-217.8(j), 218.1-218(9)(h), 219.1-219.8(d),
220.1-220.1 l(n), 223.1-223.9(c), 224.1 -224.7(e), 226.1-226.1 1(e), 227.1-227.7, 228.1-228.1 1(h), 229.1-229.5,
230.1-230.9(c), 231.1-231.9(c); Restatement (Third) §§ 457, r.n.7; 461, cmt. e; 512.
161. LOS Convention, art. 225; see also 4 Nordquist HH 225.1-225.9; Restatement (Third) § 513, cmt. e.
162. LOS Convention, arts. 232, US; see also 4 Nordquist HH 232.1-232.6(c), 235. 1-235. 10(g); Restatement (Third)
§ 604, r.n.3; Oxman & Kolodkin, n. 1 55, 176-79. Art. 235 was derived from the Stockholm Declaration, n. 53, Principle
56, 11 ILM 1418. 4 Nordquist H 235.1. The knowledge standard is the same as for self-defense and LOAC attack
situations. See Parts III.A.l.b(IX), V.A.2.
163. LOS Convention, art. 221; Charney, The Marine Environment, n. IV.49, 892 n.79; see also 4 Nordquist HH
221.1-221.9(h); Restatement (Third) § 603, r.n.3 (similar provisions in 1969 Intervention Convention, art. 1;
Intervention Protocol, to which many countries are party), see TIF 400-01; Declaration of Principles Governing the
Sea-Bed & Ocean Floor, & Subsoil Thereof, Beyond Limits ofNational Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749(1972) H 13(b),m
10 ILM 220, 223 (1973) (Seabed Declaration).
164. Cf. Birnie & Boyle 286; Brownlie, International Law 5; 1 Oppenheim § 10, 28; Restatement (Third) §
102(3), cmts. f, i, r.n.5.
165. See nn. 4-8 and accompanying text.
166. See nn. III.952-67, IV. 10-25 and accompanying text; Part B.2.b.
167. Compare LOS Convention, art. 236 with id., arts. 42(5), 96; see also High Seas Convention, arts. 8(1), 9; 3
Nordquist HH 95. 1 -96.6(c); 4 id. HH 236.1 -235.6(f). Warship and naval auxiliary immunity is an accepted international
law rule. 3 id. H 95.1; 4 id. H 236.1; see also Part IVC.4.
168. S. Doc. 103-39, n. IV.3, 24.
169. E.g., Convention on Protection of the Environment, Feb. 19, 1974, arts. 1, 13, 1092 UNTS 280, 296, 298,
among Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.
170. Kuwait Regional Convention, n. 11.63, art. 14, 1 140 UNTS 1 59; Red Sea Convention, n. 55, art. 14, 2 Wallace
2287.
171. See LOS Convention, arts. 237, 311(2). Other regional treaties are subject to the LOS Convention, e.g.,
Convention for Protection ofthe Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Feb. 16, 1976, art. 3(1), 1 102 UNTS 27, 46, and
protocols. See nn. 48-50 and accompanying text.
172. See n. IV.3 and accompanying text.
173. Compare LOS Convention, art. 94(4)(c) with High Seas Convention, art. 10.
174. Compare LOS Convention, art. 94(7) with High Seas Convention, art. 11(1). See also 3 Nordquist H 94.8(k);
Part IV.B.2.
175. LOS Convention, arts. 122-23; 3 Nordquist 344; see also id. H 123.12(e), listing inter alia Kuwait and Red Sea
Regional Conventions, nn. 11.63, VI.55 among regional coordination treaties for semi-enclosed areas; Oxman &
Kolodkin, n. 155, 179-81. See also Part B.2.c(III).
176. Compare LOS Convention, art. 87(1) with High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also Part IV.B.l.
177. LOS Convention, art. 240(d). Id., art. 87(l)(f) declares that the right to conduct scientific research is subject to
the Convention, Parts VI and XIII. Part VI declares continental shelf rules; Part XIII states general marine
environmental protection principles. See Part IV.B.2 and accompanying text. Subject to other LOS Convention
provisions, States conducting research must give other countries reasonable opportunity to obtain information
necessary to prevent and control damage to human health and safety and to the- marine environment. LOS
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Convention, art. 242. Research installations and equipment are subject to rules for conducting research. Id., art. 258.
See also 2 O'Connell, Law of the Sea ch. 26. The LOAC protects enemy ships collecting scientific data from capture
during war; ifengaged in data collection for likely military application, they are not protected. Hague XI, art. 4; see also
nn. V.264, 274-76 and accompanying text.
178. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 87(l)(e), 116 with High Seas Convention, art. 2; Restatement (Third) §
521(2)(c); see also Part IV.B.l.
179. S. Doc. 103-39, n. IV.3, 27.
180. LOS Convention, art. 116, incorporating id., arts. 63(2), 64-67, 1 18-20; compare Fishery Convention, arts. 1-8,
13; see also Restatement (Third) § 521, cmt. e; S. Doc. 103-39, n. IV.3, 27-28, listing treaties regulating or prohibiting
high seas fishing. LOS Convention, arts. 56, 61-73 regulates EEZ fishing. See also 3 Nordquist 1111 116. 1-1 16.9(g);
Charney, The Marine Environment, n. IV.49, 896-901.
181. M, art.l(l)(l);see 2 Nordquist 111 1.1-1.19, 1.26-1.31; Restatement (Third) § 523, cmt. b, declaring that id., §
523( 1 )(a) recites custom : "[N]o state may claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights over any part of
the sea-bed and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, or over its mineral resources, and no state or person
may appropriate any part of that area . . . "Id., § 523(1 )(b) states the US view of the law:
. . . unless prohibited by international agreement, a state may engage, or authorize any[one] to engage, in . .
.
exploration for and exploitation of that area, provided . . . activities are conducted (i) without claiming or
exercising sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights in any part of that area, and (ii) with reasonable regard
for the right of other states or persons to engage in similar activities and to exercise the freedoms of the high
seas; . . . minerals extracted . . . become the property of the mining state or person.
National jurisdiction means, inter alia, a declared EEZ or continental shelf. Legal status of the water column or
airspace above the Area is not affected by LOS Convention provisions dealing with it. LOS Convention, art. 135; see
also Restatement (Third) §§ 521, cmt. i; 523.
1 82. LOS Convention, arts. 1 36. 140( 1 ). The Antarctic Treaty, n. III.957, began the "common heritage" concept; it
has been copied in treaties on outer space. Restatement (Third) § 523, cmt. b & r.n.2 adopted the then US position
that deep seabed mining was a high seas freedom, rejecting the "common heritage" Convention view. If the
Convention is accepted generally, "without dissent by . . . important . . . states, the sea-bed mining regime . . . may
become effective also as custom . . . "Id. § 523, cmt. e.SeeakoBROWNLiE, International Law 5; 1 Oppenheim§ 10,28;
Restatement (Third) § 102(3).
183. See Part II.A.6.
184. LOS Convention, art. 137(2) vests Area governance in an Authority. Id., arts. 156-91 are the Authority's
constitutive provisions; the Convention protocol, n. IV.3, would modify them in amending LOS Convention, Part
XI. See S. Doc. 103-39, n. IV.3, 34-43. The Authority must adopt rules and procedures to prevent, reduce and control
pollution and hazards to the marine environment, including coastlines, that interfere with that environment's
ecological balance, with particular attention being paid to protection from harmful effects of activities, e.g., drilling,
dredging, excavation, waste disposal, building and operating or maintaining installations, pipelines and other
devices. These rules must also protect and conserve Area natural resources and prevent damage to flora and fauna of
the marine environment. The Authority must take necessary measures, which may supplement existing treaties, to
protect human life in connection with Area operations. LOS Convention, arts. 145-46. There is also an obligation to
preserve objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the Area, with particular regard paid to
preferential rights of a State or country of origin, and which incorporates by reference other rules of law and
agreements dealing with artifacts protection. Id., art. 149. Area activities must be undertaken "with reasonable regard
for other activities in the marine environment." Area installations, like those in the EEZ and on the continental shelf,
must not be established "where interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential to international
navigation or in areas of intense fishing activity . . . Other activities in the marine environment shall be conducted
with reasonable regard for activities in the Area." The LOS Convention has an other rules clause for the Area:
The general conduct of States in relation to the Area shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Part
[XI], the principles embodied in the [UN] Charter . . . and other rules of international law in the interests of
maintaining peace and security and promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding.
As in the case ofthe high seas, the LOS Convention declares the Area shall only be used for peaceful purposes. Compare
id., art. 141 with id., arts. 88, 240(a). The same interpretations should apply for these articles as under other parts ofthe
LOS Convention and its 1958 antecedents. "Other rules" means the LOAC may be applied in certain contexts; the
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peaceful purposes provision means no State may act, e.g., commit aggression, in violation of the Charter. Area
activities can include military operations, e.g., naval maneuvers. States may act in self-defense in the Area. UN
Charter,arts. 51, 103;^a/xonn.III.10, 47-630,916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Parts. V.B.1-V.B.2.
185. The treaties disclaim intention to affect parties' rights or claims to maritime jurisdiction "established in
conformity with international law." Kuwait Regional Convention, n. 11.63, arts. 2, 15, 1 MOUNTS 156, 159; Red Sea
Convention, n. 55, arts. 2, 15, 2 Wallace 2284, 2287. The protocols allow application to ports, harbors, estuaries, bays
and lagoons for a "marine emergency," defined broadly, and ifa particular State so decides. Kuwait Protocol, n. 11.63,
arts. 1(2), 4, 1140 UNTS 201, 204. Red Sea Protocol, n. 55, arts. 1(2), 4, 2 Wallace 2294, 2296, are similar. These
implement LOS Convention, arts. 122-23; see n. 175 and accompanying text.
186. Compare Kuwait Regional Convention, n. 11.63, art. 1(a), 1 140 UNTS 156,with Red Sea Convention, n. 55, art.
1(2), 2 Wallace 2283.
187. Kuwait Regional Convention, n. 11.63, arts. 3(a), 4-7, 1140 UNTS 156-57; Red Sea Convention, n. 55, arts.
3(1), 4-8, 2 Wallace 2284-85, which adds a pledge to prevent, abate and combat pollution "resulting . . . from other
human activities."
188. See generally Kuwait Protocol, n. 11.63, 1140 UNTS 201; Red Sea Protocol, n. 55, 2 Wallace 2293.
189. Compare Kuwait Protocol, n. 11.63, art. 1(2), 1140 UNTS 201, with Red Sea Protocol, n. 55, art . 1(2), 2
Wallace 2294. (Italics in original.)
190. See nn. 160-65 and accompanying text.
191. The Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centre, an administrative agency, also must be notified. Kuwait
Protocol, n. 11.63, arts. 3, 10, 1 140UNTS 202-03, 205; Red Sea Protocol, n. 55, arts. 3, 7(2), 2 Wallace 2294-95, 2297.
192. Kuwait Protocol, n. 11.63, art. 1(4), 1140 UNTS 202; Red Sea Protocol, n. 55, art. 1(4), 2 Wallace 2294.
193. See nn. 160-72 and accompanying text.
194. Cf. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Part B.l.
195. See n. 185 and accompanying text.
196. See nn. 11.264, 384, VI. 185 and accompanying text.
197. See nn. 11.368-72 and accompanying text.
198. Iran and Iraq were not parties to the 1958 or 1982 LOS Conventions. The customary other rules principle
restated in these agreements did apply, however. See, e.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2;
see also nn. 111.952-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying text; Part B.2.b.
199. Vienna Convention, arts. 61-62; see also nn. III.928-29, IV.26-27, VI.80-88 and accompanying text.
200. See nn. 185-89 and accompanying text.
201. See n. 11.213 and accompanying text.
202. See n. 11.214 and accompanying text.
203. Brownlie, International Law 5; 10ppenheim§ 10, 28; Restatement (Third) § 102(3); Okorodudu-Fubara,
n. 11.210, 197.
204. LOS Convention, arts. 232, 235; Kuwait Protocol, n. 11.63, art. 1(2), 1140 UNTS 201; see also n.162 and
accompanying text.
205. See nn. 11.212 and accompanying text.
206. The UN Security Council deplored attacks on merchant shipping and violations of LOAC principles. If
obeyed, these would have resulted in no more attacks on these vessels and therefore no more pollution ofthe Gulffrom
this cause. These resolutions covered a specific point, i.e., freedom of navigation, and therefore should not be
construed as applying special Charter law to the exclusion ofconventional norms, to environmental situations. See nn.
34-37 and accompanying text.
207. See Part B.2.b.
208. See n. 184 and accompanying text.
209. UN Charter, arts. 5 1 , 103; see also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Part B. 1
;
nn. 194, 197 and accompanying text.
210. See nn. 4-8 and accompanying text.
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211. See nn. 198-202 and accompanying text.
212. UN Charter,arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630,916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Part B.l.
213. See Parts V.A.1-V.A.2, VI.B.2.b.
214. See Part B.2.a.
215. E.g., the United States' active policy of objecting to LOS variances in practice by other States. See generally
Chapter IV.
216. See, e.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. III.952-67, IV.10-25 and
accompanying text; Part B.2.b.
217. Compare Part B.2.c.(I) with Part B.2.c(II).
218. &?<? Part B.2.a.
219. E.g., self-defense. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and
accompanying text; Part B.l.
220. See Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.
221. UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying text.
222. Hague VIII arts. 1-6; see also Part V.G.2.
223. See n. V.686 and accompanying text.
224. Levie, Mine Warfare, n. V.426, 137 predicts environmental protests if nuclear mines are detonated. The
same can be said for conventional mines, particularly if pollutants escape from mined ships, or mines are laid in
environmentally sensitive areas and locations are not published.
225. See Hague VIII, arts. 3-5; Part V.G.2.
226. See Part V.G.2.
227. Iran, formerly Persia, was an independent country in 1 907 and signed but did not ratify Hague VIII. Iraq was
part ofTurkey, formerly the Ottoman Empire, in 1907. The Empire, ofwhich Turkey is a successor State, signed but
did not ratify Hague VIII. The United Kingdom did not accede to Hague VIII while serving as Iraq's mandatory
Power. See Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration; n. V.732 and accompanying text.
228. C/ Melia, n. 11.6,119-27.
229. See Part V.G.2.
230. Seen. 224.
231. Hague IX, arts. 1-4, forbidding naval bombardment of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings or
buildings. Ifautomatic submarine contact mines are anchored off a harbor, the place cannot be considered a defended
site. Military targets may be destroyed but only after warning, unless surprise or other "military reason" dictates
immediate action. Shelling undefended places may begin after due notice if local authorities fail to comply with
requisition requests proportionate to local resources. Undefended places may not be bombarded for failure to pay
money contributions. See Part V.G.I.
232. E.g., environmentally sensitive beaches or parks might be close to ports or be within towns to fall within
Hague IX's scope.
233. Hague IX, art. 5 also provides for visible signs for these structures; Cultural Property Convention, arts. 16-17,
20, 36, or Roerich Pact, arts. 1 -3 supersede art. 5 for some countries. E.g., the United States is party to Hague IX and the
Roerich Pact but not to the Convention. TIF 350, 442. The Pact does not have a supersession clause like the
Convention; law oftreaties later in time principles govern. Vienna Convention, art. 30; see also nn. IV. 32, 60, VI.45 and
accompanying text.
234. Hague IX, arts. 6-7. Protocol I, art. 57(2)(c) repeats the notice to civilian population principle as a precaution
in attacks when the situation permits; it is considered a customary rule. NWP 1 -14M Annotated 11 8.5.2 & n.126; NWP
9A Annotated 11 8.5.2 & n.106, refine the rule:
. . . Where the military situation permits, commanders should make every reasonable effort to warn the
civilian population located in close proximity to a military objective targeted for bombardment. Warnings
may be general rather than specific warnings lest the bombarding force or the success of its mission be placed
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in jeopardy Warnings are relevant to the protection ofthe civilian population (so the civilians will have an
opportunity to seek safety) and need not be given when they are unlikely to be affected by the attack.
NWP 1-14M Annotated f 8.5 and NWP 9A Annotated 11 8.5 define bombardment as naval and air bombardment of
enemy targets on land with conventional weapons. See also Part V.G.I.
235. Compare Hague IX, arts. 1-7 with Hague IV, Regulations, arts. 23(g), 25-28, superseding 1899 Hague II,
Regulations, arts. 23(g), 25-28; their terms differ slightly. Second Protocol, art. 15(l)(e) declares theft or pillage of
cultural property is a "serious violation" of the Protocol. Compare Oxford Naval Manual, arts. 25-29, with 1880
Oxford Manual, arts. 32-34, 53; Brussels Conference of 1874, Project ofand International Declaration Concerning the
Laws and Customs of War, arts. 15-18 (1874), in id. 27, 29; Lieber Code, arts. 19, 34-36, 38. Military codes criminalize
pillage, e.g., Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice, arts. 103, 109, 10 USC. §§ 903, 909, strengthening the customary norm.
Brownlie, InternationalLaw 5; 1 Oppenheim § 10, 26. See also Toman 7, 10-11,73,91, 196 (Lieber Code, 1899 Hague
II, Hague IV cultural protection aspects).
236. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment & Sentences (Oct. 1, 1946), in 41 AJIL 172, 248-49
(1949); accord, AFP 110-31 11 5-2b; 2 Oppenheim § 68, 229; Stone 551; Diederich, n. 17, 141, 146-47; Edwards, n. 2,
110-13; LeGrand, n. 12, 26; Lijnzaad & Tanja, n. 2, 183-84; Plant, Legal Aspects, n. 17, 222-23; Sharp, n. 2, 10-42; cf
NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 8.1; NWP 9A Annotated 11 8.1; McNeill, Protection, n. 2, 539; Harlow & McGregor, n. Ill,
318.
237. See Part V.G.I.
238. See id.
239. 1980 TIF 347.
240. See nn. 231-38 and accompanying text.
241
.
See Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.
242. To that extent LOAC bombardment principles were integrated into Charter law. UN Charter, art. 2(4); see
also Part B.l. They can be different, depending on circumstances. UN Charter, art. 103; nn. IV.57; Part B.l.
243. Ifan object is considered contraband or aiding the enemy war effort, its exemption is lost even ifsent through
the mail. Hague XI, arts. 1-2; see also nn. V.112, 257, 271 and accompanying text.
244. See Paris Declaration, arts. 1-3; London Declaration, arts. 27-29; Part V.D.3.
245. London Declaration, arts. 61-62; see also Paris Declaration, arts. 2-3; Part V.B.3.
246. Hague XI, arts. 3-4, stating customary rules; see also nn. V.l 13, 265, 274-76 and accompanying text.
247. But see Parts B.3.a(I)(D), B.3.a(I)(F) (Hague IV; Oxford Naval Manual, art. 88).
248. Hague XI, arts. 3-4; San Remo Manual HU 47(h), 136(g); see also nn. 264, 266 and accompanying text.
249. See Hague IV, Regulations, art. 23(c); Hague IX, arts. 1-4; Second Convention, arts. 12, 18, 21-22, 24, 26-27,
29-30, 32-33, 38, 43, 47; Third Convention, arts. 70-77, 118; Fourth Convention, arts. 107-13; Cultural Property
Convention, arts. 12, 14; Protocol I, arts. 8(b), 22-23, 41 ; see also nn. V. 1 10, 1 13, 240, 258-69, 274-76 and accompanying
text.
250. See Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration. Iran (formerly Persia), Iraq and the
United States were not Paris Declaration parties. Turkey, a Coalition member, signed but did not ratify the
Declaration and Hague XI. Schindler & Toman 789, 823-24; 1980 TIF 348.
251. See nn. 4-8 and accompanying text.
252. See nn. 231-42 and accompanying text.
253. Hague IV, Regulations, arts. 22, 23(g), 46-47, 53, 55-56, superseding 1899 Hague II, Regulations, arts. 46-47,
53, 55-56; see also 1880 OxfordManual, arts. 51-55; Lijnzaad & Tanja, n. 2, 174-76; Evan ].Wa\lach, The Use ofCrude
Oil by an Occupying Belligerent State as a Munition de Guerre, 41 ICLQ 287 (1992); Edward R. Cummings, Note, Oil
Resources in Occupied Arab Territories Under the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 9 Geo. Wash. J. Intl L. & Econ. 533
(1974). Hague IV standards have been customary law since the end ofWorld War II. See n. 236 and accompanying text.
254. See nn. 231-42 and accompanying text.
255. Plant, Introduction, n. 2, 17 and Plant, Legal Aspects, n. 17, 222 suggested this for Protocol I, art. 1(2). See nn.
402, 450 and accompanying text. If so, this analysis applies to Hague IV, preamble; 1899 Hague II, preamble. Hague
IX, preamble, does not have the Hague IV or 1899 Hague II language but recites:
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Whereas it is expedient that bombardments by naval forces should be subject to rules of general application
which would safeguard the rights of the inhabitants and assure the preservation of the more important
buildings, by applying as far as possible to this operation of war the principles of the Regulation of 1899 [i.e.,
Hague II] respecting the laws and customs of land war . .
.
This might or might not be a Martens clause, but Hague XI, preamble, incorporates prior law to the extent it is not
inconsistent with Hague XI's norms:
Considering ... it is expedient, in giving up or, if necessary, in harmonizing for the common interest certain
conflicting practices of long standing, to commence codifying in regulations of general application the
guarantees due to peaceful commerce and legitimate business, as well as the conduct of hostilities by sea; that
it is expedient to lay down in written mutual engagements the principles which have hitherto remained in the
uncertain domain of controversy or have been left to the discretion of Governments;
That, from henceforth, . . . certain . . . rules may be made, without affecting the common law now in force with
regard to the matters which that law has left unsettled . .
.
For trends analysis perhaps leading to custom before negotiation of these conventions, see Pietro Verri, The Condition
of Cultural Property in Armed Conflicts, 1985 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 67.
256. Oxford Naval Manual, art. 88.
257. Verri, Commentary, n. IV.71, 337.
258. See Part V.B.3.
259. An exception is Hague III, not relevant to this analysis and partly superseded by the Pact of Paris, n. III. 160,
and the UN Charter.
260. E.g., Hague IV, Regulations, art. 53, superseding Hague II, Regulations, art. 53, declaring transportation
systems, including steamers and other publicly or privately owned ships, are subject to seizure, except cases covered
by naval law, i.e., the LONW. 1880 Oxford Manual, art. 51 is less precise:
Means of transportation (railways, boats, etc.), as well as land telegraphs and landing-cables, can only be
appropriated to the use of the occupant. Their destruction is forbidden, unless . . . demanded by military
necessity. They are restored when peace is made in the condition in which they then are.
Whether "boats" refers to oceangoing vessels, and if so which, is not clear.
261. Colombos §§ 95-121; 1 O'Connell, Law of the Sea ch. 3; Restatement (Third) § 512 & r.n.l (issue not
resolved until Territorial Sea Convention ratified generally after 1958). There is a presumption against retroactively
applying treaties. Vienna Convention, art. 28; Restatement (Third) § 322(1), cmt. a, r.n. 1.; but see Namibia, 1971 ICJ
1 6, 3 1 . Today coastal State sovereignty includes the territorial sea and inland waters on the landward side ofa baseline,
usually the low water line, marking the beginning of the territorial sea. LOS Convention, arts. 2-16; Territorial Sea
Convention, arts. 1-13. See also Part IV.B.4.
262. Compare Hague Air Rules, arts. 22-26 with Hague IV, Regulations, arts. 23(g), 25-26, (land warfare) and Hague
IX, arts. 1-5 (naval warfare). Hague Declaration (XIV) Prohibiting Discharge of Projectiles & Explosives from
Balloons, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2439; Hague Declaration (IV.l) to Prohibit for Five Years the Launching of
Projectiles & Explosives from Balloons, & Other Methods of a Similar Nature, July 29, 1899, 32 id. 1839, also bear on
the issue, but most do not consider them as stating custom. AFP 110-31 II 5-2a; Toman 15, 178; Bierzanek,
Commentary, n. V.197, 396-97; Verri, Commentary, n. IV.71, 133-35.
263. Compare, e.g., AFP 1 10-31, n.254, H 5-2(c) ("they do not represent existing customary law as a total code") (italics in
original) with NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 7.3.7 n.82 (Hague Air Rules represent custom); see also n. V.679.
264. See, e.g., AFP 110-31 HI! 5-3(b)(2), 5-17 n.22 (citing inter alia Hague Air Rules); 11 5-6, at 5-19 n.33 (Hague Air
Rules, art. 21); NWP 1 - 14 Annotated UK 8.5.1.1 (Hague Air Rules, art. 24[4], declaring military objectives within a city,
town village may be bombarded if required for the enemy's submission with minimum expenditure of time, life,
physical resources; exception to the general rule that wanton or deliberate destruction ofareas ofconcentrated civilian
habitation is prohibited); 8.5.1.2 (Hague Air Rules, art. 22; bombardment only for terrorizing civilian population is
forbidden); NWP 9A Annotated 1111 8.5.1.1, 8.5.1.2 (same). See generally AFP 110-31 ch. 5; NWP 1-14M Annotated HU
8.5-8.5.2; NWP 9A Annotated 1111 8.5-8.5.2 for air bombardment rules; see also Part V.G.I.
265. See, e.g., Part V.D.3 (contraband).
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266. Robertson, Commentary, in Protection of the Environment 170; see also Part V.G.I.
267. See Part B.l.
268. Iran, Iraq and most if not all States involved in the Tanker War were either ratifying parties or were bound
through treaty succession principles to the Geneval Gas Protocol. 1980 TIF 294-95. The Protocol and its no-first-use
reservations are considered part of customary law. McDougal & Feliciano 634; NWP 1-14M Annotated H 10.3.2.1;
NWP 9A Annotated H 10.3.2.1; George Bunn, Banning Poison Gas and Germ Warfare: Should the United States Agree?,
1969 Wis. L. Rev. 375, 384-85; John Norton Moore, Ratification of the Geneva Protocol on Gas and Bacteriological
Warfare: A Legal and Political Analysis, 58 Va. L. Rev. 419, 447-52 (1972); Hays Parks, Classification of
Chemical-Biological Warfare, 13 U. Toledo L. Rev. 1165, 1167 (1982); Elizabeth A. Smith, Note, International
Regulation of Chemical and Biological Weapons: "Yellow Rain" and Arms Control, 1984 U. III. L. Rev. 1011, 1048-56.
Iran, Iraq and most States involved in the Tanker War were also bound by the Convention on Prohibition of
Development, Production & Stockpiling ofBacteriological (Biological) & Toxin Weapons, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 UST 583,
1015 UNTS 163. 1980 TIF 268. See AFP 110-31 11 6-4(b); NWP 1-14M Annotated H 10.4; NWP 9A Annotated H 10.4;
Moore 447-52 (any use of biological weapons is a customary law violation). Mark D. Budensiek, A New Chemical
Weapons Convention: Can ItAssure theEnd ofChemical Weapons Proliferation?, 25 Stan. Intl LJ. 647 (1990), 39 Nav. L.
Rev. 15 (1990), traces developments leading to the Convention on Prohibition of Development, Production,
Stockpiling & Use ofChemical Weapons & on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993,— UST— , 32 ILM 800 (1993), being
ratified worldwide. Convention parties agree not to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or retain these weapons; to
transfer them to anyone; or to use or engage in military preparations to use them. States pledge to destroy these,
production facilities and weapons abandoned on another party's territory. Helping combat chemical terrorism is a
Convention goal. Implementing these conventions, like the Geneva Gas Protocol, will also protect the environment.
See generally Panel, Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention: Progress and Challenges, 1994 ASIL Proc. 12, 37-40
( 1 995). Legality ofThreat or Use ofNuclear Weapons, 1 996( 1 ) ICJ 248 held the Protocol had been interpreted to apply
to poison and asphyxiating gases; States had not treated it as referring to nuclear weapons. But see id., 508-12
(Weeramantry, J., dissenting). For reservation principles, see Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23; n. III.621 and
accompanying text; for treaty succession issues, see Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and
Disintegration.
269. See Diederich, n. 17, 146; L. Craig Johnstone, Ecocide and the Geneva Protocol, 49 Foreign Affairs 711, 718
(1971); Okorodudu-Fubara, n. 11.210, 158-59; Roberts, Environmental Issues, n. 2, 230. Wil D. Verwey, Comment:
Protection of the Environment in Times ofArmed Conflict — Do We Need Additional Rules?, in Protection of the
Environment 558, 563 did not consider this possibility.
270. Hence the territorial sea issue the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention settled does not arise with respect to the
Protocol. See n. 261 and accompanying text; Part IV.B.4.
27 1
.
See generally Chapter II.
272. States may fly a distinctive flag over monuments and institutions to identify them. Roerich Pact, arts. 1-3;
TIF 350. The Netherlands presented the Preliminary Draft International Convention for Protection of Historic
Buildings & Works of Art in Time of War, Oct. 1938, Toman 403, developed through the International Museums
Office, to governments in 1 939; it was never accepted due to World War II. UNESCO developed the Cultural Property
Convention, analyzed nn. 300-27 and accompanying text, after the war. Toman 19, 22; Introductory Note, Schindler &
Toman 741.
273. See n. 261 and accompanying text; Part IV.B.4.
274. SeePartsIV.B.l-IVB.2.
275. Roerich Pact, art. 1; Toman 386; see also nn. III.948, IV.30, VI.84 and accompanying text.
276. Brownlie, International Law 5, 13-14; 1 Oppenheim § 10, 28; Restatement (Third) § 102(3).
277. See nn. 231-42 and accompanying text.
278. The Genocide Convention was not invoked during Tanker War aspects of the 1980-88 conflict. The 1948
Genocide Convention addresses a different problem: intentional acts during peace or war designed to destroy a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group. However, some of this international crime's components, e.g., "Deliberately
inflicting . .
. conditions of life calculated to bring about [a group's] physical destruction," Convention on Prevention
& Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, arts. 1, 2(c), — UST —, 78 UNTS 277, 280 (Genocide
Convention), might raise environmental issues. Restatement (Third) §§ 404 & r.n.l, 702 & cmt. c declare the
Convention definition of genocide is a customary norm for a universal jurisdiction crime. The Convention is
implemented for the United States by Genocide Implementation Act of 1988, 18 USC § 1091. See also Nuremberg
Judgment, n.253, in 41 AJIL 172-75, 220-21 ; Justice Case (Case 3), Opinion & Judgment, 3 Tr. War Criminals Before
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Nuremberg Milit. Tribunals under Control Council L. No. 10, 954, 955, 970-72, 974-75, 979, 983-84 ( 195 1 ). Nearly all
States including Iran, Iraq and other Tanker War participants were parties by ratifying it or through treaty succession
principles, or were bound not to act to defeat its object and purpose. TIF 367; Vienna Convention, art. 18; Symposium,
Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration; nn. IV.32, 60, VI.45 and accompanying text. Many countries
have reserved to the Convention, including the United States. See generally Schindler & Toman 239-49 (list as of
1987); 28 ILM 754 (US reservations). The result may be a treaty law patchwork because of the law of treaty
reservations. See Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23; Reservations to Convention on Prevention & Punishment ofCrime
ofGenocide, 195 1 ICJ 19-30; n. III.621and accompanying text. If naval warfare is conducted to deliberately destroy an
environment that is a condition of life for a group covered by the Convention, there is potential for genocide as well as
environmental deprivation claims. The same could be said ofgenocide through "Deliberate and public incitement to
commit genocide." Genocide Convention, art. 3(c). Deliberate and public incitement to commit the crime may result
in environmental destruction as well; one may recall destruction of synagogues before and during World War II. A
landed naval or marine force could be held accountable for such behavior, by destruction of, e.g., houses ofworship of
such a group. A genocide issue could also arise during psychological warfare, where naval personnel engage in
broadcasting or leafleting that incites to violations. Most genocide issues involving use of the military to inflict
damage by force will arise in the land warfare context, but if the prospect is for close inshore operations, sea services
involvement is more likely. Naval aviation and land-based air forces stand on an equal footing in this regard as to
targeting. See nn. 231-42 and accompanying text; Part V.G.I. An operation might or might not involve genocide
claims. If, e.g., enemy fishing communities or their environment are ordered destroyed with intent to destroy them as
a group because of national, ethnic, racial or religious attributes, a genoide issue arises. If enemy coastal craft are
destroyed because of suspected aid to the enemy through gun running, and not because of ethnic, etc., composition of
crews, an issue arises under Hague XI, art. 3, and not the Genocide Convention, See also nn. 243-51 and accompanying
text. Either scenario might raise environmental issues. The Convention has no territorial limitation; issues related to
the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, continental shelf and EEZ can arise. As with humanitarian law, no derogation
from the Convention during armed conflict is permitted. See nn. III.948, IV. 30, VI. 84 and accompanying text. There
is no evidence of practices amounting to genocide during the Tanker War; Iraq has been condemned for violations,
<?.£., during the 1990-91 war. See generally S.C. Res. 674(1990), 677 (1990), 686 (1991), 687 (1991),m Wellens 536, 539,
540-41 ; DOD Report, n. II.8, 609, 623; John Norton Moore, War Crimes and the Rule ofLaw in the Gulf Crisis, 31 VJIL
403 (1991); William V. O'Brien, The Nuremberg Precedent and the Gulf War, id. 391 (1991). During the Gulf War the
Coalition used psychological tactics, perhaps beamed from the sea as well as the land and air. DOD Report 536-38.
These did not incite to genocide or otherwise violate the Convention; no one has suggested the Coalition committed,
or incited to, genocide. Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996(1) ICJ 240, after reciting Genocide
Convention, art. 2 definitions, pointed out that the prohibition ofgenocide would be pertinent in a nuclear weapons
situation only if the element of intent toward a group as such was present and declined to conclude on the issue absent
specific circumstances.
279. Convention for Protection ofWorld Cultural & Natural Heritage, Nov. 15, 1972, 27 UST 37, 1037 UNTS 151
(World Cultural & Natural Heritage Convention).
280. 1980 TIF 338-39, 342-43, 349.
281. Fourth Convention, art. 154, citing 1899 Hague II, Hague IV; see also 4 Pictet 613-21.
282. See Fourth Convention, arts. 4-6, 1 1, 35-37, 47-78; 4 Pictet 45-64, 99-1 13, 233-43, 272-369, does not elucidate
the point.
283. See n. 261 and accompanying text; Part IV.B.4.
284. See Parts IV.B.MV.B.2.
285. See nn. III.948, IV.30, VI.84 and accompanying text.
286. Fourth Convention, arts. 14-15; 4 Pictet 119-33 focuses on these areas for purposes stated in the Convention
and mentions Henry Dunant's hospital town proposals during the Franco-Prussian War and for refuges during the
1 871 Paris Commune uprising. The ICRC administered neutralized zones in Madrid, Shanghai and Jerusalem before
and after World War II. Argentina and the United Kingdom agreed on a zone in the Falkland Islands capital in 1982
and a Red Cross Box at sea, a concept not mentioned in the Second Convention, during the Falklands/Malvinas War.
See Part V.F.4. Gitta Sereny, Albert Speer: His Battle with Truth 487 (1995) reports Speer's attempt to have
Heidelberg declared a hospital city late in World War II. These cities are known for cultural artifacts and buildings. If
a hospital area or zone is established near cultural sites, a result is protection for cultural property and therefore the
urban environment.
287. These lose protected status if used for acts harmful to the enemy, e.g., antiaircraft weapons on the roof,
sheltering troops, storing arms or ammunition, as observation posts or liaison centers. They may be attacked after
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warning about their illegal use. Fourth Convention, arts. 18-19. See also AFP 110-31 H 5-5; NWP 1-14M Annotated H
8.5.1.4; NWP 9A Annotated H 8.5.1.4; 4 Pictet 141-56; Part V.F.4.
288. First Convention, art. 23. These hospitals lose protected status if used for acts harmful to the enemy. See n.
287. The same is true for hospital ships in the territorial sea or inland waters. Second Convention, arts. 22-35; see also 1
Pictet 206-18; 2 id. 154-98; Part V.F.4.
289. Second Convention, arts. 38-40; see also 2 Pictet 212-25.
290. NWP 1-14M Annotated H 8.5.1.5; NWP 9A Annotated H 8.5.1.5.
291
.
Fourth Convention, arts. 53, 147; see also 4 Pictet 300-02 (art. 53 reinforces, broadens Hague IV, Regulations,
arts. 46, 56; id., Regulations, art. 23(g), more comprehensive in scope).
292. Lijnzaad & Tanja, n. 2, 178; Plant, Legal Aspects, n. 17, 223; Roberts, Environmental Issues, n. 2, 230-31; see nn.
231-42, 252-54 and accompanying text.
293. See nn. 231-42, 252-55 and accompanying text. The 1949 Conventions, through their Martens clauses
continuing rules ofhumanity and the public conscience, incorporate and carry forward principles related to direct or
indirect environmental protection. First Convention, art. 63; Second Convention, art. 62; Third Convention, art. 142;
Fourth Convention, art. 158. Earlier treaties' Martens clauses, similarly carry forward earlier law. See 1 Pictet 413; 2
id. 282; 3 id. 648; 4 id. 625-26; Morris, n. 17, 780; n. 255 and accompanying text. Plant, Introduction, n. 2, 17; Plant, Legal
Aspects, n. 17, 222, argue the Martens clause ofProtocol I could be interpreted to incorporate environmental concerns
as matters of humanity and the public conscience. See nn. 402, 450 and accompanying text. If this is so, the 1949
Convention clauses might apply too.
294. Michael Bothe, Remarks, in Panel, Criminal Responsibilitiesfor Environmental Damage, in Protection of the
Environment 499, 501 ; Ariane L. DeSaussure, The Role ofthe Law ofArmed Conflict During the Persian Gulf War: An
Overview, 37 Air Force Review 41, 57 (1994); Edwards, n. 2, 130; McNeill, Protection, n. 2, 540-541; Okorodudu-Fubara,
n. 11.210, 191; Roberts, Environmental Issues, n. 2, 250; Terry, n. 17, 63. Plant, Legal Aspects, n. 17, 224 says Fourth
Convention, art. 53 did not apply to some discharges, i.e., Iraqi-owned oil in the tankers and from the Mina al Bakr
terminal. It did apply to discharge of Kuwaiti oil from the Sea Island Terminal.
295. Fourth Convention, art. 63; see also 4 Pictet 333-34.
296. NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 11.3 & n.16; NWP 9A Annotated, n.33, H 11.3 & n.17; Matheson, Remarks 427.
297. See Part V.F.4.
298. See Part V.F.4; nn. VI.281-93 and accompanying text.
299. See Diederich, n. 17, 159; Part V.F.4; nn. VI.281-93 and accompanying text. Part ofWorld War II lore may be
that there was a tacit agreement between the United Kingdom and Germany that if Heidelberg and another German
university would be spared from attack, Oxford and Cambridge would be. What has been proposed would follow this
idea.
300. Immediate incentives were looting of art during the Nazi occupation, removal of important works from
private and public collections, and intentional destruction of culturally significant movables and immovables,
including cities. Toman 21-22; Prott, n. V.110, 582.
301. Cultural Property Convention, art. 36, citing Hague IV; Hague IX; 1899 Hague II; Roerich Pact. The United
States is or has been party to the latter treaties and is a signatory but not a Convention party. Iran and Iraq ratified the
Convention; many if not all other States involved in the Tanker War were parties through ratification or treaty
succession. See Schindler & Toman 769-75; TIF 350, 441-42; Toman 318-20; Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker,
Integration and Disintegration. Although the United States is not a Convention party, NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 8.5.1.6
and NWP 9A Annotated H 8.5.1.6 condemn the sort of destruction it denounces, unless property is used to further an
enemy war effort. Id. publish orders from US higher commands that ordered preservation ofcultural property during
previous wars where the United States was a belligerent. The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), a UN specialized agency like IMO, sponsored the Convention. Toman 21-24. The United States
withdrew from UNESCO in 1984; Singapore and the United Kingdom followed in 1985. See 23 ILM 218 (1984); 24 id.
489 (1985). See also Birnie & Boyle 59-60. Toman 322-23 explains why no Martens clause was included. The Second
Protocol to the Cultural Property Convention also has no Martens clause. The Protocol, opened for signature in 1999,
will come into force 3 months after 20 States ratify it. Second Protocol, art. 43. For Martens clause analysis, and
possible application to environmental concerns, see nn. 255, 293, 402, 450 and accompanying text.
302. Compare Cultural Property Convention, art. 18 with, e.g., Fourth Convention, art. 2; see also 4 Pictet 17-25;
Toman 195-206; Theodor Meron, Comment: Protection of the Environment During Non-International Conflicts, in
Protection ofthe Environment 353, 354; Prott, n. V.l 10, 587-88. The Roerich Pact applies at all times; see n. 275 and
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accompanying text. Second Protocol, arts. 2-4, states its supplementary status, declares its scope of operation and the
relationship between id., arts. 10-14, and other provisions of the Cultural Property Convention and the Second
Protocol.
303. Cultural Property Convention, art. 1, states that cultural property, irrespective of origin or ownership,
includes:
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as
monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of
buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other
objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important
collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the property described above;
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the movable cultural property defined
in . . . (a) such as museums, large libraries and depositories of archives, and refuges intended to shelter, in the
event of armed conflict, the movable cultural property defined in . . . (a);
(c) centres containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in . . . (a) and (b), to be known as "centres
containing monuments."
This definition covers cultural resources, £.£., underwater sites of archaeological or historical importance, including
historic shipwrecks and buildings, etc., now under water. Toman 45-46; Prott, n. V.110, 582-83. Port Royal off
Kingston, Jamaica, is a sunken town lost to earthquake. There are many sites in the Mediterranean Sea, e.g., ancient
Tyre off Lebanon. Id. 584-85. For comparative analysis between Convention art. 1 and Protocol II, art. 16, see Daniel
Smith, Protectionsfor Victims ofInternationalArmed Conflicts: The Proposed Ratification ofProtocol II by the United States,
120 Mil. L. Rev. 59, 72-75 (1988); see also Diederich, n. 17, 147. Second Protocol, arts. 1(e), 10-14, declare an "enhanced
protection" regime for cultural property if the property is "cultural heritage of the greatest importance for humanity",
is protected by adequate domestic measures recognizing its exceptional cultural and historic value that insure the
highest level of protection, and is not used for military purposes or to shield military sites and a declaration has been
made by the State having control over the property, confirming it will not be so used.
304. Cultural Property Convention, art. 2; see also Toman 57-58; Second Protocol, arts. 1(e), 10-14, establishing an
enhanced protection regime; n. 303.
305. Parties pledge instructing their armed forces or publishing military regulations to insure Convention
observance and respect for all peoples' culture and cultural property. Armed forces must establish a service or
specialists to secure respect for cultural property and to cooperate with civil authorities responsible for safeguarding
it. The property must be marked pursuant to the Convention. Cultural Property Convention, arts. 3, 7, 10, 16; see also
Second Protocol, arts. 5-9; Toman 59-66, 91-96, 141-42, 177-84.
306. Armed custodians assigned to guard property are considered police responsible for public order and are not
deemed part of a belligerent's armed forces because of their status as guards. Cultural Property Convention, arts. 8-9;
see also Second Protocol, arts. 5-9; Toman 96-112, 138-40.
307. Cultural Property Convention, Regulations, art. 11; see also Toman 113-15. Diederich, n. 17, 159 suggests
similar environmental sanctuaries.
308. Cultural Property Convention, arts. 12-14; Regulations, arts. 17-19; see also Toman 151-72.
309. See generally Part V.B. The Convention's implications for submarine warfare and reconnaisance "need
discussion," according to Prott, n. V.110, 585; he offers no solutions.
310. Hague XI, art. 4; see also Toman 171; n. 248 and accompanying text.
311. The Cultural Property Convention also provides for dispute resolution, including arbitration. Id., art. 8;
Regulations, arts. 12-16; see also Toman 97-112, 116-37.
312. Protecting Powers are States not party to a conflict who safeguard interests of parties to the conflict. See n.
V.439; Toman 94, 222-27.
313. Cultural Property Convention, art. 21; Regulations, arts. 1-10; see also Toman 222-49.
314. Cultural Property Convention, art. 4(1); see also Second Protocol, art. 6; Toman 68-69.
315. Cultural Property Convention, arts. 4(l)-4(2), 9; see also Toman 68-70, 72-79. This was included because of
UK and US delegations' strong advocacy; neither country has ratified the Convention, however. Toman 75-77; Prott,
n. V.110, 586. See also Second Protocol, art. 7.
316. Cultural Property Convention, arts. 4(3)-4(4); see also NWP 9A Annotated, Table ST6-1; Toman 70-71.
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317. Cultural Property Convention, art. 4(5), referring to id., art. 3; see also Toman 59-66, 71-72; nn. 305-13 and
accompanying text.
318. A party whose government is considered its legitimate government by a resistance movement shall ifpossible
draw its attention to the obligation to comply with cultural property conventions. Cultural Property Convention, art.
5; see also Toman 83-89.
319. Cultural Property Convention, art. 1; Toman 39-56 says coverage of sites ofgreat natural beauty was rejected;
they are covered by the Convention for Protection ofWorld Cultural & Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 27 UST 37,
1037 UNTS 151 (World Cultural & Natural Heritage Convention), analyzed nn. 339-48 and accompanying text. See
also Harlow & McGregor, n. Ill, 325-26, citing Bernard H. Oxman, Environmental Warfare (Environmental Terrorism
During Wartime and Rules of War), 22 ODIL 433 (1991). McNeill, Protection, n. 2, 543-44 notes discussions to protect
nature preserves like demilitarized zones. The Second Protocol, arts. 1(e), 10-14 would add a special category of
property subject to "enhanced protection;" see n. 303 and accompanying text. The Protocol also provides for criminal
responsibility and jurisdiction of these offenses, including international judicial assistance and extradition. Second
Protocol, arts. 15-21. Id., art. 22 declares the Protocol will apply to armed conflicts not of an international nature
within a party's territory but not to, e.g., riots.
320. Roberts, Environmental Issues, n. 2, 231.
321. Cf. Prott, n. V.110, 583 (need to observe customary warfare rules, e.g., proportionality). Cultural Property
Convention, arts. 4(l)-4(2), 9, allow destroying cultural property if "military necessity imperatively requires" it; see
also n. 315 and accompanying text.
322. See n. 261 and accompanying text; Part IV.B.4.
323. See Parts IV.B.I -2.
324. See nn. III.948, IV.30, VI.84 and accompanying text.
325. Schindler & Toman 769-73, 780-82.
326. DOD Report, n. II. 8, 605-06; John H. McNeill, Remarks, in Panel Discussion, The Strategic Imperative,
Protection of the Environment 63, 80; Roberts, Environmental Issues, n. 2, 240; cf. Harlow & McGregor, n. 1 1 1, 325
(1990-91 war sources; assumption is that same practice applied for Tanker War).
327. See Part V.F.4; nn. 297-99, 319 and accompanying text; cf. McNeill, Protection, n. 2, 543-44.
328. See generally Toman 25, 258-59; see also n. 301 and accompanying text.
329. Convention on Means of Prohibiting & Preventing Illicit Import, Export & Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, — UST — , 823 UNTS 231 (Illicit Import, Export & Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property Convention).
330. Toman 465-67. By 1998 90 States were parties. TIF 350.
331. Toman 25.
332. Illicit Import, Export & Transfer ofOwnership ofCultural Property Convention, n. 329, arts. 2-3,— UST—
,
823 UNTS 236; Toman 362.
333. Compare Cultural Property Convention, art. 1 with Illicit Import, Export & Transfer ofOwnership ofCultural
Property Convention, n. 329, art. 1,— UST— , 823 UNTS 234; see also Toman 359-60.
334. Cultural Property Convention, art. 8; see also n. 311 and accompanying text.
335. Compare Illicit Import, Export & Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property Convention, n. 329, art. 11,—
UST— , 823 UNTS 242 with Cultural Property Convention, art. 4(3); see also Toman 361.
336. Toman 361; compare Illicit Import, Export & Transfer ofOwnership ofCultural Property Convention, n.329,
art. 3,— UST— , 823 UNTS 236 , with id., art. 1 1,— UST— , 823 UNTS 242.
337. Illicit Import, Export & Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property Convention, n. 329, art. 9,— UST—
,
823 UNTS 242.
338. Id., art. 10(a), — UST— , 823 UNTS 242.
339. See TIF 350; treaty succession principles may push the total of States party to the Convention higher.
Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.
340. Toman 369.
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.
I.U.C.N./I.C.E.L., Protection ofCultural and Natural Heritage Sites in Times ofArmed Conflict, 23 Envt'L Pol. &
L. 259 (1993) (Convention, although concluded for times of peace, also applies during war); see also Toman 369;
Verwey, n. 269, 563.
342. World Cultural & Natural Heritage Convention, n. 3 1 9, arts. 3-5, 27 UST 4 1 , 1 037 UNTS 1 54; Toman 369.
343. Cf LOS Convention, art. 2; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 1; see also n. 261 and accompanying text; Part
IV.B.4.
344. World Cultural & Natural Heritage Convention, n. 319, arts. 1-2, 27 UST 40-42, 1037 UNTS 153-55.
345. Toman 53-55; see also Part B.3.a(HI)(B).
346. Verwey, n. 269, 563. The 1954 and 1982 Conventions lists can be and are different. The World Cultural &
Natural Heritage Convention, n. 319, covers only fixed objects; the Cultural Property Convention protects
immovable and movable property. Toman 54, 110, 117-18.
347. LeGrand, n. 2, 30.
348. Compare Toman 373-75 with Cultural Property Convention, art. 20.
349. E.g., DOD Report, n. II. 8, 605-07, does not cite World Cultural & Natural Heritage Convention, n. 319.
350. Cf Toman 487-90.
351. TIF 468-69; treaty succession principles may push that total higher. Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker,
Integration and Disintegration.
352. Brownlie, International Law 5; 1 Oppenheim § 10, 28; Restatement (Third) § 102(3).
353. Daniel Barstow Magraw & Sergei Vinogradov, Environmental Law, in Beyond Confrontation, n. III. 358,
193, 199.
354. Reservation & Understanding of Kuwait, Jan. 2, 1980, in Schindler & Toman 174: "This Convention
binds . . . Kuwait only towards States Parties thereto. Its obligatory character shall ipsofacto terminate with respect to
any hostile State which does not abide by the prohibition . . . therein. ..." (emphasis in original). See also Vienna
Convention, arts. 19-23; n. III.621, VI.268, 278 and accompanying text. Another interpretation is that it restates
principles on the effect of fundamental change of circumstances, war and possibly impossibility of performance. See
Vienna Convention, arts. 61-62; nn. III.928-29, IV.26-27, VI. 80-81 and accompanying text.
355. Art. 1(2) bars any party from assisting, encouraging or inducing any State, group of States or international
organization from engaging in environmental modification techniques the Convention condemns. ENMOD
Convention, art. 1 (emphases added).
356. "[This Understanding is] not incorporated into the Convention but [is] part of the negotiating record and
[was] included in the report ... by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the . . . General Assembly in
September 1976." Schindler & Toman 168 &n.l (emphasis added), citing Report ofthe Conference ofthe Committee on
Disarmament, 1 UN GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 27, 91-92, UN Doc. A/31/27 (1976) (Report of the Conference). The
understanding interprets the Convention and is not a reservation excluding, limiting or modifying it. The
understanding binds the United States. Restatement (Third) §§ 313 cmt. g, 314 cmt. d; see also Vienna Convention,
arts. 19-23; nn. III.621, VI.268, 278 (multilateral treaty reservations).
357. ENMOD Convention, art. 2.
358. "[This Understanding is] not incorporated into the Convention but [is] part of the negotiating record and
[was] included in the report transmitted by the Conference ... to the . . . General Assembly " Schindler & Toman
168 & n.l, citing Report of the Conference, n. 356, 91-92 (emphasis added). The understanding interprets the
Convention and is not a reservation purporting to exclude, limit or modify it. The understanding binds the United
States. See n. 356 and accompanying text; see also Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23; nn. III.621, VI.268, 278 and
accompanying text (multilateral treaty reservations).
359. ENMOD Convention, art. 3(1). The Committee appended an understanding: "... [T]his Convention does
not deal with . . . whether ... a given use of environmental modification techniques is in accordance with generally
recognized principles of international law." "[This understanding is] not incorporated into the Convention but [is]
part of the negotiating record and [was] included in the report transmitted by the Conference ... to the . . .
Assembly . . . . " Schindler & Toman 168 & n.l, citing Report of the Conference, n. 369, 91-92. The understanding
interprets the Convention and is not a reservation purporting to exclude, limit or modify it. The understanding binds
the United States. See nn. III.621, VI.356, 358 and accompanying text.
360. UN Charter, arts. 5 1 , 1 03; see also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, 1V.6-25 and accompanying text; Part B. 1
.
Maritime Environment 583
361. Vienna Convention, arts. 190-23; see also nn. III.621, VI.268, 278 and accompanying text.
362. ENMOD Convention, art. 1(1); see also Okorodudu-Fubara, n. 11.210, 182-83; nn. 354-56 and accompanying
text. Terry, n. 17, 64 makes this point but does not inquire whether it might restate custom; see n. 365 and
accompanying text.
363. TIF 364-65.
364. Vienna Convention, art. 18; Schindler & Toman 170; Sharp, n. 2, 19; see also nn. IV.32, 60, IV.45 and
accompanying text.
365. E.g., San RemoManual H 44, cmt. 44.4(ENMOD Convention standards "the threshold indicated"); cf. Arkin,
n. 2, 121; Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2, 430; cf. Okorodudu-Fubara, n. 11.210, 171-72, 179; Ivan Shearer, The Debate to
Assess the NeedforNew International Accords, in Protection of the Environment 546, 547; contra, Edwards, n. 2, 129.
Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996(1) ICJ 241-42, discussed ENMOD but appeared to take no
position:
. . . [T]he issue is not whether the treaties relating to the protection of the environment are or are not
applicable during an armed conflict, but rather whether the obligations stemming from these treaties were
intended to be obligations of total restraint during military conflict.
The Court does not consider that the treaties . . . [including ENMOD] could have intended to deprive a
State of the exercise of its right of self-defense . . . because of its obligations to protect the environment ....
State must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and
proportionate in [pursuing] legitimate military objectives. Respect for the environment is one . . . element . .
.
[in] assessing whether an action [conforms] . . . with necessity and proportionality.
See also UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; n. III. 10 and accompanying text. Paul C. Szasz, reviewing the Convention, Protocol
I and the World Charter for Nature, said that "[I]t can be safely concluded that the principle expressed in all these
instruments—that nature is no longer fair game in mankind's conflicts—is well on its way to becoming an accepted
principle . . ." Panel, The Gulf War: Environment as a Weapon, 1991 ASIL Proc. 215, 216-17. World Charter for Nature,
G.A. Res. 37/7 (Annex),UN GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 5 1, at 1 7,UN Doc. A/37/5 1 1HI 5, 20 ( 1 982) (World Charter for
Nature), in 22 ILM 455, 457, 459 (1983), declared that "Nature shall be secured against degradation caused by warfare
or other hostile activities;" "Military activities damaging to nature shall be avoided."
PaulC. Szasz,Comment: The ExistingLegalFramework, Protecting theEnvironmentDuring InternationalArmed Conflict, in
Protection of the Environment 278, 279, characterized "these statements, . . . merely declarations of leading
representative international bodies, ... at best constitute international 'soft law' [but] their adoption by the votes or
with the concurrence of representatives of a majority of countries lend some weight to the suggestion that they
represent, ifnot yet well-established customary law, at least . . . legeferenda." See also G.A. Res. 35/8 (1980), discussed in
Howard S. Levie, Comment: Criminal Responsibilities for Environmental Damage, in Protection of the Environment,
491, 494-95.
366. ENMOD Convention, art. 2; see also Sharp, n. 2, 22.
367. See n. 358 and accompanying text.
368. ENMOD Convention, art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
369. See n. 356 and accompanying text.
370. Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2, 432; Leslie C. Green, The Environment and the Law of Conventional Warfare, 29
CYBIL 222, 226-27 (1991); Roberts, Environmental Destruction, n. 2, 544.
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Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2, 432, citing Final Declaration ofSecond Review Conference ofParties to Convention
on Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, Sept. 14-18, 1992,
art. 2, in U.N.I.D.R Newsletter 60 (1993). Low & Hodgkinson say Convention preparatory works support this; they
accept this view. Id. 432-33.
372. ENMOD Convention, art. 1(1).
373. Id., art. 2.
374. Cf, e.g., Space Treaty n. III.957, art. 1,18 UST 2411, 610 UNTS 207; see also AFP 110-31 11 2-3(a); Brownlie,
International Law 267-71; NWP 1-14M Annotated 1 1.9; NWP 9A Annotated 11 1.9.
375. See n. 357 and accompanying text.
376. LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also Part IV.B.l.
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377. See n. 356 and accompanying text.
378. See nn. III.958, IV.16, VI.68 and accompanying text.
379. See n. 356 and accompanying text.
380. See Chapter IV for development of these LOS norms. Since the ENMOD Convention has no territorial
boundaries, historical analysis of norms that may or may not apply to given treaties has no bearing. It is like the
Geneva Gas Protocol and the Genocide Convention, which also apply worldwide. See nn. 270, 278 and accompanying
text.
381. The World Meteorological Organization and UN Environmental Program Informal Meeting on Legal
Aspects ofWeather Modification Draft Principles (Apr. 1978),in Aviation & Space Law: Meteorology, 1978 Digest § 7,
at 1204-05, declares States must take "all reasonable steps to ensure that weather modification activities under their
jurisdiction or control do not cause adverse environmental effects . . . outside their national jurisdiction." See also
Agreement Relating to Exchange of Information on Weather Modification Activities, Mar. 26, 1975, Can.-US, art. 7,
26 UST 540, 545.
382. See Parts IV.B.1-IV.B.3.
383. Vienna Convention, art. 18; see also nn. IV.32, 60, VI.45 and accompanying text.
384. See n. 365 and accompanying text.
385. See nn. 370-71 and accompanying text.
386. The record is not clear; presumably neutral ships diverted around the spill to avoid fouling engineering
plants; Gulf fishing grounds were damaged, however. See n. 4-5 and accompanying text.
387. See nn. 4-5 and accompanying text.
388. See n. 356 and accompanying text.
389. Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2, 434; Okorodudu-Fubara, n. 11.210, 179.
390. See nn. 367-68 and accompanying text.
391. See n. 6 and accompanying text.
392. See n. 8 and accompanying text.
393. See nn. 11.65, 215, 221, 519, VI.9 and accompanying text.
394. ENMOD Convention, art. 1; see also nn. 355-56 and accompanying text.
395. ENMOD Convention, art. 2; see also nn. 357-58 and accompanying text.
396. See generally Walker, State Practice 158-70; Parts V.C-V.D.
397. See n. 6 and accompanying text.
398. ENMOD Convention, arts. 1-2; see also nn. 355-58 and accompanying text.
399. UN Charter,arts. 51, 1 03; see afro nn. 111.10,47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Part B.l.
400. See ENMOD Convention, arts. 1-2; nn. 355-58 and accompanying text.
401. Schindler & Toman 701-03 (1987 list). The United States has declared it will not ratify Protocol I; Protocol II
has been sent to the US Senate for advice and consent. See n. III.622 and accompanying text.
402. Cf. DOD Report, n. II. 8, 606-07. The Martens clause, Protocol I, art. 1(2) carried forward other humanitarian
law, and perhaps environmental concerns as a matter of humanity and public conscience. Plant, Legal Aspects, n. 17,
222. See also n. 450 and accompanying text.
403. Protocol I, art. 49(3); Bothe et al. 290; Pilloud, Commentary 605-06; Michael Bothe, Commentary, in Law of
Naval Warfare 760-62; Fenrick,Mt/irary Objectives, n. 11.202, 23-24; ¥tm'\ck, LegalAspects, n. 11.501, 264-65; Low &
Hodgkinson, n. 2, 441 ; van Hegelsom, n. III.623, 8-10 (noting, criticizing two commentators' opposing views); see also
nn. 427-31 and accompanying text.
404. Protocol II, art. 1 . Confusion in applying the Protocols has crept into secondary literature. E.g., Edgerton, n. 2,
173 cites Protocol II, art. 14 instead of Protocol I, art. 54 in analyzing deliberate attempted destruction of Saudi
Arabia's desalination plants during the 1990-91 war. Whatever one might think of Iraq's arguments for its invasion
and trying to annex Kuwait as a long-lost province, rejected by the UN Security Council, see Walker, Crisis Over
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Kuwait 34, its assault on Saudi Arabia was part of an international armed conflict, covered by Protocol I and not
Protocol II.
405. The 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War belligerents agreed on a Red Cross Box on the high seas, analogous to
demilitarized zones protected by Protocol I, art. 60 for transfer of sick and wounded; see Part V.F.4. The San Remo
Manual analogizes Protocol I standards, particularly if they restate general customary norms, to the law of naval
warfare.
406. Philippe Antoine, International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of the Environment in Time ofArmed
Conflict, 32 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 517, 527 (1992).
407. Louise Doswald-Beck, The Principle ofHumanity in the Law ofSea Warfare: The Protection of Civilians and the
Hors de Combat, in Panel, Neutrality, the Rights ofShipping and the Use ofForce in the Persian Gulf War (Part II), 1988
ASIL Proc. 599, 600-01 (1990).
408. Cf Edgerton, n. 2, 173; Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2, 441.
409. Protocol I, art. 35(1), restating the principle ofHague IV, Regulations, art. 22; 1899 Hague II, Regulations, art.
22; G.A. Res. 2444, 23UN GAOR Supp. No. 1 8, 50,UN Doc. A/72 1 8, in Schindler & Toman 263; see also AFP 1 1 0-3 111
6-3(a); Bother al. 193-95; Final Protocol, Aug. 27, 1974, art. 12, in Schindler & Toman 25, 29 (never ratified); NWP
1 - 14M Annotated H 8. 1 n.2 (citing inter alia Lieber Code, art. 30); NWP 9A Annotated 11 8. 1 n. 1 (same); OxfordNaval
Manual, art. 14; 1880 Oxford Manual, art. 4; Pilloud, Commentary 390; San Remo Manual 11 38 & cmts.; Stone
551; Fenrick, Military Objectives, n. 11.201, 1; Lijnzaad & Tanja, n. 2, 180; Matheson, Remarks 424; Robertson,Modern
Technology, n. V.173, 363, 370; William G. Schmidt, The Protection of Victims ofInternationalArmed Conflicts: Protocol I
Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 24 Air Force L. Rev. 189, 213 (1984). Protocol I, art. 35(2) denounces weapons,
projectiles or means of warfare intended, or may be expected, to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
This customary rule, applicable to naval warfare, is analyzed at 442-52 and accompanying text.
410. Protocol I, art. 35(2), a customary norm; see also nn. 442-52 and accompanying text.
411. Protocol I, art. 35(3) (emphasis added).
412. See nn. 354-56 and accompanying text.
413. Report ofCommittee III, Second Sess., in 2 Howard S. Levie, Protection ofWar Victims: Protocol I to the
1949 Geneva Conventions 276 (1980); Pilloud, Commentary 416; Antoine, n. 406, 525; Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2,
429; Schmidt, TheProtection,n. 111.623,215-16. Levie, The 1977 ProtocolIand the United States, 38 St. Louis U.L.J. 469,
478 (1993), describes the ENMOD Convention distinctions and says "it would be extremely difficult for a . . . party to
the 1977 Protocol I to assert that the words so used had a different meaning in the Protocol ..."
414. Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2, 429.
415. Antoine, n. 406, 526.
416. Compare ENMOD Convention, preamble with Protocol I, preamble; see also Bothe et al. 33; Pilloud,
Commentary 27-28.
417. Birnie & Boyle 210; Green 123 ("new 'basic rule'"); John Norton Moore, Crisis in the Gulf: Enforcingthe
Rule of Law 81 (1992); cf. San Remo Manual, 11 44 & cmt.; cf. Arkin, n. 2, 121; cf. Fleck, Protection, n. 17, 530; cf.
Gasser, The Debate, n. 17, 523; Frits Kalshoven, Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use ofMethods andMeans of Warfare, in
Dekker & Post 97, 100; Levie, The 1977Protocol I, n. 413,479 (United States has no valid reason to object to substance
of art. 35[3]); Glen Plant, Comment, n. 2, 440, 441 (emerging norm); cf. Shearer, The Debate, n. 365, 547; Solf, Protection,
n. III.623, 134 (1986); Terry, n. 17, 65 (replication of Hague IV standards); contra, Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2, 427;
Matheson, Remarks 424 (US view is that art. 35(3) does not state a customary norm); McNeill, Protection, n. 2, 540-41
(treaty norms); cf. Bernard H. Oxman, Comment: Developing the InternationalLaw ofArmed Conflict, in Protection of
the Environment 576, 577; L.R. Penna, Customary InternationalLaw and Protocol I: An Analysis ofSome Provisions, in
Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles 200, 210 (Christophe Swinarski
ed. 1984); cf. Roberts, Environmental Issues, n. 2, 235; Robertson, Modern Technology, n.V.173, 363; Schmidt, The
Protection, n. III.623, 214-17; cf. Verwey, n. 269, 560-61. Low & Hodgkinson 427-28 seem to miss the point in saying
that art. 35(3) "do[es] not apply to conventional warfare" and therefore would not apply to the Iraqi oil spills.
Authorities id. cites do not speak ofinapplicability but lack ofsignificant limitations on belligerents, i.e., that art. 35(3)
would not be triggered by damage incidental or peripheral to conventional warfare. See, e.g., Bothe et al. 348; George
H. Aldrich, Progressive Development ofthe Laws of War: A Reply to Criticisms ofthe 1977 Geneva Protocol I, 26 VJIL 693,
711 (1986); Green, The Environment, n. 370, 228; Diederich, n. 17, 152; Report of Committee III, Second Sess.
(CDDH/215/Rev. 1; XV, 263), in 2 Levie, Protection, n. 413, 276-77 (Protocol I preparatory works), cited by Low &
Hodgkinson 417-18, notes Art. 35(3) has been criticized as being insufficient, unworkable or unrealistic; Lijnzaad &
Tanja, n. 2, 182; Guy B. Roberts, TheNew Rulesfor Waging War: The CaseAgainst Ratification ofAdditional Protocol 1, 26
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VJIL 109, 148 (1985); Christopher Greenwood, Customary InternationalLaw and the First Geneva Protocol of1977 in the
Gulf Conflict, in The Gulf War 1990-91 in International and English Law 63, 86-87 (Peter Rowe ed. 1993) (Art.
35(3)'s equivocal status.)- The United States appears firm in opposing the art. 35(3) standard. A condition of its
ratifying the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Fragments and Mine Protocols was: "The United States
considers that the fourth paragraph of the Preamble to the present Convention, which reproduces the subject of
provisions ofArticle 35 . . . [3] and Article 55 . . . [1] ofAdditional Protocol 1, applies only to States which have accepted
those provisions[.]" Levie, Prohibitions, n. III.627, 666. Legality ofThreat or Use ofNuclear Weapons, 1996(1) ICJ 242,
may have agreed that Protocol I, arts. 35(3) and 55 do not restate custom:
. . . [T]hese provisions embody a general obligation to protect the natural environment against widespread,
long-term and severe environmental damage; the prohibition of methods and means of warfare which are
intended, or may be expected, to cause such damage; and the prohibition of attacks against the natural
environment by . . . reprisals.
These are powerful constraints for all States having subscribed to these provisions.
One implication is that those countries that have not "subscribed" to these provisions by Protocol ratification or
acceptance of them as custom are not bound.
418. Commentators divide on this point; see n. 365 and accompanying text.
419. Compare Protocol I, art. 35(3) with ENMOD Convention, art. 1(1).
420. See n. 417 and accompanying text.
421. See nn. 413-16 and accompanying text.
422. See nn. 403, 427-31 accompanying text.
423. Compare Protocol I, art. 35(3) with id., art. 55. Most commentators lump the two provisions together in arguing
whether they restate customary international law. See n. 417 and accompanying text. See also Harlow & McGregor, n.
Ill, 318 (Art. 55 does not restate custom); Verwey, n. 269, 561-63 (same).
424. Netherlands Declaration, June 26, 1977, in Schindler & Toman 713, 714; UK Declaration, Dec. 12, 1977, in
id. 717.
425. Declarations have the same legal effect as understandings, as distinguished from reservations, which
introduce new terms for a treaty. See Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23; nn. III.62 1 , VI.268, 278 and accompanying text.
426. See nn. 413-14 and accompanying text; but see Lijnzaad & Tanja, n. 2, 18 1 . Second Protocol, art. 1(f) echoes the
principles of the declarations. See n. 424 and accompanying text.
427. See van Hegelsom, n. HI.623, 8-10, referring to two commentators.
428. See n. 403 and accompanying text.
429. Protocol I, art. 49, incorporating by reference id., arts. 48-67 and Fourth Convention, arts. 13-26. '"[R]ules of
international law applicable in armed conflict' means the rules applicable in armed conflict set forth in international
agreements to which the Parties to the conflict are Parties and the generally recognized principles and rules of
international law which are applicable to armed conflict[.]" Protocol I, art. 2(b). This does not include, e.g., UN
General Assembly recommendations under UN Charter, arts. 10, 14, or the law oijus ad bellum, e.g. Charter law under
id., art. 51. Bothe et al. 54-55; Pilloud, Commentary 60-61.
430. Under the LOS the territorial sea and inland waters are part of sovereign territory. See Part IV.B.4. The
LONW and arms control law also make this distinction. See generally Seabed Arms Control Treaty, art. 4; Nyon
Arrangement, art. 4; Nyon Supplementary Agreement; London Declaration, art. 37; Oxford Naval Manual, arts. 1,
9, 21, 88; Robertson, New LOS 274-75; San Remo Manual 1H 10(a), 14, 20-21.
431. See Parts. IV.B.1-IV.B.2.
432. Moore, Crisis, n. 417, 81 says Iraq violated Protocol I, arts. 35(3), 55, without differentiating between the
1990-91 sea and land campaigns; see also Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2, 430 (same).
433. See nn. 411, 423 and accompanying text.
434. See nn. 413-15 and accompanying text.
435. See nn. 4-6 and accompanying text.
436. See nn. 353-91 and accompanying text.
437. See Parts V.B-V.D; nn. VI. 8, 41 1 -34 and accompanying text.
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438. See UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 9 16- 18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Part
B.l; n. 429 and accompanying text; Protocol I, preamble, art. 2(b); Bothe et al. 32-33; Pilloud, Commentary 25-29,
60-61.
439. See nn. VI.5, 8, 41 1-34 and accompanying text.
440. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 429, 438 and accompanying text.
441. Protocol I, art. 49(3); see also nn. 430-31 and accompanying text.
442. Hague IV, Regulations, art. 23(e); 1899 Hague II, Regulations, art. 23(e); AFP 1 10-31 HH 6-2, 6-3(b); Bother
al. 195; Green 131; Lieber Code, art. 16; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 9.1-9.1.1; NWP 9A Annotated HH 9.1-9.1.1;
OxfordNavalManual, art. 16(2); Pilloud,Commentary 409; San RemoManual II 42(a) & cmt. 42.2; Stone 558; US
Department of Defense General Counsel letter, Sept. 22, 1972, in 67 AJIL 122 (1973); Fenrick, Comment, New, n.
III.627, 233; Lijnzaad & Tanja, n. 2, 180; Matheson,Remarks 424; Henri Meyrowitz, The Principle ofSuperfluous Injury
or Unnecessary Suffering, 1994Int'lRev.RedCross 98; Roach, Certain, n. III.627, 69-72; Robertson, Modern Technology,
n. V.173, 363; Schmidt, The Conventional, n. III.627, 308-12; Schmidt, The Protection, n. III.623, 213-14.
443. See nn. 268-71 and accompanying text.
444. Cf. Hague IV, Regulations, art. 23(e); n. 442 and accompanying text.
445. See nn. 4-5 and accompanying text.
446. Cf. Protocol I, preamble, art. 1; see also Bothe et al. 33, 37-45; Pilloud, Commentary 27-28, 34-40.
447. See n. 4 and accompanying text.
448. See n. 446 and accompanying text.
449. See n. 8 and accompanying text.
450. See generally Walker, State Practice 164-66 and sources cited. It has been argued that the language invoking
"principles ofhumanity and the dictates ofpublic conscience," in the Martens clause includes a requirement to avoid
unjustifiable damage to the environment. Plant, Introduction, n. 2, 17; Plant, Legal Aspects, n. 17, 222, referring to
Protocol I, art. 1(2). Be that as it may, this language supports culpability for States ordering attacks on innocent
merchantmen. However, Art. 1(2) commentaries do not mention environmental degradation. See Bothe et al. 44;
Pilloud, Commentary. 38-39.
451. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; Protocol I, art. 2(b); see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and
accompanying text; Part B.l; n. VI.429 and accompanying text.
452. See nn. 6-8 and accompanying text.
453. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 103; Protocol I, art. 2(b); see also Part B.l.
454. Protocol I, art. 49; see nn. 403, 429 and accompanying text.
455. See n. 402 and accompanying text.
456. Bothe et al. 282.
457. Id. 282; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 8.1-8.1.2; NWP 9A Annotated HH 8.1-8.1.2; Pilloud, Commentary 598;
San Remo Manual H 39 & cmts.; Kalshoven, Prohibitions, n. 417, 100; Roberts, Environmental Issues, n. 2, 235;
Robertson, Modern Technology, n. V.173, 363, 370; Schmidt, The Protection, n. III.623, 221-25; Solf, Protection, n.
III.623, 129; see also G.A. Res. 2444, n. 409; see also Second Protocol, art. 1(f).
458. See generally NWP 1-14M Annotated HI 8.2-8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated HH 8.2-8.4.1; San Remo Manual HH
47-52, 59-61, 67-69 & cmts.
459. Bothe et al. 324-25; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 8.1.1; NWP 9A Annotated H 8.1.1; Pilloud, Commentary
668-69; US Department ofDefense General Counsel letter, n. 442, 123-24; Burrus Carnahan, Protecting Civilians Under
the Draft Geneva Protocol: A Preliminary Inquiry, 18 Air Force L. Rev. 32, 47-48 (No. 4, 1976).
460. Bothe et al. 309-11, 359-67; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 8.1.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated H 8.1.2.1; Matheson,
Remarks 426.
461. See nn. 4-6 and accompanying text.
462. See Part V.G.2-V.G.3.
463. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 51, 103; Protocol I, art. 2(b); see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and
accompanying text; Part B.l; n. VI.429 and accompanying text.
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464. Protocol I, art. 50 defines "civilian" as anyone not belonging to categories in Third Convention, arts.
4(A)(1)-4(A)(3) or 4(A)(6), or Protocol I, art. 43, i.e., members ofarmed forces, militias, volunteer corps, an organized
resistance, inhabitants ofunoccupied territory who spontaneously take up arms to resist invaders and not members of
regular armed units ifthey carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs ofwar, and organized armed forces, etc.
under command of a party whose government or authority is not recognized by an adverse party if these forces are
under an internal disciplinary system enforcing compliance with the international law of armed conflict. If a party
incorporates paramilitary or armed law enforcement agencies into its armed forces, it must notify other parties to a
conflict. In case ofdoubt, a person is considered a civilian. Protocol I, art. 50. Argentina filed declarations for Protocol
I, art. 43(1); Belgium filed them for art. 43(3). See Argentina Declaration, Oct. 6, 1986, in Schindler & Toman 704-05;
Belgium Declaration, n. III.626, 706. Thus wounded, ill or shipwrecked mariners at sea and civil air crews downed at
sea remain subject to the Second Convention and become prisoners ofwar under the Third Convention, if they do not
benefit by more favorable treatment under other rules. Second Convention, art. 13(5); Third Convention. See also
Bothe et al. 293-96; 2 Pictet 93-104; 3 id., n. 320, at 44-65, 67-68; Pilloud, Commentary 506-18, 610-12.
465. Protocol I, art. 51; see also Bothe et al. 299-318; Pilloud, Commentary 615-28.
466. Belgium Declaration, n. III.626, 707; Italy Declaration, n. III.626, 712; Netherlands Declaration, n. III.626,
714; UK Declaration, n. III.626, 717; for these declarations' impact, see n. III.621 and accompanying text.
467. Belgium Declaration, n. III.626, 707; Netherlands Declaration, n. III.626, 714; UK Declaration, n. III.626,
717. For these declarations' impact, see n. III.621 and accompanying text.
468. Protocol I, art. 52; see also Bother/. 320-27; Pilloud, Commentary 630-38; Second Protocol, arts. 1(f), 5-9.
469. Belgium Declaration, n. III.626, 707; Italy Declaration, n. III.626, 712; Netherlands Declaration, n. III.626,
714; UK Declaration, n. III.626, 717. For these declarations' impact, see n. III.621 and accompanying text. Second
Protocol, art. 1(f), is to the same effect.
470. Italy Declaration, n. 111.626,713; Netherlands Declaration, n. III.626, 714; UK Declaration, n. III.626, 717.
For these declarations' impact, see n. III.621 and accompanying text.
471. Protocol I, art. 57(1); see also Bothe et al. 359-62; Pilloud, Commentary 678-80.
472. Protocol I, art. 57(2)(a); see also Bothe etal. 362-65; Pilloud, Commentary 680-85; Second Protocol, arts. 1(f),
5-9.
473. Article 57 cannot be construed to authorize attacks against civilians, the civilian population or civilian
objects. Protocol I, arts. 57(2)(b)-57(5); see also Bothe et al. 365-69; Pilloud, Commentary 686-89; Second Protocol,
arts. 1(f), 5-9.
474. Austria Reservation, Aug. 13, 1982, in Schindler & Toman 705; Switzerland Declaration, Dec. 12, 1977, in id.
716. For these reservations' impact, see Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23; nn. III.621 , VI.268, 278 and accompanying
text.
475. Belgium Declaration, n. III.626, 707; Italy Declaration, n. III. 626, 712; Netherlands Declaration, n. III.626,
714; UK Declaration, n. III.626, 717. For these declarations' impact, see n. III. 621 and accompanying text.
476. AFP 110-31,ch. 14; Bothe etal. 299 & n. 3; NWP 1-14M Annotated 111 6.2.3.2 (protections also under Fourth
Convention, art. 33), 11.2 n.4, 11.3; NWP9A Annotated 1M 6.2.3.2 ,11.2 n.3, 11.3 (same); 4 Pictet 224-29; San Remo
Manual 11 39; Stone 684-732; Mallison & Mallison, Naval Targeting, n. III.262, 260; Matheson, Remarks 423, 426;
Robertson, Modern Technology, n. V.173, 363; Schmidt, The Protection, n. III.623, 225-32; Solf, Protection, n. III.623,
130-31.
477. 1 Levie, Protection, n. 413, 217-18; NWP 1-14M AnnotatedHH 11.2 (noting protections also under Fourth
Convention, arts. 28, 33), 1 1.3; NWP 9A Annotated Wl 1 1.2, 1 1.3 (same); Hans-Peter Gasser, Prohibition ofTerroristActs
in International Humanitarian Law, 1985 Intl Rev. Red Cross 200; Hague Air Rules, art. 22; Matheson, Remarks 426;
Robertson, Modern Technology, n. V.173, 363; Schmidt, The Protection, n. III.623, 227.
478. See generally Bother/. 320-27; Colombos §§ 510-1 1, 524-25, 528-29; NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 6.23 & n.36,
6.2.3.2 (protections for some civilians from reprisals under Fourth Convention, art. 33), 8.1.1 & n.9, 8.1.2 & n.12 (US
position that Protocol I, art. 52[1] creates new law); NWP 9A Annotated Ml 6.2.3 & n.33, 6.2.3.2, 8.1.1 & n.9, 8.1.2 &
n.12 (same); 2 O'Connell, Lawofthe Sea 1105-06; 4 Pictet 227-29; Pilloud, Commentary 630-38; Toman 384-85;
Matheson, Remarks 426; cf. Roberts, Environmental Issues, n. 2, 235; Soli, Protection, n. III.623, 131. Russo, Targeting, n.
III.624, 17 n. 36 rejects applying art. 52(2) to naval warfare.
479. See generally Bothe et al. 309-11, 359-67; Frits Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War 99-100
(1987) (reviewing Protocol I declarations); McDougal & Feliciano 525;NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 5.2 & n.7, 8.1.2.1;
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NWP 9A Annotated HI 5.2 & n.6, 8.1.2.1; San Remo Manual HH 39-42 & cmts.; Stone 352-53; Fenrick, The Rule, n.
III.623, 125 (questioning whether proportionality accepted as custom); Matheson, Remarks 426; Results of the First
Meeting ofthe Madrid Plan ofAction Held in Bochum, F.R.G., November 1989, 7 BSFHV 170-71 (1991); Schmidt, The
Protection, n. III.623, 233-38; Soli, Protection, n. III.623, 131; van Hegelsom, n. III.623, 18-19.
480. See n. 8 and accompanying text.
481. See n. 8 and accompanying text.
482. See nn. 4-5 and accompanying text.
483. Iran's attacks on the UAE Abu al-Bakoush oil installations and Kuwaiti facilities, besides lacking in
discrimination, proportionality and necessity, also violated UN Charter, art. 2(4). Charter law governed these
situations. See also UN Charter, art. 103; Protocol I, art. 2(b); Part B.l; n. 429 and accompanying text.
484. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; Protocol I, art. 2(b); see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and
accompanying text; Part B.l; n. 429 and accompanying text.
485. See n. 8 and accompanying text.
486. See n. 8 and accompanying text.
487. See nn. 300-27 and accompanying text. Presumably Protocol I's statement ofits being without prejudice to the
Cultural Property Convention includes the 1999 Second Protocol, when it is in force 3 months after 20 States ratify it.
The Second Protocol provides for relationships between it and the Convention but does not define relationships
between it and, e.g., Protocol I. See Second Protocol, arts. 2-4, 43. Interesting law of treaties analysis problems may
ensue.
488. See nn. 272-76 and accompanying text.
489. Protocol I, art. 53; Protocol II, art. 16 repeats general Protocol I, arts. 53(a)-53(b) prohibitions against attacks
on historic monuments, works ofart or places ofworship constituting the cultural or spiritual heritage ofpeoples, and
prohibiting use ofthem to support the military effort, without prejudice to the Cultural Property Convention. There is
no saving clause for other relevant international instruments as in Protocol I, art. 53, a curious omission, because even
ifthere were no such treaties when the Protocols were negotiated, there may be in the future, and incorporation might
avoid interpretation problems. See generally Vienna Convention, art. 30; nn. IV.455, VI.47 and accompanying text.
490. See nn. 403, 429-30 and accompanying text.
491. Netherlands Declaration, n. III.626, 714-15; UK Declaration, n. III.626, 717; NWP 1-14M Annotated H
8.5.1.6; NWP 9A Annotated H 8.5.1.6; 2 O'Connell, Law ofthe Sea 1 105; Toman 385-97; Solf, Protection, n. III.623,
1 33 ("it is not yet clear whether customary international law is as broad as article 53 seems to be"); see also n. 111.62 1 and
accompanying text.
492. Cultural Property Convention, art. 4(2); see also n. 315 and accompanying text.
493. Toman 389; see also id. 394-95.
494. Compare Protocol I, art. 52 with id., art. 53; see also nn. 468-70, 478-79 and accompanying text.
495. The Cultural Property Convention provides for transoceanic carriage of cultural property. See generally nn.
300-27 and accompanying text. The 1999 Second Protocol, arts. 1(f), 5-9, also speaks to the military necessity issue.
496. Protocol II, art. 14 is similar in theme to Protocol I, art. 54.
497. See nn. 403, 429-30 and accompanying text.
498. See Part V.E.
499. See nn. 502-03 and accompanying text.
500. Bothe el al. 336-42; Pilloud, Commentary 652-59 (arts. 54(l)-54(2) de legeferenda). The United States agrees
as to art. 54(1) but maintains art. 54(2) is lex lata but might in due course ripen into custom. NWP 1-14M Annotated 11
8.1.2 & n. 15; NWP9A Annotated H 8.1.2 & n. 15, citing inter alia US Department ofDefense General Counsel letter, n.
442, 1300; Matheson, Remarks 426; Solf, Protection, n. 111.623, 133 (art. 54 establishes substantially new principle not
yet custom).
501. See nn. 4-6 and accompanying text.
502. See n. 6 and accompanying text.
503. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 103; Protocol I, art. 2(b); see also Part B.l; n. 429 and accompanying text.
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504. Protocol I, art. 56(1). Protocol II, art. 15 repeats Protocol I, art. 56(1 )'s first sentence.
505. Belligerents must avoid locating military objectives in these installations' vicinity. Weapons used solely to
defend them cannot be a basis of attack. Civilians around these installations keep civilian protections. Protocol I, arts.
56(2)-56(3), 56(5).
506. Protocol I, art. 56(4). None of these qualifications appear in Protocol II.
507. Belgium Declaration, n. III.626, 707; Italy Declaration, n. III.626, 712; Netherlands Declaration, n. III.626,
714; UK Declaration, n. III.626, 717. For the effect of these declarations, see n. 621 and accompanying text.
508. Bothe et al. 353; Pilloud, Commentary 669.
509. Bothe et al. 348-57; Green 149-50; NWP 1-14M Annotated 1111 8.1.2 & n.14 (provision would create new law
and is militarily unacceptable to the United States), 8.5.1.7 & n.124; NWP 9A Annotated UU 8.1.2 & n.14 8.5.1.7 &
n.104 (same); Pilloud, Commentary 668-74; Matheson, Remarks All; but see Solf, Protection, n. III.623, 134 (art. 56
"differs little from customary . . . law.")
510. AFP 110-31 11 5-3(d); Green 149-50, 184; Bothe et al. 355-56; NWP 1-14M Annotated HH 8.5.1.7; NWP 9A
Annotated 11 8.5.1.7; Pilloud, Commentary 672, citing inter aha Protocol I, arts. 51, 57-58; Solf, Protection, n. III.623,
134 (art. 56 differs little from customary necessity, proportionality norms).
511. See nn. 403, 429 and accompanying text.
512. See nn. 430-31 and accompanying text.
513. See nn. 456-79 and accompanying text.
514. See n. 459 and accompanying text; see also Kalshoven, Prohibitions, n. 417, 106-07.
515. See nn. 4-5 and accompanying attack.
516. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 103; Protocol I, art. 2(b); see also Part B.l; n. 429 and accompanying text.
517. Neutralized and hospital zones are protected under the First and Fourth Conventions. See Part V.F.4; nn.
281-99 and accompanying text.
518. See Part V.F.4; nn. 281-99 and accompanying text; cf. Toman 393.
519. Protocol I, arts. 59-60, 62-63, 65; see also Bother al. 375-78, 380-85, 387-92, 400-03, 405-06; 410-15; Pilloud,
Commentary 697-98, 700-06, 708-16, 738-58, 770-78.
520. See nn. 295-96 and accompanying text.
521. Compare Protocol I, art. 59 with Hague IV, Regulations, art. 25; Hague IX, art. 1; see also 1899 Hague II,
Regulations, art. 25; Oxford Naval Manual, art. 27; Hague Air Rules, art. 24; Part V.G.I; nn. 231-42 and
accompanying text.
522. See nn. 238-42, 252 and accompanying text.
523. Bothe et al. 382.
524. NWP 1-14M Annotated H 85.1.3; NWP 9A Annotated H 8.5.1.3; Matheson, Remarks All. This parallels
customary rules for hospital and neutralized zones. See nn. 517, 520 and accompanying text.
525. NWP 1-14M Annotated H 11.3; NWP 9A Annotated 11 11.3; Matheson, Remarks All.
526. See n. 517 and accompanying text.
527. See Part V.F.4.
528. See nn. 297-99, 327 and accompanying text.
529. See nn. 468-69 and accompanying text.
530. UN Charter, art. 2(4), 103; Protocol I, an. 2(b).
531. Id., arts. 51, 103; Protocol I, art. 2(b).
532. Edgerton, n. 2, at 173; K.M. Kelly,Declaring War on the Environment: The Failure ofInternational Environmental
Treaties During the Persian Gulf War, 1 Am. U.J. Intl L. & Pol. 921, 929 (1992).
533. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 103.
534. Id.
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535. Id., arts. 51, 103.
536. Conventional Weapons Convention, preamble; Fragments Protocol; Mine Protocol; Incendiary Weapons
Protocol. See Toman 24-30; Burrus M. Carnahan, TheLaw ofLand Warfare: Protocol II to the United Nations Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons, 105 Mil. L. Rev. 73 (1984); Fenrick, Comment, New, n. III.627; Levie, Prohibitions,
n. III.627; Roach, Certain, n. III.627; Schmidt, Conventional, n. III.627. Conference ofStates Parties to Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects negotiated Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Mines,
Booby-Traps and other Devices (Protocol II) as Amended, May 3, 1996,— UST— , in 35 ILM 1209 (1996) (Amended
Mine Protocol) and Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), Oct. 13, 1995,— UST— , in 35 ILM 1218
(1996) (Laser Protocol). For analysis of and comments on negotiations on Amended Mine Protocol and Laser
Protocol, see generally Panel,/! Look at CurrentAction on the Conventional Weapons Convention of1980, 1996 ASIL Proc.
381.
537. Schindler & Toman 191-92.
538. See Levie, Prohibitions, n. III.627, 666; Protocol I, art. 35(3). The US Declaration, Apr. 8, 1982, in Schindler &
Toman 196, says prohibitions and restrictions in the Convention and its Protocols were "new contractual rules"
except provisions stating existing international law, and that these new rules would bind States only upon ratification
or accession to the Convention and consent to be bound by the Protocols. The US Declaration also says in part:
The United States . . . welcomes the adoption of this Convention, and hopes that all States will give the most
serious consideration to ratification or accession. We believe that the Convention represents a positive step . .
.
in efforts to minimize injury or damage to the civilian population in time ofarmed conflict. Our signature . .
reflects the general willingness of the United States to adopt practical and reasonable provisions
concerning . . . military operations, [to] . . . protect . . . noncombatants.
At the same time, we want to emphasize that formal adherence by States to agreements restricting the use of
weapons in armed conflict would be of little purpose if the parties were not firmly committed to taking every
appropriate step to ensure compliance with those restrictions after their entry into force. It would be the firm
intention of the United States and, we trust, all other parties to utilize the procedures and remedies provided
by this Convention, and by the general laws of war, to see to it that all parties to the Convention meet their
obligations under it. The United States strongly supported proposals by other countries during the
[negotiating] Conference to include special procedures for dealing with compliance matters, and reserves the
right to propose at a later date additional procedures and remedies, should this prove necessary, to deal with
such problems.
. .
.
[T]he United States . .
.
reserves the right, at . . . ratification, to exercise the option provided by article 4(3) of
the Convention, [which provides, 1342 UNTS 164-65, that ratifying countries may opt not to consent to be
bound by any Protocol, provided that the Depository, the UN Secretary-General pursuant to art. 10(1), id. at
167, is notified,] and to make statements of understanding and/or reservations, to the extent that it may
deem . .
.
necessary to ensure that the Convention and its Protocols conform to humanitarian and military
requirements. . .
.
See alsoNWP 1-14M Annotated H 9.7 n.44; NWP 9A Annotated 11 9.6 n.33; Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23, nn. III.621,
VI.268, 278 and accompanying text (reservations principles). China Declaration, Dec. 13,1981; Romania Declaration,
Apr. 8, 1982, Schindler & Toman 192, 195, may imply a view that the Convention and Protocols do not state
customary norms.
539. By 1998 there were 70 Convention parties, most of which had ratified all Protocols. TIF 464.
540. Conventional Weapons Convention, art. 8; see also Roach, Certain, n. III.627, 38-44; Schmidt, Conventional, n.
III.627, 312. The Conference produced Amended Mine Protocol and Laser Protocol, n. 536, now being ratified.
541. Conventional Weapons Convention, art. 1, noting applicability to situations in common article 2 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, i.e., First Convention, art. 2; Second Convention, art. 2; Third Convention, art. 2; Fourth
Convention, art. 2, and situations in Protocol I, art. 1(4) (armed conflict involving peoples' fights for
self-determination against colonial domination, alien occupation or racist regimes). See also Conventional Weapons
Convention, art. 7; Roach, Certain, n. III.627, 18-30; Schmidt, Conventional, n. III.627, 298-304. Fenrick, Comment,
New, n. III.627, 230, says the Convention does not apply to nuclear weapons or "weapons used exclusively against
targets at sea or in the air . . . " It is not clear from the Convention or its Protocols how his interpretation was derived;
art. 1 refers to all 1949 Geneva Conventions, and, as seen nn. 543-45, the Protocols to the Convention state limitations
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in application, e.g., for mine warfare; that aside, the Convention and Protocols seem to apply across the board. For
common article 2 analysis, see 1 Pictet 27-37; 2 id. 26-31; 3 id. 19-27; 4 id. 17-25. For Protocol I, art. 1(4) analysis, see
Bothe et al. 45-46; Pilloud, Commentary 41-56.
542. Fragments Protocol is a single sentence: "It is prohibited to use any weapon the primary effect of which is to
injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection by X-rays." It does not codify custom but develops
basic rules. Roach, Certain, n. III.627, 69. When the Protocol was drafted, it was accepted unanimously because no
negotiating State had such weapons or foresaw future use for them. Fenrick, Comment, New, n. III.627, 242; Levie,
Prohibitions, n. III.627, 654. These weapons were not used during the Tanker War. Laser Protocol, n. 536, arts. 1, 3, 35
ILM 1218, prohibits laser weapons specifically designed to blind permanently unenhanced vision; the prohibition
does not cover blinding as incidental or collateral effect of legitimate military use of laser systems.
543. Protecting civilians and UN, ICRC or other humanitarian missions or peacekeepers is its primary goal. Mine
Protocol, arts. 1, 8; Amended Mine Protocol, n. 536, arts. 1(1), 12,— UST— ,35 ILM 1209, 1213-15. See also Toman
28-29; Carnahan, The Law, n. 536, 76-77; Fenrick, Comment, New, n. III.627, 244-46; Schmidt, The Conventional, n.
III.627, 313.
544. See DOD Report, n. 11.8,213-21.
545. Mine Protocol, an. 2(1); Amended Mine Protocol, n. 536, art. 2(1),— UST — , 35 ILM 1209.
546. Carnahan, The Law, n. 536, 77-79; Fenrick, Comment, New, n. III.627, 244-45; Schmidt, The Conventional, n.
III.627, 315; see also Part V.G.I; nn. 456-69 and accompanying text.
547. Compare, e.g., Mine Protocol, arts. 2(4)-2(5), 3-4 (applying to mines, booby traps, "other devices"), with
Protocol I, arts 51(2), 51(4)-51(6), 52. See also Levie, Prohibitions, n. III. 627, 656-57. Mines are defined as
any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed to be detonated or
exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle, and "remotely delivered mine" means
any mine so defined delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar or similar means or dropped from an aircraft.
Mine Protocol, art. 2(1). Booby traps are defined as
any device or material . . . designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure and which functions unexpectedly
when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act.
Id., art. 2(2). "Other devices" are defined as
manually-emplaced munitions and devices designed to kill, injure or damage and . . . actuated by remote
control or automatically after a lapse of time.
Id., art. 2(3). Fenrick, Comment, New, n. III.627, 246, viewed the Mine Protocol as a "modest advance in the law;"
accord, Schmidt, The Conventional, n. III.627, 338.
548. Compare Amended Mine Protocol, n. 536, arts. 3(8)-3(9),— UST— , 35 ILM 1210, with Mine Protocol, arts.
2(4)-2(5), 3-4; Protocol I, art. 52(3). The definitions list has been expanded; see Amended Mine Protocol, an. 2,
— UST— , 35 ILM 1209-10.
549. Incendiary Weapons Protocol, art. 2, which does not restate customary law with respect to reprisals or
military objectives within a concentration of civilians. Fenrick, Comment, New, n. III.627, 249; Schmidt, 77t*
Conventional, n. HI.672, 342-44. Fourth Convention, art. 33 forbids using any weapons reprisals against enemy
civilians in occupied territory. Schmidt 342. The Fourth Convention commentary does not speak specifically of
incendiary reprisals, either. 4 Pictet 227-29.
550. NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 9.7 n.44; NWP 9A Annotated H 9.6 n.33; cf. Harlow & McGregor, n. Ill, 318;
Schmidt, The Conventional, n. III.627, 341. Some oppose using incendiaries against combatants; there was support for
this at the Incendiary Weapons Protocol negotiations. See Fenrick, Comment, New, n. III.627, 248.
551. Israel's attack on U.S.S. Liberty is a rare example. See James Ennes, Assault on the Liberty 67-68, 70, 81, 92,
152 (1980); Walter L. Jacobsen,/! JuridicalExamination ofthe IsraeliAttack on the USS Liberty, 36 Nav. L. Rev. 1 (1986).
Since Liberty was a warship, the Incendiary Weapons Protocol did not apply; it deals with attacks on civilians.
Neutrality, military objective, necessity and proportionality principles did, and Liberty, ifnot so disabled that it could
not return fire, could have exercised the right of self-defense. Other US forces also could have responded. Moreover,
the Protocol addresses LOAC situations, and Liberty's case was covered by the law ofself-defense. UN Charter, arts. 51,
103; Protocol I, art. 2(b); see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Part B.l; n. 429
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and accompanying text; Mallison & Mallison, Naval Targeting, n. III.262, 267. Israel agreed to pay for deaths and
injuries on Liberty and damage to the ship without admitting liability. See 58 Bulletin 799 (1968); 59 id. 473 (1969);
Agreement Concerning Claims Arising from Damage to United States Ship "Liberty," Dec. 17, 1980, Israel-US, 32
UST 4434, 1268 UNTS 33.
552. Compare Incendiary Weapons Protocol, arts. l(2)-2(3) with Mine Protocol, arts. 2(4)-2(5), 3(2)-3(4), 4(2) and
Protocol I, arts. 51(2), 51(4)-51(6), 52, 57(2). See also Toman 29; Fenrick, Comment, New, n. III.627, 249; Levie,
Prohibitions, n. III.627, 664-65, criticizing arts. 2(2), 2(3); Schmidt, The Conventional, n. III.627, 341-421; Part V.G.I;
nn. 464-83 and accompanying text. Harlow & McGregor, n. Ill, 318 probably refer to the Incendiary Weapons
Protocol's substantive provisions in saying it is not accepted as customary law.
553. Incendiary Weapons Protocol, art. 2(4). Id., arts. 1(3)-1(4) define "military objective" and "objective" in the
same language as Protocol I, art. 48. See nn. 456-63 and accompanying text.
554. Fenrick, Comment, New, n. III.627, 250; Schmidt, The Conventional, n. III.627, 345. Harlow & McGregor, n.
Ill, 318 say the forests provision does not represent customary law.
555. The low-water line is recognized as the mark from which the territorial sea is measured unless otherwise
provided. LOS Convention, art. 5; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 3. Traditional warships (e.g., destroyers, frigates)
cannot navigate that close to shore, except areas like the Bay ofFundy where tidal differences are great, but hovercraft
and small boats use only a few inches ofwater. Moreover, the Protocol protects forest cover from air, missile or shore
bombardment by vessels well outside these waters.
556. Compare Incendiary Weapons Protocol, art. 2(4)with Protocol I, art. 56; see also nn. 505-16 and accompanying
text.
557. Compare Incendiary Weapons Protocol, art. 2(4)with Protocol I, art. 35(3); ENMOD Convention, art 1(1). See
also Protocol I, art. 55; nn. 411-37, 504-16 and accompanying text.
558. See, e.g., n. 532 and accompanying text (Protocol I, art. 54).
559. Schindler & Toman 191-92, reporting that 28 countries ratifying the Convention had ratified the three
Protocols by 1987. The United States has ratified the Convention, and its Fragments and Mine Protocols but not the
Incendiary Weapons Protocol, maybe the only State in this status. See TIF 464.
560. The Convention cannot derogate from other principles ofinternational humanitarian law, i.e., norms stated
in custom. Conventional Weapons Convention, preamble, arts. 1-2, 7.
561. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; Protocol I, art. 2(b); see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and
accompanying text; Part B.l; n. 429 and accompanying text.
562. See n. 31 and accompanying text.
563. World Charter for Nature, n. 365, HH 5, 20 in 22 ILM 455, 457, 459 (1983), declaring that "Nature shall be
secured against degradation caused by warfare or other hostile activities"; "Military activities damaging to nature
shall be avoided," another "soft law" source. See n. 365.
564. The Summit closed June 14, 1992 and resulted in some nonbinding documents, inter aliaAgenda 21, UNDoc.
A/CONF.151/6/Rev. 1 (1992) (Agenda 21), in 31 ILM 876 (1992), an action plan for sustainable development to guide
national policies for this and the next century. See Edith Brown Weiss, Introductory Note, id. 814-15 (1992). Agenda 21
repeated points in the Stockholm Declaration, n. 53. Agenda 21's Principle 24, 31 ILM 880, said: "Warfare is
inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore respect international law providing
protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary."
Principle 26, id. 880, admonishes "States [to] resolve their environmental disputes peacefully and by appropriate
means in accordance with the Charter " Two treaties were signed: Framework Convention on Climate Change,
May 9, 1992,— UST— , in id. 849 (1992); Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992,— UST— , in id. 822
(1992). Birnie & Boyle 545 say the Summit Declaration on Environment and Development "can best be seen in part
as a codification of the subject," and as having gone "significantly beyond what could be achieved at Stockholm in
1972," where a similar conference produced, inter alia, the Stockholm Declaration. See nn. 11.62, VI.53 and
accompanying text.
565. Kuwait Regional Convention & Protocol, n. 11.63; Red Sea Convention, n. VI.55; see also nn. VI. 169-70,
185-206 and accompanying text.
566. Security Council resolutions bind UN Members ifstated as a "decision" under UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103;
the Council may also pass non-binding resolutions, and all General Assembly resolutions are non-binding. These
resolutions may reinforce preexisting customary or treaty law, however. See n. IV.57 and accompanying text; see also
Chapter III.
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567. See generally Walker, State Practice 122-23, 125-26, 128, 133-37, 141-44, 153-54, 158-67, describing impact, or
lack of it, of Council and Assembly actions for wars and confrontations at sea, 1945-90.
568. S.C. Res. 540 (1983); S.C. Res. 552 (1984), S.C. Res. 598 (1987), in Wellens 451, 454, 473.
569. See nn. 4-5 and accompanying text.
570. S.C. Res. 660-62, 664-67, 669-70, 674, 677-78 (1990), 686-87 (1991) in Wellens 527-42, referring inter alia to
the Fourth Convention, Geneva Gas Protocol, and, in S.C. Res. 687 to Iraq's liability for environmental damage.
Michael Bothe, Remarks, in Protection of the Environment 17, 18, viewed Resolution 687 as dealing with
aggression, cf. UN Charter, art. 2(4), and not the laws ofwar. See also San Remo Manual HI 1 16-19, 121-24, 135, 138-40,
146-49, 151-52.
571. S.C. Res. 678 (1990), incorporating by reference S.C. Res. 664-67, 670, 674 (1990),m Wellens 530-31, 534,540.
572. Cf. DOD Report, n. II.8, Appendix O.
573. S.C. Res. 687, in Wellens 542.
574. See n. 570 and accompanying text.
575. E.g., S.C. Res. 665, in Wellens 530.
576. S.C. Res. 687, in id. 542.
577. See nn. 300-52 and accompanying text.
578. ICJ Statute, arts. 38, 59; Restatement (Third) §§ 102-03; see also n. III. 10 and accompanying text.
579. UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103; see also n. IV. 57 and accompanying text.
580. Other Council actions, e.g., calls for action or recommendations, do not bind Members unless construed as a
decision under id. arts. 25, 48, 103. Nearly all General Assembly resolutions are non-binding, although they can
strengthen norms stated in them. See n. IV.57 and accompanying text.
581. See n. III. 10 and accompanying text.
582. See n. IV.57 and accompanying text.
583. See nn. 1-16 and accompanying text.
584. See n. 17 and accompanying text.
585. Accord, Fleck, Comments, n. 17, 532; Gasser, The Debate, n. 17, 524; Conrad Harper, Opening Address, in
Protection of the Environment 8, 13; LeGrand, n. 12, 30; McNeill, Protection, n. 2, 544; Moore, Concluding Remarks,
in Protection of the Environment 630-32; Morris, n. 17, 780; Roberts, Environmental Issues, n. 2, 258-59; Szasz,
Comment, n. 365, 280; contra, Verwey, n. 269, 572. Shearer, The Debate, n. 365, 554-55, suggests a Restatement
approach; de Guttry & Ronzitti, n. 11.210, 14, advocate "codification."
586. Seen. IV.3.
587. Cf. Robertson, Modern Technology, n. V.173, 7.
588. Walker, State Practice 190-91.
589. See Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.
590. See Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23; nn. III.621, VI.268 and accompanying text.
591. UN Charter, art. 2(2); Vienna Convention, art. 26; nn. III.934, IV.31, VI. 85 and accompanying text.
592. Cf. ICJ Statute, arts. 38, 59; Restatement (Third) §§ 102-03; n. III. 10 and accompanying text.
593. Exceptions may be treaties classified for security reasons. Restatement (Third) § 312 r.n.5; see also id. r.n.3,
referring to UN Charter, art. 102, which requires treaty registration before an agreement can be cited before a UN
organ.
594. See generally Walker, State Practice 190. Roach & Smith is a rare example of a government's position in one
source. The last complete digest ofUS practice, Whiteman, appeared over 25 years ago. The annual digest of practice
following Whiteman ends with 1979, with partial publication of the 1980-88 series since then.
595. San Remo Manual, Introduction to the Cmts. 62.
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596. Robertson submitted this as a paper to the International Institute of Humanitarian Law Round Table
considering the relationship between the LOS and the law of naval warfare; it was later published as a Newport Paper
and in Moore & Turner; the last version is cited. See Robertson, New LOS 302-03 & n.l.
597. San Remo Manual 11 34.
598. LOS Convention, art. 87; High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also Part IV.B.l; n.l 10 and accompanying text.
599. Robertson, New LOS 302 & n.207.
600. Compare id. with San Remo Manual HH 12 (where neutrals have sovereign rights, jurisdiction, other rights
under general international law, belligerents must have due regard for those neutrals' legitimate rights and duties
when carrying out operations; no qualification as Robertson, New LOS 302 recommended), 34 (requiring
belligerents' due regard for neutral coastal States' EEZ, continental shelf rights, duties, including those States'
obligations toward the marine environment, and particularly due regard for artificial islands, etc., established by
neutrals; qualified by other rules of LOAC), 36 (due regard for neutrals' exploring, exploiting seabed, ocean floor
resources beyond national jurisdiction; no qualification as Robertson 302 recommended), 88 (minelaying
belligerents must pay due regard to legitimate high seas uses by inter alia providing safe alternate routes for neutral
shipping; no qualification as Robertson 302 recommended), 106(c) (in declaring exclusion zones, belligerents must
exercise due regard for neutrals' rights to legitimate ocean uses; no qualification as Robertson 302 recommended). See
also id. H 37 (belligerents must "take care" to avoid damaging cables, pipelines on the seabed that do not exclusively
serve other belligerents; no qualification as Robertson 302 recommended). The IIHL group rejected "respect" for the
environment and others' LOS rights; "respect" is often used in humanitarian law treaties; the Manual wished to
preserve this distinction. San Remo Manual 11 44, cmts. 44.6-44.10; Fleck, Comment, n. 17, 530.
601. See, e.g., San Remo Manual 11 3 & cmts., noting the Manual is primarily concerned withes in hello, the
LOAC, and notjus ad helium, with which, e.g., UN Charter, arts. 51, 103 is concerned.
602. San Remo Manual HU 34 & cmts., 34.2, 34.4; 35 & cmts. 35.2-35.4; 44 & cmts. 44.6-44.10.
603. Id. H 11 (italics in original); this accords with the first alternative proposed by Diederich, n. 17, 156.
604. San Remo Manual U 11, cmts. 11.1-11.7, citing inter alia LOS Convention, arts. 192, 194.
605. San Remo Manual II 44; accord, Diederich, n. 17, 158; compare similar provisions in Protocol I, arts. 35(1),
35(2), 51(4), 51(5), 57.
606. San Remo Manual 1111 47(a), 48-50.
607. See Geneva Gas Protocol; using chemical and biological weapons, subject to a no-first-use rule, also violates
customary law. Depending on agents employed, chemical and biological weapons can degrade many aspects of the
environment. See nn. 268-71 and accompanying text.
608. San Remo Manual H 35, in id., Part II, Regions of Operations.
609. Id. 11 1 1, cmt. ll.l; see also id. 11 44, cmt. 44.4.
610. See id. H 11, cmt. 11.1; 11 44, cmt. 44.4, citing the LOS Convention; ENMOD Convention; Protocol I, arts.
35(3), 55.
611. San Remo Manual 11 10 preserves the distinction while recognizing the place of the continental shelfand the
EEZ; see also Robertson, New LOS 274 (three divisions, internal waters, territorial waters [territorial sea], high seas).
612. For LOS and LOAC rights and obligations in these areas at stake in the Tanker War, see generally Chapters IV
andV.
613. See generally LOS Convention, Part XI as modified by the Boat Agreement, declaring the Area, the deep
seabed beyond the continental shelf, as part of the common heritage ofhumankind; see also n. IV.3 and accompanying
text.
614. San Remo Manual 11 36. See also id. H 12. Id. H 12, cmt. 12.1 says:
Although it was recognized that the most crucial areas where [the interface of belligerent operations and
neutrals' rights] might occur would be in the [EEZ] or the continental shelf, a consensus [of IIHL
participants] developed that the principle should be stated in general terms and for all areas, regardless of
whether neutral rights were based on jurisdictional claims (for example, [EEZ], continental shelf) or
universal rights flowing from the general law ofthe sea (for example, the high seas). Such rights also included
those involving activities in the "Area" [as defined by LOS Convention, Part XI] [S]ome States had not
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formally claimed [EEZs] but may have established exclusive fishery zones or the like. [San Remo Manuali H
12 reflects this consensus.
Thus the Manual does cover these areas, perhaps obliquely, as in the case of contiguous zones, presumably if they are
"like" exclusive fishery zones. The relationship with the Area Authority is not clear. Presumably reference to the
Convention, Part XI would include subsequent protocols such as the Boat Agreement, n. IV.3. However, the Manual
intends that the due regard formula apply across the board for the relationship between the law of naval warfare and all
ocean areas recognized by the law ofthe sea, whether in the LOS Convention, the 1958 LOS conventions or customary
law. Therefore, in situations the Manual does not cover, those following it should accord due regard to environmental
concerns wherever occurring on the ocean, unless there is specific law to the contrary.
615. San Remo Manual, Introduction to the Commentaries 64; see also Part V.G.I.
616. This kind ofomission was a shortcoming ofthe Oxford NavalManual. Verri, Commentary, n. IV.7 1,339-40.
617. San Remo Manual, Introduction to the Commentaries 67-68, referring to id. IIU 3-9; see also n. 589 and
accompanying text.
618. San Remo Manual, Introduction to the Commentaries 68, referring to id. H 13(d)&cmts. 13.11-13.14; seealso
Walker, Maritime Neutrality 142-48.
619. San Remo Manual, Introduction to the Commentaries 68, referring to id. IW 38-111; see also Part V.G.I.
620. San Remo Manual, Introduction to the Commentaries 69, referring to id. 1111 105-08; see also Part V.F.2.
621. San Remo Manual, Introduction to the Commentaries 69, referring to id. 11 11 14-37.
622. Id., Introduction to the Commentaries 69, referring to, e.g., IM 53-58, 62-66, 70-77, 112-13, 115-18, 125-34,
141-45, 1 53-68, 174-80. The Manual does not address air operations and land targets, except for general principles and
rules of humanitarian law, e.g., targeting. See also Part V.G.I.
623. ENMOD Convention, art. 1, cited in San Remo Manual 11 44, cmt. 44.4; see also nn. 353-400 and
accompanying text.
624. UN Charter, art. 103; see also Part B.l; nn. IV. 10, 57 and accompanying text.
625. See Part B.l.
626. International Committee of the Red Cross, Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the
Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict (1994) (ICRC Guidelines), in NWP 1-14M Annotated,
Annex 8A-1.
627. Id. 1111 8-20, in NWP 1-14M Annotated H, 8-21-33, citing these agreements related to international armed
conflict; Hague IV, Regulations, arts. 1, 23(g); Hague VIII; ENMOD Convention, arts. 1-2; Fourth Convention, arts.
1, 53, 63(2), 144, 146-47; Cultural Property Convention; Protocol I, arts. 1(1), 35(3)-36, 51(4)-51(5), 52, 54-56, 61-67,
83, 86-87; Mine Protocol; Incendiary Weapons Protocol. Chapters W-Vlpassim have discussed all of these treaties and
others, e.g., Roerich Pact. Some treaties are not in force for some countries, e.g., Protocol I for the United States, and
some provisions the Guidelines cite are not recognized as customary law by some countries.
628. ICRC Guidelines, n. 626, H 4, at 8-30.
629. Id. 11 5, at 8-30.
630. Id. H 7, at 8-31, reflecting language in humanitarian law treaties' Martens clauses; see also, e.g., First
Convention, art. 63; Second Convention, art. 64; Third Convention, art. 142; Fourth Convention, art. 158; Protocol I,
art. 1(2); nn. 255, 293, 402, 450 and accompanying text.
631. See nn. 111.938-51, IV.29-30, VI.83-84 and accompanying text.
632. E.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. III.953-67, 10-25 and
accompanying text; Part B.2.b.
633. LOS Convention, arts. 237, 31 1 ; see also Parts IV.A.2, VI.B.2.a.
634. ICRC Guidelines, n. 626, II 1, at 8-30 refers to armed conflict, and all cited treaties deal withjus in hello, i.e., the
LOAC. Unlike San Remo Manual H11 3-9, which recognize the possibility of applying different rules forjus ad helium,
see n. 647 and accompanying text, the Guidelines are only concerned with protection of the environment and the
LOAC.
635. Compare ICRC Guidelines, n. 626with NWP 1-14M Annotated 11 8.1.3, citing inter alia UN General Assembly
Resolutions A/47/37 (1992), A/49/50 (1994). NWP 9A Annotated has no comparable provision.
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636. See NWP 1-14M Annotated IH 4.3.2-4.3.2.1; compare NWP 9A Annotated Ml 4.3.2-4.3.2.1.
637. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; Protocol I, art. 2(b); see also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and
accompanying text; Part B.l; n. 429 and accompanying text.
638. UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying text.
639. Jus cogens overrides treaties and custom, two primary sources of international law. See n. III. 10 and
accompanying text.
640. See nn. 231-42, 268-71 and accompanying text.
641. See nn. 340-47 and accompanying text.
642. Impossibility ofperformance, fundamental change ofcircumstances or armed conflict are among reasons for
claiming suspension during war. Vienna Convention, arts. 61-62; see also nn. III.928-29, 938-51; IV.26-28, 29;
VI.80-81 and accompanying text.
643. Waters landward ofbaselines establishing the territorial sea are subject to coastal State sovereignty; the LOS
does not govern for internal waters pollution except ship pollution. See generally LOS Convention, arts. 2(1), 7(3),
8(2)-9, 10(4), 18(1), 25(2), 27(2), 27(5), 28(3), 35(a), 50, 111(1), 21 1(3), 218; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1,5, 7(4), 8,
13, 14(2), 16(2), 19(2), 20(3); Part IV.B.4.
644. See Part B.2.a.
645. See n. IV.3 and accompanying text.
646. See Part B.2.c(II).
647. See nn. 596-600 and accompanying text.
648. E.g., Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol, n. 11.63, a product oftheUN Environmental Programme; see
also Part B.2.c(III).
649. See, e.g., Frank M. Snyder, Introduction, in SoundMilitary Decision (1992); George K. Walker, Sea Power an
d
theLaw ofthe Sea: The Needfor a ContextualApproach, 7 ODIL 299 (1979), 83 Mil. L. Rev. 131 (1979), 30 NWC Rev. 88
(No. 4, 1978).
650. See, e.g., Part V.A.3.
651. Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws (1971 & 1995 Supp.) (Restatement (Second), Conflicts).
652. Other categories of jurisdiction recognized by Restatement (Third) besides prescriptive jurisdiction (also
known as legislative or regulatory jurisdiction or jurisdiction to prescribe), are jurisdiction to adjudicate (also known
as judicial jurisdiction) and defined as a State's authority to subject particular persons or things to its judicial process,
and jurisdiction to enforce (occasionally stated as executive jurisdiction), or a State's authority to use governmental
resources to induce or compel compliance with that State's law. Restatement(Third) § 401 & Introductory Note to Part
IV, 231. Restatement (Second), Conflicts, n. 657, § 6 is an analogous approach to the problem of prescriptive
jurisdiction for conflict of laws, i.e., private international law, among the 50 states of the United States. Id. chs. 3-4
offers a more elaborate analysis of judicial jurisdiction than does Restatement (Third) § 421.
653. Restatement (Third) § 402 enumerates these bases of jurisdiction to prescribe:
Subject to [Restatement (Third)] § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its
territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory;
and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the
security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests.
This recitation of bases of prescriptive jurisdiction is similar to that of Restatement (Second) §§ 7, 17-18, 40 and
concerned with transnational assertions of the right to prescribe national standards of conduct outside a prescribing
State's borders. These jurisdictional bases have also been labeled as territorial jurisdiction, events occurring within
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the territory of the prescribing State; sometimes "floating territorial jurisdiction" with respect to jurisdiction over
events aboard ships, aircraft and spacecraft registered by the prescribing State; objective territorial jurisdiction (the
"effects" doctrine), concerned with acts outside the territory of the prescribing State that have impact within that
State; jurisdiction based on nationals of a prescribing State; jurisdiction based on nationality of the victim (passive
personality); the protective principle, i.e., prescribing norms ofconduct related to a prescribing State's vital interests.
See generally Restatement (Third) § § 402, cmts. a-h; 502(2) & cmt. d. The ensuing analysis is more concerned with the
rule ofreasonableness to which these bases are subject; see Restatement(Third) § 402. Id. § 403(1) declares these rules
of reasonableness as limitations on jurisdiction to prescribe:
. . . Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to
prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of
such jurisdiction is unreasonable.
Id. § 403(2) supplies examples of factors of reasonableness:
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is determined by evaluating all
relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the activity
takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the
territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state
and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those
whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state,
the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of
such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Analogous reasonableness factors are the heart of the proposed analysis to expand on the "due regard" rubric in the
LOS Convention and the San Remo Manual. Restatement (Third) § 403(3) adds that when it would not be
unreasonable for each of two States to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction, but the prescriptions are in conflict, "each
state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the
relevant factors, including those set out in Subsection (2); a state should defer to the other state ifthat state's interest is
clearly greater." This principle of deference also has utility in the ensuing analysis.
654. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d 909, 948-53 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Reinsurance Co. ofAmerica v. Administrata Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1283-84 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook,
J., concurring); Robert H. Bork, Introduction, 18 Stan. J. Int*l L. 241, 244 (1982); Stephen B. Burbank, The World in
OurCourts, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1456, 1463-64(1991); Eleanor J. Fox, Extraterritoriality, Antitrust, and the New Restatement:
Is Reasonableness the Answer?, 19 N.Y.U.J. Intt. L. & Pol. 565, 592-93 (1987); David I. Gerber, Beyond Balancing:
International Law Restraints on the Reach ofNational Laws, 10 Yale J. Int'l L.185, 208 (1984); James M. Grippando,
Declining to Exercise Extraterritorial Antitrust Jurisdiction on Grounds ofInternational Comity: An Illegitimate Extension of
theJudicialAbstention Doctrine, 23 VJIL 395,400 n.22 (1983); Steven A. Kadish, Comity and the InternationalApplication
of the Sherman Act: Encouraging Courts to Enter the Political Arena, 4 Nw. J. Int'L L. & Bus. 130, 156-66 (1982); Larry
Kramer, Extraterritorial Application ofAmerican Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld
and Trimble, 89 AJIL 750, 755 (1995); Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 Am. J.
Comp. L. 579 (1983); Karl M. Meessen, Conflicts ofJurisdiction Under the New Restatement, 50 L. & Contemp. Probs. 47,
53-69 (No. 3, 1987); James A. Rahl, International Application ofAmerican Antitrust Laws: Issues and Proposals, 2 Nw. J.
Int*l L. & Bus. 336, 362-64 (1980); Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of
Restatement Section 403, 89 AJIL 53 (1995); Michael G. McKinnon, Comment, Federal Judicial and Legislative
Jurisdiction Over Entities Abroad: The Long-Arm of US Antitrust Law and Viable Solutions Beyond the
Timberlane/Restatement Comity Approach, 21 Pepp. L. Rev. 1219, 1300-11 (1994); Note, Beyond the Rhetoric of
Comparative Interest Balancing: An Alternative Approach to Extraterritorial Discovery Conflicts, 50 L. & Contemp. Probs.
95, 101 (No. 3, 1987).
655. E.g., Boudreau v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849, 853-56 (N.C. 1988); Eugene F. Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict
of Laws §2.14 (2d ed. 1992).
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656. See Restatement (Third) § 403 r.n.6, citing inter alia Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d
597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976), opin. after remand, 747 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,
595 F.2d 1287, 1297-99 (3d Cir. 1979). The Restatement (Second) had espoused a similar approach. See id. § 40 r.n.l,
citing inter alia United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.Supp. 835, 878 (D.N.J. 1953). A difference between the
Restatement (Third) § 403 and Restatement (Second) § 40 is that the former "is understood . . . not as a basis for
requiring states to modify their enforcement of laws that they are authorized to prescribe [essentially the position of
Restatement (Second) § 40], but as an essential element in determining whether, as a matter of international law, the
state may exercise jurisdiction to prescribe." Restatement (Third) § 403 r.n.10. The ensuing analysis is closer to the
Restatement (Second) and its intellectual debt to Restatement (Second), Conflicts, n. 65 1 than to the Restatement
(Third), although the latter's more elaborate articulation of factors is more helpful.
The Supreme Court of the United States has never passed on the Restatement (Third) analysis. In re Insurance
Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 933-34 (9th Cir.1991) applied Timberlane factors, but the Supreme Court of the United
States found no conflict between US antitrust law and UK law and therefore no need to pronounce whether a factorial
test was appropriate for resolving conflicts of prescriptive jurisdiction. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 US
764, 797-99 (1993); compare similar analysis in British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, Ltd., 1985 A.C. 58, 78-86, 95-96
(H.L.). For Hartford Fire analysis, see, e.g., Roger P. Alford, The ExtraterritorialApplication ofAntitrust Laws:A Postscript
on Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 34 VJIL 213 (1993); Case Two: ExtraterritorialApplication of United States
Law Against United States andAlien Defendants, in Symposium, Conference on Jurisdiction, Justice, and Choice ofLawfor
the Twenty-First Century, 29 New Eng. L. Rev. 517, 577 (1995); Kramer, n. 654; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict,
Balancing ofInterests, and the Exercise ofJurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 AJIL 42
(1995); Low enfeld, International Litigation and the Questfor Reasonableness, 245 RCADI 9, 49-58 (1994); Trimble, n.
654; McKinnon, n. 654.
657. E.g., Oil Shipping (Bunkering) B.V. v. Sonmez Denizcilik VE Ticaret A.S., 10 F.3d 1015, 1019-20 (3d Cir.
1993), citing Restatement (Second), Conflicts, n. 651; Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 US 571 (1953). This is not surprising,
because Restatement (Second), Conflicts drafters relied on inter alia Lauritzen and Romero v. International Term.
Op. Co., 358 US 354 (1959) for choice oflaw principles for torts. Restatement (Second), Conflicts § 145 & cmts. b-d,
r.n., referring to id. § 6. Neely v. Club Med Mgt. Serv., Inc., 63 F.3d 166, 186-98 (3d Cir. 1995) {en banc) applied
Restatement (Third) factors in a Jones Act and general maritime law context, also citing inter alia Lauritzen. Federal
courts, sitting in admiralty under 28 USC. § 1333(1), must apply federal choice oflaw rules. Schoenbaum § 18-1 1. The
federal common law ofconflict oflaws governs unless supplanted by federal legislation or a treaty ofthe United States.
The Second Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 USC § 2370(e)(2) is an example of the former, partly superseding Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 US 398 (1964). Convention for Unification ofCertain Rules Relating to Salvage of
Vessels at Sea, Sept. 23, 1910, art. 15, 37 Stat. 1658, 1672 is an example of treaty-dictated choice oflaw principles. This
illustrates the point ofRestatement (Second), Conflicts § 6(1), that statutes, and by extension treaties establishing
choice of law principles, displace common law factorial analysis in US conflicts analysis involving federal law. US
Const., art. VI requires the courts of the states of the Union to apply federal conflicts principles, including treaties,
when adjudicating federal law issues.
658. Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws § 2.2.3, 74-75 (2d ed. 1995); Gregory E. Smith, Choice ofLaw in the United
States, 38 Hastings L.J. 1041, 1169-79 (1987).
659. E.g., British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., [1953] 1 Ch. 19,finaljudgment, [1955] 1 Ch. 37;
Otto Kahn-Freund, English Contracts and American Anti-Trust Law— The Nylon Patent Case, 18 Mod. L. Rev. 65
(1955); Meessen,n. 654.
660. This is particularly true in the European Union. Wood Pulp Case, Case 89/85, [1988] E.C.R. 5193; see also
Restatement (Third) § 41 5, r.n.9. Nevertheless, these countries' and others' blocking or clawback statutes and others
represent contrary policy in recognizing extraterritorial effect of US multiple damages awards, particularly in
antitrust cases, and reach ofUS discovery requests abroad. See generally British Airways, n. 656 (Lord Diplock, J.); Rio
Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] A.C. 547; Restatement (Third) § 442, r.n.4; A.V. Lowe,
Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 75 AJIL 257 (1981).
661. See nn. 654-46 and accompanying text.
662. This is the approach required in the US military planning process, which has been in operation over a
century. Undoubtedly other States use similar decisionmaking. Diederich, n. 17, 160, argues for environmental
planning in the context of military operations planning. NWP 1-14M Annotated 1111 8.1.3 directs this; see also n. 649
and accompanying text.
663. See n. 1 1 1 and accompanying text.
664. US Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations 20-22 (Apr. 1995), in 34 ILM 1080, 1 102-04 (1995).
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665. Id. 10-11, 34 ILM 1092-93, chinginteralia NAFTA, n. III.949 and treaties with the European Union and other
major US trading partners; see also nn. III. 949, IV.22, VI. 76 and accompanying text.
666. Practice under multilateral and bilateral treaties with the same or similar terms can lead to custom. Brownlie,
International Law 5; 1 Oppenheim § 10, 28; Restatement (Third) § 102(3).
667. See nn. 654-55 and accompanying text.
668. LOS Convention, art. 91(1); High Seas Convention, art. 5(1), declaring in identical terms that there must be a
genuine link between a flag State and a ship. See also Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, n. 11.61 ; Part
V.C.3. Since the LOS Convention's navigational articles and the High Seas Convention are generally thought to be
declaratory of customary international law, this provision, implicating use of a factorial analysis not unlike that of
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 US 571 (1953) and similar cases, argues for its use in other maritime contexts. See n. IV. 3 and
accompanying texts. On the other hand, it might be submitted that the holding of S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No.
10, at 12-32 argues against it, i.e., that the law of the flag is the only concern. See LOS Convention, art. 97; High Seas
Convention, art. 11; see also Convention for Codification of Certain Rules Relating to Penal Matters in Matters of
Collision or Other Incidents of Navigation, May 10, 1952, arts. 1-2, 439 UNTS 233, 235-37. Lotus and these treaties
dealt with States' applying municipal law to conduct aboard ships flying other flags on the high seas in the absence of
an international norm; what is at stake here is a technique of analysis, not extraterritorial reach of laws. LOAC
customary rules, e.g., the flag a neutral merchantman flies is primafacie indication of a ship's nationality, or that a ship
flying an enemy flag is conclusive of its enemy character, are also of no consequence in this context. See generally Part
V.D.I. As with the LOS and rules governing collisions at sea, these principles concern rights of visit, search, diversion
and capture and destruction of merchant ships and do not reject a factorial approach. See Part V.B.
669. See Restatement (Second) Conflicts, n. 651 § 6(1), requiring a court, subject to constitutional restrictions, to
follow its own state's statutory directive on choice of law; see also Robertson, New LOS 302-03. Uniform Commercial
Code § 1-105 is a typical, and commonplace, example in the United States; all but one of the states have enacted it.
Judge Weis' Mannington Mills opinion, 595 F.2d 1297-99, lists a relevant treaty as a factor to be considered, but it is not
clear whether the treaty would govern over all factors if the treaty prescribed choice of law.
670. UN Charter, art. 103, declares that if there is conflict between Members' Charter obligations and obligations
under other international agreements, Charter obligations prevail. This applies to Member obligations under
Security Council decisions pursuant to id., arts. 25, 48. Art. 103's rule is analogous to US Const., art. VI. The
Constitution, US treaties and federal legislation prevail over laws of the states of the United States. The same is true in
conflict of laws, or private international law; states' conflicts principles, whether in statute or case law, are subject to
the Constitution. See generally Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 US 717 (1988); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts,472 US 797
(1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 US 302 (1981). Restatement (Second), Conflicts, n. 651 § 6(1) recognizes the
Constitution's primacy; this heirarchy is proposed by analogy for public international law issues, i.e., first applying
the Charter and;ws cogens, and secondarily treaties or custom, with a factorial approach used only ifnone ofthese recite
rules.
671. See n. III. 10 and accompanying text.
672. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103 ; see also nn. III. 10, 47-630,916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Part B.l.
673. Analysis proceeds under the simplest model, i.e., two States in bilateral confrontation; if it is a multilateral
situation, analysis might proceed by analogy to treaty reservation rules. See Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23; nn.
III.621, VI.268 and accompanying text.
674. LOS Convention, arts. 21(1X0, 21(2)-21(4); see also Part IV.B.4.
675. Cf. LOS Convention, art. 197; see also Part B.2.c(III).
676. ICJ Statute, arts. 38, 59; Restatement (Third) §§ 102-03; see also n. III. 10. Treaties might be subject to
analysis under impossibility ofperformance or fundamental change ofcircumstances, e.g., ifthere is a natural disaster
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accompanying text.
677. UN Charter, art. 103; n. III. 10 and accompanying text.
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accompanying text.
682. UN Charter, art. 103; nn. III. 10 and accompanying text.
683. See n. 588 and accompanying text.
684. See n. III.874 and accompanying text.
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VI.268 and accompanying text.
688. UN Charter, art. 103; see also n. III. 10 and accompanying text.
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694. San Remo Manual 5.
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651-68 and accompanying text.
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self-defense as part ofan inherent right ofindividual and collective self-defense; see UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also
nn. 111.10,47-630, 916-18,968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Parts B.l, B.2.c(III); n. 163 and accompanying text.
A right of anticipatory self-defense to major environmental threats tends to confirm a right of anticipatory
self-defense to threats to a State's right to territorial integrity and political independence, confirmed by art. 2(4), in
that ifaffirmative action against a major environmental threat has received such widespread acceptance, anticipatory
action is proper if a State protects much more than the environment, i.e., political existence and freedom under art.
2(4), that Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 100, held customary law approaching the character ofjus cogens. See also n. III. 10
and accompanying text.
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and accompanying text.
699. Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23; see also nn. III.621, VI.268 and accompanying text.
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713. See nn. 11.239-40 and accompanying text.
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715. See nn. 11.250-59, 376-78 and accompanying text.
716. See nn. 11.210-15 and accompanying text.
717. See nn. 185-206 and accompanying text.
718. Vienna Convention, arts. 61-62; see also nn. 111.928-29, 938-51; IV.26-27, 29; VI.80-81, 83 and accompanying
text.
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723. Vienna Convention, arts. 61-62; see also nn. 111.928-29, 938-51; IV.26-27, 29-30; VI.80-84.
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734. See nn. 583-94 and accompanying text.
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(1948), are the core of this body of law. Cf. Restatement (Third), Introductory Note to Part VII. The United States is
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Convention. TIF 377-78, 382-83.
736. E.g., European Convention for Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
UNTS 221; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 id. 123; African Charter on Human &
Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, in 21 ILM 58 (1982) (Banjul Charter).
737. See, e.g., A.A. Cancdo Trinidade, The Contribution of International Human Rights Law to Environmental
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Rights Norms, 3 Georgetown Int*l Envt'l L. Rev. 85 (1990); Alexandre Kiss,/1« Introductory Note on aHuman Right to
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Note, International Human Rights Law and the Earth: The Protection ofIndigenous Peoples and the Environment, 31 VJIL
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internationally recognized human rights." Restatement (Third) § 702.
739. E.g., Convention Concerning Liability of Shipowner in Case of Sickness, Injury or Death of Seamen (ILO
Convention No. 55), Oct. 24, 1936, 54 Stat. 1693,40 UNTS 169, held by Warren v. United States, 340 US 523 (1951) as
coinciding with US admiralty law maintenance, cure and wages standards. The United States has been a member of
ILO, another UN specialized agency, for all but three years. TIF 394; Note, U.S. Assaults ILO, 65 AJIL 136 (1977). See
also Birnie & Boyle 56-57.
740. Defrenne v. SABENA, 1976 E. Comm. J. Rep. 455, 473-76; Symposium, The Emerging European Constitution,
1978 ASIL Proc. 166, 169 (Eric Stein remarks).
741. See nn. III.948, IV.30, VI.84 and accompanying text.
742. E.g., Civil & Political Rights Covenant, art. 4, limiting applicability to circumstances stated in id., arts. 6-7,
8(l)-8(2), 1 1, 15-16, 18; European Convention for Protection ofHuman Rights & Fundamental Freedoms, n. 736, art.
15, 213 UNTS 232-34, excluding application "during war or public emergency" except arts. 3, 4(1), 7, id. 227; see also
Subatra Roy Chowdhury, Rule of Law in a State of Emergency 12-13, 22-29, 59, 121-25, 210-11(1989) (analyzing
International Law Association Minimum Standards ofHuman Rights Norms in a State of Emergency [1984]); Joan
Fitzpatrick, Protection Against Abuse of the Concept of "Emergency," in Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next
Century 203 (Am. Socy Int'L L. Stud, in Transnatl Pol., Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds. 1994);
Henkin, InternationalHuman Rights as "Rights," 1 Cardozo L. Rev. 446-47 (1979). Legality ofThreat or Use ofNuclear
Weapons, 1996(1) ICJ 239-40, observed
that the protection ofthe [Civil & Political Covenant] . . . does not cease in times ofwar, except by operation of
Article 4 ofthe Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency.
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This analysis would seem to apply if a right to a clean environment is considered a human right, an issue the case did
not address in the majority opinion.
743. E.g., Banjul Charter, n. 736. The Genocide Convention does not have a derogation clause; its background
emphasizes that it, like the humanitarian law treaties, applies in all places and at all times. See nn. III.948, IV.30, VI. 84,
278 and accompanying text.
744. See UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; Protocol I, art. 2(b); Vienna Convention, arts. 61-62; see also nn. III. 10, 47-630,
916-18, 928-29, 938-5 1 , 968-84, IV.6-27, 29-30 and accompanying text; Part B. 1 ; nn. 80-84, 429 and accompanying text.
745. Some have already begun to advocate animal rights. See Birnie & Boyle 422-24.
746. See generally Part B.3.a.(III)(B).
747. See nn. 16-18 and accompanying text.
Chapter VII
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND
APPRAISAL: POLICY AND LAW
The Tanker War is important for many reasons. For the belligerents, Iran and
Iraq, it represented the maritime aspects of total war. For neutral Persian
Gulf States the war was a major if not a dominant factor. Other neutral countries,
e.g., the United States, at first treated the conflict as a policy matter, e.g., by pro-
claiming the need to maintain freedom of the seas and free access through the
Strait ofHormuz, although they may have had naval or other forces in the area on
routine or special operations. By the war's end in 1988, however, many countries,
including the United States, were involved in the conflict in direct military action,
e.g., convoying, accompanying or escorting neutral merchantmen, or indirectly
through mine clearance and similar operations, as well as continuing statements of
policies of freedom of the seas and the right of straits passage. States aligned with
the belligerents, e.g., some Gulf countries, Arab League members, and other na-
tions, e.g., much ofWestern Europe, the USSR and the United States, dependent
on Gulf oil or concerned with law of the sea, self-defense and law ofarmed conflict
issues, became increasingly involved politically and economically. In some in-
stances involvement came through individual States' actions, and in other cases
through collective statements or actions through intergovernmental organiza-
tions, e.g., the Arab League, the European Economic Community, the formerly
moribund Western European Union, or the Group of Seven. Gulf States formed
the GulfCooperation Council initially for internal security; the GCC assumed an
economic and national security posture as the war continued. The Cold War-
gridlocked UN Security Council also became increasingly involved as the Tanker
War continued, passing resolutions condemning belligerents' deprivations of
high seas freedoms, violations of the LOAC, and continuation of the war in gen-
eral. The war ended with Iran's accepting Council Resolution 598, establishment
ofUNIIMOG to supervise a ceasefire, and neutrals' individual and collective ef-
forts to clear the Gulf of mines.
Although some commentators date the Tanker War from 1982 or perhaps 1984
when belligerents' interceptions ofand attacks on merchant ships accelerated, the
war at sea actually began with the initial land battles in 1980 near the Shatt al-Arab
when 70+ merchantmen were bottled up in the Shatt. The belligerents' exclusion
zone proclamations and attempts to route neutral traffic came soon thereafter. By
1988 seafaring countries had suffered major tonnage losses in their merchant
fleets, particularly tankers, but a worldwide glut of available bulk petroleum
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carriers partly offset these losses. The number of ships lost, or declared construc-
tive total losses, was relatively low because ofmerchant ships' growth in size since
World War II. Nevertheless, more merchant mariners lost their lives during
1980-88 than at any time since that War; again, the number was low because of
smaller-sized merchant crews on most ships. Iraqi attacks on Iran's Nowruz facili-
ties produced a major oil spill in the Gulf; spills probably also resulted from
belligerents' attacks on other enemy facilities and neutral countries' shoreside pe-
troleum production or pumping facilities. Undoubtedly oil slicks resulted from
belligerents' attacks on merchantmen or after neutral navies responded in self-de-
fense to belligerents' maritime attacks.
Chapter II discusses these developments in more detail. And while Chapter III
analyzes the Tanker War in the context of self-defense and other aspects of thejus
adbellum under the UN Charter, and Chapters IV (LOS issues), V (LOAC issues)
and VI (law ofthe maritime environment) analyze LOS and;ws in hello (i.e., LOAC)
problems during the war, a summary ofimportant legal aspects ofthe Tanker War
and projections for the future are useful here.
Part A. Self-Defense, Charter Law and Neutrality Issues 1
After the Nicaragua Case and its applying customary law alongside the Charter,
which is a treaty (albeit the most important of the post-World War II agreements
because of its Article 103 trumping provision for other treaties and the possibility
that parts of it may now have;ws cogens status), a principal issue arising from the
war is the definition and scope of the right of self-defense. First, it is arguable, fol-
lowing the Case, that a parallel customary law of self-defense travels alongside
Charter-based principles deriving from Article 5 1 . Second, this customary right of
self-defense may be different in content and scope from Charter-based norms and
therefore subject to the balancing of sources oflaw usually employed in determin-
ing norms to be applied in a situation. Third, if the right of self-defense is a jus
cogens norm, as some claim, it has priority over all other rules (custom, treaties,
general principles, etc.) except otherjus cogens norms, e.g., the law under the Char-
ter, Article 2(4). (If self-defense is ajus cogens norm, it must be balanced with other
jus cogens norms, e.g., those under Article 2(4).)
The Tanker War did not resolve these issues. Indeed, belligerents' claims and
counterclaims of aggression at the beginning of the war left neutrals in a legal
quandary, if one subscribes to a view, characterized as nonbelligerency during
1939-41 when the United States was officially neutral, that under the Charter
States may aid victims ofaggression. Unlike the 1990-91 Coalition buildup against
Iraq where Iraqi aggression was blatant, the 1980-88 war's record is far from clear.
However, practice since 1945 seems to point to a right ofcountries to aid victims of
aggression, the position of the International Law Association's Budapest Articles
interpretation of the Pact of Paris (1928), still in force for the United States and
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many countries when treaty succession principles are considered. The Pact con-
demns the use of war as an instrument of national policy, subject to the inherent
right of self-defense. The Falklands/Malvinas War is an example of aggression
and neutrals' response to aid a target of aggression, the United Kingdom.
The Tanker War supplies several examples of informal collective self-defense,
which continues to exist during the Charter era as a valid response, provided ade-
quate notice of actions is given. Unlike the 1990-91 conflict, where the United
States had self-defense agreements with Kuwait and perhaps other Gulf countries
and the possibility of multilateral NATO involvement if Iraq had moved against
Turkey to the north, there was no formal treaty arrangement proclaiming a right of
collective self-defense like the soon to be defunct Warsaw Pact, theNATO treaties,
or bilateral agreements the United States and many nations have negotiated since
World War II. To be sure, the GCC pledged collective action in many respects, but
it does not have a formal statement of collective self-defense. Nevertheless, it may
be argued that the GCC engaged in informal collective self-defense actions among
its members during the Tanker War.
Neutrals' cooperating to clear the Gulf of mines, and the Red Sea in the case of
the 1984 Libyan mining, are other examples ofinformal collective self-defense. In-
sofar as the record indicates, there were no formal treaties proclaiming self-defense
arrangements among Gulf and other States for this and similar purposes. Never-
theless, when these countries worked together to clear the seas ofmines, they were
in effect acting collectively to defend coastal States' shores, and countries' mer-
chant shipping plying these waters, from the potential for mine attack.
The same might be said for cooperation to protect neutral shipping from
belligerents' air and warship attacks. The US declaration that it would extend pro-
tection to foreign-flag neutral merchant ships not carrying goods destined for a
belligerent, upon that neutral's request, was a third example ofinformal collective
self-defense. The United States had a right to defend US-flag merchant ships un-
der longstanding rules of international law; this included its right to defend Ku-
waiti tankers reflagged under US law and the LOS. However, in those situations
only US flagged vessels were involved; issues of collective self-defense, formal
through treaty or informal through other arrangements, did not arise. When the
United States published its policy of defending foreign-flag ships upon request, it
legitimately acted under a right of informal self-defense as long as the policy was
published, was clear, and did not otherwise violate Charter principles, e.g., aiding
an aggressor.
Belligerents' attacks on neutral territories, including oil production or pump-
ing facilities, were violations ofArticle 2(4), and could have triggered a right of in-
dividual or collective self-defense. The same could be said about belligerents'
attacks on neutral flag shipping where there were no LOAC violations (e.g., fleeing
legitimate belligerent attempts to exercise visit and search).
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The United States claimed rights ofself-defense in its responses to attacks on its
warships and US-flag merchant ships. In most cases these responses were reactive
in nature, i.e., coming after a belligerent's attack. In some cases a response came
while a belligerent was attacking or threatening attack; this invoked anticipatory
self-defense issues. Commentators agree that self-defense responses, whether reac-
tive or anticipatory, must be necessary and proportional under the circumstances.
Commentators disagree on whether a right ofanticipatory self-defense, which ap-
pends a requirement of no other alternative besides the response, exists in the
Charter era. Given the nature of modern weaponry and its delivery systems, it
would seem that a right of anticipatory self-defense, whether delivered individu-
ally by a State or collectively by countries acting in formal concert (i.e., pursuant to
treaty) or informally, is admissible during the Charter era. To repeat: This right of
anticipatory self-defense is subject to limitations, e.g., necessity, proportionality,
admitting of no other alternative, and prior consultation (perhaps agreed in ad-
vance) for collective response. Responding States are bound by what their leader-
ship knows, or would be reasonably expected to know, at the time of decision.
Necessity and proportionality principles for self-defense responses may be, but are
not necessarily, the same as those to be observed during LOAC situations. For ex-
ample, during war belligerents may attack any legitimate military target (e.g., an
enemy warship far from a war operations area), while self-defense proportionality
may dictate a different rule (e.g., a warship far from an area of attack invoking a
self-defense response may or may not be a proper target under self-defense propor-
tionality principles). Although under the majority view the right of reprisal
through use of force in peacetime is no longer an option in the Charter era, coun-
tries may respond through nonforce reprisals (proportional acts that are unlawful,
e.g., trade sanctions in violation of trade treaties, seeking to compel an offender to
observe the law) or retorsions (unfriendly acts, e.g., naval forces operating on the
high seas offa State's coasts). There is nothing in the US actions during the Tanker
War to indicate that it violated principles of necessity and proportionality, or that
there were viable alternative actions the United States could have taken in antici-
patory self-defense situations, during the Tanker War, based on what the United
States or its military commanders knew at the time of response. This is why, e.g.,
the Airbus response was legitimate; based on what the Vincennes commanding offi-
cer knew at the time, he thought an attack was coming from an Iranian fighter. The
response was necessary, proportional and admitting of no other alternative,
thereby meeting the Caroline Case criteria, from what the commander then knew.
It was a tragic mistake for which the United States paid compensation while not
admitting liability.
In terms ofUN Security Council lawmaking, i.e., Council decisions binding as
law on UN Members through Charter Articles 25 and 48, there were none that af-
fected the war at sea. However, the Council's increasing interest in and resolutions
Conclusions and Appraisal 609
on the war was apparent. The Council passed Resolutions 540 and 552, confirming
as a matter of supportive "soft law," rights of freedom of navigation and access to
neutral ports. Resolution 598 (1987), the basis for the 1988 ceasefire, was the first
Council resolution specifically referring to a breach ofthe peace and Articles 39-40
of Chapter VII of the Charter.
The Tanker War also illustrates the relationship between rules of engagement
and the law of self-defense. US ROE, then and now, instruct commanders that re-
gardless of options listed in the rules, the first duty is defense of the command or
unit. This is coincident with the law of self-defense in the Charter era. ROE may
give options that may be more restrictive than what international law might per-
mit in a given situation.
Part B. The Law of the Sea and the Tanker War
The Tanker War illustrated two fundamental principles applicable to armed
conflict and the LOS: (1) the primacy of self-defense over norms in the LOS con-
ventions; (2) the LOS, whether stated in treaties or customary law, is subject to
other rules ofinternational law, i.e., the LOAC, in situations involving armed con-
flict at sea.
As to specific LOS issues, Security Council Resolutions 540 and 552 and neu-
trals' protests and actions confirmed customary high seas freedoms and entry into
neutral ports. The right of neutrals, including neutral warships, to unimpeded
straits passage, i.e., through the Strait of Hormuz, was also confirmed.
The straits passage controversy is but one more argument for ratifying the 1982
LOS Convention by major maritime powers, e.g., the United States. Others on the
periphery of the war include strengthening customary warship immunity rules,
for which there is a gap in the 1958 LOS conventions; standards for warship inno-
cent passage in the territorial sea; maritime environmental standards; and rules
delimiting ocean areas like the EEZ, continental shelf, contiguous zone and terri-
torial sea.
Although more ofan issue ofadmiralty and maritime law and only indirectly an
LOS issue, the war demonstrated the relationship ofnational decisionmaking, and
perhaps decisions at international levels, with private interests, e.g., seafarers and
their unions and the complicated web of parties (vessel owners, charterers,
subcharterers, cargo interests, marine insurance) engaged in ocean trade, whether
in war or peace. Arms suppliers might operate contrary to national policies, or per-
haps with overt or covert governmental assistance.
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Part C. The Tanker War and the Law of Armed Conflict
The Tanker War raised many issues relevant to modern warfare at sea. While
Parts V.A-V.J analyze these in more detail, this Part offers summaries ofimportant
points.
1. Basic Principles: Necessity and Proportionality; ROE;
the Spatial Dimension.
The general factual record is not clear as to whether the belligerents generally
observed LOAC principles of necessity, proportionality and distinction in attacks
during the Tanker War, based on information they had or should have had when
deciding on attacks. However, it is reasonably certain that these principles were
not observed in specific situations, e.g., mine warfare, discussed below and in Parts
V.B-V.I.
The war is an example of the difference between necessity, proportionality, etc.,
principles that must be observed under the LOAC and principles employing the
same names, e.g., necessity and proportionality, that must be observed in self-de-
fense responses. What is necessary and proportional in a self-defense response, and
what is necessary and proportional under the LOAC, may be entirely different.
The United States observed these principles in its self-defense responses where its
warships and military aircraft were under attack, or were reasonably believed to be
under attack, and in its responses to attacks on merchant shipping. Whether these
responses would have met LOAC standards, or whether a different and greater or
lesser response would have been in order if the United States had been at war with
Iran or Iraq, would have required different analysis. For example, the United
States responded proportionally in self-defense in shooting to destroy Iranian na-
val vessels and platforms attacking it. The United States would not have been re-
quired to wait for an Iranian attack, or threat of attack under anticipatory
self-defense principles, if the United States had been at war with that country.
The war also demonstrates differences in ocean spatial dimensions under the
LOAC and the LOS. The LOAC recognizes only two divisions ofocean areas: the
high seas and territorial waters, today equated to the territorial sea. The LOAC
also differentiates between belligerents' territorial seas and territorial seas ofneu-
trals, while the LOS has no similar differentiation. A belligerent may wage war,
subject to other LOAC principles (e.g., rights of neutrals, principles of humanity,
etc.) on the high seas, in its territorial waters, in its allies' territorial waters and in
enemy territorial waters. It may not wage war in neutral territorial waters. To do so
violates the LOAC. It is also a violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter, if directed
against the neutral coastal State, and would therefore be subject to that State's right
to exercise individual and collective self-defense. It would also be a violation of
LOS innocent passage rules. Thus belligerents' attacks on neutrals' coastal
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installations during the Tanker War was an LOAC violation, an LOS violation to
the extent that belligerents did not exercise innocent passage rules or overflew
neutral territorial waters without coastal State permission, and a violation of the
Charter.
The LOAC and Charter law are not the same in this context, either. For exam-
ple, a belligerent may attack an enemy ship, e.g., a submarine, lurking in neutral
territorial seas where that neutral either cannot or will not cause the submarine to
leave under the LOAC, under principles of necessity. A neutral could not attack
that submarine unless threatened by it under principles of self-defense, and the
standards for either attack might be the same or different. No such incidents oc-
curred during the Tanker War, however, but this again illustrates the point of the
difference between self-defense principles and LOAC principles. Nor are the LOS
and the LOAC necessarily the same under the circumstances. For example, neu-
tral warships are subject to the LOS innocent passage regime for territorial sea pas-
sage, while belligerents' warships are subject, under special LOAC rules applicable
to them through the LOS other rules principle, to the LOAC during war. If a bel-
ligerent's warship within neutral territorial waters and subject to the LOAC for
such passage threatens or attacks a coastal State, that coastal State has inherent
rights of individual or collective self-defense besides rights it might have under
the LOAC governing belligerent warship passage. Conversely, the warship retains
its rights of individual and collective self-defense. The same is true for neutral
warships legitimately exercising LOS rights of innocent passage. If a warship
transiting under innocent passage rules attacks or threatens a coastal State, that
State may respond in self-defense in addition to whatever claims it might have un-
der the LOS. Conversely, the warship retains its rights ofindividual and collective
self-defense.
As noted above, LOS divisions of the sea (e.g., high seas fishing areas, EEZs,
continental shelf waters, contiguous zones, or the Area) are high seas areas for
LOAC purposes. Robertson advanced a view, which theSan Remo Manual accepts,
that belligerents must observe due regard for neutrals' rights in these areas, includ-
ing neutrals' high seas rights of, e.g., freedom ofnavigation and overflight, pipeline
and cable laying, etc., so long as there is no positive LOAC rule governing a situa-
tion. LOS high seas freedoms definitions of ocean areas, e.g., of the EEZ, may be
used in LOAC situations as rules for belligerent operations, but the two need not
coincide. Where they do, there may be confusion as the sometimes muddled
claims of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War demonstrate. Thus it was proper for
Iran and Iraq to declare maritime exclusion zones, analyzed under the name ofwar
zones in this volume, whose boundaries sometimes coincided with LOS lines, as in
the case of Iranian territorial sea claims, and sometimes stretched over the high
seas far beyond belligerents' EEZ claims. Whether use of these zones was lawful
during the war is a different story, however.
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The war also raised issues of neutrals' straits passage rights during war. As Part
IV.B.6 demonstrates, the LOS recognizes many varieties of international straits,
depending on special treaty regimes in a few cases and geographic or LOS consid-
erations, e.g., whether a strait connects two high seas areas or otherwise, in other
situations. The Strait ofHormuz, one of the Earth's great sea transportation arter-
ies, or choke points in geopolitical terms, may have been a high seas passage strait
when the war began in 1980 and a three-mile territorial sea limit, although waning
as a customary norm, was in force for many countries including the United States.
As such, Iran had no right to close the strait, any more than it had a right to close
high seas areas for other than limited times incident to belligerent naval opera-
tions. By the war's end, however, it was reasonably clear that coastal States could
validly claim 1 2-mile territorial seas, the result being that except for perhaps a nar-
row sliver ofhigh seas, unusable for navigation ofall shipping but dhows, the Strait
was governed by the 1982 LOS Convention transit passage regime as a matter of
customary law. States' continued protests over perceived Iranian threats to close
the Strait, and the majority view of commentators since 1980, combine to declare
that no belligerent may close international straits like Hormuz to neutral
shipping.
... 12
2. Visit and Search; Capture, Destruction or Diversion.
Iran conducted visit and search operations involving neutral merchant ships it
suspected ofcarrying goods to Iraq to sustain its war-fighting or war-sustaining ef-
fort. Iran was within its rights to conduct these operations, but attacking neutral
merchantmen incident to otherwise lawful visit and search was inadmissible un-
less the merchant ships were attempting to evade visit and search. Iran could em-
ploy military aircraft for these operations, but these aircraft could not attack
neutral merchantmen involved in visit and search operations unless these vessels
were attempting to escape. Both belligerents legitimately flew aircraft over the
Gulffor general surveillance as a high seas freedom, but these aircraft could not in-
discriminately attack neutral merchantmen. The Tanker War strengthened the
principle that belligerents may use military aircraft, including helicopters, in ad-
dition to warships for visit and search operations.
The United States and other neutrals were within their rights to convoy, es-
cort or accompany neutral merchant ships that did not carry goods sustaining
belligerents' war efforts. A neutral could convoy, escort or accompany a merchant-
man flying that neutral's flag, and that neutral could convoy, escort or accompany
merchant vessels with other neutrals' registry if the two States agreed on this pro-
cedure. Belligerents' attacks on these formations could be met by self-defense re-
sponses. Neutrals could clear mines belligerents laid indiscriminately on the high
seas, particularly those laid in shipping lanes, also under self-defense principles.
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3. Belligerents 3 Seaborne Commerce; Belligerents 3 Convoys.
Apparently the belligerents did not attack platforms the LOAC exempts as tar-
gets unless they contribute to the enemy war effort, e.g., hospital ships or civil air-
liners. On the other hand, Iran and Iraq did not always discriminate between
merchant ships carrying war-fighting or war-sustaining cargo for the enemy under
enemy flags and innocent merchantmen with other cargoes. While it was lawful
for Iraq to attack merchantmen, regardless of flag, under Iranian military convoy,
it was not lawful for Iran or Iraq to attack independently-steaming merchantmen
bound for neutral ports and not carrying goods for the enemy war effort. It was also
not lawful for Iran to attack neutral flag merchant ships accompanied, escorted or
convoyed by neutral warships.
As noted in Part C.l, it is also questionable whether Iranian and Iraqi attacks
were necessary and proportional when visit, search and diversion were options,
and whether under the circumstances belligerents observed humanitarian law
standards in caring for merchant ship survivors after attacks, particularly in the
case of Iranian surface ship actions.
Neutral-flag warships could respond in self-defense to belligerents' attacks on
merchant ships flying their flag, and to attacks on other neutrals' merchant ships if
the flag State requested protection. Although these responses were governed by
the law of self-defense and not the LOAC, LOAC and LOS principles for succor-
ing survivors applied in these situations, even though necessity and proportional-
ity principles might have been different from LOAC standards for responses to
these attacks. The same principles applied to what were perceived to be bel-
ligerents' attacks, or threats of attack, on neutral warships. There is no evidence
that neutrals' responses were other than necessary and proportional, or admitting
ofno other alternative in the case of anticipatory self-defense, or that neutrals did
not apply humanitarian standards after responding.
4. Neutral Flag Merchantmen: Enemy Character; Reflagging; Contraband.
Neutral flag merchantmen that Iran convoyed down its coasts acquired enemy
character by being convoyed. War-fighting or war-sustaining goods aboard neu-
tral flag merchant ships preceding to or from belligerents' ports and under bellig-
erent direction or control would also have resulted in characterization as flying an
enemy flag and therefore being subject to belligerents' attack and destruction be-
sides liability to visit, search, diversion and condemnation as prize. On the other
hand, goods destined to or from neutral ports, invoiced under other than a bellig-
erent's title, did not give a neutral flag merchant ship enemy character. These ves-
sels were not subject to attack on this account.
During the war neutral States' merchantmen were reflagged under US or other
registry. Besides qualifying as neutral flag merchant ships under the LOS, under
the LOAC these vessels were considered as flying a neutral flag. Unless, e.g., they
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carried war-fighting or war-sustaining goods destined to or from a belligerent port
while under belligerent direction or attempted to evade legitimate visit and search,
they were not subject to attack on this account.
The law ofcontraband did not impact the war; it could have applied only to in-
bound cargoes destined for a belligerent. Therefore, this law did not apply to out-
bound shipments, nor did it apply to pipeline shipments to neutrals, even though
there may have been later transshipment to neutral flag ships for sealift. The law of
contraband could not have applied until 1988, when Iran published a list; contra-
band lists must be published before the law ofcontraband may be applied. That list
comported generally with modern principles, allowing diversion and prize court
condemnation of ships carrying war-fighting or war-sustaining cargoes destined
to or from an enemy, instead of high seas seizure and later condemnation before a
prize court, or current concepts ofcontraband, which tend to ignore publication of
lists of absolute or conditional contraband and which only list goods not consid-
ered contraband, i.e., free goods, or humanitarian cargoes. Although systems like
navicerts or clearcerts have been used during the Charter era, e.g., during the 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis, there is no evidence ofemployment ofthis option during the
war.
5. The Law ofBlockade and the Tanker War.
There is no formal record of either belligerent's declaring a blockade, although
commentators loosely mentioned blockade in their accounts, as similar sources
would during the 1990-91 GulfWar. Even ifthese commentators reflected govern-
ment sources, neither belligerent observed well-established rules for blockades,
which must be noticed, be definite in area, and state a time when a blockade begins
and a grace period for neutral ships to leave a blockaded area. It is doubtful whether
Iraq could have maintained an effective blockade, since it had no appreciable naval
assets to conduct one; paper blockades have been unlawful since the 1856 Paris
Declaration. Although Iraq might have declared a blockade to be enforced by air-
craft, provided those aircraft could have functioned as surface ships do in block-
ade, e.g., communicating with merchant ships, diverting them as appropriate, or
boarding them for visit and search, Iraq did not declare such a blockade. Iran's at-
tempts to inhibit Kuwait or Saudi Arabia-bound merchant traffic by mining, war-
ships or aircraft attacks could not have been characterized as a blockade; the
LOAC does not permit blockades ofneutral coasts. Thus theUN Security Council
was fully justified in condemning this action in Resolution 552, in addition to the
Resolution's explicit invocation ofLOS principles offreedom of the seas and free-
dom to enter neutral ports.
Iraq refused to allow passage oftrapped merchant ships out ofthe Shatt al-Arab
at the beginning ofthe war. If it had done so, this would have been permissible as a
Conclusions and Appraisal 615
matter ofinternational law by analogy to cartel ships passing through blockade, ifa
legitimate blockade of nearby high seas areas had been declared.
6. Zones: Excluding Shipping, AircraftfromArea ofBelligerents yNaval Operations;
High Seas Defense Zones; War Zones; Air Defense Identification Zones; Ocean
Zones Createdfor Humanitarian Law Purposes.
Although customary law, recently confirmed in publications like the San Remo
Manual andNWP 1-14M, allows belligerents to exclude neutral shipping and air-
craft from an immediate area ofbelligerent naval operations, there is no record of
this during the Tanker War.
The United States published warnings of risk of self-defense responses if ship-
ping or aircraft came within stated ranges ofUS forces operating in international
waters. Although proclaiming these self-defense zones (SDZs) was admissible,
there is no obligation to publish them. They are like warnings, usually published
in NOTAMs and NOTMARs, that States may legitimately publish for peacetime
naval maneuvers, which Iran published during the Tanker War for this purpose.
States may use the seas beyond territorial waters for naval maneuvers ifthey have
due regard for others' high seas/EEZ uses, i.e., freedoms of navigation and over-
flight. States conducting peacetime high seas naval maneuvers may not exclude
other shipping and aircraft from the areas ofthese maneuvers as they can for bellig-
erent naval operations during war. If there is a belligerent naval operation during
war that includes what would usually be considered peacetime naval operations,
e.g., high seas refueling in the course ofwar measures against an enemy, the right of
exclusion applies to the ocean area(s) affected insofar as the areas and times for the
operations coincide. States also have a right ofself-defense at sea, for which an SDZ
warning is notice. Exercise ofself-defense does not require an SDZ notice as a pre-
requisite. A State's ROE or other national rules, perhaps stated in operation orders
or plans, may require it, but this would be a national policy or national law require-
ment and not a rule of international law.
The belligerents published war zone notices. Although these zones were not
"paper" zones, were reasonable in geographic scope and gave notice of times ofap-
plication, they could not be used to justify free-fire on all shipping in these areas. If
not a paper zone, (i.e., a zone that a State proclaims when that State has insufficient
military assets to enforce the zone) and if noticed with stated times of application
and if reasonable in geographic scope under the circumstances, a war zone may be
proclaimed under the LOAC. LOAC principles, e.g., rules for visit and search, ap-
ply within the zone. States proclaiming a zone must have due regard for neutrals'
LOS rights, e.g., offreedom ofnavigation and overflight, and must have due regard
for the maritime environment, within the zone. Neutrals' rights to respond in in-
dividual and collective self-defense also apply within a zone. Belligerents also have
self-defense rights against neutral States within a zone.
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Saudi Arabia proclaimed an ADIZ over the Gulf during the war; it was within
its rights under international law to do so. Actions against intruding aircraft were
governed by the law of self-defense, i.e., responses had to be necessary and propor-
tional, and in the case of anticipatory self-defense, admitting of no other alterna-
tive, under the circumstances of each situation, based on what the responsible
commander, which might have been a single aviator in the case ofsolo flights to in-
vestigate an intruder, knew or should have known at the time.
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7. Weapons and Weapons Use; Mine Warfare.
There were two principal issues connected with weapons and weapons use dur-
ing the Tanker War; shore bombardment from the sea and mine warfare at sea. Al-
though Iraq used poison gas against its opponent in the land war during 1980-88,
there is no record of its use in the sea war. Intermediate range ballistic missiles
were employed during the War ofthe Cities, but these were land-launched and hit
land-based targets, an issue outside the scope of this volume.
There were attacks delivered from over the sea against land-oriented targets,
e.g., belligerents' strikes against oil platforms in enemy territorial seas and other
offshore zones and shore facilities. Shore-based aircraft, perhaps flying over the
Gulf, and perhaps belligerents' naval assets, delivered these attacks. The record is
not clear as to the lawfulness ofthese operations in terms ofcompliance with rules
for naval bombardment from the sea or air. Whether notice if appropriate was
given; whether Hague IX and Hague Air Rules standards, articulating general ne-
cessity and proportionality standards; whether civilian objects or historical, artis-
tic, scientific or hospital sites were involved; whether belligerents attacked areas
where the civil population was concentrated; whether attacks were designed to
and did terrorize the civil population; or whether attacks followed general LOAC
principles of necessity and proportionality; is not clear from the available evi-
dence. If the nature of attacks on Gulf shipping or the War of the Cities and other
land-based aspects ofthe war are indicators, there is a high likelihood that some or
all ofthese principles were at issue, and that there were LOAC violations. It is quite
likely, e.g., that general principles of necessity and proportionality were violated,
an example being the result of attacks on Iran's Nowruz facility in 1983, resulting
in a large oil spill into the Gulf. We do not know with certainty, from the available
record, whether and when LOAC violations occurred. These principles for shore
bombardment, whether from aircraft or warships, applied to the Tanker War,
however. Possible charges ofLOAC violations are not proven in most cases.
The record ofmine warfare during the war is better documented. In unleashing
what was in some cases unrestricted mine warfare, e.g., employing mines that did
not deactivate after becoming unmoored or laying mines in neutral shipping lanes
and perhaps neutrals' territorial waters, the belligerents violated general LOAC
principles of discrimination, necessity and proportionality. Failure to publish
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minefield locations or to give alternative routes around a minefield were also
LOAC violations, as was Iran's laying mines off neutral coasts solely to intercept
shipping. Iran's mining the Strait ofHormuz in an attempt to deny international
18
straits passage to neutral vessels also violated the LOAC.
During the war neutral navies engaged in mine countermeasures. International
law permitted sweeping of unlawfully laid mines in international waters, and in
neutrals' territorial seas with approval of the neutral coastal State. The law of
19
self-defense also authorized these actions.
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8. Other Humanitarian Law Issues.
Parts V.A-V.G and VII.C.1-VII.C.7 have analyzed LOAC questions that arose,
or may have arisen, during the Tanker War. There were also humanitarian law is-
sues related to merchant ship crews trapped in the Shatt al-Arab in 1980, rescuing
those in peril on the sea, and neutral repatriations of belligerent armed forces
members.
Ifcrew stranded in the Shatt al-Arab were aboard vessels that had not acquired
enemy character, they were protected persons under the Fourth Convention and
were entitled to be returned home promptly. If aboard vessels that had acquired
enemy character, they had prisoner of war status. However, these PW mariners
were entitled to repatriation at cessation of hostilities in 1988, and not 10 years
later, when many PW's were repatriated. If seriously ill or wounded, they should
have been repatriated long before 1998. Ifinternees under the Fourth Convention,
they should have been returned at the end of hostilities.
US forces rescued surviving crew ofthe minelayer Iran Ajr after the US self-de-
fense response. These crew members and remains ofdead crew were turned over to
Omani Red Crescent officials, who repatriated them to Iran. The United States
also picked up Iranian Revolutionary Guards boat crew members after they went
overboard during another US self-defense response. Two died aboard US Navy
ships; the remains and the survivors were turned over to Omani Red Crescent offi-
cials,who sent them to Iran. After theUS self-defense response against the Rostum
oil platforms, Iranian tugs were allowed to pick up survivors. As a technical matter,
the law of self-defense covered these situations, but the United States acted prop-
erly, following LOAC principles in rescuing survivors, or allowing them to be res-
cued. To the extent that other mariners were in peril after other self-defense
responses, e.g., the US response to Iranian warship attacks, the same principles
applied.
These situations might be contrasted with a US rescue of an Iraqi pilot whose
plane was shot down by an Iranian air-to-air missile; the basic rule of assisting
those in peril on the sea, common to the LOS and the LOAC, applied. (The United
States turned the pilot over to Saudi Arabian Red Crescent officials, who repatri-
ated him to Iraq.) The same principles applied in other rescues of merchant
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mariners in peril after belligerents' attacks on merchant ships; there is no positive
record ofthis, but LOS and LOAC principles applied to these situations as well.
Although under humanitarian law the neutral Red Crescent officials ofOman
and Saudi Arabia should have detained the Iranian crews and the Iraqi pilot until
the end ofhostilities, the opposing belligerents did not protest any ofthese actions.
Therefore, it can be argued that the opposing belligerent acquiesced in their pre-
mature repatriation.
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9. Deception DuringArmed Conflict at Sea: Ruses and Perfidy.
There are no reported ruses ofwar, lawful or unlawful, adopted by belligerents
during the war. There are no reports ofperfidious conduct. Other neutrals' actions
may have been deceptive in nature, but they could not be considered ruses, since
neutrals employed them. These included warships' painting pendent numbers
black instead of white on black in the case of US warships to minimize reflective
surfaces attractive to missiles. As long as a warship displays its pendent number,
the LOAC is indifferent to its coloration. The same is true of nonreflective paint
for general hull coating or hull configuration to make the vessel relatively invisible
to missile radar, or emission control to minimize electronic radiations that might
attract missiles or invite attack.
Although there were situations where ships might have flown flags other than
those of their registry States (the proposal to use the UN or ICRC ensign to extract
merchantmen trapped in the Shatt early in the war, and the proposal late in the war
for a UN flotilla), these possibilities did not come to fruition. False flags issues
therefore did not arise.
No perfidy issues arose when merchantmen began tailing neutral naval convoys
or simulating convoys during the night. This might have put the neutrals at
greater risk. However, since they were neutral flagged, and perfidy applies to
belligerents' conduct, no perfidy issue arose. Similarly, neutral merchant vessels
that were painted grey like warships did not raise a problem of perfidy.
Part D. The Tanker War and the Law of the Maritime Environment22
The Tanker War's impact on the Gulfmaritime environment is less than clear.
The only recorded major environmental disaster occurred when Iraq attacked
Iran's Nowruz offshore oil installations in 1983. Even if it could be argued that the
Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol did not apply between the parties be-
cause of law of treaties principles like suspension or termination during war, the
law oftreaties says that the Convention and Protocol continued to govern relations
between belligerents and neutrals unless suspended or ended under theories ofim-
23
possibility of performance or fundamental change of circumstances. However,
there were necessarily petroleum spills from vessels' bunkers or tankers split open
or sunk by belligerents' attacks or during neutrals' self-defense responses. Thus,
Conclusions and Appraisal 619
although Chapter VI is largely theoretical when applied to the Tanker War, as me-
dia coverage of Iraq's outrageous and unlawful behavior during the 1990-91 Gulf
War demonstrated, environmental issues are likely to arise and become major con-
siderations in future conflicts.
The law of the environment as expressed in regional agreements, e.g., the Ku-
wait Convention and Protocol, is subject to important qualifications. First, these
treaties, like all international agreements, are subject to the Charter and its princi-
ples, e.g., the right ofself-defense. Second, regional agreements cannot be incon-
25
sistent with general LOS Convention standards. Third, like general LOS
principles affecting navigation, etc., they are subject, through the LOS Conven-
tions' restatement ofthe other rules principle, to the LOAC in certain situations.
Fourth, any treaty-based norms must be balanced against other sources, e.g., cus-
27
torn. Fifth, any attempt to declare the right to a clean, healthful environment as a
human right is subject to the human rights conventions' derogation clauses and to
general law oftreaties provisions dealing with LOAC situations, e.g., impossibility
of performance, fundamental change of circumstances, and the impact of armed
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conflict on treaty obligations.
Although there is little positive law governing environmental protection dur-
ing war, many LOAC norms offer incidental but important protection to the envi-
ronment if observed. These include rules, many of which are also customary
norms, stated in, e.g., the 1907 Hague Conventions, the Hague Air Rules, the
Geneva Gas Protocol, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, cultural property treaties like
the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, ENMOD, Protocol I to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, and the Conventional Weapons Convention and its proto-
cols. Although these treaties are often site, object or warfare method specific, many
(e.g., Hague IX, Protocol I, Conventional Weapons Convention) restate customary
rules applying to all warfare, e.g., military objective, necessity, proportionality and
limiting actors' liability to what they knew or should have known when they di-
rected an attack. There seems to be no need for international agreements to govern
environmental protections during naval warfare.
Modern military manuals analyzing the place of the LOS and environmental
considerations during war at sea say due regard should be paid to neutrals' LOS
rights and obligations and to the environment without specifying whether there
should be one or two due regard applications, i.e., one governing LOS obligations
and another for the environment, or a single due regard analysis taking into ac-
count LOS and environmental policies and law. In some cases there is no clear
statement ofthe place ofpositive rules oflaw, e.g., in treaties governing the LOAC,
in connection with environmental protection. As Robertson persuasively argues,
the first step is to apply positive rules; if there are none, a due regard principle
should govern for environmental considerations. Chapter VI advocates a single due
regard principle, taking into account LOS issues and environmental principles. A
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single due regard principle, not necessarily the same one as in LOAC situations,
should also apply in self-defense situations where LOS and/or environmental con-
siderations are at issue. Chapter VI also offers a factorial analysis for defining due
regard.
Part E. Projections for the Future
With the USSR's demise and the breakup of other countries, e.g., Czechoslova-
kia and Yugoslavia incident to the end of the Cold War, many trends portend for
the future ofarmed conflict situations at sea and the law governing them. As Chap-
ters II-VI demonstrate and McDougal and his associates have theorized, the law
governing these situations is interactive with many factors, including values at
stake; participants with different and perhaps multiple perceptions that range
from the individual to the intergovernmental organization; situations that in-
clude time, geography, the degree oforganization, and relative crisis level; what as-
sets can be brought to bear on a situation; coercive or persuasive strategies that
include military force, diplomacy, ideology, or financial strength; short-range out-
comes and long-range effects to be achieved, after which goals should be clarified,
past trends described, conditions affecting those trends evaluated, future trends
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predicted, and policy alternatives at that point reviewed. This multifactor analy-
sis should be no stranger to national or international planners or defense analysts,
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who have used variants for years. Part E. 1 discusses some geopolitical and other
trends emerging during the Tanker War; Part E.2 follows with trends in the law re-
lated to them.
/. Geopolitical and Other Trends Emerging During the Tanker War.
The separatist disintegration of the USSR into Russia and the USSR's compo-
nent republics, and a possibility offurther spinoffs from Russia, today a federation
of semiautonomous areas, and dismemberment of Yugoslavia and Czechoslova-
kia, have been echoed in other countries. These include, e.g., Canada (the Quebec
separatist movement, establishment of a separate Inuit province), China (Tibet),
India and Pakistan (the festering Kashmir dispute), Indonesia (East Timor and
other parts of that archipelago), Iraq and Turkey (Kurds), Italy (tensions between
northern and southern Italian cultures), Mexico (native Americans in southern
Mexico), Spain (Basque areas), the United Kingdom (separate legislatures in Scot-
land and Wales) and all across Africa, where colonial boundaries often divide terri-
tories in which native populations of sometimes very different ethnic origins live
on different sides of lines. Ifthe end ofthe Cold War ended fears of Soviet domi-
nance and a perceived need for association with the United States while remaining
a cohesive State or nonalignment but with a cohesive facade for possible unified
opposition to the USSR in the case ofYugoslavia and maybe other countries, and if
Soviet dominance, now removed, has been a catalyst for expressing pent-up desires
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for separation (the case ofthe USSR itself, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia), the re-
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suit in some areas has been clustering around other ideologies, e.g., tribalism,
messianic and sometimes fanatic or fundamental religion (a factor in the 1980-88
Iran-Iraq war ), or political separatism, which continues to bedevil Russia today,
even after the breakup of the Soviet Union.
On the other hand, Europe, including countries beset with internal separatist
movements {e.g., Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom) has been moving through the
European Union toward greater economic and political integration that may pre-
vent international wars that have ravaged it during the Twentieth Century. In
the Western Hemisphere the United States, emerging in political, economic and
military strength as the only superpower, has joined its neighbors in the North
American Free Trade Agreement, a northern hemisphere free trade zone with a
promise ofdeveloping even stronger economies for its members and a potential for
expansion to Central and South America. The Arab League remains a potential
force for cohesive action, as does the GCC, formed during the Tanker War.
Today the United Nations has over 180 Members, virtually all countries on
Earth except Switzerland. If it is too early today to determine whether the United
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Nations, acting through Security Council decisions to maintain international
peace and security, the ColdWar era ( 1947-9 1 ), with the risk ofa Permanent Coun-
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cil Member veto, was certainly no measure of the UN's potential. However,
Council resolutions promoting freedom of navigation were a positive indicator of
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the UN's potential for the future.
The result ofthese developments may lie in an even more pluralistic world soci-
ety, in which even the smallest and relatively weakest countries may choose to go
their own way rather than being coerced or guided by the more powerful. Add to
that the possibility ofethnic or religious fanaticism, and the possibility ofnational
decisions not guided by political, economic or legal considerations emerges. And
although certain areas ofthe Earth are relatively stable and prosperous due to eco-
nomic integration (the EU, NAFTA), or are relatively prosperous, e.g., the United
States, budget expenditures for defense, and therefore naval forces, are down
worldwide.
With the Soviet threat gone, a rationale for maintaining large and expensive
armed forces is not as strong for many countries, including the United States. This
comes when the potential for use of armed forces is more multipolar than at any
time since 1945. Many similar situations involving use of forces occurred during
39
the Cold War as before it, but the principal thrust of national policies has
changed dramatically since 1991. One indicator of this has been the US Navy's
"From the Sea" emphasis on littoral warfare as distinguished from a blue water
high seas confrontation with the Soviet Union. One result is that navies may be
called upon to do more with less. The newer and economically weaker States may
decide to employ cheaper weapons, as distinguished from the relatively
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sophisticated (and expensive) weaponry that nations like the United States have.
The United States and other major naval powers will be called on to counter these
threats as well as more sophisticated weaponry, including adversaries' use of the
Internet
42
The beginnings of this were apparent during the Tanker War.
Although the mechanisms for formal collective enforcement of the peace were
available from 1980 through 1988, ending the war was as much a result of the
belligerents' mutual exhaustion as any outside pressure. The European Economic
Community, now the EU, and the Group of Seven passed resolutions, but these
were of no effect; there was no legal authority behind them. The GCC was politi-
cally and militarily weak, sometimes divided on which side to support during the
war. The Arab League was similarly divided, at least until the end of the war. Al-
though NATO andWEU countries cooperated with each other and other nations,
including GCC countries, Gulf naval operations were geographically "out ofarea"
for both organizations. In the main the result was individual State action, or infor-
mal cooperation, for or against belligerents, with some countries {e.g., the United
States, the USSR) seemingly tilting either way, depending on circumstances. The
United Nations, with its potential for Security Council action that might have
ended the war sooner, did little until 1987, when Resolution 598, passed under
Chapter VII of the Charter, called upon the belligerents to end the war but did not
decide on action. Given the end of the Warsaw Pact, and the possibility of
flareups around the world where established alliances, e.g., NATO or the Rio Pact,
do not apply, might this be the trend for future crises?
Iranian Islamic fundamentalism was a factor in starting the war in 1980; it may
well have been a factor in prolonging it until that country was totally exhausted in
terms of its economy, national morale and military forces. Planning for suicidal at-
tacks on Gulf shipping apparently was part of Iran's strategy late in the war, and
this factor was echoed in at least neutral responses. The amended US SDZ an-
nouncements for a cordon sanitaire around US forces was one manifestation, and
clearly the reason for the Airbus tragedy lay in US fears of a kamikazi-siyle aerial
crash on a US warship analogous to the Beiruit truck bombing of the Marine bar-
racks in Lebanon. The media carry almost daily accounts of ethnic or reli-
gious-based violence; unquestionably this sort ofadvocacy may influence national
decisionmaking involving future naval wars.
Although the USSR, many European powers and the United States ordered na-
val forces to the Gulfor augmented forces already there, it became apparent that no
single naval power, not even the United States, had the kind of forces to meet all
contingencies. US lack ofmine countermeasures ships and forces and dependence
on Western European navies is one example; acceptance ofUS offers for defense of
other countries' merchantmen is another. Even at the Cold War's height and as the
USSR and its navy and merchant marine began declining, there were not enough
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naval forces available to go around. The same was true for the contemporaneous
Falklands/Malvinas War (1982), when neither belligerent could bring over-
whelming naval force to bear. This might be compared with the Korean War
(1950-53) or the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), where there were plenty of naval as-
sets to prosecute policy.
It is virtually impossible to negotiate a treaty to regulate specific weaponry in an
age ofrapid technological development. At the same time, for those countries with
less robust economies or defense budgets, there is the option of cheaper, often in-
discriminate weapons, e.g. sea mines whose technology may date back 100 years.
For countries, e.g., the United States, with economic potential and industrial bases
for relatively sophisticated and expensive systems, there is the dilemma ofhaving
to meet sophisticated threats while maintaining the capability for countering
more traditional but equally deadly weapons. The close-in rapid fire gun as a final
defense against missile or suicide aircraft attacks on warships is an example ofa re-
sponse to a threat as old as World War IPs kamikazis, where the proximity fuse and
the 3-inch rapid-fire gun responded to these attacks. Lack ofadequate mine coun-
termeasures forces during the Tanker War is an example of the inability of a rela-
tively sophisticated navy to meet and overcome a traditional, one might say
archaic, weapon threat. One further problem for the future might be marrying tra-
ditional technology with inexpensive but sophisticated components, e.g., using
the Internet to trigger traditional devices at great distance and little cost to a coun-
try, either in manufacturing the device or means ofcommunicating it. Fortunately
for neutrals involved in the Tanker War, this variant did not occur.
Another factor that became apparent in the Tanker War was the interest ofpar-
ties other than States or international organizations. These included arms suppli-
ers, seafarers of many nations, their unions, ship owners and others involved in
ocean carriage (charterers, subcharterers, cargo interests, marine insurers), that
might involve still more countries' interests in a conflict. This was really a repeti-
tion ofbehind the scenes situations in earlier conflicts. For example, the US World
War II Lend-Lease program of supplying arms began before Pearl Harbor. The
pattern of parties involved in oceanic cargo transport is nearly the same as it has
been for years, the major changes being the advent of larger and more automated
merchantmen, smaller crews, and a greater use of open registry (flag of conve-
nience) shipping. This trend will continue in the future and may become even
more complicated with the growth of large transnational companies.
2. Developments in the Law: Trends for the Future.
Invoking the inherent right of self-defense, particularly unit and individual
countries' claims for a right of anticipatory self-defense, is more likely in the plu-
ralistic world ofthe next millenium. This is so for several reasons. First, the multi-
lateral and bilateral self-defense alliances developed during the Cold War had a
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goal ofcontaining the potential opponent(s), i.e., the USSR and the Soviet bloc by
NATO, ANZUS, and bilateral treaties like those between Japan and the United
States and Korea and the United States, or their complimentary opposites, the
Warsaw Pact and a web of bilaterals between the USSR and its satellites, the latter
now all defunct. Second, navies the world over are downsizing, in part due to the
Cold War's end and in part because of the spiraling cost of modern naval vessels.
The era oflarge fleet exercises as contemplated during the Cold War may be over.
Naval vessels that remain to patrol the world oceans, and merchant ships as well
for that matter, remain expensive assets. They are also quite vulnerable to attacks,
particularlyby missiles that kill with the first strike. This new technology suggests
that countries are more likely to act preemptively, at displays of hostile intent
rather than hostile acts, to protect these scarce and increasingly valuable naval as-
sets. An increased concern for human life, including the lives ofmilitary personnel
threatened by these kinds of attacks, is also a major factor. As long as principles of
proportionality, necessity and the availability ofno other alternative are observed,
based on information known or what should have been known at the time, coun-
tries may successfully invoke anticipatory self-defense to justify responses in these
situations.
As long as new permanent Security Council Member veto issues do not arise, in-
creased Council lawmaking through its decisions may be the order of the day in
future conflicts, perhaps started with assertions ofthe right ofindividual or collec-
tive self-defense. Whether this will be true is less than clear. An active General As-
sembly, where there is no veto but also no authority to enact positive rules oflaw in
these situations, may contribute to lawmaking through supporting resolutions as-
serting principles of law. The same may be true in other international organiza-
tions, e.g., IMO, a UN specialized agency, and the ICRC, a nongovernmental
organization.
Law of the sea issues will continue to arise. A major contributing factor to this
may be US failure to ratify the 1982 LOS Convention. Although the Convention's
navigational articles largely restate customary norms today, as the United States
delared nearly 20 years ago, custom can change through practice accepted as law.
However, if the LOS Convention becomes a worldwide treaty-based norm as the
1949 Geneva Conventions have for humanitarian law during war, the number of
sources for applying the Convention's terms as law has doubled. And while rati-
fication is not an absolute assurance that the law will not change, since a contrary
custom can develop to outweigh treaty-based norms, the risk of change through
evolving custom may be halved, particularly since many nations stress the impor-
tance of treaties. For issues related to potential naval warfare situations, e.g., war-
ship innocent passage and straits passage, the difference could be critical. This is
particularly true where there is an interface between LOAC standards and LOS
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principles that are relatively hazy because ofthe nature ofcustom in a world ofover
180 countries, most of them with seafaring capability.
If future wars at sea involve ever more sophisticated naval assets opposing so-
phisticated military assets, the result necessarily will be resort to traditional gen-
eral LOAC principles, e.g., target discrimination, military objective, necessity and
proportionality. For these kinds of conflicts, present treaty law or other attempts
to specify particular weapons use under particular circumstances will almost al-
ways be outrun by human inventiveness. The same can be said about wars involv-
ing less sophisticated weapons, whether opposed by technologically advanced
systems or more traditional devices. Some warfare methods, particularly those
that are by nature indiscriminate, e.g., poison gas or bacteriological weapons, are,
will be, and should be, outlawed. Beyond this, however, the law of naval warfare
will remain as it has been for centuries, largely a corpus of custom and general
principles.
The maritime environment will continue to be an important factor in naval
warfare considerations. Although there was one reported environmental catastro-
phe during the Tanker War, the 1983 Nowruz spill, it was the 1990-91 war that re-
sulted in massive destruction ofthe environment at sea, in the air and on the land.
Given greater public awareness through the media and today the Internet, the en-
vironment may become a major force in national and international decision-
making. Here too widespread ratification of the LOS Convention will help; its
comprehensive terms for protection should promote due regard for the maritime
environment, in connection with due regard for neutrals' LOS Convention rights,
by belligerents. Moreover, many LOAC treaties, most ofwhich restate customary
norms, offer protection for the environment if States observe these standards.
3. Final Thoughts.
Future conflicts at sea, like the Tanker War and in reality all wars, are likely to
be multidimensional in terms of participants, levels of participants, organization
ofparticipants, interests ofparticipants (economic or otherwise), relative sophisti-
cation of participants {e.g., in weapons available to them), perspectives of partici-
pants (perhaps based on ethnic or religious persuasions instead of nationalism or
deologies like communism), and factors participants must consider (e.g., Charter
aw, neutrality or shades of it, the general LOS, LOAC principles, the maritime en-
vironment). Despite a growing number of international organizations and new
:ountries which may attempt to harness the worst or best intentions ofhumanity,
he beginning ofthe next millenium may be more pluralistic, more integrated and
t the same time more disintegrated than at any recent time before.
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